In re termination of parental rights (Feb. 25, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
In re termination of parental rights (HK)
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Arizona (AZ)
Court
Arizona Supreme Court
Decided
Feb. 25, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Paton (Judge), joined by Catlett (Presiding Judge), Perkins (Judge)
IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K., Not Reported in Pac. Rptr.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 517864Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOTICE: NOT FOR OFFICIAL PUBLICATION. UNDERARIZONA RULE OF THE SUPREME COURT 111(c),THIS DECISION IS NOT PRECEDENTIAL ANDMAY BE CITED ONLY AS AUTHORIZED BY RULE.Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1.IN RE TERMINATION OFPARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K.No. 1 CA-JV 25-0131|FILED 02-25-2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Appeal from the Superior Court in Mohave County No.S8015SV202400044 The Honorable Michala M. Ruechel,JudgeAFFIRMEDAttorneys and Law FirmsRobert. K., Lake Havasu City AppellantThe Law Offices of Robert Casey, Phoenix By Robert IanCasey Advisory Counsel for AppellantGenesis Legal Group, Glendale By Alyssa N. Oubre Counselfor AppelleeJudge Angela K. Paton delivered the decision of the Court, inwhich Presiding Judge Michael S. Catlett and Judge JenniferM. Perkins joined.MEMORANDUM DECISIONPATON, Judge:*1 ¶1 Robert K. (“Father”) appeals the juvenile court'sorder terminating his parental rights to H.K. For the followingreasons, we affirm.FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY¶2 We view the facts in the light most favorable to upholdingthe juvenile court's termination order. Jordan C. v. Ariz. Dep'tof Econ. Sec., 223 Ariz. 86, 93, 18 (App. 2009).¶3 H.K., who was born in July 2019, is Father's biologicalchild. After H.K.’s birth, Angela B. (“Mother”) and H.K.moved to California to live with Angela's father andstepmother. Mother subsequently petitioned for parentingtime and legal decision-making for H.K. In October ofthat year, the superior court ordered Father to undergourinalysis testing, which returned positive results for THC andamphetamines. The court ordered Father to complete a hairfollicle test, but he failed to comply.¶4 In December 2020, the court adopted the parties’agreement that Mother have sole legal decision-makingauthority as to H.K., granted Father parenting time every otherweekend contingent upon his sobriety proven by compliancewith drug testing, and ordered Father to pay Mother $300 permonth in child support. Father, however, did not regularly test,and Mother declined to allow him parenting time with H.K.as a result.¶5 Father saw H.K. nine times between September 2023 andAugust 2024 and did not see H.K. at all between August 2024and December 2024. During the summer of 2024, Motheroffered to let Father watch H.K. while she worked, but Fatherconsistently declined. And Father regularly failed to paychild support. He paid for H.K.’s daycare until H.K. stoppedattending around July 2024. His final child support paymentwas $100 in August 2024; after that, he paid no more.¶6 In December 2024, Mother petitioned to terminate Father'sparental rights as to H.K. based on abandonment and chronicsubstance abuse grounds. The juvenile court appointed aninvestigator who interviewed Mother, Father, and H.K.,documented the family history, and prepared a social study.During Father's interview with the investigator, he admittedhe had not seen H.K. for the prior eight months and that hewas not paying child support on a regular basis. He reportedhe should not have to pay child support because he was notseeing H.K.¶7 Father initially told the investigator he had no drug chargesand no problems with probation but later admitted to being
IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K., Not Reported in Pac. Rptr.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2charged with possession of drug paraphernalia. Father alsoclaimed he had never tested positive for drugs while onprobation, which was false. Mother reported that Father'sprobation was revoked in 2024 after he tested positive formethamphetamine and cocaine. The investigator concludedthat Mother appropriately denied visitation based on Father'sfailure to drug test and recommended termination based onFather's abandonment of H.K.¶8 The juvenile court set a contested termination trial for June16, 2025, at 8:30 a.m. Father was informed of the date andtime while present at a scheduling conference on May 8, 2025.Father, however, failed to appear in person or virtually onthe trial date. Father's attorney told the court she mistakenlytold Father the trial began at 9:00 a.m. and asked the courtto waive his appearance during the beginning of testimonyand not find him in default. She also said she had beencommunicating with Father via email that morning “on atleast four occasions.” The court delayed the trial start timeuntil a few minutes after 9:00 a.m. at which time Father stillhad not appeared. It found no good cause for his failure toappear, found him in default, and proceeded in his absence.*2 ¶9 After hearing from Mother, the social studyinvestigator, and Mother's fiancé Christopher M. (“Fiancé”),the juvenile court found Mother had proven the abandonmentground by clear and convincing evidence but not the chronicsubstance abuse ground. The court then found it was in H.K.’sbest interests to terminate Father's parental rights.¶10 Father timely appealed. We have jurisdiction underArticle 6, Section 9, of the Arizona Constitution andArizona Revised Statutes (“A.R.S.”) Sections 8-235(A) and12-120.21(A)(1).DISCUSSION¶11 Father argues (1) the juvenile court improperly foundFather failed to appear without good cause and held him indefault, (2) Mother improperly prevented him from seeingH.K., excusing his abandonment, and (3) termination was notin H.K.’s best interests.¶12 We note at the outset Father failed to cite any legalcitation or the record in his opening brief. An openingbrief must include an argument containing the appellant'scontentions about the issues presented, along with supportingreasons and citations to the record and legal authority.ARCAP 13(a)(7); see also Ritchie v. Krasner, 221 Ariz. 288,305, 62 (App. 2009). An appellant's failure to support ordevelop an argument waives the issue on appeal. Polanco v.Indus. Comm'n, 214 Ariz. 489, 491, 6 n.2 (App. 2007). Thedecision to find waiver, however, is discretionary, Logan B. v.Dep't of Child Safety, 244 Ariz. 532, 536, 9 (App. 2018), andbecause the best interests of a child are at stake, we decline todo so here and will address the merits, see Nold v. Nold, 232Ariz. 270, 273, 10 (App. 2013).¶13 To terminate a parent-child relationship, the juvenilecourt must find (1) by clear and convincing evidence that atleast one statutory ground for termination exists and (2) by apreponderance of the evidence that the termination is in thechild's best interests. Alma S. v. Dep't of Child Safety, 245Ariz. 146, 149-50, 8 (2018); see also A.R.S. § 8-533(B)(listing grounds for termination). As the trier of fact, thejuvenile court “is in the best position to weigh the evidence,observe the parties, judge the credibility of witnesses, andresolve disputed facts.” Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec. v. Oscar O.,209 Ariz. 332, 334, 4 (App. 2004). We therefore affirm thejuvenile court's factual findings if supported by reasonableevidence. Denise R. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 221 Ariz. 92,93-94, 4 (App. 2009).I. The juvenile court did not abuse its discretion byfinding Father in default.¶14 Father argues the court abused its discretion in findinghim in default, arguing that his absence should be excusedbecause he was misinformed about the hearing time,experienced poor cell service, and had no Wi-Fi connection.A finding of good cause for failure to appear rests withinthe juvenile court's discretion. Adrian E. v. Ariz. Dep't ofEcon. Sec., 215 Ariz. 96, 101, 15 (App. 2007). Therefore,we review for abuse of discretion, which occurs if thejuvenile court's exercise of its discretion was “manifestlyunreasonable, or exercised on untenable grounds, or foruntenable reasons.” Id. (citation omitted).¶15 If a parent fails to appear at a pretrial conference, statusconference, or termination trial, and the court confirms theparent received the required notice under Section 8-535, thecourt may deem the parent to have “waived his or her legalrights and admitted the petition's allegations.” Marianne N. v.Dep't of Child Safety, 243 Ariz. 53, 58, 27 (2017); A.R.S.§ 8-535(D). The court may then “terminate the parent's rightsbased on the record and evidence presented.” Marianne N.,243 Ariz. at 58, 27; A.R.S. § 8-537(C). Although Section8-537(C) does not explicitly reference “default,” it effectively
IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K., Not Reported in Pac. Rptr.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3incorporates the concept from Rule 55 of the Arizona Rules ofCivil Procedure when a parent fails to appear at a terminationhearing. See Christy A. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ. Sec., 217 Ariz.299, 304, 14 (App. 2007). But a parent does not waivehis rights and admit the petition's allegations if he showsgood cause for the absence, which requires him to show both“excusable neglect” and a “meritorious defense.” See id. at 16.*3 ¶16 Here, Father failed to appear at trial despite beingproperly notified of the date and time in open court onMay 8, 2025. Father was also not prejudiced when hisattorney mistakenly told him the trial started at 9:00 a.m.because the court waited to start the trial until after 9:00a.m. And while the court indicated it would proceed in hisabsence, it noted he could appear in person or virtually atany time during the proceedings. He did not. We are notpersuaded by Father's claimed poor cell service and lackof Wi-Fi because his attorney told the court she had beencommunicating with Father that morning and he expressedno issues about connecting remotely. Father's counsel cross-examined witnesses and otherwise participated in the trial onhis behalf. The court did not abuse its discretion by findingFather in default. See Marianne N., 243 Ariz. at 58, 27;A.R.S. § 8-537(C).II. The juvenile court's termination order is not clearlyerroneous.¶17 Father next argues that he did not abandon H.K.; rather,Mother improperly prevented him from seeing H.K. byavoiding his phone calls and refusing to let him pick up H.K.from school.¶18 Whether abandonment occurred is a question of fact forthe juvenile court, and we will affirm its termination orderunless clearly erroneous. Michael J. v. Ariz. Dep't of Econ.Sec., 196 Ariz. 246, 250, 20 (2000); In re B.W., 153 Ariz.Cases Dig. 19, 25, 14 (2025). A parent abandons his orher child when he fails “to provide reasonable support andto maintain regular contact with the child” and instead onlymakes “minimal efforts to support and communicate with thechild.” A.R.S. § 8-531(1). A parent's “[f]ailure to maintain anormal parental relationship with the child without just causefor a period of six months constitutes prima facie evidence ofabandonment.” Id.; In re B.W., 153 Ariz. Cases Dig. at 25, 15.¶19 Here, the juvenile court found Father failed to maintain anormal parent-child relationship with H.K. for more than sixmonths. Father saw H.K. only nine times between September2023 and August 2024 and had no contact with H.K. atall from August through December 2024. The court furthernoted Father had provided H.K. no financial support betweenhis $100 child support payment in August 2024 and thetrial in June 2025. Mother's testimony and the investigator'stestimony and social study support these findings.¶20 Further, Father's arguments are inconsistent with thefacts. Mother reported to the investigator that she offeredFather the opportunity to be more involved in H.K.’s life—for example, by inviting him to watch H.K. while she workedthroughout the summer of 2024—but Father consistentlydeclined. And Father did not dispute at trial that he agreedto the arrangement that the court adopted early on regardingFather's parenting time. That agreement specifically providedthat Father could only exercise parenting time if he drug testedto prove sobriety—which he did not do. Mother testified sherepeatedly told Father he could see H.K. if he submitted todrug testing, yet Father refused to do so. Reasonable evidencesupports the juvenile court's finding that Father abandonedH.K.III. Reasonable evidence supports the juvenile court'sbest interests findings.¶21 Finally, Father argues he “has a lot to offer his son,” so itwas not in H.K.’s best interests to terminate his parental rights.¶22 We will affirm the juvenile court's best interests findingsif supported by reasonable evidence. Dominique M. v. Dep'tof Child Safety, 240 Ariz. 96, 97, 6 (App. 2016). Afterfinding a statutory ground for termination exists, the juvenilecourt must then determine whether termination is in the bestinterests of the child by a preponderance of the evidence. KentK. v. Bobby M., 210 Ariz. 279, 284, 22 (2005). Once thecourt finds a parent unfit under at least one statutory groundfor termination, “termination is in the child's best interests ifeither: (1) the child will benefit from severance; or (2) thechild will be harmed if severance is denied.” Alma S., 245Ariz. at 150, 13.*4 ¶23 “[A] determination of the child's best interestsmust include a finding as to how the child would benefitfrom a severance or be harmed by the continuation of therelationship.” In re Appeal in Maricopa Cnty. Juv. ActionNo. JS-500274, 167 Ariz. 1, 5 (1990). Courts “must considerthe totality of the circumstances existing at the time of theseverance determination, including the child's adoptabilityand the parent's rehabilitation.” Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 148, 1.
IN RE TERMINATION OF PARENTAL RIGHTS AS TO H.K., Not Reported in Pac. Rptr.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4The court may find a child would benefit from termination ifthere is an adoption plan in place, or if the child is consideredadoptable—even if only one parent's rights are terminated.See In re M.L., 162 Ariz. Cases Dig. 13, 17-18, ¶¶ 13-17 (App.2025).¶24 In finding that termination was in H.K.’s best interests,the court relied on his adoptability and Fiancé’s plan foradoption. Mother and Fiancé were scheduled to marry inJune 2025 and Fiancé testified he intended to adopt H.K.as soon as possible. The court found Mother provided H.K.with a loving, nurturing home where he is thriving. Thecourt further found H.K. and Fiancé shared an “amazingrelationship,” noting they spent significant time together, andalready have a parent-child relationship. Fiancé testified thathe regularly took H.K. to and from school, prepared his meals,and engaged in various activities with him, such as videogames and taking him to the park. Fiancé also testified he isan attorney and financially capable of supporting H.K.¶25 H.K.’s attorney also argued that termination was in H.K.’sbest interests because it would allow for Fiancé to adopt andgive him a safe and stable home. Although Father argues hehas much to offer his son, we do not reweigh the evidenceon appeal. See Alma S., 245 Ariz. at 151, 18. Reasonableevidence supports the court's best interests findings.IV. Mother's Answering Brief¶26 Mother's answering brief contains what appear to behallucinated quotations from statutes and cases.¶27 Mother claims that Section 8-531(1) states that“[a]bandonment is measured by a parent's conduct, notthe parent's subjective intent.” Mother also claims Section8-533(B)(1) provides that abandonment is established whenthe parent has failed to maintain a normal parental relationship“without just cause.” These statutes do not contain thelanguage Mother quotes.¶28 Mother also claims Raymond F. v. Department ofEconomic Security, 224 Ariz. 373, 378, 21 (App. 2010),contains the following quote: “[a] parent who creates barriersto contact through substance abuse cannot claim just causefor his failure to maintain a relationship.” This quote does notexist in the case.¶29 Finally, Mother cites JS-501568, 177 Ariz. at 577,claiming it states, “[a] parent's ability to maintain arelationship must be judged by what they do, not what anotherparent does or does not do.” Mother also claims this case holdsthat Arizona courts consistently find: “[m]inimal efforts donot preclude abandonment ... sporadic or infrequent contactis not normal parental contact.” We are unable to find thesequotes within this case.¶30 Counsel has ethical duties of candor to this court and tocertify that representations made to this court are accurate.Ariz. R. Sup. Ct. 42, ER 3.3; Ariz. R. Civ. P. 11(b); see alsoMangan v. Mangan, 227 Ariz. 346, 353-54, ¶¶ 29-32 (App.2011) (sanctioning counsel for misrepresenting the record andrelying on inappropriate legal authorities). We will forwardthis decision to the State Bar of Arizona to determine whetherMother's counsel violated any rules of professional conduct.CONCLUSION*5 ¶31 We affirm.All CitationsNot Reported in Pac. Rptr., 2026 WL 517864End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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