The testatrix must have testamentary capacity in order to execute a valid will; i. e., she must have
“mind and memory sufficient to recall and remember the property she was about to bequeath, and the objects of her bounty, and the disposition which she wished to make — to know and understand the nature and consequences of the business to be performed, and to discern the simple and obvious relation of its elements to each other . . ..”
Knox v. Knox, 95 Ala. 495, 503, 11 So. 125, 128 (1892). However, since it is presumed that every person has the capacity to make a will, the contestant has the burden to prove a lack of testamentary capacity. Johnston v. Johnston, 174 Ala. 220, 227, 57 So. 450, 452 (1912). This court has said that:
“The burden is on the contestant to show incapacity at the time the will was made and insanity prior to that time, unless of a permanent character, raises no presumption of insanity at the time the will was made.”
King v. Aird, 251 Ala. 613, 617, 38 So.2d 883, 887 (1949). Unless the contestant presents evidence that the testatrix suffered from a permanent type of insanity prior to the execution of the will (which was not shown in this case), the contestant’s burden of proof is met when the jury is reasonably satisfied from the evidence that the testatrix did not have testamentary capacity at the time she executed the will. See Tucker v. Tucker, 248 Ala. 602, 611, 28 So.2d 637, 645 (1946).
When mental capacity is at issue, the factual inquiry must necessarily be of the broadest range:
“Evidence is competent to prove conduct and language at various times and places indicating an unhealthy mental condition, and the more extensive the view the safer is the determination reached.”
Id. at 610, 28 So.2d at 644; accord, Batson v. Batson, 217 Ala. 450, 456, 117 So. 10, 15 (1928); Johnston v. Johnston, supra, 174 Ala. at 226, 57 So. at 452. Thus, evidence offered as to the mental and physical condition of the testatrix, either before or immediately after execution of the will, is admissible since it tends to indicate her condition when the will was signed. Burke v. Thomas, 282 Ala. 412, 417, 211 So.2d 903, 908 (1968); Haghart v. Cooley, 278 Ala. 354, 357-58, 178 So.2d 226, 228 (1965); Tucker v. Tucker, supra, 248 Ala. at 610, 28 So.2d at 644; Knox v. Knox, supra, 95 Ala. at 503-04, 11 So. at 128; Fountain v. Brown, 38 Ala. 72, 75 (1861). Likewise, testimony regarding the testatrix’s “conversations, deportment, acts, and appearance” has been found to be competent on the issue of testamentary capacity. Batson v. Batson, supra, 217 Ala. at 456, 117 So. at 15.
Also relevant to this issue is the character of the testamentary scheme; i. e., the reasonableness of the distributions made by the testatrix in her will. It is permissible for the jury to examine the will to see if its provisions are “just and reasonable, and consonant with the state of the [testatrix’s] family relations,” since this would reflect on her capacity to recall the natural objects of her bounty. Fountain v. Brown, supra at 74. This court, in Councill v. Mayhew, 172 Ala. 295, 55 So. 314 (1911), has stated that:
“An unequal disposition of property per se raises no presumption ... of testamentary incapacity, nor is it per se unnatural; but the unequal treatment of those who ostensibly have equal claims upon the testator’s bounty, or the preference of one to the exclusion of another, may under the circumstances of a particular case, be deemed unnatural. In such a case, an unnatural disposition is a fact to be ascertained and considered by the jury [on the issue of testamentary capacity]-”
Id. at 308, 55 So. at 318; accord, Tucker v. Tucker, supra, 248 Ala. at 612, 28 So.2d at 646; Batson v. Batson, supra, 217 Ala. at 457, 117 So. at 16. The pecuniary condition of the testatrix’s heirs, when considered in the light of an unnatural disposition of property, would also reflect on the character of the will and would therefore be admissible. Fountain v. Brown, supra at 75.