Legarza v. Northern Star (Alaska), Inc., No. 3:24-cv-0007-HRH (Feb. 12, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Andre Legarza v. Northern Star (Alaska), Inc.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Alaska (AK)
Court
Alaska Supreme Court
Decided
Feb. 12, 2026
Disposition
Dismissed
ANDRE LEGARZA, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN STAR (ALASKA),..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 396509Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Alaska.ANDRE LEGARZA, Plaintiff,v.NORTHERN STAR (ALASKA), INC., d/b/aNORTHERN STAR RESOURCES, LTD., Defendant.Case No. 3:24-cv-0007-HRH|Filed 02/12/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsIsaac D. Zorea, Attorney & Counselor at Law, Anchorage,AK, for Plaintiff.Connor Royce Smith, Stoel Rives LLP, Anchorage, AK,Karin D. Jones, Stoel Rives LLP, Seattle, WA, for Defendant.ORDERH. RUSSEL HOLLAND Senior United States District JudgeRe: Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment*1 Defendants move for summary judgment on the claimsmade in Plaintiff's complaint on procedural grounds, as wellas on the merits.1 The motion is opposed by Plaintiff.2Defendants have replied.3 Oral argument has not beenrequested and is not deemed necessary.4I. PARTIESPlaintiff, Andre Legarza, is an individual and a formeremployee of Pogo Mine, a gold mine in the state of Alaska.The Defendant named in the complaint is a single entity:“Northern Star (Alaska), Inc. dba Northern Star Resources,Ltd.” However, according to the pleadings this entity doesnot exist, but rather is a combination of two separate entities:Northern Star (Alaska) Incorporated and Northern StarResources, Ltd.5 (Hereinafter referred to as “Defendants”).Defendants further argue that neither entity is Plaintiff'semployer, and they provide evidence that Northern Star(Pogo) LLC, which is not a named defendant, was Plaintiff'sactual employer.Defendants repeatedly informed Plaintiff that he had sued thewrong party. Plaintiff never sought to amend his complaintand Defendants did not file a motion to dismiss. It now istoo late for Plaintiff to amend in accordance with Local Rule16.1(c)(2).Based on the foregoing, Defendants now move for summaryjudgment first on procedural grounds, arguing that Plaintiffhas sued the wrong entity.6 They argue that while theyare parent companies of Plaintiff's employer, Northern Star(Pogo) LLC, they are separate legal entities that did notserve as Plaintiff's direct employer or take the actions allegedby Plaintiff in this case.7 Plaintiff argues that Defendants’“belated argument” fails for multiple reasons.A. WaiverPlaintiff argues that Defendants waived any argument thatthey were the wrong party by accepting service andparticipating in the underlying administrative proceedingsunder the exact same name without objection.8 Plaintiffalso argues, without authority, that “[t]heir choice to pursuesummary judgment on the merits—rather than movingto dismiss—constitutes waiver.”9 The Court finds thesearguments unpersuasive. “In the absence of a showing ofprejudice ... an affirmative defense may be raised for the firsttime at summary judgment.... [and] ... [t]here is no prejudiceto a Plaintiff where an affirmative defense would have beendispositive if asserted when the action was filed.”10B. Integrated Enterprise with Unified Control*2 Plaintiff next argues that Northern Star Resources, Ltd.,operates as an integrated enterprise with centralized controlover employment policies, human resources, and disciplinarydecisions.11 Citing the Fifth Circuit's relevant four-part test,Plaintiff argues that Northern Star satisfies all four prongs:(1) interrelation of operations, (2) centralized control oflabor relations, (3) common management, and (4) commonownership or financial control.12 Notably, Defendants didnot respond to this argument in their Reply brief.The Court finds Plaintiff's reasoning persuasive:
ANDRE LEGARZA, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN STAR (ALASKA),..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Northern Star Resources Limitedexercises extraordinary control overemployment matters at its subsidiaries:it creates all employment policies (asevidenced by the “NORTHERN STARRESOURCES LIMITED” headers onevery policy); mandates those policiesacross all subsidiaries (as statedin the policies themselves); requirescorporate-level HR and executiveapproval for terminations ...; maintainsunified branding, email systems,and employee identification with theparent company; and presents itselfthrough its own policies as a unified“Northern Star” organization wherethe parent and all subsidiaries operateunder common governance.13The Court finds that the “level of integration [which Plaintiffalleges and Defendants concede] far exceeds the ‘typical’parent-subsidiary relationship.”14 Accordingly, the Courtconcludes that summary judgment on the procedural issue ofsuing the proper party is not warranted.The Court now turns to the merits of the matter.II. FACTUAL BACKGROUNDPlaintiff began employment at the Pogo Mine's MobileEquipment Maintenance (MEM) Department as a Level 5Mechanic in September 2016.15 In early 2020, Plaintiff wentout on medical leave related to his knee. His medical providercleared him to return to work as of March 18, 2020. OnSeptember 20, 2020, Plaintiff was issued a written warning(his first in four years) related to performance deficiencieson four different pieces of equipment.16 According toDefendants, Plaintiff did not dispute his shortcomings.17Also in September 2020, Plaintiff began experiencing kneepain again, and he was provided with light duty. He went outon extended medical leave for knee replacement surgery onOctober 1, 2020. He returned to work without any restrictionson May 18, 2021, and although Plaintiff suggests that hecontinued to have concerns about his knee,18 he testified inhis deposition that he did not tell anyone about it.19On June 3, 2021, Plaintiff was assigned to “replace worn swaybar bushings on an axle of a haul truck.” He signed off on therepair and returned the haul truck to service, but he failed totighten the bolts on the sway bar. As a result, while the haultruck was being operated, the sway bar came loose. No onewas injured, but according to Defendants the situation had thepotential to be a major safety issue. Plaintiff does not disputethat the bolts came loose, although he offered the excusethat: “I didn't get the new bolts back in there because I didn'thave the right bolts.”20 Plaintiff was given a second writtenwarning21 and placed on a performance improvement plan(PIP), which identified objectives for improving his jobperformance.22*3 On August 30, 2021, another incident occurred thatDefendants say led to the decision to terminate Plaintiff'semployment.23 Plaintiff should have “checked the uppercab mounts” of a “mucking loader” that he had worked on,but he had not, and then falsely claimed on the paperworkthat he had done so.24 Plaintiff admitted in writing that hehad been rushing and had not inspected the cab mounts buthad intentionally marked them as inspected.25 Plaintiff alsotestified at his deposition that he knew he was including falseinformation in the documentation.26 He was terminated onSeptember 2, 2021, at 55 years of age.III. STANDARD OF REVIEWSummary judgment is proper where there is no genuine issueof material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment asa matter of law.27 A party asserting that a fact is undisputedmust support such an assertion by citing to materials inthe record, including depositions, affidavits or declarations,stipulations, admissions, answers to interrogatories, or othermaterials.28 The moving party bears the initial burden ofproof for showing that no fact is in dispute.29 If the movingparty meets that burden, then it falls upon the non-movingparty to refute with facts that would indicate a genuine issueof fact for trial.30 An issue is “genuine” only if the evidenceis such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for thenonmoving party,31 and a dispute is ‘material’ only if it
ANDRE LEGARZA, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN STAR (ALASKA),..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3could affect the outcome of the suit under the governinglaw.32 When considering the evidence on a motion forsummary judgment, courts are required to view the facts anddraw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to theparty opposing summary judgment.33 Summary judgment isappropriate if the facts and allegations presented by a partyare merely colorable, or are not significantly probative.34IV. DISCUSSIONPlaintiff brings two claims against Defendants, alleging thatthey discriminated against him on the basis of his age, inviolation of the ADEA,35 and on the basis of an allegeddisability, in violation of the ADA,36 when they fired him.37Defendants move for summary judgment on the merits,arguing that Plaintiff's age discrimination and disabilitydiscrimination claims fail as a matter of law.A. The McDonnell Douglas Burden Shifting AnalysisThe burden-shifting analysis from McDonnell Douglas Corp.v. Green,38 originally applied in the context of racialdiscrimination, has been extended to other areas of the law,including age and disability discrimination. A plaintiff mustfirst make a prima facie case of discrimination.If a plaintiff makes a prima facie case of discrimination, theburden then shifts to the employer to provide a legitimate,nondiscriminatory (or nonretaliatory) reason for the adverseemployment action. If the employer does so, then the burdenshifts back to the employee to prove that the reason given bythe employer was pretextual.39B. Age Discrimination*4 A prima facie case of age discrimination under thedisparate treatment theory requires a showing by Plaintiff thathe:(1) was a member of the protected class [age 40–70];(2) was performing his job in a satisfactory manner;(3) was discharged; and(4) was replaced by a substantially younger employee withequal or inferior qualifications.40Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot show a prima faciecase of age discrimination because he fails prongs 2 and 4.The Court agrees. Although Plaintiff was over age 40 andwas discharged, he cannot show that he “was performing hisjob in a satisfactory manner.” He does not dispute that hereceived two prior written warnings, was placed on a PIP, andknowingly falsified paperwork. He has admitted as much inhis deposition.41Plaintiff also fails to show prong 4, that he “was replacedby a substantially younger employee with equal or inferiorqualifications.” Plaintiff argues that the clearest evidence ofage discrimination is another employee of Pogo Mine whowas 24–25 years old during the relevant period. “He workedin the same MEM Department under the same supervisorsand was later promoted to Leading Hand.”42 Plaintiff arguesthat this individual “was late to work a minimum of 10 timeswhile he was still in his probationary period. Several of thesetimes he was more than a half an hour late, sometimes overtwo hours late. He never once received a write up or anydiscipline. Eventually, he was promoted to a lead mechanicspot.”43 But Plaintiff does not argue that he was replacedby a younger employee, only that a younger employee withan imperfect work record remained employed. In light of theforegoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff does not make a primafacie case of age discrimination, and the Court need not reachthe issue of pretext.C. Disability DiscriminationA prima facie case of disability discrimination under the ADArequires a plaintiff to show:(1) he has a disability;(2) he is a qualified individual, meaning he could performthe essential functions of his job with or without areasonable accommodation; and(3) he suffered an adverse employment action on the basisof his disability.44The term “disability,” with respect to an individual, requires ashowing of a physical or mental impairment that substantiallylimits one or more major life activities of such individual; arecord of such an impairment; or being regarded as havingsuch an impairment.45
ANDRE LEGARZA, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN STAR (ALASKA),..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Plaintiff argues that Defendants take “incompatible”positions—first stating they proactively accommodatedPlaintiff's knee problems, then denying in discoveryany knowledge of accommodation requests—creating a“credibility dispute that precludes summary judgment.”46But Defendants acknowledge that they provided Plaintiffwith accommodations, including light-duty work and twoextended medical leaves.47 However, they claim that theyhad no knowledge of any continuing disability after hereturned to work in May 2021.48 Moreover, Defendantsargue that Plaintiff cannot show that he suffered an adverseemployment action on the basis of his disability, because headmitted to engaging in the misconduct that resulted in histermination, and has produced no evidence that his employerwas motivated to terminate him due to his knee injury.*5 The Court finds that Plaintiff provides no indication thathe could show a prima facie case of disability discrimination,because he cannot show that he was terminated due tohis disability (prong 3). It is undisputed that Defendantsaccommodated Plaintiff's needs prior to his 2020 surgery.It is undisputed that Plaintiff was fully released by hismedical provider to return to work in May 2021, without anyrestrictions. It is undisputed that Plaintiff did not request anyaccommodations upon his return to work in May 2021.49And it is undisputed that Plaintiff made the multiple safetymistakes or omissions that led to his dismissal, includingknowingly falsifying paperwork.50Moreover, the Court notes that Plaintiff does not suggestthat his mistakes or omissions occurred as a result ofany disability. Nevertheless, Plaintiff now argues, withoutauthority, that Defendants’ knowledge of Plaintiff's kneecondition as of October 2020 triggered continuing ADAobligations after he returned to work with no restrictions andwithout telling anyone about his knee pain.51 The Court isunpersuaded. Having found that Plaintiff does not make aprima facie case of disability discrimination, the Court againneed not reach the issue of pretext.V. CONCLUSIONFor the reasons discussed herein, the Court finds that Plaintiffhas failed to make a prima facie case of either age ordisability discrimination. Accordingly, Defendants’ Motionfor Summary Judgment at Docket No. 14 is GRANTED andPlaintiff's complaint is DISMISSED.IT IS SO ORDERED this 12th day of February, 2026, atAnchorage, Alaska.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 396509Footnotes1Docket 14.2Docket 20.3Docket 22.4Additionally, Defendants have provided a list identifying 17 cases cited by Plaintiff that “quote language thatdoes not exist in the case,” including one where the language is correct but from a different case. Docket23-1. The rapid development of artificial intelligence (“AI”) requires caution in the context of legal research.The Court recommends that attorneys also follow the guidance provided to the judiciary, that AI systemsshould be used only to perform tasks that can be easily verified for accuracy and involve public data ornonconfidential and nonsensitive information.5Accordingly, the Court refers to plural “Defendants” in this Order.
ANDRE LEGARZA, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN STAR (ALASKA),..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.56Defendants’ motion for summary judgment was timely filed on the last day available to the parties for thefiling of potentially dispositive motions. Docket 13 at 2.7Docket 14 at 11.8Docket 20 at 15.9Id. at 18.10Garcia v. Salvation Army, 918 F.3d 997, 1008 (9th Cir. 2019) (internal citations and quotations omitted).11Docket 20 at 20–24.12Id. at 20 (citing Schweitzer v. Advanced Telemarketing Corp., 104 F.3d 761, 764 (5th Cir. 1997).13Id. at 23–24.14Id. at 24.15Mechanics at Pogo Mine are classified in five levels, with “Level 1” being the least experienced, and “Level5” being the most experienced and with the highest skill level expectations.16Docket 20 at 6.17Docket 14 at 3–5.18Id. at 5–6.19See Docket 15-1 at 24.20Docket 15-1 at 28.21See Docket 16-5.22Docket 16-6.23Docket 17 at 23 (Mooney Declaration).24Id.25Docket 14 at 7–8 (citing “Incident Statement” at Docket 16-7).26Id. at 9 (citing Plaintiff's deposition 223:2-10; See Docket 15-1 at 32).27Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).28Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(1).29Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).30Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986).31Id. at 248.32Id.
ANDRE LEGARZA, Plaintiff, v. NORTHERN STAR (ALASKA),..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.633Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S. Ct. 1769, 1774, 167 L. Ed. 2d 686 (2007).34Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250; see also In re Lewis, 97 F.3d 1182, 1187 (9th Cir. 1996); Taylor v. List, 880 F.2d1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1995).35The Age Discrimination in Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 623 et seq.36The Americans with Disabilities Act, as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.37Docket 1.38411 U.S. 792, 802, 93 S. Ct. 1817, 1824, 36 L. Ed. 2d 668 (1973), holding modified by Hazen Paper Co. v.Biggins, 507 U.S. 604, 113 S. Ct. 1701, 123 L. Ed. 2d 338 (1993).39Docket 14 at 24 (citing Curley v. City of N. Las Vegas, 772 F.3d 629, 632 (9th Cir. 2014)).40Rose v. Wells Fargo & Co., 902 F.2d 1417, 1421 (9th Cir. 1990) (citation omitted) (emphasis added).41See Docket 15-1 at 15-16, 32-33.42Docket 20 at 9.43Id. (citing Plaintiff's answer to interrogatories; Docket 20-2 at 6).44Nunes v Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 164 F.3d 1243, 1246 (9th Cir. 1999).45Shields v. Credit One Bank, N.A., 32 F.4th 1218, 1222 (9th Cir. 2022) (citing 42 U.S.C. § 12102(1)).46Docket 20 at 30.47Docket 22 at 13.48Id.49While Plaintiff now claims continuing knee pain beyond that date, he admitted in his deposition that he didnot tell anyone about it. See Docket 15-1 at 24.50See Docket 15-1 at 15-16, 32-33.51Docket 20 at 31.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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