Davis v. Airlines (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Nia Elan Davis v. American Airlines, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Arizona (AZ)
Court
Arizona Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Nia Elan Davis, Plaintiff, v. American Airlines, et al., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 444958Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Arizona.Nia Elan Davis, Plaintiff,v.American Airlines, et al., Defendants.No. CV-25-01992-PHX-KML|02/17/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsNia Elan Davis, Tempe, AZ, Pro Se.Sarah Martin Humble, Ogletree Deakins PC, Phoenix, AZ,for Defendant.ORDER*1 Plaintiff Nia Elan Davis has filed at least four complaints(Docs. 1, 26, 30, 32), requiring her employer, defendantAmerican Airlines, to file three motions to dismiss (Doc. 27,31, 34.) The operative complaint does not contain sufficientfacts to state any claim for relief and, given the history of thiscase, additional leave to amend is not appropriate.BACKGROUNDDavis filed her original complaint on June 9, 2025. (Doc. 1.)A little over one month later, Davis filed a “Motion to AcceptWaiver of Service.” (Doc. 13.) The court denied that motionafter explaining it was not appropriate because it would beup to American Airlines to object to the adequacy of service.(Doc. 14 at 1.) The court informed Davis that although shewas proceeding pro se, she was required to comply with thesame rules of procedures that apply to all litigants. Daviswas also instructed to “ensure her filings compl[ied] with allapplicable rules and procedures.” (Doc. 14 at 1.) Despite thosewarnings, on July 25, 2025, Davis filed another “Motion toAccept Waiver of Service.” (Doc. 20.) The court issued asecond order denying the motion as “baseless” and remindingDavis she was risking sanctions by ignoring court orders.(Doc. 23 at 2.)On September 8, 2025, the parties filed a joint motionrequesting Davis be allowed to amend her complaint. (Doc.24.) The court granted that motion and, on September19, 2025, Davis filed her amended complaint. (Doc. 26.)American Airlines responded to that complaint by filing itsfirst motion to dismiss. (Doc. 27.) Davis did not opposethat motion and two weeks after the opposition was due, thecourt granted the motion with leave to amend. (Doc. 29.) Inthe order granting the motion, the court explained AmericanAirlines had argued Davis did not exhaust her administrativeremedies regarding any claim other than retaliation. (Doc. 29at 2.) Because Davis had not filed an opposition, the courtagreed “Davis only exhausted her retaliation claim.” (Doc.29 at 2.) The court also discussed other problems with thecomplaint, such as the lack of sufficient factual allegations.(Doc. 29 at 2.) As of that point, Davis was on notice thatany future complaint would need significantly more factualallegations than she had provided up to that time.On November 12, 2025, Davis filed a second amendedcomplaint. (Doc. 30.) Two weeks later, American Airlinesfiled its second motion to dismiss. (Doc. 31.) Before filingthat motion American Airlines had conferred with Davis,but the parties were unable to reach an agreement that thesecond amended complaint could be cured by amendment.(Doc. 31-1 at 1.) Instead of opposing the motion to dismiss,however, Davis filed a third amended complaint. (Doc. 32.)That filing included two different complaints, so the courthad to clarify the operative complaint was the documentfound at Doc. 32 and the parties were to ignore the documentfound at Doc. 32-1.1 (Doc. 33.) American Airlines filedits third motion to dismiss asking the court to dismiss thethird amended complaint. Davis responded to this motionand requested leave to amend if her complaint was foundinsufficient. (Doc. 35 at 4.) Davis's opposition also containeda citation to a non-existent case. (Doc. 35 at 4.) AmericanAirlines's reply argued the fictitious citation merited sanctionsin the form of dismissal. (Doc. 38 at 10.)*2 On January 15, 2026, Davis filed a “Notice of Correctionand Request for Leave to Amend.” (Doc. 39.) In thatnotice, Davis sought to withdraw the fictitious citation inher opposition. Davis also requested leave to amend thecomplaint if the motion to dismiss was granted. (Doc. 39.)Given that Davis had already made a request for leave toamend, it is not clear why she made this separate request.Turning to the substance, the third amended complaint beginsby stating Davis “was subjected to adverse treatment based
Nia Elan Davis, Plaintiff, v. American Airlines, et al., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2on race, color, sexual orientation, and age, and later subjectto retaliation for engaging in protected activity.” (Doc. 32 at1.) The complaint does not identify Davis's race, color, sexualorientation, or age. The complaint then includes a list of vagueallegations regarding Davis's employment.Davis alleges she has “consistently performed work dutiesat or above expectations” but she has been excludedfrom an unidentified “training program” despite unidentified“less qualified individuals” being selected for the program.(Doc. 32 at 2.) Davis raised unspecified “concerns aboutdiscrimination and adverse work conditions,” but she offersno allegations about when this occurred, to whom Daviscomplained, or any specifics regarding her “concerns.” (Doc.32 at 2.) After raising her “concerns,” Davis “sufferedescalating retaliation” that included her managers mentioning“the expiration date of [Davis's] Right-To-Sue letter.” (Doc.32 at 2.) The managers also “falsif[ied] documentation on[Davis's] record and more events past and current which willbe available during discovery.” (Doc. 32 at 2.) Althoughnot clear, the documentation Davis is referencing may be“[f]alsified coaching and disciplinary documentation.” (Doc.32 at 2.)Davis then alleged a bullet-point list of additional acts ofretaliation:• Davis received “[t]hreatening messages via Teams Chat”from an unspecified individual sometime in 2024;• Unidentified individuals “[m]anipulated stats bycontrolling the types of calls coming to plaintiff and others”at unidentified times in 2024 and 2025;• Davis was “[e]xclu[ded] from advancementopportunities” by unidentified individuals at unidentifiedtimes;• Davis was subjected to “[r]epeated verbal hostility” byunidentified individuals at unidentified times; and• Unidentified individuals at unidentified times created“[a]dditional documentation to justify adverse actions afterprotected activity.”Based on these allegations, Davis calculates she is owedback-pay damages of $269,400. (Doc. 32 at 3.) As pointedout by American Airlines, Davis also requests “[f]ront payif reinstatement is not feasible,” despite Davis still beingemployed by American Airlines. (Doc. 32 at 4.)ANALYSISAmerican Airlines's motion to dismiss makes two basicarguments. First, Davis did not exhaust any claim other thanretaliation. (Doc. 34 at 5-7.) And second, Davis has notalleged sufficient facts to state a retaliation claim. (Doc. 34 at7-13.) Both arguments are correct.I. Exhaustion of Administrative RemediesAmerican Airlines argues Davis only exhausted a retaliationclaim with the EEOC such that all of her non-retaliationclaims must be dismissed. American Airlines made this sameargument in an earlier motion to dismiss and, based in largepart on Davis's failure to file an opposition, the court agreedwith American Airlines. (Doc. 27 at 6-8; Doc. 29 at 2.)Although Davis did respond to the latest motion to dismiss,she still does not address exhaustion. Instead, her oppositionmight be read as conceding she is only pursuing a retaliationclaim. (Doc. 35 at 1) (allegations in third amended complaint“easily meet the standard for retaliation”). But regardlessof the previous order regarding exhaustion and the lackof meaningful argument from Davis, American Airlines iscorrect that Davis only exhausted a retaliation claim.*3 Once a plaintiff files a charge with the EEOC andreceives a right-to-sue notice, she may pursue litigation overthe claims in the administrative charge alongside additionalclaims that “are like or reasonably related to the allegationscontained in the EEOC charge.” B.K.B. v. Maui PoliceDep't, 276 F.3d 1091, 1100 (9th Cir. 2002) (simplified). Inother words, claims are administratively exhausted if theywould “fall within the scope of the...EEOC investigation thatcould reasonably be expected to grow out of the charge.”Vasquez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 644 (9th Cir.2003). When comparing the allegations in an administrativecharge to the claims in a civil complaint, the court mayconsider “the alleged basis of the discrimination, dates ofdiscriminatory acts specified within the charge, perpetratorsof discrimination named in the charge, and any locations atwhich discrimination is alleged to have occurred.” Freemanv. Oakland Unified Sch. Dist., 291F.3d 632, 636 (9th Cir. 2002) (simplified).Davis's administrative charge focuses on retaliation. That isthe sole basis Davis identified in the section of the formasking for her to identify what the alleged “discrimination[was] based on.” (Doc. 34-1 at 12.) And although Davis's
Nia Elan Davis, Plaintiff, v. American Airlines, et al., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3factual allegations in the charge are meandering, they endwith “I believed [sic] I have been retaliated against for filing aprevious EEOC Charge.” (Doc. 34-1 at 13.) An investigationinto the retaliation referenced in the charge would not haveexpanded to cover the discrimination based on “race, color,sexual orientation, or age” that Davis now alleges in herthird amended complaint. That Davis only intended to make aretaliation claim with the EEOC is supported by the fact thatshe had filed an earlier EEOC charge alleging she had beendiscriminated against based on her age, color, race, retaliation,and sex. (Doc. 34-1 at 3.) Thus, Davis knew how to selectand describe additional forms of discrimination, but for theEEOC charge underlying her current suit, she chose to raiseonly retaliation. All of her claims except for retaliation aredismissed for failure to exhaust. Sommatino v. United States,255 F.3d 704, 708 (9th Cir. 2001).II. Failure to State a ClaimAmerican Airlines argues Davis has not alleged sufficientfacts to state a plausible claim of retaliation. A complaintmust contain a “short and plain statement of the claimshowing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R.Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Although Rule 8 does not demand detailedfactual allegations, “it demands more than an unadorned,the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation.” Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). “Threadbare recitals of theelements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusorystatements, do not suffice.” Id.A prima facie case of retaliation claim under Title VII requiresallegations “(1) [the plaintiff] was engaging in protectedactivity, (2) the employer subjected her to an adverseemployment decision, and (3) there was a causal link betweenthe protected activity and the employer's action.” Bergenev. Salt River Project Agr. Imp. & Power Dist., 272 F.3d1136, 1141 (9th Cir. 2001). The requirement of establishinga prima facie case is an “evidentiary standard” and not a“pleading requirement[ ].” Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534U.S. 506, 510 (2002). Thus, a complaint cannot be dismissedmerely because it does not contain facts establishing all therequirements of a prima facie case. See Austin v. Univ. ofOregon, 925 F.3d 1133, 1137 (9th Cir. 2019). But it is helpfulto consider the elements of a prima facie case when assessingthe plausibility of a complaint. See Khalik v. United Air Lines,671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012) (holding a plaintiff isnot required to “establish a prima facie case in her complaint”but “the elements of each alleged cause of action help todetermine whether Plaintiff has set forth a plausible claim”).*4 The third amended complaint identifies the protectedactivity as “filing an EEOC complaint.” (Doc. 32 at 2.)Although it would have been helpful for Davis to identifywhich of her two EEOC complaints she is referencing, anEEOC filing complaining of discrimination undoubtedly isprotected activity meeting the first element of a retaliationclaim. The problems come with Davis not sufficientlyidentifying the adverse actions and not providing anyallegations supporting a link between the EEOC complaintand those adverse actions.The complaint alleges a wide variety of conduct that Davisseems to believe qualified as adverse actions. But Davisdoes not provide sufficient surrounding factual allegations toprovide American Airlines with fair notice of the conductat issue. For example, the allegation that “[t]hreateningmessages” were sent “via Teams chat” at some point in 2024does not provide adequate notice. Similarly, the allegation thatDavis experienced “[r]epeated verbal hostility” is too vague.These general allegations are insufficient because they leaveAmerican Airlines largely “in the dark” about the actual basisfor Davis's claims. Whitaker v. Tesla Motors, Inc., 985 F.3d1173, 1177 (9th Cir. 2021).Beyond vague allegations of adverse actions, there areno allegations establishing a causal relationship betweenthose actions and Davis's EEOC complaint. Davis allegesthe actions took place sometime after filing her EEOCcomplaint, but she does not identify the actual length of timebetween the various events (or even specific enough datesto infer the length). Simple temporal proximity can supporta retaliation claim but “[e]ven cases involving very closetemporal proximity have generally featured independentevidence of discrimination or retaliation.” Kama v. Mayorkas,107 F.4th 1054, 1060 (9th Cir. 2024). Without identifyingthe temporal proximity at issue, and without including anyother allegations indicating a retaliatory intent, Davis has notalleged a plausible causal connection.III. Leave to Amend“The court considers five factors in assessing the proprietyof leave to amend—bad faith, undue delay, prejudice tothe opposing party, futility of amendment, and whether theplaintiff has previously amended the complaint.” UnitedStates v. Corinthian Colleges, 655 F.3d 984, 995 (9th Cir.2011). Although there is not sufficient evidence to concludeDavis has acted in bad faith, the other factors support denyingleave to amend.
Nia Elan Davis, Plaintiff, v. American Airlines, et al., Defendants., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4This case began approximately eight months ago and sincethat time Davis has filed four complaints, requiring AmericanAirlines to file three motions to dismiss.2 After AmericanAirlines filed its first motion to dismiss, Davis did not filean opposition. (Doc. 27.) The court granted the motionbut also provided Davis with guidance if she plannedto file an amended complaint. (Doc. 27 at 29 at 2-3.)Unfortunately, the third amended complaint represents nomeaningful improvement as it consists of vague allegations ofevents not tied to particular dates or individuals. For whateverreason, Davis appears incapable of providing meaningfulfactual allegations.*5 Overall, Davis's approach to this litigation has causedundue delay and given the many amendments she hasalready made, it would be futile to give her another chance.In addition, “consideration of prejudice to the opposingparty...carries the greatest weight” when determining whetherto allow amendment. Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc.,316 F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). It would be prejudicialto American Airlines to give Davis endless opportunities tostate a claim for relief. Leave to amend is denied.IT IS ORDERED Motion to Dismiss (Doc. 34) isGRANTED. The Clerk of Court shall enter judgment in favorof defendant and close this case.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Motion for Leave toAmend (Doc. 39) is DENIED.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED the Motion to AllowElectronic Filing (Doc. 42) is DENIED AS MOOT.Dated this 17th day of February, 2026.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 444958Footnotes1The document found at Doc. 32 contains claims for discrimination based on race, color, sexual orientation, age, andretaliation. (Doc. 32 at 3.) The document found at Doc. 32-1 contains a single claim for retaliation. (Doc. 32-1 at 3.) Thereis no explanation why Davis filed documents containing such different claims.2Davis's second amended complaint included more details and a single claim for retaliation. (Doc. 30 at 1.) But Davis thenvoluntarily amended her complaint to remove the details and assert other claims. Davis “is the master of [her] complaintand responsible for articulating cognizable claims.” Newtok Vill. v. Patrick, 21 F.4th 608, 616 (9th Cir. 2021). Therefore,the court must accept that Davis intended to remove details and add claims, even though doing so may have beenharmful to her case.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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