Arrieta v. Cervantes (July 15, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
ELIZABETH ARRIETA v. JOSEPH CERVANTES
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Arizona (AZ)
Court
Arizona Supreme Court
Decided
July 15, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
IN THE ARIZONA COURT OF APPEALS DIVISION TWO ELIZABETH ARRIETA; THE STATE OF ARIZONA, EX REL. THE DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMIC SECURITY, Petitioners/Appellees, v. JOSEPH CERVANTES, Respondent/Appellant. No. 2 CA-CV 2025-0103-FC Filed July 15, 2026 THIS DECISION DOES NOT CREATE LEGAL PRECEDENT AND MAY NOT BE CITED EXCEPT AS AUTHORIZED BY APPLICABLE RULES. NOT FOR PUBLICATION See Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 111(c)(1); Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. 28(a)(1), (f). Appeal from the Superior Court in Pima County No. D20081068 The Honorable Patricia A. Green, Judge Pro Tempore AFFIRMED COUNSEL Gilbert Law Firm, Tucson By Thea M. Gilbert Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee Elizabeth Arrieta Kristin K. Mayes, Arizona Attorney General By Jennifer R. Blum, Assistant Attorney General, Tucson Counsel for Petitioner/Appellee Arizona Department of Economic Security
ARRIETA v. CERVANTES Decision of the Court 2 Joseph Cervantes, Oro Valley In Propria Persona MEMORANDUM DECISION Vice Chief Judge Eppich authored the decision of the Court, in which Presiding Judge Vásquez and Judge Kelly concurred. E P P I C H, Vice Chief Judge: Joseph Cervantes appeals from the trial court’s February 2025 order requiring him to make monthly payments for arrearages for child support originally ordered in 2008. He also appeals from the court’s denial of his motion to vacate the 2025 order.1 He contends that his support obligations were rendered void by the child’s adoption in 2025. He further argues that the original support order was fraudulent, that enforcement of the support obligation was improper under Title IV-D of the Social Security Act, and that the February 2025 arrearage order was void because the issuing commissioner had not been properly assigned to hear the matter. Finally, he claims that the court unlawfully granted leave for an updated arrears calculation to be filed post-hearing.2 For the following reasons, we affirm. Cervantes argues that the child’s adoption, completed thirteen days before the enforcement hearing resulting in the February order, absolved him of all support obligations under A.R.S. § 8-117(B). In support of his argument, he cites State v. Gilman, a case which does not exist. 1We stayed Cervantes’s appeal of the 2025 order to permit the trial court to rule on the motion to vacate, which we deemed a motion for relief from judgment under Rule 85, Ariz. R. Fam. Law P., and allowed the parties to file supplemental briefs. 2In his amended opening brief Cervantes also claims the child support enforcement hearing was held without adequate notice as to the subject matter and without sworn testimony, but he fails to develop any argument relating to the issue. Accordingly, the argument is waived. See Boswell v. Fintelmann, 242 Ariz. 52, n.3 (App. 2017) (failure to adequately develop arguments waives them on appeal).
ARRIETA v. CERVANTES Decision of the Court 3 In the very real case of In re Marriage of Ramirez & Alarcon, 173 Ariz. 135 (App. 1992), this court rejected the exact interpretation of § 8-117(B) that Cervantes proposes. We recognized that nothing in the language of the statute affects legal rights that vest before an adoption order is entered. Marriage of Ramirez, 173 Ariz. at 137. And because periodic installments of child support become vested when due, adoption does not absolve a former parent of the obligation to pay arrearages for past support. Id.3 Accordingly, Cervantes’s argument on this issue is wholly lacking in merit. We next address Cervantes’s contention that the underlying child support order from 2008 was fraudulent. The sole basis for his claim is that the child’s mother, Appellee Arrieta, having claimed daycare expenses in her pre-decree filings, subsequently failed to produce receipts for two months of those expenses as ordered by the trial court, and that her attorney in 2024 claimed that disclosure was not required. As Appellee Department of Economic Security notes, Arrieta’s attorney’s 2024 email was in reference to whether financial disclosures were required in a then-pending proceeding—not with respect to the 2008 order. And Cervantes makes no persuasive argument as to precisely how Arrieta’s failure to provide receipts, which he was aware of well before he stipulated to owing more than $160,000 in child support arrears in 2023, is sufficient to establish fraud so as to render the 2008 order appealable more than sixteen years after Arrieta’s noncompliance.4 Because the time for Cervantes to challenge the 2008 order has long since passed, we lack jurisdiction to consider it. See In re Marriage of Thorn, 235 Ariz. 216, 5, 10 (App. 2014) (court lacks jurisdiction unless notice of appeal filed within thirty days of judgment).5 Cervantes next contends that the actions taken by the IV-D Commissioner were void because her assignment to the matter did not 3Subsequent amendments to § 8-117(B) are immaterial to the holding in Marriage of Ramirez. See 1999 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 347, § 14; 2000 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 155, § 12. 4In support of this argument, Cervantes cites Johnson v. Elson, 192 Ariz. 486 (App. 1998), a wholly irrelevant case involving the propriety of reinstatement of a personal injury suit after dismissal. 5Cervantes having failed to make a credible case for fraud, we need not consider his argument that fraud upon the court can be raised at any time.
ARRIETA v. CERVANTES Decision of the Court 4 comply with the requirements of reassignment and notice provided for in Rule 72(b), Ariz. R. Fam. Law P. But that rule addresses the powers of a family law master and has nothing to do with the assignment of a judicial officer to a case.6 Under Rule 13(a), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., an opening brief must set forth an appellant’s contentions concerning each issue presented for review with supporting reasons, citations to legal authorities, and appropriate references to the record. In re Aubuchon, 233 Ariz. 62, 6 (2013). In evaluating the sufficiency of briefing, we hold unrepresented litigants to the same standards as attorneys and do not afford them special leniency. Flynn v. Campbell, 243 Ariz. 76, 24 (2017). With respect to this issue, Cervantes’s opening brief is entirely deficient. Aside from his citation of nonexistent and irrelevant legal authority, his argument is conclusory and undeveloped. See Boswell v. Fintelmann, 242 Ariz. 52, n.3 (App. 2017). And although Cervantes claims that he objected in the trial court, his brief does not cite where in the record that specific objection on these same grounds can be found. See Rule 13(a)(7), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. Nor do we agree with Cervantes’s suggestion that he preserved the claim by raising it in his Motion for Reconsideration. See Ramsey v. Yavapai Fam. Advoc. Ctr., 225 Ariz. 132, 18 (App. 2010) (court of appeals does not generally consider arguments raised for first time in motion for reconsideration). This issue is waived.7 Cervantes also contends that he is entitled to relief based upon noncompliance with federal statutory prerequisites to IV-D enforcement. But he fails to develop his argument sufficiently in his opening brief to allow for meaningful appellate review. In particular, he does not meaningfully explain precisely how the purported violations resulted in error and makes no argument as to any resulting prejudice. See Rule 13(a)(7), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P. Cervantes also challenges enforcement under IV-D in his supplemental brief in response to the denial of his motion to vacate, arguing that the filing of an application for benefits under 42 U.S.C. § 654(4)(A)(ii) 6In further support of his argument, Cervantes cites Silva v. De Mendoza, another case which does not exist. 7To the extent that Cervantes tries to cure these and other defects in his opening brief by raising new or different arguments in his reply brief, we do not consider them. See Johnson v. Provoyeur, 245 Ariz. 239, n.5 (App. 2018) (court of appeals does not consider arguments first raised in reply brief).
ARRIETA v. CERVANTES Decision of the Court 5 is a condition precedent to a IV-D proceeding, and the absence of such an application in this case deprived Commissioner Green of subject matter jurisdiction. But while the statute cited by Cervantes requires states to assist custodial parents in collecting child support upon such application, it in no way precludes the state from participating absent such an application. § 654(4)(A)(ii). Indeed, as the Department of Economic Security notes in its answering brief, A.R.S. § 25-509(B) grants the state an unconditional right to intervene in child support actions by simply filing a notice of appearance. Moreover, to the extent Cervantes argues that the state’s participation renders the trial court’s order void, he confuses the Attorney General’s authority to participate with the court’s unquestionable subject matter jurisdiction over child support matters.8 See Ariz. Const. art. VI, § 14(1), (9); A.R.S. §§ 25-311, 25-320; see also Balazic v. Balazic, 235 Ariz. 588, 9 (App. 2014) (superior court has subject matter jurisdiction over domestic relations matters, including child support). Nor does he offer any other argument as to why the state’s participation in enforcement relieves him of his responsibility for years of child support arrearages. The IV-D Commissioner granted leave for a final arrears calculation to be submitted post-hearing. Cervantes contends that the decision to do so was “improper and unlawful.” But the sole legal authority he cites for that conclusion is Kline v. Kline, 221 Ariz. 564 (App. 2009), yet another irrelevant case involving the validity of a default judgment and the application of the attorney-client privilege. Moreover, Cervantes fails to explain how he was prejudiced by the decision. Because his argument is insufficient to establish error or prejudice, we affirm on this issue. Appellee Arrieta requests we award her attorney fees on appeal as a sanction under Rule 25, Ariz. R. Civ. App. P., for having to respond to an opening brief that cites no actual legal authority in support of the arguments set forth therein. We agree that such an award is 8In his supplemental brief Cervantes also argues that the trial court erred by ruling on his motion to vacate without taking evidence on a contested matter and in relying upon an expired, contingent stipulation in determining that he owed unpaid child support. But it is clear from the record that Cervantes has paid only a fraction of the support plainly owed under the 2008 order. And, as we explain below, the court granted leave for the filing of a final arrears calculation. Under the circumstances, Cervantes has failed to identify any prejudice resulting from the ongoing payment obligations that were ordered.
ARRIETA v. CERVANTES Decision of the Court 6 warranted given the noncompliant nature of Cervantes’s brief and his legally frivolous argument that the adoption wiped away his obligation to pay arrearages for child support. Accordingly, we award reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal to Arrieta upon her compliance with Rule 21(b), Ariz. R. Civ. App. P.
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