Horton v. 27 (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Appeals of Alabama. Norman HORTON v. David COLVIN CL-2025-0041 February 27
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Alabama (AL)
Court
Alabama Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Reversed
Majority
Edwards (J.), joined by Moore (P.J.), Hanson (J.), Fridy (J.)
Concurrence / dissent
Bowden (J.)
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 547656Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOT YET RELEASED FOR PUBLICATION.Court of Civil Appeals of Alabama.Norman HORTONv.David COLVINCL-2025-0041|February 27, 2026Appeal from Dale Circuit Court (CV-24-3)OpinionEDWARDS, Judge.*1 In February 2024, Norman Horton filed in the DaleCircuit Court (“the trial court”) a complaint against DavidColvin in which Horton alleged that Colvin had defamedhim by posting certain comments on various social-mediaaccounts, specifically stating: “When are you going to dosomething about the METH HOUSE that you sponsor!!!!,”and by making comments at a political meeting indicatingthat Horton was associated with a prostitution ring.1 In thecomplaint, Horton further alleged that Colvin's defamatorycomments had resulted in “election interference” and theloss of a state-senate race in which Horton had been acandidate. Horton also alleged that Colvin had interfered withhis business relationships and had harassed certain personsby discharging a firearm during their visit to tour Horton'sbusiness premises for the purpose of considering whetherto lease the premises, which adjoins property owned byColvin.2 Finally, Horton averred that Colvin had converted tohis own use a driveway that Horton had allegedly been usingpursuant to an agreement Horton had with another propertyowner, Buddy Skelton.In March 2024, Colvin filed a handwritten answer generallydenying the allegations of the complaint; once he securedcounsel, Colvin amended his answer. In his amended answer,Colvin admitted to having made the social-media comments.He also asserted the affirmative defenses of truth, “substantialtruth,” “fair comment,” and consent. Colvin further asserteda “qualified privilege” and alleged that Horton was a publicfigure and, therefore, that Horton must prove that thestatements were made with “actual malice.”3*2 Horton filed a motion in which he sought to add his wife,Roslyn, as a plaintiff, but, after Colvin objected, the trial courtdenied that motion. Horton also moved to compel Colvin toanswer certain of his discovery requests. Although Colvinresponded and Horton replied to that response, the trial courtdid not rule on Horton's motion.On July 17, 2024, well after he had filed his answer to thecomplaint, Colvin filed a document that he titled “Motion toDismiss.” In that motion, regarding the defamation claims,Colvin argued that Horton was a “limited public figure” andtherefore that he was required to prove actual malice; thatthe “meth house” statement was “hyperbolic and constitute[d]an opinion”; that the allegedly libelous statement regardingthe “prostitution ring” did not actually accuse Horton of anyconnection to such activity; and that Horton had not providedevidence that Colvin's allegedly defamatory statements hadresulted in his losing the election. Regarding Horton's otherclaims, the motion to dismiss argued that Horton could notmaintain an action against Colvin arising out of the erectionof a barrier across the driveway because, he said, Skelton,the owner of the property over which the driveway runs,had erected the barrier. Colvin disavowed knowledge of anyincident involving discharging a firearm and also contendedthat Horton lacked standing to bring the “harassment withdisplay of deadly force” claim.4 Colvin appended severaldocumentary exhibits to his motion. The trial court set themotion to dismiss for a hearing to be held on August 12, 2024,but, on Horton's motion, the trial court continued that hearingto October 15, 2024.After the hearing, the trial court entered an order onNovember 8, 2024, dismissing Horton's complaint withoutstating its reasoning. On December 9, 2024, Horton filed atimely postjudgment motion and a separate motion seekingleave to amend his complaint. The trial court denied thosemotions by separate orders entered on December 10, 2024.Horton filed a timely notice of appeal.On appeal, Horton argues that the trial court erred bydismissing his complaint. He argues that, because Colvinattached documentary evidence to his motion to dismiss, themotion was converted to a motion for a summary judgmentand that the trial court committed error by failing to grant himleave to amend his complaint, by dismissing the complaintwithout prejudice after the applicable statute-of-limitations
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2periods had run, by failing to compel discovery as requested,and by granting the motion to dismiss while discoverywas still pending. He further contends that the facts thathe alleged regarding his defamation claims were sufficientto withstand a motion to dismiss filed pursuant to Rule12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P. He also argues that he adequatelystated claims of “election interference,” tortious interferencewith his business relationships, harassment, and conversion.Finally, he contends that the trial court was required to affordhim “nonprejudicial treatment” as a pro se litigant, that he wasdenied due process because of “procedural irregularities,” andthat the trial court was required to enter a “reasoned order” onthe dispositive motion to dismiss.5*3 Before considering the propriety of the trial court'sdismissal of Horton's claims, we will first consider Horton'sprocedural arguments in support of reversal. Initially, we mustreject Horton's contention that the trial court was required toafford him “nonprejudicial treatment” and construe his prose pleadings under “less stringent standards” than pleadingsdrafted by counsel. Horton relies on federal caselaw, likeEstelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106, 97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d251 (1976), to support his argument. Although federalauthorities require the federal courts to take a more lenientapproach to the evaluation of pro se pleadings, Alabama lawtreats pro se parties no differently than those represented bycounsel.6“While we are not unsympathetic to pro se litigants ..., a prose litigant must nonetheless comply with legal procedureand court rules. Jones v. Seibert, 624 So. 2d 639 (Ala. Civ.App. 1993). ‘[T]he operation of the courts of this state isgoverned by rules which are no more forgiving to a pro selitigant than to one represented by counsel.’ Black v. Allen,587 So. 2d 349, 349 (Ala. Civ. App. 1991). See also Lockettv. A.L. Sandlin Lumber Co., 588 So. 2d 889 (Ala. Civ. App.1991).”Overy v. Murphy, 827 So. 2d 804, 806 (Ala. Civ. App. 2001);see also Bowman v. Pat's Auto Parts, 504 So. 2d 736, 737(Ala. Civ. App. 1987) (“The rules of procedure which governthe operation of the trial courts thereby leading to the orderlytransaction of its business are no more forgiving to a pro selitigant than to one represented by counsel.”). We find no errorin the trial court's alleged failure to have treated Horton moreleniently based on his status as a pro se plaintiff.Similarly, we reject Horton's contention that the trial courtwas required to enter a detailed or “reasoned” dismissalorder. Although findings of facts and conclusions of law arerequired to be included in certain judgments or orders inlimited instances under particular statutes, see, e.g., Ala. Code1975, § 25-5-88 (requiring that a judgment in a workers’compensation case contain findings of facts and conclusionsof law), a trial court is not required to state its reasoningfor entering a dispositive order or judgment in every action.In fact, Rule 52(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., specifically states that“[f]indings of fact and conclusions of law are unnecessary ondecisions of motions under Rule[ ] 12[, Ala. R. Civ. P.].” SeeEx parte Williamson, 329 So. 3d 664, 672 (Ala. Civ. App.2020) (explaining that Rule 52(a) indicates that a trial courtneed not state its reasoning in an order dismissing a party'sclaims).Horton's argument that Colvin's motion to dismiss wasconverted into a motion for a summary judgment is alsounavailing. Although Colvin appended materials outside thepleadings to his July 2024 motion, under current supreme-court precedent, this court is not permitted to presume thatthe trial court considered the materials that were appendedto Colvin's July 2024 motion in deciding whether to dismissthe complaint. See Ex parte Price, 244 So. 3d 949, 955 (Ala.2017) (indicating that, unless the trial court indicates thatit considered materials submitted outside the pleadings indeciding a Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion, an appellatecourt must presume that the trial court did not consider thosematerials and that the motion was therefore not converted toa Rule 56, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion for a summary judgment);Ray v. Ray, 413 So. 3d 733, 736 (Ala. Civ. App. 2024)(explaining that, “for a motion to dismiss to be convertedto a motion for a summary judgment[,] the record mustaffirmatively reflect that the trial court, when making itsdecision to grant a motion to dismiss, considered mattersoutside the pleadings”); but see Newman's Med. Servs., Inc. v.Mobile Cnty., 370 So. 3d 228, 231 (Ala. 2022) (treating a Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismiss as having been converted to a Rule56 motion for a summary judgment when “[n]othing in therecord ... indicate[d] that the trial court specifically excludedany [submitted] evidence from its consideration”). The recorddoes not definitively establish that the trial court consideredthe materials appended to Colvin's motion to dismiss, and wetherefore cannot consider the motion to dismiss to have beenconverted to a motion for a summary judgment.*4 Although Horton argues that “the [t]rial court [e]rredby allowing a [Rule] 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion afterdiscovery had commenced and before it's [sic] completion,”Horton's brief, p. 44, he cites no authority indicating that a trial
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3court may not consider a motion to dismiss while discoveryis pending. See Rule 28(a)(10), Ala. R. App. P. (requiringthat an appellant support his arguments with appropriate legalauthorities); White Sands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998So. 2d 1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008) (“Rule 28(a)(10)[, Ala. R. App.P.,] requires that arguments in briefs contain discussions offacts and relevant legal authorities that support the party'sposition.”). Neither of the two Alabama authorities Hortonprovides for the stated proposition -- Hornsby v. Sessions, 703So. 2d 932, 938 (Ala. 1997), and Ex parte Harrington, 450 So.2d 99, 100 (Ala. 1984) -- address any issue regarding pendingdiscovery. To the extent that he relies on Reeves v. Porter, 521So. 2d 963, 965 (Ala. 1988), and Hope v. Brannan, 557 So. 2d1208, 1212 (Ala. 1989), which both address the issue whethera summary-judgment motion may be granted when discoveryremains pending, his reliance is misplaced because, as wehave explained, Colvin's motion to dismiss was not convertedto a motion for a summary judgment. Thus, Horton has failedto present a legally supported argument on this issue, and wedecline to further consider this basis for his challenge to thetrial court's November 8, 2024, dismissal order. See Waldenv. Hutchinson, 987 So. 2d 1109, 1120 (Ala. 2007) (indicatingthat a legally unsupported argument results in a failure of theappellant to effectively challenge a judgment based on thatargument).Likewise, Horton's arguments that the trial court erred byfailing to compel discovery and by dismissing his actionwithout prejudice after the applicable statute-of-limitationsperiods on his claims had run are unconvincing. Certainly,Rule 26, Ala. R. Civ. P., “contemplates a broad right ofdiscovery,” Ex parte AMI West Alabama Gen. Hosp., 582So. 2d 484, 485 (Ala. 1991), but Horton has not presented alegally supported argument that the trial court's decision towithhold a ruling on Horton's motion to compel discoverypending resolution of the motion to dismiss was error. He hasalso failed to provide authority to support his contention that atrial court may not dismiss an action if the applicable statute-of-limitations periods have run on the claims asserted in thataction.7 His failure to present arguments supported by legalauthority permits us to reject those arguments. See Walden,987 So. 2d at 1120.We also reject Horton's argument that the trial court erred infailing to permit him to amend his complaint. Horton relieson Rule 15(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., and the principle expressedtherein that amendments “shall be freely allowed when justiceso requires.” Horton does not, however, cite any authorityrequiring that a trial court allow an amendment after thedismissal of an action. We find such authority in Rule 78,Ala. R. Civ. P., which provides that, “[u]nless the court ordersotherwise, an order granting a motion to dismiss shall bedeemed to permit an automatic right of amendment of thepleading to which the motion is directed within ten (10) daysfrom service of the order.” Horton did not file an amendedcomplaint within 10 days of the service of the November 8,2024, dismissal order, and we cannot hold the trial court inerror for failing to permit Horton to amend his complaint morethan 10 days after the entry of that order.Finally, we reject Horton's arguments that he was deprived ofdue process by not being notified of witness subpoenas andby “procedural irregularities” allegedly committed by the trialcourt. Horton's allegations of procedural irregularities includeallegations that the trial court applied the incorrect standardto evaluate his complaint, that the trial court improperlyconsidered matters outside the pleadings, and that the trialcourt failed to compel discovery. He also complains thatthe trial court denied his postjudgment motion too quickly.We have already addressed Horton's complaints regardingthe motion to compel discovery and the trial court's allegedconsideration of extraneous materials. Our discussion ofthe merits of the dismissal of Horton's complaint, infra,will adequately address any concerns about the appropriatestandard for reviewing his complaint. The trial court's swiftruling on Horton's postjudgment motion is, as far as weknow, not a basis for error. To the extent that Horton furthercomplains that these “procedural irregularities,” coupled withthe fact that Colvin's wife works at the courthouse, createsan “appearance of impropriety,” Horton admits that he didnot request that the trial-court judge recuse herself. Thus, weneed not further consider Horton's argument relating to anyappearance of impropriety. See Ross v. Luton, 456 So. 2d 249,255 (Ala. 1984) (indicating that “disqualification of a trialjudge for interest or prejudice may be waived” if not assertedbefore entry of a particular order or judgment).*5 Before we begin our review of Horton's argumentsthat his complaint adequately stated claims of defamation,“election interference,” tortious interference with his businessrelationships, harassment, and conversion, we must firstdetermine the proper standard of review of the November 8,2024, order. Our supreme court has explained that a “[Rule]12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] motion should not be used to testthe sufficiency of a complaint after a responsive pleading hasbeen filed”; this is so because “Rule 12(b) provides that amotion asserting the defense of failure to state a claim ‘shallbe made before pleading if a further pleading is permitted.’
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4” Sims v. Lewis, 374 So. 2d 298, 301 (Ala. 1979). Thus,Colvin's July 2024 motion was not a timely filed Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Instead, as our supreme court has explained, “adefense of failure to state a claim upon which relief can begranted, although typically raised pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6),can be raised after an answer has been filed by moving for ajudgment on the pleadings,” pursuant to Rule 12(c), Ala. R.Civ. P. Pontius v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 915 So. 2d557, 562 (Ala. 2005). Our supreme court has further observedthat,“ ‘often times, after a responsive pleading has been filed, adefendant will move to dismiss for failure to state a claimunder Rule 12(c), even though there may be no need torefer to the responsive pleading, such that it would havebeen proper to move for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6).In such an instance, it is proper to treat the motion in themanner as one brought pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6). See [5ACharles Alan Wright & Arthur R. Miller, Federal Practiceand Procedure § 1368] at 515 [(2d ed. 1990)]. Moreover,where the pleadings are closed but a defendant mistakenlymoves to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), instead of Rule12(c), the Sixth Circuit has held that “where the substanceof the motion is plain,” it is proper to treat a motion styledas one under Rule 12(b)(6) as if it were brought under Rule12(c). See Wagner v. Higgins, 754 F.2d 186, 188 (6th Cir.1985).’ ”Pontius, 915 So.2d at 562 (quoting Reed Elsevier, Inc. v.TheLaw.net Corp., 269 F. Supp. 2d 942, 947 (S.D. Ohio2003)).Thus, the July 2024 motion filed by Colvin, in which hesought a dismissal of Horton's complaint based on its allegedfailure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted,was untimely. However, the trial court could properly haveconsidered that motion in one of two ways. The trial courtcould have considered the July 2024 motion as a Rule 12(c)motion seeking dismissal of the complaint for failure to statea claim upon which relief can be granted and could havetherefore applied the standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6)motion in evaluating that motion. See Hall v. EnvironmentalLitig. Grp., P.C., 248 So. 3d 949, 957 (Ala. 2017) (treatinga Rule 12(b)(6) motion filed after the close of the pleadingsas a 12(c) motion seeking relief based on the ground thatthe complaint failed to state a claim for relief and reviewingthe motion under the standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion). The trial court could also have treated Colvin'smotion as a Rule 12(c) motion seeking a judgment as a matterof law based on the facts contained in the pleadings, i.e.,Horton's complaint and Colvin's answer. See Ex parte MutualSav. Life Ins. Co., 765 So. 2d 649, 650 (Ala. 1998) (explainingthat an appellate “[c]ourt looks to the essence of a motion, notjust to its title, to determine how the motion should be treatedunder our Rules of Civil Procedure”).In his brief, Horton argues that he properly pleaded his libelclaim (see note 1, supra) by providing the following statementallegedly posted by Colvin on various social-media pagesthat stated: “When are you going to do something about theMETH HOUSE that you sponsor!!!!,” by alleging that thestatement was false, and by alleging harm to his reputation.He further asserted that Colvin's statement was either madewith knowledge of its falsity or with a reckless disregard asto its truthfulness. Horton further explains that he allegedthat Colvin had taken certain actions that could support adetermination that he was acting out of personal ill will ormalice when he made the alleged “meth house” statement.Moreover, Horton contends that the alleged “meth house”statement imputed criminal conduct that would render thestatement libel per se, which would not require Horton toestablish special damages.*6 Upon review of Horton's argument, we conclude that,whether analyzed under the standard of review applicable toan order granting a motion under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule12(c), the trial court could not have properly determined thatHorton's complaint, insofar as it is premised on his allegationsof libel arising from the alleged “meth house” statement,should be dismissed.“ ‘To establish a prima facie case of defamation, theplaintiff must show [1] that the defendant was at leastnegligent, [2] in publishing [3] a false and defamatorystatement to another [4] concerning the plaintiff, [5] whichis either actionable without having to prove special harm(actionable per se) or actionable upon allegations and proofof special harm (actionable per quod).’ ”Delta Health Grp., Inc. v. Stafford, 887 So. 2d 887, 895 (Ala.2004) (quoting Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d1085, 1091 (Ala. 1988)). Moreover,“[t]he effect and tendency of the language used, not itsform, is the criterion determining its actionable quality. Itis not necessary to render words defamatory and actionablethat they make defamatory charges in direct terms; theyare equally actionable if the charge is made indirectly orby necessary inference, and it matters not how artful ordisguised their meaning is concealed, if they are in fact
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5defamatory. In determining their actionable character, theyare to be taken in their natural meaning, and according tothe sense in which they appear to have been used, and theidea they are adapted to convey to those who heard them.A forced construction is not to be put upon them in orderto relieve the defendant from liability.”Marion v. Davis, 217 Ala. 16, 18-19, 114 So. 357, 359 (1927).If the July 2024 motion is evaluated as a Rule 12(c) motionrequesting that the complaint be dismissed for failure to statea claim under Rule 12(b)(6), this court must evaluate it underthe standard applicable to a Rule 12(b)(6) motion and may notconsider anything but the allegations of the complaint.“ ‘ “On appeal, a dismissal is not entitled to a presumptionof correctness. The appropriate standard of review underRule 12(b)(6), [Ala. R. Civ. P.,] is whether, when theallegations of the complaint are viewed most stronglyin the pleader's favor, it appears that the pleader couldprove any set of circumstances that would entitle [him] torelief. In making this determination, this Court does notconsider whether the plaintiff will ultimately prevail, butonly whether [he] may possibly prevail. We note that a Rule12(b)(6) dismissal is proper only when it appears beyonddoubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in supportof the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” ’ ”Flickinger v. King, 385 So. 3d 504, 511 (Ala. 2023) (quotingLloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. HealthSouth Corp., 979 So. 2d784, 791 (Ala. 2007), quoting in turn Nance v. Matthews, 622So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala. 1993)).Horton alleged that the statement was published by Colvin onseveral posts on Horton's own social-media page related tohis campaign for state senate and on various pages associatedwith other groups, including a dog-hunting association andmultiple “buy, sell, and trade” groups. Horton alleged thatthe statement was false, that it had made him the subject of“disgrace, ridicule, odium, and/or contempt,” and that it hadresulted in his losing the election for state senate. Moreover,although Horton contended in his complaint that he wasnot required to establish malice, he alleged that Colvin hadknowledge of the falsity of his statement or had acted witha reckless disregard as to its truthfulness. See note 3, supra.He also alleged facts indicating that Colvin held a possiblepersonal animus toward him, including that Colvin was nota constituent of the district in which Horton conducted hiscampaign, that Colvin had taken steps to interfere withHorton's access to his business property, which is locatedon property adjoining property owned by Colvin, and thatColvin knew or could possibly have ascertained the fact thatHorton did not “sponsor a meth house”; those allegations, ifproven, could be sufficient to establish malice or negligenceon the part of Colvin.8 Finally, Horton contended that thestatement accused him of a crime and, that, therefore, thestatement was defamatory per se.9 The allegations containedin the complaint regarding the statement associating Hortonwith a “meth house” are sufficient to survive a motion todismiss reviewed under the Rule 12(b)(6) standard. Thatis, his complaint alleges facts that, if proven, would entitleHorton to relief.*7 If, instead, the motion is considered to be a Rule 12(c)motion for a judgment on the pleadings, which would requirethis court to consider both the complaint and the answer inour analysis, Horton's libel claim based on the “meth house”statement still survives.“When a motion for judgment on the pleadings is made by aparty, ‘the trial court reviews the pleadings filed in the caseand, if the pleadings show that no genuine issue of materialfact is presented, the trial court will enter a judgment for theparty entitled to a judgment according to the law.’ B.K.W.Enters., Inc. v. Tractor & Equip. Co., 603 So. 2d 989, 991(Ala. 1992). See also Deaton, Inc. v. Monroe, 762 So. 2d840 (Ala. 2000). A judgment on the pleadings is subjectto a de novo review. Harden v. Ritter, 710 So. 2d 1254,1255 (Ala. Civ. App. 1997). A court reviewing a judgmenton the pleadings accepts the facts stated in the complaintas true and views them in the light most favorable to thenonmoving party. Id. at 1255-56. ... [I]n deciding a motionfor a judgment on the pleadings, the trial court is boundby the pleadings. See Stockman v. Echlin, Inc., 604 So. 2d393, 394 (Ala. 1992).”Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 776 So. 2d 81,82-83 (Ala. 2000). “ ‘A Rule 12(c) motion for judgment onthe pleadings disposes of a case when the material facts arenot in dispute.’ ” Harden v. Ritter, 710 So. 2d 1254, 1255 (Ala.Civ. App. 1997) (quoting McCullough v. Alabama By-Prods.Corp., 343 So. 2d 508, 510 (Ala. 1977)).Colvin admitted in his answer that he had made the “methhouse” statement in social-media posts. However, Colvinasserted in his answer the defenses of truth, substantial truth,“fair comment/opinion,” and consent.10 He also contendedthat Horton was a public figure and was therefore requiredto show malice to succeed on his defamation claims. Finally,
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Colvin asserted in his answer that Horton had “not shown that[he] published the question or statement ... with negligence”and that Colvin had not “caused or contributed to the allegedinjury that [Horton] may have sustained.”In Colvin's answer, he included factual averments that Hortonowned a rental house in Colvin's community and that thetenants of that house “were known to local law enforcementfor their illegal activities and drug use or sale” and thatHorton had “ignored or failed to respond to [Colvin] andothers in the community about their concerns [regarding] therental house.” Colvin also asserted that, because Horton hadindicated to Colvin that “it was of no concern to [Colvin] whatwas happening at the rental home,” he had used the statementshe published on the social-media pages to address the issueof public concern created by the tenants of the rental house.Thus, Colvin contended that the “meth house” statement wastrue, substantially true, or a matter of public concern givingrise to a right of “fair comment.”*8 A review of the complaint and the answer does notconvince this court that no issue of material fact exists. Hortonalleges that the “meth house” statement is false, and Colvinasserts that it is true or “substantially true.” Even if the trialcourt concluded that Horton was a public figure and wasrequired to prove constitutional malice, facts alleged in thecomplaint indicate that Colvin knew that the statement thatHorton “sponsored” a “meth house” was not true or that hehad made the statements recklessly, despite having the abilityto ascertain their truth or falsity. Thus, the complaint, insofaras it alleged libel based on the “meth house” statement, wasnot subject to being resolved on a motion for a judgment onthe pleadings under Rule 12(c). Having determined that thecomplaint's allegations regarding the libel claim stemmingfrom the alleged “meth house” statement state a claim and thatissues of material facts exist regarding that claim, we cannotaffirm the trial court's November 8, 2024, order dismissingHorton's libel claim, and we therefore reverse the orderinsofar as it dismisses that claim.However, we reach a contrary result regarding Horton's otherdefamation allegation -- that Colvin slandered Horton whenColvin “publicly linked [Horton] to ‘prostitution rings.’ ”Horton did not provide in his complaint the statements thatColvin allegedly made, thereby preventing the trial court orthis court from being able to assess whether those statementscould serve as a basis for liability. Although the allegedstatements were produced in discovery and presented as anexhibit to the July 2024 motion, this court is precludedfrom considering that exhibit in reviewing the November8, 2024, order granting that motion under either the Rule12(b)(6) standard or the Rule 12(c) standard. See, e.g.,Universal Underwriters, 776 So. 2d at 83 (stating that,because the record was silent regarding whether a trial courthad considered an affidavit submitted with a motion onthe pleadings, the appellate court would not consider theaffidavit and would “look only to the pleadings in determiningwhether the trial court [had] erred in granting [the] motion”).Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's November 8, 2024,order dismissing Horton's slander claim.In his complaint, Horton asserted a conversion claim againstColvin for allegedly “convert[ing] use of [a driveway], whichwas developed and used by [Horton and his former business]for over 30 years.”11 On appeal, Horton argues that, althoughhis claim is for conversion of what he characterizes as “aright to use real property,” i.e., the driveway to his businessproperty, the trial court erred in dismissing the claim because,he says, he alleged facts that, if proven, would establishthat Colvin had “asserted dominion over the permissiveagreement [between Horton and Skelton] granting access tothe driveway.” He says that his claim is premised on hisallegation that “the permissive right of use, an agreementlong recognized and acted upon, was wrongfully interferedwith and ‘converted’ by” Colvin. However, as Horton admits,the tort of conversion involves exercising dominion oversomeone else's personal property and not real property. SeeBaxter v. SouthTrust Bank of Dothan, 584 So. 2d 801, 805(Ala. 1991) (“An action for conversion will not lie for thetaking of real property ....”). He presents no legal authorityindicating that a “permissive right of use” or an agreementrelating to the use of real property may be converted. SeeRule 28(a)(10); White Sands Grp., 998 So. 2d at 1058. Weconclude therefore that Horton's claim of conversion wasproperly dismissed under either Rule 12(b)(6) or Rule 12(c).Similarly, we affirm the trial court's November 8, 2024, orderinsofar as it either dismissed Horton's “election interference”claim under Rule 12(b)(6) or entered a judgment on thepleadings on that claim under Rule 12(c). In his brief to thiscourt, Horton has failed to provide authority or to present acogent legal argument concerning the viability of his claimthat Colvin's defamatory statements had resulted in “electioninterference.” See Rule 28(a)(10); White Sands Grp., 998So. 2d at 1058. Horton attempts to incorporate arguments hemade in the trial court into his brief, but this court does notpermit a party to incorporate by reference arguments madein the trial court. See Perry v. State Pers. Bd., 881 So. 2d
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.71037, 1039 (Ala. Civ. App. 2003) (rejecting an attempt bythe appellant to “incorporate by reference the brief she filedin the circuit court” and stating that “Rule 28 does not allowsuch a procedure” and that “Rule 28(i), Ala. R. App. P.,provides only for incorporation of arguments contained inother parties’ appellate briefs, not for incorporation of briefsfiled in circuit courts”).*9 We also affirm the trial court's November 8, 2024, orderinsofar as it dismissed Horton's claim of interference with hisbusiness relationships or entered a judgment on the pleadingson that claim. The elements of an intentional interferencewith business relations are “(1) the existence of a protectiblebusiness relationship; (2) of which the defendant knew; (3)to which the defendant was a stranger; (4) with which thedefendant intentionally interfered; and (5) damage.” WhiteSands Grp., L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 32 So. 3d 5, 14 (Ala.2009). Horton's allegations include the following:“[Colvin] has interfered with business relationships towhich he is not a party to [sic].“On or about January 9, 2024,Colvin fired a large caliber gunwhen [sic] prospective clients Jeremy[Bolin] and Dhyana [Bolin] andtheir grandchildren preventing themfrom using [the driveway] while theywere touring the Stormins shop andproperty. It is unclear if Colvin wasfiring directly at the Bolins and/or thechildren.”Affidavits from Jeremy Bolin and Dhyana Bolin wereattached to Horton's complaint. Those affidavits indicatethat the Bolins had gone to the property to tour it becausethey were considering purchasing or leasing the premisesfor their business. Even if we were to generously construethe complaint to conclude that Horton alleged sufficientlythat he had a protectible business relationship with theBolins, the complaint fails to state a claim because Hortonfailed to allege that Colvin was aware of the protectiblebusiness relationship between the Bolins and Horton or thatColvin's actions were the reason that the Bolins did notpurchase or lease the property, if, in fact, they did not doso. Without such allegations in the complaint, Colvin wasnot required to refute those allegations, and therefore thereis no issue of material fact regarding Colvin's knowledge ofthe business relationship between the Bolins and Horton toresolve, rendering a judgment on the pleadings on this claimproper, as well.Horton also alleges in his brief on appeal that, even if hedid not properly assert a conversion claim arising from hisallegations that Colvin had interfered with Horton's use of thedriveway, he sufficiently stated a claim that Colvin interferedwith the agreement between Horton and Skelton regarding theuse of the driveway. The factual averments in the complaintregarding this claim include allegations that Colvin had“slandered [Horton] to Buddy Skelton resulting in [Colvin'stortious] interference whereby [Colvin] succeeded in securingpermission, or in the alternative, acting on his own accord, tobuild a gate/fence to block access to [the] driveway,” whichHorton alleged had been utilized by him for his business forover 30 years pursuant to an oral agreement between him andSkelton to create and use the driveway. Horton also allegedthat, at times, when Horton or others had used the drivewayto access the premises, Colvin had locked the gate, purposelypreventing the use of the driveway to leave the premises.In the portion of his complaint entitled “Interference witha business relationship,” Horton incorporated the earlierparagraphs of his complaint and alleged that “[Colvin] hasconstructed a barrier [across the driveway to Horton's formerbusiness premises] on property which does not belong toColvin.”Horton does not effectively develop an argument onappeal that he has a claim against Colvin for interferencewith a contractual relationship. See Rule 28(a)(10); WhiteSands Grp., 998 So. 2d at 1058. As opposed to a claimof interference with a business relationship, a claim ofinterference with a contractual relationship is premised on anexisting contract between the plaintiff and another individual.See White Sands Grp., 32 So. 3d at 14 (quoting Orrin K.Ames III, Tortious Interference with Business Relationships:The Changing Contours of this Commercial Tort, 35 Cumb.L. Rev. 317, 330 (2004-2005)) (“ ‘The two torts are initiallydistinguished by their primary elements -- one tort deals withthe interference with a fixed-term contract that is already inexistence; the other tort deals with “mere expectancies.” Thelatter element determines which interests along the continuumof business dealings are protected.’ ”). However, as noted,Horton's complaint does not merely claim a right to use thedriveway via an agreement; instead, his claim appears to bepremised on what he considers to be Colvin's interferencewith a property right in the driveway, which he characterizes
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8in his complaint as an express easement or an easement byprescription. See Magna, Inc. v. Catranis, 512 So. 2d 912, 913(Ala. 1987) (“An easement is property.”). Horton has failedto present legal authority to support an argument that Colvin'sactions, which he alleges resulted in interference with his andhis customer's use of the easement, can be characterized asinterference with a contractual relationship. Thus, based onthe averments of the complaint and the lack of a developedlegal argument on appeal, we cannot conclude that the trialcourt erred in determining that the complaint fails to state aclaim of interference with a contractual relationship.*10 Finally, we address Horton's claim of “harassmentwith a display of deadly force,” which is premised uponthe factual allegations regarding the incident involving theBolins, and his request for an injunction to prevent Colvinfrom “discharging weapons and a display of deadly force inthe presence of children and parties who have an interest orpotential interest in conducting business at [Horton's businesspremises].”12 First, we note that Alabama does not have acivil action for harassment; instead, conduct that might beconsidered harassment is typically addressed through othertort claims, including assault and the tort of outrage.13See, e.g., Bennett v. Dunn, 507 So. 2d 451 (Ala. 1987)(involving a claim of assault and battery stemming from thedischarge of a weapon in an attempt to scare off an intruder);Woodley v. City of Jemison, 770 So. 2d 1093, 1096 (Ala.Civ. App. 1999) (reversing a summary judgment in favorof a defendant accused of continuous telephone harassmenton the ground that an issue of fact existed as to whetherthe harassment was “so outrageous that it goes beyond thebounds of decency”); Harrison v. Mitchell, 391 So. 2d 1038(Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (considering an appeal from an awardof damages on an assault claim premised on the plaintiff'shaving been threatened by a person armed with a shotgun).In his brief on appeal, Horton appears to argue that hisallegations regarding the incident involving the Bolins areintended to bolster his claim that Colvin “interfere[ed] with[Horton's] business relationships [in an attempt to] deter[ ]potential commercial engagement.” Horton's brief, p. 55.Because Horton has not presented a cogent legal argumentto support his contention that his claim of “harassment witha display of deadly force” is a claim upon which relief canbe granted or that a question of fact relating to any suchclaim exists, we affirm the November 8, 2024, order of thetrial court regardless of whether the trial court dismissed theclaim pursuant to Rule12(b)(6) or entered a judgment onthe pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c).14 Furthermore, Hortonmakes no argument in his brief relating to his request for aninjunction, precluding our review of that issue. See Boshellv. Keith, 418 So. 2d 89, 92 (Ala. 1982) (“When an appellantfails to argue an issue in its brief, that issue is waived.”).Having considered Horton's several arguments, we reversethe trial court's November 8, 2024, order insofar as iteither dismissed Horton's libel claim relating to the “methhouse” statement or entered a judgment on the pleadings onthat claim. We therefore remand the cause for proceedingsconsistent with this opinion regarding Horton's libel claim.However, we affirm the trial court's November 8, 2024, orderinsofar as it either dismissed Horton's other claims or entereda judgment on the pleadings regarding those claims.*11 AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; ANDREMANDED.Moore, P.J., and Hanson and Fridy, JJ., concur.Bowden, J., concurs in part and dissents in part, with opinion.BOWDEN, Judge, concurring in part and dissenting in part.I respectfully dissent from this court's decision to reverse thejudgment of the Dale Circuit Court insofar as it dismissedNorman Horton's libel claim against David Colvin; I concurin all other respects. The main opinion holds that Hortonsufficiently pleaded a claim of libel; however, Horton failed tomeet his burden of presentation on appeal. Horton's appellatearguments concerning his libel claim are therefore waived,and this court cannot make those arguments for him.This court applies a de novo standard of review to a judgmentgranting a motion to dismiss. See Williams v. Dodd, [Ms.SC-2024-0704, Sept. 26, 2025] ––– So. 3d ––––, –––– (Ala.2025)(“ ‘On appeal, a dismissal [under Rule 12(b)(6), Ala.R. Civ. P.,] is not entitled to a presumption of correctness.’” (quoting Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299 (Ala.1993))). However,“[t]he de novo standard of review does not relieve anappellant of her burden of demonstrating that the trial courterred. Under the precedent and the Rules of AppellateProcedure, an appellant -- even one seeking de novo review-- must make reasoned and particularized arguments insupport of reversal. See, e.g., Archer ex rel. Archer v. Estateof Archer, 45 So. 3d 1259, 1266 (Ala. 2010)(applying ade novo standard of review, yet refusing to entertain anargument unsupported by specific citations to the record
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9and to authority, explaining that ‘ “ ‘ “ ‘it is neither ourduty nor function to perform all the legal research for anappellant’ ” ’ ” ’ (citations omitted)); White Sands Grp.,L.L.C. v. PRS II, LLC, 998 So. 2d 1042, 1058 (Ala. 2008).... After an appellant has fulfilled that threshold obligation,this Court will review the relevant aspects of the trialcourt's decision de novo .... But an appellant who has notperformed that threshold function has failed at the outset tocarry her burden of presentation and, accordingly, cannotprevail on appeal.”Lay v. Destafino, 385 So. 3d 15, 23-24 (Ala. 2023).Therefore, on appeal, Horton must meet his initial burdenof presentation. Specifically, he must present arguments andrelevant legal authority, with a discussion of the relevant facts,to demonstrate that he sufficiently pleaded all the elementsrequired to prevail on his libel claim.Horton argues that his complaint “sets out a textbook case ofactionable defamation under Alabama law.” Horton's brief,p. 38. And he alleges that his “allegations, supported byadmissions, affidavits, and a documented pattern of conduct,are more than sufficient to state viable claims for defamation,libel, slander, and defamation per se under Alabama law.”Horton's brief, p. 42. But Horton does not establish withcitation to legal authority the elements of a libel claim in hisbrief, leaving this court to perform the legal research into theelements of that species of claim for him.“To establish a prima facie case of defamation, the plaintiffmust show [1] that the defendant was at least negligent,[2] in publishing [3] a false and defamatory statementto another [4] concerning the plaintiff, [5] which iseither actionable without having to prove special harm(actionable per se) or actionable upon allegations and proofof special harm (actionable per quod).”*12 Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085,1091 (Ala. 1988) (citations omitted).15 Furthermore, whena public figure asserts a defamation action, the public figuremust demonstrate actual malice, if the alleged defamatorycomments related to his conduct as a public official. SeeSmith v. Huntsville Times Co., 888 So. 2d 492, 496 (Ala.2004)(“The threshold question whether the actual-malicestandard applies in a defamation action involves a two-pronged inquiry -- whether the defendant is a public officialand, if so, whether the allegedly defamatory comments relatedto his conduct as a public official.”). Actual malice has at leasttwo subcategories, “common-law malice” and “constitutionalmalice.” Wiggins v. Mallard, 905 So. 2d 776, 787 (Ala. 2004).“ ‘Constitutional malice’ refers to the standard set forth inNew York Times Co. v. Sullivan, [376 U.S. 254, 84 S.Ct.710, 11 L.Ed.2d 686 (1964)], ‘This standard is satisfied byproof that a false statement was made “ ‘with knowledgethat it was false or with reckless disregard of whether it wasfalse or not.’ ” ’ Smith[ v. Huntsville Times Co.], 888 So. 2d[492,] 499 [(Ala. 2004)](quoting Harte-Hanks Commc'ns,Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 659, 109 S. Ct. 2678,105 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1989), quoting in turn New York Timesv. Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 279-80 [84 S.Ct. 710]).”Little v. Consolidated Publ'g Co., 83 So. 3d 517, 522(Ala. Civ. App. 2011). A candidate for an elected officeis a public official. See, e.g., Camp v. Yeager, 601 So. 2d924, 928 (Ala. 1992)(applying “actual malice” standard todefamation action brought by candidate for secretary of state);Loveless v. Graddick, 295 Ala. 142, 147, 325 So. 2d 137,141 (1975)(applying “actual malice” standard to defamationaction brought by candidates for district attorney). Thus, tomeet his burden of presentation, Horton must argue on appeal,with citations to relevant legal authority and the record, that hesufficiently pleaded facts necessary to establish constitutionalmalice.Horton does not make that argument. Instead, he argues theopposite, asserting that actual malice is not an element thatmust be specifically alleged in the complaint. Horton's brief,p. 40 (“However, as a matter of pleading, malice is not anelement that must be specifically alleged in the complaint.”)(emphasis omitted); Horton's brief, p. 41 (“Importantly, anydispute over actual malice or privilege is a matter fordiscovery and trial, not for the sufficiency of the pleadings.”).But see Ex parte Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Alabama,773 So. 2d 475, 478 (Ala. 2000)(“[T]he plaintiff must pleaddefamation with actual malice ....”). Horton likewise makesno argument, with citation to relevant legal authority andthe record, that he sufficiently pleaded that the allegedlibelous comments were published, which is an element ofdefamation.The circuit court found that Horton's complaint failed tostate a libel claim. It is incumbent upon Horton to show onappeal that his complaint did, in fact, sufficiently plead alibel claim, and the arguments in his brief fell well short ofthis requirement. The main opinion argues that Horton didsufficiently plead defamation; however, whether he did or didnot is not the relevant inquiry regarding whether Horton methis initial burden of presentation. To reverse the circuit court'sjudgment, Horton must demonstrate that point in his brief to
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10this court, which he failed to fully accomplish. We are notpermitted to make arguments on behalf of a party.*13 “A party acting pro se must comply with legalprocedure and court rules and may not avoid the effect ofthe rules due to unfamiliarity. Hines v. City of Mobile, 480So. 2d 1203 (Ala. 1985); Hubbard v. Montgomery, 372 So.2d 315 (Ala. 1979). Rules governing the operation of thecourts of this state are no more forgiving to a pro se litigantthan to one represented by counsel. Bowman v. Pat's AutoParts, 504 So. 2d 736 (Ala. Civ. App. 1987). In view of[the appellant's] failure to substantially comply with therules, we pretermit a discussion of the issues he attemptsto raise in this case. It is not the duty nor the function ofan appellate court to perform one's legal research. Lokey v.State Department of Industrial Relations, 527 So. 2d 1327(Ala. Civ. App. 1988).”Lockett v. A.L. Sandlin Lumber Co., 588 So. 2d 889, 890(Ala. Civ. App. 1991). Because Horton has not argued thathe pleaded all the elements required to state a libel claim,with citations to his pleadings and relevant legal authority, hisargument on that issue is waived.Accordingly, I respectfully dissent insofar as the main opinionreverses the circuit court's judgment dismissing Horton's libelclaim.All Citations--- So.3d ----, 2026 WL 547656Footnotes1Horton properly categorized the statements made in comments on various social-media accounts as libel andthe statements made at the political meeting as slander. Blevins v. W.F. Barnes Corp., 768 So. 2d 386, 390(Ala. Civ. App. 1999) (explaining that “[t]here are two types of defamation: libel, which involves the use of printmedia to publish the defamatory comment, and slander, which involves the oral expression of a defamatorycomment”).2We note that the act alleged to have been committed by Colvin -- discharging a firearm -- was not directed atHorton; in fact, based on the complaint and the affidavits appended to the complaint, Horton was not presentat the time of the alleged act.3Technically, a public figure must establish “constitutional malice,” not “actual malice.” See Wiggins v. Mallard,905 So. 2d 776 (Ala. 2004) (discussing the two types of malice and stating that the evidence required toprove them often overlaps). To prove “constitutional malice,” a plaintiff must establish that the defendantmade his or her statement “ ‘with actual knowledge of its falsity or ... with reckless disregard of its truth orfalsity.’ ” Wiggins, 905 So. 2d at 786 (quoting Mobile Press Register, Inc. v. Faulkner, 372 So. 2d 1282, 1284(Ala. 1979), disapproved of on other grounds by Nelson v. Lapeyrouse Grain Corp., 534 So. 2d 1085, 1092(Ala. 1988)).4In his motion to dismiss, Colvin referred to a lack of standing; however, his argument appears to be that,because other persons and not Horton, had endured the alleged harassment, Horton cannot maintain anaction arising from any such harassment, which is, instead, an argument that Horton is not the real partyin interest. State v. Property at 2018 Rainbow Drive, 740 So. 2d 1025, 1027 (Ala. 1999) (quoting Dennis v.Magic City Dodge, Inc., 524 So. 2d 616, 618 (Ala. 1988), quoting in turn 6 Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller& Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1542 (1971)) (“ ‘ “[T]he real party in interest principleis a means to identify the person who possesses the right sought to be enforced. Therefore, the term directsattention to whether [the] plaintiff has a significant interest in the particular action he has instituted.” ’ ”). Rule17(a), Ala. R. Civ. P., provides, in pertinent part, that “[n]o action shall be dismissed on the ground that it is not
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11prosecuted in the name of the real party in interest until a reasonable time has been allowed after objectionfor ratification of commencement of the action by, or joinder or substitution of, the real party in interest.”5In his brief on appeal, Horton also raises an argument relating to the assessment of attorney fees against apro se party; however, the record does not contain any order of the trial court directing Horton to pay any orall of Colvin's attorney fees. See Rule 28(a)(5), Ala. R. App. P. (stating, in pertinent part, that, “[i]n civil cases,a statement of the case [in a parties’ brief on appeal] should also identify the adverse ruling or rulings fromwhich the appeal is taken and asserted as error on appeal ....”). We therefore decline to consider Horton'sattorney-fee argument. See Ramer v. Ramer, 289 So. 3d 819, 823 (Ala. Civ. App. 2019) (quoting Lewis v.Providence Hosp., 483 So. 2d 398, 398 (Ala. 1986)) (“ ‘Only adverse rulings by the trial court are reviewableon appeal.’ ”).6In Estelle, the United States Supreme Court, held that “a pro se complaint, ‘however inartfully pleaded,’ mustbe held to ‘less stringent standards than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.’ ” 429 U.S. at 106, 97 S.Ct. 285(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520, 92 S.Ct. 594, 30 L.Ed.2d 652 (1972)). In addition, the EstelleCourt stated that pro se complaints “can only be dismissed for failure to state a claim if it appears ‘ “beyonddoubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief.” ’ ”Id. (quoting Haines, 404 U.S. at 521, 92 S.Ct. 594, quoting in turn Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957)). As discussed infra, Alabama courts use the “no set of facts” standard whenevaluating any Rule 12(b)(6), Ala. R. Civ. P., motion to dismiss. See Nance v. Matthews, 622 So. 2d 297, 299(Ala. 1993) (stating that “a Rule 12(b)(6)[, Ala. R. Civ. P.,] dismissal is proper only when it appears beyonddoubt that the plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of the claim that would entitle the plaintiff to relief”).7The citation that Horton includes in his brief -- Jones v. City of Decatur, 53 So. 3d 885 (Ala. 2010) -- is anincorrect citation for that case, which is reported at 53 Ala.App. 470, 301 So. 2d 235 (1974); in any event,Jones, which addresses an appeal from a criminal conviction for driving while intoxicated, is not authority forany proposition relating to dismissals without prejudice or the expiration of statute-of-limitations periods.8We note that “the determination of malice in defamation cases is particularly in the province of the jury.”Cousins v. T.G. & Y. Stores Co., 514 So. 2d 904, 906 (Ala. 1987). Furthermore, regarding the requirementthat the defendant be negligent if the plaintiff is a private person, we note that,“[i]n determining whether the defendant acted as a reasonable, prudent person under thecircumstances in publishing the defamatory communication the finder of fact may takeinto account the thoroughness of the check that a reasonable person would make beforepublishing the statement, the nature of the interests that the defendant was seeking topromote in publishing the statement, and the extent of damage to which the statementexposed the plaintiff's reputation.”Mead Corp. v. Hicks, 448 So. 2d 308, 312 (Ala. 1983).9The word “sponsor” connotes “one who assumes responsibility for some other person or thing” or “a person ...that pays for or plans and carries out a project or activity.” Merriam-Webster's Collegiate Dictionary 1206(11th ed. 2020). Thus, the statement could be read to indicate that Horton bears some responsibility for, or isinvolved in some way in, the activities of a “meth house” and therefore in the production of methamphetamine.The production of methamphetamine is illegal. See Ala. Code 1975, §§ 13A-12-217 and 13A-12-218.10Colvin also asserted the defense of conditional privilege regarding statements that he admittedly had madeat a political meeting that Horton had alleged “linked” Horton to a “prostitution ring.” As noted in note 1, supra,
Horton v. Colvin, --- So.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12the complaint does not contain sufficient information regarding those alleged statements to permit analysisof the sufficiency of the claim of slander premised upon them.11In his complaint, Horton averred that he had owned a business or businesses that had formerly operated onthe premises adjoining Colvin's property. Those businesses were referred to as “Stormins Garage,” “StorminsTowing Service,” and “Stormins Wrecker Sales.”12Harassment is a criminal act and would include conduct like that allegedly directed toward the Bolins. SeeAla. Code 1975, § 13A-11-8(a)(2) (stating that “harassment shall include a threat, verbal or nonverbal, madewith the intent to carry out the threat, that would cause a reasonable person who is the target of the threatto fear for his or her safety”).13The tort of outrage, or intentional infliction of emotional distress, was recognized in American Road ServiceCo. v. Inmon, 394 So. 2d 361, 365 (Ala. 1980). The Inmon court stated that it“recognize[d] that one who by extreme and outrageous conduct intentionally or recklesslycauses severe emotional distress to another is subject to liability for such emotionaldistress and for bodily harm resulting from the distress. The emotional distress ... mustbe so severe that no reasonable person could be expected to endure it. Any recoverymust be reasonable and justified under the circumstances, liability ensuing only whenthe conduct is extreme.”394 So. 2d at 365.14We further note that, because Horton was not present when the alleged act took place, meaning that he couldnot have been placed in any fear of harm or have suffered any emotional upset, he would lack the ability toestablish his entitlement to recovery for such causes of action as assault or the tort of outrage. See Harris v.McDavid, 553 So. 2d 567, 570 (Ala. 1989) (explaining that, in order to succeed on a tort-of-outrage claim, theplaintiff must establish that the defendant's actions caused the plaintiff severe emotional distress); Harrisonv. Mitchell, 391 So. 2d 1038, 1040 (Ala. Civ. App. 1980) (indicating that, once the plaintiff established that thedefendant had “unlawfully threatened to touch [the plaintiff] in an angry manner under such circumstances asto lead [the plaintiff] to believe that [the defendant] not only possessed an immediate ability to carry out histhreat but that he would soon do so,” the jury was able to award compensatory damages); John R. Thompson& Co. v. Vildibill, 211 Ala. 199, 202, 100 So. 139, 141 (1924) (indicating, in case involving the wielding of afirearm, that, although “ ‘[p]hysical pain, mental suffering, or mental anguish, or all three, may be inferred bythe jury to exist” a plaintiff must first establish “proof of fright caused by a sudden, unprovocated, unjustifiable,assault with a pistol, accompanied with insulting language”). As a result, the allegations in Horton's complainthave not stated a claim for either tort; nor do the factual allegations of the complaint and answer reveal adispute concerning any material fact regarding any such claim.15Horton cites to Nelson v. Lapeyrouse, 534 So. 2d 1085 (Ala. 1988), but that citation is to support the definitionof slander per se, not to establish the elements of defamation. Slander, like libel, is a branch of defamation.Casey v. McConnell, 975 So. 2d 384 (Ala. Civ. App. 2007).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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