Polite v. TitleMax of Arizona Inc., No. CV-25-01574-PHX-JZB (2026)

Case details
Full caption
D. Arizona. Mykhal Lloyd Polite v. TitleMax of Arizona Incorporated
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Arizona (AZ)
Court
Arizona Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Majority
United States (J.) (unanimous Court)
Mykhal Lloyd Polite, Plaintiff, v. TitleMax of Arizona Incorporated,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 183546Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Arizona.Mykhal Lloyd Polite, Plaintiff,v.TitleMax of Arizona Incorporated, Defendant.No. CV-25-01574-PHX-JZB|01/23/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsMykhal Lloyd Polite, Los Angeles, CA, Pro Se.Julia Elizabeth McFall, Justin Duke Rodriguez, Max AlexJones, Pro Hac Vice, Atkinson Baker & Rodriguez PC,Albuquerque, NM, for Defendant TitleMax of ArizonaIncorporated.United States Magistrate JudgeORDER*1 Pending before the Court is Plaintiff's “Motion for Leaveto File First Amended Complaint” (“Third Motion for Leaveto Amend,” and “Motion”) (doc. 37).1 The instant Motionwas filed on December 29, 2025. See (doc. 37.) Plaintiffseeks leave to file a Third Amended Complaint2 (“TAC”)to narrow his legal theories, “[e]liminate [n]on-[a]ctionableand [c]ontextual statutes,” and clarify his factual allegations.(Id. at 1–2.) The Court will deny the Motion with prejudicebecause Plaintiff's TAC is futile for failing to state a viableclaim upon which relief may be granted.I. Factual Background.On April 1, 2025, Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, commencedthis action by filing his original Complaint against DefendantTitleMax of Arizona, Inc. (“TitleMax”). See (doc. 1.) Thefollowing facts are taken from Plaintiff's TAC.3Plaintiff's action arises from a settlement agreement betweenthe Parties entered on July 16, 2024, involving a repossessed2011 Chevrolet Camaro.4 (Doc. 37-1 at 3.) Under thesettlement agreement, Plaintiff would regain possession of thevehicle and take steps necessary to transfer title to Plaintiff.(Id.)On an undisclosed date, Plaintiff retrieved the vehicle.(Id.) Plaintiff alleges that he found “the vehicle in amaterially damaged condition that differed from the conditionpreviously communicated to Plaintiff.” (Id.) The damagesalleged are mechanical and physical in nature, “including butnot limited to damage affecting its operability and ability topass emissions testing.” (Id.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendantdid not disclose the state of the vehicle to Plaintiff beforehe regained possession of the vehicle. (Id.) Beyond thealleged damage to the vehicle, Plaintiff alleges that Defendantdelayed transferring title to the vehicle, which preventedPlaintiff from lawfully registering and driving his vehicle. II.Procedural background.On April 1, 2025, Plaintiff commenced this action in theMaricopa County Superior Court. (Doc.1-1 at 3.) This actionwas subsequently removed to the U.S. District Court for theDistrict of Arizona by Defendant on May 7, 2025. (Doc. 1at 6.) On May 21, 2025, Plaintiff filed a First Motion forLeave to Amend. See (doc. 11.) This motion was denied forfailure to comply with LRCiv 15.1 and because of the useof hallucinated cases from purported Artificial Intelligenceuse. See (doc. 25.) Following the Court's denial, Plaintiffsimultaneously filed his Second Motion for Leave to Amendon October 6, 2025. (Doc. 26.) The Court denied his SecondMotion for Leave to Amend because it was futile and undulyprejudicial to Defendant. See (doc. 35.) The Court permittedPlaintiff to file a renewed motion for leave to amend on orbefore December 26, 2025. (Id. at 11.) The instant Motion wasfiled on December 29, 2025. (Doc. 37.)*2 III. Legal Standards. Rule 15 of the Federal Rules ofCivil Procedure governs whether the Court shouldor should not grant leave to amend. See generally Fed. R.Civ. P. 15. Under Rule 15, a party may amend its pleadingsas a matter of course within 21 days of serving it, or 21 daysafter service of a responsive pleading or Rule 12(b), (e), or (f)motion. Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(1). “In all other cases, a partymay amend its pleading only with the opposing party's writtenconsent or the court's leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2).Generally, leave to amend is “freely give[n] when justice sorequires.” Fed. R. Civ.P. 15(a)(2). “Rule 15’s policy of favoring amendments topleadings should be applied with extreme liberality” innormal circumstances. DCD Programs, Ltd. v. Leighton, 833
Mykhal Lloyd Polite, Plaintiff, v. TitleMax of Arizona Incorporated,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2F.2d 183, 186 (9th Cir. 1987) (cleaned up); Chudacoff v. Univ.Med. Ctr. of S. Nevada, 649 F.3d 1143, 1152 (9th Cir. 2011)(“Rule 15(a) is designed to facilitate decision on the merits,rather than on the pleadings or technicalities.”) (cleaned up).While Rule 15 is to be applied with extreme liberality, itdoes not guarantee leave to amend will be granted. Rather,the decision whether to “grant or den[y]...an opportunity toamend is within the discretion of the District Court[.]” Komiev. Buehler Corp., 449 F.2d 644, 648 (9th Cir. 1971) (citationomitted).In analyzing whether leave to amend should be granted, theCourt applies the following Foman factors:In the absence of any apparent ordeclared reason—such as undue delay,bad faith or dilatory motive on thepart of the movant, repeated failureto cure deficiencies by amendmentspreviously allowed, undue prejudiceto the opposing party by virtue ofallowance of the amendment, futilityof amendment, etc.—the leave soughtshould, as the rules require, be ‘freelygiven.’Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962).In applying the Foman factors, the U.S. Court of Appealsfor the Ninth Circuit has clarified that not every factor isweighed evenly. Eminence Cap., LLC v. Aspeon, Inc., 316F.3d 1048, 1052 (9th Cir. 2003). Specifically, “[p]rejudice isthe ‘touchstone of the inquiry under rule 15(a).’ ” Id. (quotingLone Star Ladies Inv. Club v. Schlotzsky's Inc., 238 F.3d 363,368 (5th Cir. 2001)).Beyond undue prejudice, “[f]utility of amendment can, byitself, justify the denial of a motion for leave to amend.” Boninv. Calderon, 59 F.3d 815, 845 (9th Cir. 1995). An amendmentis futile where it does not “present a viable claim on the meritsfor which relief could be granted[,]” Murray v. Schriro, 745F.3d 984, 1015 (9th Cir. 2014), or “[w]here the legal basisfor a cause of action is tenuous[.]” Lockheed Martin Corp. v.Network Sols., Inc., 194 F.3d 980, 986 (9th Cir. 1999).IV. Discussion.Plaintiff seeks leave to amend so that he may: (1) narrowhis legal theories; (2) eliminate non-actionable and contextualstatutes; and (3) clarify his factual allegations. (Doc. 37 at1–2.) Plaintiff supports his Motion by referencing Rule 15’sliberal standard and stating that none of the Foman factorsare present. (Id. at 1.) In its Response, Defendant asserts thatPlaintiff's Motion should be denied because: (1) Plaintiff'sproposed TAC is futile; “Plaintiff improperly seeks damageswhich he intended to release in the settlement agreement”; and(3) because he neither attached the settlement agreement5 noraverred how Defendant breached said agreement. (Doc. 38at 1–4.) Additionally, the Court notes that Plaintiff's Motionis untimely under this Court's prior order. Compare (doc.35) with (doc. 37). Accordingly, the Court will address: (1)whether the untimeliness of Plaintiff's Motion necessitatesdenying it; (2) whether Plaintiff's TAC is futile; and (3)whether the damages sought are improper.1. Untimely Motion.*3 As an initial matter, the Court notes that Plaintiff's Motionis untimely. Plaintiff was given until December 26, 2025,to file a renewed motion for leave to amend. (Doc. 35 at11.) Plaintiff did not file the instant Motion until December29, 2025. See (doc. 35.) The Court puts Plaintiff on noticethat he must file motions by the deadline. See Fed. R. Civ.P. 6. Signing and mailing by the deadline is insufficient;Rather, Plaintiff has an obligation to file motions and noticesby the deadline, especially considering “[p]ro se litigantsmust follow the same rules of procedure that govern otherlitigants.” King v. Atiyeh, 814 F.2d 565, 567 (9th Cir. 1987),overruled on other grounds, Lacey v. Maricopa Cnty., 693F.3d 896 (9th Cir. 2012).Although Plaintiff's Motion is late, the Court will not deny iton procedural grounds. This is because the Court finds thatPlaintiff's untimely motion was due to excusable neglect.6However, going forward, Plaintiff is warned that he must filemotions by the deadline. Signing a motion or mailing a motionby the deadline is insufficient.2. Futility.The Court will next address whether Plaintiff's TAC is futile.Plaintiff's TAC asserts the following counts: (a) breach ofcontract; (b) violations of the Arizona Consumer Fraud Act(“ACFA”); and (c) negligence. (Doc. 37-2 at 6–7.) The Courtwill address each count in turn.
Mykhal Lloyd Polite, Plaintiff, v. TitleMax of Arizona Incorporated,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3a. Count One: Breach of Contract.In his first count, Plaintiff alleges that Defendant's breachedthe settlement agreement by delivering the vehicle in adamaged condition and failing to timely transfer title to thevehicle. (Id. at 6.) To succeed on a breach of contract claimunder Arizona law, a party “must show that an enforceablecontract exists, that it was breached, and that the plaintiffsuffered damages.” Williams v. Alhambra Sch. Dist. No. 68,234 F. Supp. 3d 971. 984–85 (D. Ariz. 2017) (citing Grahamv. Asbury, 540 P.2d 656, 657 (Ariz. 1975)).Viewing the facts in the light most favorable to Plaintiff, hehas failed to present a viable claim for which relief couldbe granted. This is because, as an initial matter, Plaintiff'sTAC does not establish that an enforceable settlementagreement exists. While Plaintiff references a settlementagreement between the Parties, he does not attach a copyof the agreement to the TAC. Instead, Plaintiff solely statesthat “[u]nder the settlement, Defendant agreed to returnpossession of the vehicle to Plaintiff and take the stepsnecessary to transfer title[.]” (Doc. 37-2 at 3.) This singularreference to a purported settlement agreement in the TAC isinsufficient to establish that an enforceable contract existed.7*4 Second, Plaintiff's TAC, were it to be adopted, does notestablish that Defendant “breached” a purported settlementagreement. See Williams, 234 F. Supp. at 984–85. First, underthe sole purported provision of the agreement, Defendant'sonly obligation was to return the vehicle and transfer title.See (doc. 37-2 at 3.) This, under the TAC, Defendant did.(Id.) (noting that Defendant did in fact transfer the vehicleand title—albeit allegedly late). So, Defendant complied withits two purported requirements: (a) return possession; and (b)transfer title. Regarding the averred delay in transferring thevehicle, Plaintiff does not allege a deadline for the vehicleto be transferred nor a date when the vehicle and title weretransferred. See (id.) Without these crucial facts, the Court isunable to ascertain whether there was a late transfer of title.Because it would require the Court and opposing party tointuit crucial facts regarding a contract and the state of affairsin this action, Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is futile forfailing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.b. Count Two: Violation of ACFA.Plaintiff's ACFA claim is futile for failure to state a claimupon which relief may be granted. Such finding should not beof surprise considering that this is Plaintiff's second attemptto raise an ACFA claim. Specifically, in Plaintiff's proposedSecond Amended Complaint (“SAC”), Plaintiff asserted anACFA violation which the Court found insufficient. See (doc.35 at 9–10.) Although Plaintiff's ACFA claim in this TACdoes not perfectly mirror the ACFA claim in his SAC, bothversions of his ACFA are legally insufficient because theACFA does not apply to settlement agreements. As this Courthas already stated:Under Arizona law, the use of “any deception, deceptive orunfair act or practice, fraud, false pretense, false promise,misrepresentation,...with intent that others rely on such[act], in connection with the sale or advertisement of anymerchandise...[is] unlawful.” A.R.S. § 44-1522(A).Viewing the facts [of Plaintiff's proposed Complaint] in thelight most favorable to [him], the Court finds that he hasfailed to present a viable ACFA claim because, under theplain and unambiguous terms of the Act, it does not applyto settlement agreements. Under both federal and stateprecedent, where “the words of a statute are unambiguous,the ‘judicial inquiry is complete.’ ” Desert Palace, Inc. v.Costa, 539 U.S. 90, 98 (2003) (quoting Conn. Nat'l Bankv. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992)); State v. Serrato,568 P.3d 756, 759 (Ariz. 2025) (“If a statute's text isclear and unambiguous, it controls unless it results in anabsurdity or a constitutional violation.”). Turning to thetext of the ACFA, the Act only applies to advertisementsand sales. Id. Starting with advertisements, the Act definesan advertisement as “the attempt by publication,...oral orwritten, to induce directly or indirectly any person to enterinto any obligation or acquire any title or interest in anymerchandise.” A.R.S. § 44-1521(1). Next, the Act definessales as “any sale, offer for sale or attempt to sell anymerchandise for any consideration, including sales, leasesand rentals of any real estate subject to any form of deedrestriction imposed as part of a previous sale.” A.R.S.§ 44-1521(7). So, on its face, the ACFA is clear that asettlement agreement—and the negotiations leading to thatagreement—is neither an advertisement nor a sale. BecausePlaintiff fails to present a viable claim upon which reliefmay be granted, his ACFA count is futile.(Doc. 35 at 9–10.)The Court finds no reason to deviate from its prior holding.Accordingly, Plaintiff's ACFA is futile for failure to state aclaim.c. Count Three: Negligence.
Mykhal Lloyd Polite, Plaintiff, v. TitleMax of Arizona Incorporated,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4The Court finds that Plaintiff's negligence fails to state a claimupon which relief may be granted, and is accordingly futile.A negligence claim under Arizona law requires: “(1) a dutyrequiring the defendant to conform to a certain standard ofcare; (2) a breach by the defendant of that standard; (3) acausal connection between the defendant's conduct and theresulting injury; and (4) actual damages.” Gipson v. Kasey,150 P.3d 228, 230 (Ariz. 2007).*5 Plaintiff's TAC fails to aver all the required negligenceelements—i.e., duty, breach, causation, and damages asrequired for a negligence claim. Specifically, Plaintiff has notsufficiently alleged that Defendant breached a duty of care—regardless of whether a duty existed. See Sanders v. Alger, 394P.3d 1083, 1085–86 (Ariz. 2017) (noting Arizona state courts’aversion to basing decisions on broad statements of generalduties owed to all persons). Plaintiff has not alleged sufficientevidence that he had any right to the vehicle before reaching asettlement agreement.8 Consequently, Plaintiff cannot allegethat Defendant breached a duty regarding the vehicle becausehe had no right to the vehicle before regaining the vehicle.Furthermore, Plaintiff has not asserted sufficient facts inhis TAC to determine whether a breach of duty occurredregarding the transfer of title. Accordingly, the Courtagrees with Defendant that Plaintiff's negligence claim ismerely “an unadorned, the Defendant unlawfully-harmed-meaccusation.” (Doc. 38 at 7) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). Because of this, Plaintiff's negligenceclaim is futile.3. Improperly Sought Damages.As a final matter, the Court finds Defendant's assertionthat Plaintiff cannot recover consequential damages wellplead. See (doc.38 at 8.) Under Arizona state law, settlementagreements are contracts governed by contract law. SeeEmmons v. Super. Ct. in & for Cnty. of Maricopa, 968 P.2d582, 585 (Ariz. App. 1998); see also Hisel v. Upchurch, 797F. Supp. 1509, 1518–19 (D. Ariz. 1992) (“An agreement tosettle a legal dispute is a contract governed by the principlesof contract law.”). In analyzing the Parties’ settlementagreement, the Court does not find any unconscionability,unilateral or mutual mistake, or fraud that would make theagreement and its provision unenforceable. Because of thisand considering that Plaintiff has waived seeking “economicor emotional damages,” (doc. 38 at 9), Plaintiff is unableto assert a claim for consequential damages. Therefore, anyclaim for consequential damages is futile.V. Conclusion.For the foregoing reasons, the Court finds that Plaintiff's TACis futile for failing to present viable claims upon which reliefmay be granted. Therefore, the Court will deny Plaintiff'sMotion for Leave to Amend. Because this was Plaintiff's thirdattempt to amend his Complaint, the Court will not grantleave to amend. See Sanchez v. Arpaio, No. CV 06-0571-PHX-DGC-HCE, 2006 WL 1418562, at *1 (D. Ariz. May22, 2006) (“The Court's discretion to deny or grant leave toamend is particularly broad where Plaintiff has previouslybeen permitted to amend his complaint....The failure to curedeficiencies by previous amendments is one of the factors tobe considered in deciding whether justice requires grantingleave to amend.”).VI. Sua Sponte Motion for Summary Judgment.As a final matter, the Court notes that it is not likely to findany of Plaintiff's remaining claims sufficient based on thelaw and facts involved in this matter. Consequently, the Courtconsiders sua sponte dismissal of Plaintiff's claims pursuantto Rule 56(f).“[D]istrict courts are widely acknowledged to possess thepower to enter summary judgments sua sponte, so long asthe losing party was on notice that she had to come forwardwith all of her evidence.” Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.317, 326 (1986); Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f)(3) (“After giving noticeand a reasonable time to respond, the court may . ..considersummary judgment on its own after identifying for the partiesmaterial facts that may not be genuinely in dispute.”). “Suasponte grants of summary judgment are only appropriate ifthe losing party has reasonable notice that the sufficiencyof his or her claim will be in issue.” Norse v. City of SantaCruz, 629 F.3d 966, 971–72 (9th Cir. 2010) (citation omitted).“Reasonable notice implies adequate time to develop thefacts on which the litigant will depend to oppose summaryjudgment.” Portsmouth Square Inc. v. S'holders ProtectiveComm., 770 F.2d 866, 869 (9th Cir. 1985).*6 Because Plaintiff's breach of contract, negligence, andACFA claims are legally deficient for the reasons statedherein, and because his averments of fraud9 and otherviolations of Arizona state statutes10 in his operativeComplaint are likely legally and factually insufficient, theCourt shall Order Plaintiff to brief why his claims should notbe summarily dismissed pursuant to Rule 56(f). In this brief,
Mykhal Lloyd Polite, Plaintiff, v. TitleMax of Arizona Incorporated,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5and at the Parties’ Case Management Conference, Plaintiffshould be prepared to address the following:1) Why A.R.S. §§ 28-2131, 28-2134 are at all relevantconsidering that these statutes apply to liens andencumbrances?2) Why A.R.S. § 28-2060 is relevant to your claimsconsidering that you, the Plaintiff, are the transferee,—i.e.,person receiving—meaning that the 30-day requirementdoes not apply to Defendant?3) Why A.R.S. § 47-2718, which relates to liquidateddamages, applies to a settlement agreement that does notcontain a liquidated damages clause?4) Why you could rely upon Defendant'scounsel's representations during settlement negotiations,considering, “as a matter of law and common sense,” you“had no right to rely” upon representations from attorneysopposing you? See Linder v. Brown & Herrick, 943 P.2d758, 765 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997).5) What duty did Plaintiff owe you under Arizona Law?And how did Defendant breach that duty?6) In what way did Defendant breach the settlementagreement, considering that it did not require them totransfer the vehicle in a certain condition?Accordingly,IT IS ORDERED that Plaintiff's Motion for Leave to FileFirst Amended Complaint (doc. 37) is DENIED as futile.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that Plaintiff shall not bepermitted further leave to amend his Complaint.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Court will Orderthat Plaintiff, on or before FEBRUARY 27, 2026, showcause in writing why all claims against Defendant should bedismissed pursuant to Rule 56(f)(3). Nothing in this Ordershall prevent Defendant from filing a contemplated Rule 56Motion for Summary Judgment before that date. Plaintiffshould be prepared to discuss this matter during the scheduledCase Management Conference on January 26, 2026.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that, in light of the Parties’Joint Case Management Report (doc. 39), the Partiesmay appear telephonically for the January 26, 2026, CaseManagement Conference. The Parties are directed to call(855) 244-8681 and use access code 2302 321 0604five minutes before the hearing. It is defense counsel'sresponsibility to arrange for Plaintiff to appear telephonically.*7 IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Parties shall dialinto the number provided at least FIVE MINUTES PRIORTO THE HEARING.Dated this 23rd day of January, 2026.Honorable John Z. BoyleUnited States Magistrate JudgeAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 183546Footnotes1The Parties consented to magistrate judge jurisdiction on July 15, 2025. (Doc. 20).2While the Motion states “First Amended Complaint,” the Court notes that, in fact, this is Plaintiff's ThirdAmended Complaint. See (docs. 1, 11, 26.)3Plaintiff's clean copy of the TAC is missing page 3. See (doc. 37-1.)4The Court notes that Plaintiff's proposed Third Amended Complaint omits key facts regarding his case, suchas the existence of a title loan agreement between the Parties, the fact that he reserved the right to pursue anaction for property damage resulting, and the specific acts Defendant's counsel allegedly took—e.g., his prior
Mykhal Lloyd Polite, Plaintiff, v. TitleMax of Arizona Incorporated,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6assertion that counsel showed him an aged photograph of the care—that supports his averment of fraud.See (doc. 35 at 1–2.)5Defendant appends the settlement agreement to their Response. See (doc. 38-1.)6“When an act may or must be done within a specified time, the court may, for good cause, extend thetime...on motion made after the time has expired if the party failed to act because of excusable neglect.”Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(b)(1)(B) (emphasis added). “The determination of excusable neglect takes into account:(1) the danger of prejudice; (2) the length of the delay and its potential impact on judicial proceedings; (3)the reasons for the delay which includes whether it was within the reasonable control of the party seeking toshow excusable neglect; and (4) whether that party acted in good faith.” De La Rosa v. Costco WholesaleCorp., No. 21-CV-1630-W-BGS, 2022 WL 2541273, at *2 (S.D. Cal. July 6, 2022) (citing Pioneer Inv. Servs.Co. v. Brunswick Assoc. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)).7While Defendant appends a copy of the settlement agreement to their Response, this fact does not remedyPlaintiff's failure to sufficiently allege that an enforceable agreement existed.8As Defendant and this Court's prior Order has noted, Plaintiff's vehicle was repossessed. During this time,Plaintiff did not have either an express or implied agreement that the vehicle would be returned to Plaintiff.“When Plaintiff defaulted on the loan, Defendant—as the secured party—had the right to take possessionof the collateral and dispose of the collateral by sale or lease, so long as that disposition was reasonable.A.R.S. §§ 47-9609(A)(1), 47-9610(A).” (Doc. 35 at 9.)9To state a claim for fraud under Arizona state law, a party must sufficiently plead:(1) a representation, (2) its falsity, (3) its materiality, (4) the speaker's knowledge of its falsity or ignorance ofits truth, (5) the speaker's intent that it be acted upon by the recipient in the manner reasonably calculated,(6) the hearer's ignorance of its falsity, (7) the hearer's reliance on its truth, (8) the right to rely on it, and (9)a consequent and proximate injury.SPUS8 Dakota LP v. KNR Contractors LLC, 641 F. Supp. 3d 682, 691 (D. Ariz. 2022). Plaintiff fails tosufficiently allege all nine factors.10Plaintiff's reliance upon A.R.S. §§ 28-2060, 28-2131, 28-2134, 47-2718 do not appear applicable becausethis matter does not involve a lienholder, Plaintiff is the transferee, and there is not a liquidated damagesprovision in the settlement agreement.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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