Estate of Claxton (May 18, 2026)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Arizona (AZ)
Court
Arizona Supreme Court
Decided
May 18, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Brown (Presiding Judge), joined by Fabian (Judge), Howe (Chief Judge)
Estate of Claxton, Not Reported in Pac. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1383355Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDERARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c),THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL ANDMAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.In the Matter of the ESTATE OF:Margaret C. CLAXTON, Deceased.Richard William Claxton, Petitioner/appellant,v.Mary Margaret Brooks, etal., Respondents/appellees.No. 1 CA-CV 25-0685 PB|FILED May 18, 2026Appeal from the Superior Court in Maricopa County No.PB1997-001803 The Honorable Elizabeth T. Bingert, JudgePro Tempore.AFFIRMEDAttorneys and Law FirmsRichard William Claxton, Phoenix, Petitioner/AppellantDyer Bregman & Ferris, PLLC, Phoenix By Charles M.Dyer, Nathanael J. Scheer, Kyle H. Bycroft,Counsel forRespondent/Appellee Mary Margaret BrooksPresiding Judge Michael J. Brown delivered the decision ofthe Court, in which Judge Veronika Fabian and Chief JudgeRandall M. Howe joined.MEMORANDUM DECISIONBROWN, Judge:*1 ¶1 Richard W. Claxton (“Claxton”) appeals the superiorcourt's order denying his motion to reopen MargaretC. Claxton's (“Decedent”) probate, asserting Mary M.Brooks (“Brooks”) breached her fiduciary duty as personalrepresentative of Decedent's estate, committed fraud, andfailed to conduct an estate accounting. For the followingreasons, we affirm.BACKGROUND¶2 Decedent executed her last will and testament in 1991,naming Brooks as personal representative and dividing herproperty among her four children, including $50,000 toClaxton to be held in trust by Brooks. The will authorizedBrooks to distribute no more than $500 of trust net incometo Claxton monthly, as directed by him, until the trustterminated. The trust was to terminate upon Claxton's deathor when the principal and interest were “used in full.” WhenDecedent died in 1997, the superior court granted Brooks’petition for probate of the will and appointment as personalrepresentative. At that time, Claxton was serving two lifesentences in prison.¶3 Brooks filed a closing statement in October 2022,effectively closing the probate. Brooks stated the finaldistribution of Claxton's assets took place in July 2022 andthe estate had no other assets.¶4 Claxton moved to reopen the probate in July 2025, allegingBrooks breached her fiduciary duty by failing to: (1) openand fund an interest-bearing account for Claxton's $50,000bequest, (2) distribute the estate in accordance with the will,(3) timely close the probate proceedings, and (4) providenotice or an accounting to Claxton. Brooks responded,claiming Claxton's motion was untimely. She also explainedthat she deposited $50,000 into an account (“Account”), andClaxton was aware of all transactions because he requestedthat Account funds be sent to prison, given to his girlfriend,or used to ship items to him. Brooks also asserted that theAccount remained open until Claxton was able to obtain theremaining funds and close the Account, which then allowedher to file the closing statement.¶5 In denying the motion, the superior court construedClaxton's motion as a claim that Brooks “breached herfiduciary duty in the administration of the [D]ecedent'sestate.” The court then explained:[T]he closing statement was filed December 5, 2022. Noproceedings involving the personal representative werepending at the one-year mark, and the present Motion wasfiled July 7, 2025, which is more than 31 months after thefiling of the closing statement.Whether construed as a general challenge to administrationor as a claim of fiduciary breach, the motion is untimelyunder both A.R.S. § 14-3933(B) and § 14-3935. The
Estate of Claxton, Not Reported in Pac. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2statutory deadlines operate independently but concurrently,and the movant failed to initiate proceedings within thepermissible time under either.¶6 Claxton moved for reconsideration, asserting in partthe court failed to consider whether fraud tolled thestatute of limitations. The court denied the motion. Claxtontimely appealed, and we have jurisdiction under A.R.S. §12-2101(A)(9).DISCUSSION*2 ¶7 Claxton argues the superior court erred in rejectinghis claims that Brooks breached her fiduciary duties andcommitted fraud while serving as personal representative ofDecedent's estate and as trustee of the Account. We reviewquestions of law, including the applicability of a particularstatute of limitations, de novo. Larue v. Brown, 235 Ariz. 440,443, 14 (App. 2014).¶8 We first note that Claxton's briefing contains seriousdeficiencies. See ARCAP 13(a)(7) (requiring parties to citelegal authority and portions of the record on which theyrely); see also Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288, 305, 62 (App. 2009) (appellant must “present and addresssignificant arguments, supported by authority that set forth[his] position on the issue[s] in question”). Many of Claxton'sfactual assertions lack specific record cites, he includesseveral fictitious or inaccurate case citations, and he relies onnumerous law firm articles without explaining their relevanceor persuasive value. Though we could conclude that he haswaived his arguments, in our discretion we decline to do so.See Delmastro & Eells v. Taco Bell Corp., 228 Ariz. 134, 137, 7 n.2 (App. 2011) (acknowledging ARCAP 13 waiver isdiscretionary).¶9 Turning to the merits of Claxton's appeal, Brooks filedthe closing statement in December 2022. In July 2025, wellbeyond the six-month limitations period for asserting claimsagainst a personal representative for breach of fiduciary duty,see A.R.S. § 14-3935, Claxton moved to reopen the probate.Thus, the superior court properly concluded that Claxton'sbreach of fiduciary duty claim against Brooks as personalrepresentative is barred. To the extent Claxton claims thatBrooks breached a separate duty as Account trustee, he haswaived that claim because he did not raise it in the superiorcourt. See BMO Harris Bank N.A. v. Espiau, 251 Ariz. 588,594, 25 (App. 2021).¶10 Claxton also suggests the court erred by failing torecognize Brooks committed fraud by failing to depositDecedent's $50,000 bequest into an interest-bearing account.Fraud, however, must be alleged with particularity. Ariz. R.Civ. P. 9(b); see Town & Country Chrysler Plymouth v. Porter,11 Ariz. App. 369, 371 (1970) (stating elements of fraud).Claxton's unverified motion failed to adequately allege suchfacts against Brooks. Thus, his fraud claim cannot prevail.¶11 Claxton further claims Brooks failed to provide finalor annual accountings. Under A.R.S. § 14-3935, the six-month statute of limitations following the filing of the closingstatement does not include “rights to recover from a personalrepresentative for fraud, misrepresentation, or inadequatedisclosure related to the settlement of the decedent's estate.”However, as this court explained in Tovrea v. Nolan, 178Ariz. 485 (App. 1993),“ ‘inadequate disclosure’ cannot besingled out and separated from its accompanying contextof ‘fraud’ and ‘misrepresentation.’ ” Id. at 489. Therefore,an inadequate disclosure claim must be accompanied by afraud or misrepresentation claim. Id. (“We do not believe thelegislature intended to exempt from the six-month limitationperiod the mere failure or refusal to provide the accountingrequired under § 14-3931, absent some form of fraud orpurposeful misrepresentation, which appellants failed todemonstrate.”).*3 ¶12 As noted, Claxton has not pled a proper claim forfraud; nor has he alleged misrepresentation. He was deprivedof the opportunity to present his claim only by his owninaction. See id. His accounting claim, which he raised morethan two years after the filing of the closing statement, isbarred.¶13 Claxton also asserts Brooks did not prudently invest,protect, or distribute the $50,000 bequest. But Claxton firstraised this issue in his motion for reconsideration, and wegenerally do not consider arguments raised for the first timein a motion for reconsideration. See Evans Withycombe, Inc.v. W. Innovations, Inc., 215 Ariz. 237, 240, 15 (App. 2006).Thus, we decline to address this issue.¶14 According to Claxton, Brooks also failed to give himproper notice of the probate proceedings. But notice of thepersonal representative appointment hearing was published inthe newspaper and mailed to Claxton. The record also showsthat notice of Brooks’ appointment as personal representative,as well as the closing statement, were mailed to Claxton. He
Estate of Claxton, Not Reported in Pac. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3has not shown that Brooks failed to comply with applicablenotice requirements.¶15 Claxton further asserts a notice of lis pendens recordedin relation to a parcel of real property owned at one time bythe estate confirms the need for judicial protection over theestate. But he has not shown how that unrelated litigation hasany bearing on the issues about the Account.¶16 Finally, Claxton claims Brooks’ appellate counsel hasa conflict of interest. Even assuming that is true, we haveno jurisdiction over attorney discipline matters. See Ariz. R.Sup. Ct. 46(a) (recognizing the jurisdictional authority of theArizona Supreme Court and the State Bar of Arizona overlawyer disciplinary issues).CONCLUSION¶17 We affirm.All CitationsNot Reported in Pac. Rptr., 2026 WL 1383355End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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