8.1115 v. Vashisht-Rota (Dec. 15, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
rule 8.1115 v. Aparna VASHISHT-ROTA
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
Dec. 15, 2025
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Castillo (J.) (unanimous Court)
Howell Management Services, LLC v. Vashisht-Rota, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr. (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3628442Not Officially Published(Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, restrictscitation of unpublished opinions in California courts.Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 1, California.HOWELL MANAGEMENT SERVICES,LLC, Plaintiff and Respondent,v.Aparna VASHISHT-ROTA, Defendant and Appellant.D086055|Filed December 15, 2025APPEALS from orders of the Superior Court of San DiegoCounty, Carolyn M. Caietti, Judge. Dismissed. (Super. Ct. No.37-2024-00005370-CU-EN-CTL)Attorneys and Law FirmsLaw Office of Timothy A. Horton and Timothy A. Horton forPlaintiff and Respondent.Aparna Vashisht-Rota, in pro. per., for Defendant andAppellant.OpinionIrion, Acting P. J.*1 Howell Management Services, LLC (HMS), recovereda multimillion-dollar judgment against Aparna Vashisht-Rotafor defamation in a Utah state court and then obtained aCalifornia judgment based on the Utah judgment. In a priorappeal, we affirmed the superior court's order denying Rota'smotion to vacate the California judgment. The superior courtsubsequently issued orders denying Rota's motion to stayenforcement of the judgment, imposing monetary sanctionson her for failing to appear at a duly noticed hearing,and denying her motion for satisfaction of judgment. Rotaappeals those orders. We dismiss the first appeal for lackof jurisdiction, the second under the disentitlement doctrine,and the third as frivolous. We impose monetary sanctions onRota for prosecuting a frivolous appeal and for unreasonablyviolating the California Rules of Court.I.BACKGROUNDA. Utah JudgmentHMS is a Utah-based entity that contracts with collegesand universities to recruit mostly international students forenrollment. Starting in 2015 and continuing into 2017, HMSentered a series of contracts with August Education Group,LLC (AEG), an entity of which Rota was the managingmember, to perform services for HMS as an independentcontractor.A dispute about compensation arose, and in November 2017,HMS sued AEG and Rota in the First Judicial District ofthe State of Utah (the Utah court) for a declaration it owedthem no money and an injunction enforcing postterminationobligations of the operative contract. HMS later amended itscomplaint to add claims for defamation and related torts. Asa sanction for persistent discovery misconduct by AEG andRota, the Utah court struck their answer and counterclaim(which alleged counts for breach of contract, breach of theimplied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and unjustenrichment), and entered their default. Rota's interlocutoryappeal of the order striking her pleadings and entering herdefault was dismissed as a sanction for abusive filings.The Utah court held an evidentiary hearing on HMS'sdamages at which Rota and AEG did not appear even thoughthey had been given notice. The Utah court declared HMSowed AEG and Rota no money, awarded HMS $8,859,175 indamages against AEG and Rota for defamation, and enteredjudgment to that effect in October 2023 (the Utah judgment).Rota's appeal of the Utah judgment was dismissed.B. California JudgmentIn February 2024, HMS filed in the superior court anapplication under the Sister State Money Judgments Act(SSMJA or Act; Code Civ. Proc., § 1710.10 et seq.) for entryof a judgment against Rota based on the Utah judgment. HMSdid not seek entry of a judgment against AEG, apparentlybecause it had been dissolved. The clerk entered a judgmentfor HMA against Rota for $9,034,805.27, which included theprincipal amount of the Utah judgment plus accrued interest.C. Order Denying Motion to Vacate California Judgment
Howell Management Services, LLC v. Vashisht-Rota, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr. (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Rota filed a motion to vacate the California judgment (CodeCiv. Proc., § 1710.40) on the grounds the Utah court lackedjurisdiction and denied her due process of law and a fair trial,she had defenses she could not present to the Utah court,and the Utah judgment was not a final judgment entitled tofull faith and credit in California. The superior court deniedthe motion on July 13, 2024. On Rota's appeal, we affirmedthe denial order. (Howell Management Services, LLC v.Vashisht-Rota (Feb. 2, 2025, D084575) [nonpub. opn.].) TheSupreme Court of California denied Rota's petition for review(S289204, Supreme Court Mins., Mar. 26, 2025), and theremittitur issued on April 10, 2025.D. Subsequent Orders*2 After the superior court denied her motion to vacate thejudgment, it issued three other orders against Rota that are thesubjects of these appeals.1. Order denying motion for stayThe day after Rota filed a notice of appeal from the orderdenying her motion to vacate the judgment, she scheduled anex parte hearing on a motion to stay of enforcement of thejudgment while the appeal was pending. She filed no papersin support of the motion, however, and the superior court tookthe matter off calendar on July 24, 2024.Rota then petitioned this court for a writ of supersedeas andrequested an immediate stay of enforcement of the judgment.(Cal. Rules of Court, rules 8.112, 8.116.) We denied thepetition on August 5, 2024. She renewed her stay requests inthis court, this time by motion, on November 18, 2024. Wedenied the motion on December 6, 2024.On November 20, 2024, Rota filed in the superior court amotion to stay all proceedings to enforce the judgment duringthe pendency of her appeal of the order denying her motion tovacate the judgment and until the court ruled on her motion forsatisfaction of judgment, which was set for hearing on May9, 2025. She argued a stay was warranted because she waslikely to prevail on appeal and because the value of servicesshe performed for HMS for which she had not been paidexceeded the amount of the judgment. HMS filed oppositionto the motion. The court denied the motion on March 7, 2025.2. Order imposing monetary sanctionsAfter HMS filed a motion to compel further discoveryresponses from Rota, the superior court scheduled an informaldiscovery conference for February 4, 2025, to try to resolvethe outstanding discovery issues without the need for furtherlitigation. The clerk mailed Rota notice of the conference,but she did not appear. The court continued the informaldiscovery conference to February 27, 2025, and scheduleda status conference for the same date. The clerk mailedRota notices of these conferences. The notice for thestatus conference stated: “Appearances at all hearings aremandatory unless specifically excused by the court for goodcause shown.” Rota did not appear. The superior court thenissued an order directing her to appear on April 4, 2025, andto show cause why sanctions should not be imposed for herfailure to appear at the status conference. The clerk mailedRota a copy of the order to show cause.In response to the order to show cause, the parties submittedbriefs and supporting declarations. Rota argued she shouldnot be sanctioned because she struggles with live hearingsas a pro se litigant, was confused about the continuedhearing date, and did not intentionally violate any courtorder. In her declaration, Rota asserted she had “compliedin substance [with her discovery obligations], acted in goodfaith, and caused no prejudice to [HMS].” HMS arguedsanctions should be imposed on Rota for intentionally defyingthe court's notice that appearance at the status conferencewas mandatory. HMS's counsel attached to his declarationmultiple e-mails he had received from Rota stating shewould not appear at the scheduled conferences because sheconsidered them pointless.*3 The superior court held a hearing on the order to showcause on April 4, 2025. It was “not persuaded by the differentexcuses [Rota] offered,” noted she was “not a novice litigant”and was “fully aware of her obligation ... to comply with[c]ourt orders,” and found her failure to appear at duly noticedhearings was “without good cause and/or without substantialjustification.” The court ordered her to pay $1,500 by August1, 2025. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 177.5 [court may imposeup to $1,500 in sanctions on party who violates lawful courtorder without good cause or substantial justification].)3. Order denying motion for satisfaction of judgmentOn November 20, 2024, Rota filed a motion for satisfactionof judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., § 724.050.)1 She argued thejudgment was satisfied because the value of services sheperformed for HMS under its contracts with AEG for whichshe was never paid and must be given credit exceeded theamount of the judgment against her. HMS opposed the motion
Howell Management Services, LLC v. Vashisht-Rota, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr. (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3on the procedural ground that Rota did not serve a demandfor satisfaction of judgment at least 15 days before she filedthe motion (id., subds. (c), (d)), and on the substantive groundthat the motion was an impermissible attempt by Rota torelitigate as an offset against the judgment issues regardingcompensation for her services that had been finally resolvedagainst her by the Utah judgment. With the opposition, HMS'scounsel submitted a declaration stating he had never beenserved with a demand for acknowledgment of satisfactionof judgment. Three days before the hearing on the motion,Rota filed a declaration attaching a copy of a “motion foropposing third party appearance or disclosure as judgmentsatisfied,” which she asserted was served on HMS's counseland constituted a demand for acknowledgment of satisfactionof judgment.The superior court held a hearing on May 9, 2025, and deniedthe motion for satisfaction of judgment. The court ruled therewas no evidence Rota made the statutorily required demandfor acknowledgment of satisfaction. The court further ruledthere was “no proof of payment of any kind, i.e., satisfying thejudgment.” The court “agree[d] with [HMS] that this motion[was] another attempt by [Rota] to relitigate a final judgmenton the merits based on arguments she has lost in ... this court,the Court of Appeal and other courts.”II.DISCUSSIONRota appeals the three orders described in part I.D., ante.We consider each appeal in turn. We then consider whetherto impose monetary sanctions on Rota for prosecuting afrivolous appeal and unreasonably violating the CaliforniaRules of Court, as we notified the parties we might do in anorder for supplemental briefing on sanctions and other issues.A. Order Denying Motion for Stay*4 Rota challenges as an abuse of discretion the superiorcourt's order refusing to stay enforcement of the judgmentwhile her appeal of the order denying her motion to vacatethe judgment and her motion for satisfaction of judgmentwere pending. Because the sole case Rota cited as support forthe appealability of the challenged order has nothing to dowith appealability and we had doubts about its appealability,we obtained supplemental briefs from the parties on theissue. In her brief, Rota contends the order is an appealablepostjudgment order under Code of Civil Procedure section904.1, subdivision (a)(2). HMS contends the order is notappealable. As we shall explain, the order denying Rota's staymotion is not appealable, and her appeal of that order must bedismissed for lack of jurisdiction.Generally, an order denying a motion to stay proceedingsin the superior court is not appealable. (See, e.g., Jarboe v.Hanlee Auto Group (2020) 53 Cal.App.5th 539, 547 [“anorder denying a stay of proceedings is not appealable”];Gibson v. Savings & Loan Commissioner (1970) 6Cal.App.3d 269, 271–272 [“The order denying petitioner'sproposed temporary stay orders was obviously not a finaljudgment and therefore was not an appealable order”]; Peoplev. Causey (1964) 230 Cal.App.2d 576, 578 [“an order denyinga stay of execution is not appealable”]; Simmons v. SuperiorCourt (1950) 96 Cal.App.2d 119, 131 [“The order denyingthe motion to stay further proceedings is nonappealable”].)Rota contends the general rule does not apply to the orderat issue here because it was a postjudgment order affectingenforcement of the judgment under Code of Civil Proceduresection 904.1, subdivision (a)(2). We disagree.The general provisions governing appeals in unlimited civilcases authorize an appeal “[f]rom a judgment” and “[f]rom anorder made after a judgment made appealable by paragraph(1).” (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(1), (2).) Thesegeneral provisions apply to special proceedings of a civilnature (Knoll v. Davidson (1974) 12 Cal.3d 335, 343), whichinclude proceedings under the SSMJA (Blizzard Energy, Inc.v. Schaefers (2021) 71 Cal.App.5th 832, 843). Under theAct, entry of the California judgment against Rota basedon the Utah judgment was “a ministerial act of the clerkand not a judicial act of the court” (Aspen Internat. CapitalCorp. v. Marsch (1991) 235 Cal.App.3d 1199, 1203), andsuch entry did not result in an appealable judgment (SilbricoCorp. v. Raanan (1985) 170 Cal.App.3d 202, 206; Harris v.EMI Television Programs, Inc. (1980) 102 Cal.App.3d 214,217). The order denying Rota's motion to vacate the judgmentoperated as the final judgment in the SSMJA proceedingfor purposes of appeal, because the order determined theparties' rights with respect to the California judgment thatwas entered based on the Utah judgment and left no issuesfor future judicial decision except any concerning compliancewith the California judgment. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 1064[judgment in special proceeding is final determination ofparties' rights]; Olson v. Cory (1983) 35 Cal.3d 390, 399(Olson) [judgment is final when no issue is left for futureconsideration except compliance with judgment]; Passavanti
Howell Management Services, LLC v. Vashisht-Rota, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr. (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4v. Williams (1990) 225 Cal.App.3d 1602, 1606 [order thatfinally determines proceeding is judgment].) That order wasappealable. (Neuman v. Barbera (1985) 164 Cal.App.3d 437,440, fn. 2; Fishman v. Fishman (1981) 117 Cal.App.3d 815,819.) Hence, the order denying Rota's motion for a stayliterally constitutes an order “made after [an appealable]judgment.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2).)Despite the broad language of Code of Civil Proceduresection 904.1, subdivision (a)(2), not every “order thatfollows a final appealable judgment is appealable.” (Lakinv. Watkins Associated Industries (1993) 6 Cal.4th 644, 651.)To qualify as an appealable postjudgment order, “such ordermust affect the judgment in some manner or bear somerelation to it either by way of enforcing it or staying itsexecution.” (Lake v. Harris (1926) 198 Cal. 85, 89; accord,Lakin, at pp. 651–652; Olson, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 400.)The order denying Rota's stay motion does not satisfy thisrequirement. It “neither added to nor subtracted from therelief granted by the judgment” (Lake, at p. 89), did not“determine[ ] the rights and liabilities of the parties arisingfrom the judgment” (Lakin, at p. 656), and “d[id] not enforcethe judgment or stay execution of the judgment” (Wickwarev. Tanner (1997) 53 Cal.App.4th 570, 574). The challengedorder merely refused to stay execution of the judgment. Thus,the order, though issued after entry of an appealable judgment,is not appealable. Without an appealable judgment or order,we have no jurisdiction and must dismiss the appeal. (Collinsv. Corse (1936) 8 Cal.2d 123, 124; Chavez Reyes v. Hi-GradeMaterials Co. (2025) 110 Cal.App.5th 1089, 1095, 1104;Katzenstein v. Chabad of Poway (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th 759,771.)*5 Rota invites us to convert the appeal of the order denyingthe stay motion into an original proceeding for a writ ofmandate or prohibition. She says doing so is “necessary toaddress (1) judicial bias, (2) due process violations, and (3)the denial of a full and fair hearing on [her] motion to vacatethe domesticated Utah judgment.” Although we have powerto treat an appeal from a nonappealable order as an originalwrit proceeding (Olson, supra, 35 Cal.3d at p. 401), wedecline Rota's invitation to do so for two reasons.First, the issues Rota wants us to address greatly exceedthe scope of those we would need to consider to decidewhether the superior court abused its discretion by refusingto stay enforcement of the judgment. The scope of our reviewis limited to the order specified in her notice of appeal,i.e., the order denying her stay motion. (Faunce v. Cote(2013) 222 Cal.App.4th 166, 170; Russell v. Foglio (2008)160 Cal.App.4th 653, 661.) Second, Rota's challenge to thatorder is moot. A matter becomes moot when events make itimpossible for a court to grant effective relief even were itto rule in favor of the party seeking relief. (In re D.P. (2023)14 Cal.5th 266, 276; La Mirada Avenue Neighborhood Assn.of Hollywood v. City of Los Angeles (2016) 2 Cal.App.5th586, 590.) Rota sought to stay enforcement of the judgmentwhile the appeal of the order denying her motion to vacatethe judgment and her motion for satisfaction of judgmentwere pending. The appeal and the motion were both decidedagainst Rota and are no longer pending. The stay she wantedthus cannot be granted. An appeal or a writ proceeding thathas become moot is subject to dismissal. (Cunha v. SuperiorCourt (1933) 217 Cal. 249, 252; Calleros v. Rural Metro ofSan Diego, Inc. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 660, 667.)B. Order Imposing Monetary SanctionsRota next complains the superior court abused its discretionand deprived her of property without due process of law (U.S.Const., 14th Amend., § 1; Cal. Const., art. I, § 7, subd. (a))when it ordered her to pay $1,500 as sanctions for refusingto appear at a duly noticed hearing. A court may impose upto $1,500 in sanctions on a party who violates a lawful courtorder without good cause or substantial justification (CodeCiv. Proc., § 177.5), and an order doing so is appealableas a final order on a collateral matter directing payment ofmoney (Caldwell v. Samuels Jewelers (1990) 222 Cal.App.3d970, 975–976; Wisniewski v. Clary (1975) 46 Cal.App.3d499, 502). We do not reach the merits of Rota's appeal ofthe sanctions order and instead dismiss the appeal underthe disentitlement doctrine based on her refusal to pay thesanctions.Under the disentitlement doctrine, an appellate court hasdiscretion to dismiss an appeal when an appellant haswillfully disobeyed a superior court order or engagedin obstructive tactics. (Menezes v. McDaniel (2019) 44Cal.App.5th 340, 346; Stoltenberg v. Ampton Investments,Inc. (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 1225, 1229–1230.) “A partyto an action cannot, with right or reason, ask the aid andassistance of a court in hearing [her] demands while [s]hestands in an attitude of contempt to legal orders and processesof the courts of this state.” (MacPherson v. MacPherson(1939) 13 Cal.2d 271, 277.) “It is contrary to the principlesof justice to permit one who has flaunted the orders of thecourts to seek judicial assistance.” (Estate of Scott (1957)150 Cal.App.2d 590, 594.) “The disentitlement doctrine ‘isparticularly likely to be invoked where the appeal arises
Howell Management Services, LLC v. Vashisht-Rota, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr. (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5out of the very order (or orders) the party has disobeyed.’” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd. v. ScripsAmerica, Inc. (2015)238 Cal.App.4th 259, 265 (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd.).) Thedoctrine has been invoked to dismiss appeals from ordersimposing monetary sanctions by parties who refused to paythem. (See, e.g., Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of PomoIndians (2021) 69 Cal.App.5th 736, 757; United Grand Corp.v. Malibu Hillbillies, LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 166–167.)*6 On review of the record, we found no evidence Rotahad paid the $1,500 in sanctions the superior court imposedon her. We obtained supplemental briefs from the parties onwhether Rota had paid the sanctions and, if not, whetherher nonpayment supported dismissal of the appeal of thesanctions order under the disentitlement doctrine.Rota admits in her supplemental brief that she has not paidthe sanctions and calls the order imposing them “wrongful.”She contends the discovery conferences she did not attendwere “informal” and “can't be the basis of a sanction.” Rotaignores the notice of the status conference, which stated herappearance was “mandatory.” In any event, “the merits of theappeal are irrelevant to the application of the [disentitlement]doctrine.” (Ironridge Global IV, Ltd., supra, 238 Cal.App.4that p. 265.) “A trial court's judgment and orders, all ofthem, are presumptively valid and must be obeyed andenforced. [Citation.] They are not to be frustrated by litigantsexcept by legally provided methods.” (Stone v. Bach (1978)80 Cal.App.3d 442, 448 [rejecting appellant's argumentdismissal was unwarranted because orders he violated were“invalid”].)Rota urges us not to dismiss her appeal under thedisentitlement doctrine because: (1) such a dismissalis discretionary, not mandatory; (2) her nonpayment of“minimal” sanctions has neither “directly impeded appellateproceedings” nor “obstructed enforcement of the appealedorder”; and (3) the sanctions order “does not relate tothe satisfaction of judgment issues on appeal.” We areunpersuaded. Rota was ordered to pay the maximumamount of sanctions permitted by the statute (Code Civ.Proc., § 177.5), and she defied the very order sheis separately appealing. That order followed her willfuldisregard of notices directing her to attend hearings intendedto help the parties resolve discovery disputes that aroseas part of HMS's efforts to enforce the judgment. “Therecord shows that [Rota is] seeking the benefits of anappeal while willfully disobeying the trial court's validorders and thereby frustrating [HMS's] legitimate efforts toenforce the judgment. Therefore, we conclude the equitableconsiderations relevant to the disentitlement doctrine favordismissal of this appeal.” (Gwartz v. Weilert (2014) 231Cal.App.4th 750, 761.)C. Order Denying Motion for Satisfaction of JudgmentThe third and final order Rota challenges in these appealsis the one denying her motion for satisfaction of judgmentunder Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050, which isan appealable postjudgment order. (Id., § 904.1, subd. (a)(2); Horath v. Hess (2014) 225 Cal.App.4th 456, 462.) Shecomplains the superior court did not follow certain proceduralrequirements for such a motion, erroneously found she hadneither made the required demand for acknowledgment ofsatisfaction nor presented any evidence of satisfaction, andwas biased against her and otherwise violated her due processright to a meaningful hearing on the motion. Rota asks usto reverse the challenged order and to remand the matterwith directions to the superior court to enter a satisfaction ofjudgment or, alternatively, to hold an evidentiary hearing onher motion.In reviewing the record and the parties' briefs, we noticedthere was no evidence Rota had paid the judgment, andher claim the judgment had been satisfied was based onpreviously rejected claims that HMS owed her more moneyfor services she had performed than she owed on thejudgment. We obtained supplemental briefs from the partieson whether the appeal should be dismissed as frivolous.Rota argues “[t]his appeal is not frivolous” and “presentssubstantial legal questions distinct from those decided in [theprior appeal].” HMS counters that the appeal is a bad faithattempt by Rota to relitigate issues already decided againsther in proceedings that are final and should be dismissed asfrivolous. We agree with HMS.*7 Appellate courts have inherent power to dismiss frivolousappeals. (E.g., Ferguson v. Keays (1971) 4 Cal.3d 649, 658(Ferguson); In re Marriage of Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th71, 79 (Deal); Zimmerman v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Inc.(1988) 205 Cal.App.3d 153, 161 (Zimmerman).) An appeal issubjectively frivolous “when it is prosecuted for an impropermotive—to harass the respondent or delay the effect ofan adverse judgment.” (In re Marriage of Flaherty (1982)31 Cal.3d 637, 650 (Flaherty).) An appeal is objectivelyfrivolous “when it indisputably has no merit—when anyreasonable attorney would agree that the appeal is totallyand completely without merit.” (Ibid.) “The two standards
Howell Management Services, LLC v. Vashisht-Rota, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr. (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6are often used together, with one providing evidence of theother” (id. at p. 649), but “[a] finding of frivolousness may bebased on either standard by itself” (Malek Media Group, LLCv. AXQG Corp. (2020) 58 Cal.App.5th 817, 834 (Malek)).We first consider whether Rota's appeal is objectivelyfrivolous. “We look to the merits of the appeal froma reasonable person's perspective” and ask whether “anyreasonable person [would] agree the appeal is completelydevoid of merit.” (Malek, supra, 58 Cal.App.5th at p. 834.)Based on the record, the answer to that question is clearly yes.To prevail on her motion for satisfaction of judgment, Rotahad to show she paid the full amount of the judgment. (CodeCiv. Proc., § 724.010, subd. (a).) She submitted no evidenceshe had done so. Instead, Rota argued “HMS earned $9.988to $17.432 million ... due to [her] work” and that amountexceeded the amount of HMS's judgment against her. Setoffsare allowed in actions to enforce money judgments (Jhaveri v.Teitelbaum (2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 740, 753), and a motionto compel acknowledgment of satisfaction of a judgment isa proper procedure to balance offsetting judgments (Wade v.Schrader (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1039, 1048 (Wade)). Rota,however, has no judgment against HMS she can assert asa setoff.2 Her claim HMS still owes her for unpaid workwas rejected by the Utah court, which declared the parties'contracts were terminated and HMS owed neither her norAEG any money. As we explained in Rota's prior appeal,the Utah judgment bars relitigation of that claim in this case.(Howell Management Services, LLC v. Vashisht-Rota, supra,D084575.) We conclude her “appeal is objectively frivolousbecause it is devoid of factual or legal support.” (Malek, atp. 835.)*8 We also conclude the appeal of the order denyingthe motion for satisfaction of judgment is subjectivelyfrivolous. “[T]he total lack of merit of an appeal is viewedas evidence that appellant must have intended it only fordelay.” (Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 649.) Other evidenceof improper motive is that Rota's “brief[ing] is largelydevoted to rehashing issues raised and decided in the priorappeal, a totally inappropriate exercise.” (Hummel v. FirstNational Bank (1987) 191 Cal.App.3d 489, 495.) In herbriefs, Rota continues to claim that HMS owes her moneyfor student referrals in an amount that exceeds that ofits judgment against her, and she lists “[s]everal [i]ssues”she has with our “problematic ruling” in the prior appeal.Our determination in the prior appeal that Rota is boundby the Utah court's declaration that HMS owes her nomoney constitutes law of the case and bars her from arguingotherwise in this appeal. (Tally v. Ganahl (1907) 151 Cal.418, 421; Aghaian v. Minassian (2021) 64 Cal.App.5th603, 612.) Her “[r]epeated litigation of matters previouslydetermined by final judgment constitutes harassment” (Weberv. Willard (1989) 207 Cal.App.3d 1006, 1010) and shows she“lacked good faith in pursuing the appeal” (Personal CourtReporters, Inc. v. Rand (2012) 205 Cal.App.4th 182, 193).3“ ‘Somewhere along the line, litigation must cease’ ” (Deal,supra, 80 Cal.App.5th at p. 81), and Rota “must acceptresponsibility for [her] actions and stop abusing [HMS] andthe [court] system” (Leslie v. Board of Medical QualityAssurance (1991) 234 Cal.App.3d 117, 121 (Leslie)).In sum, we conclude Rota's appeal of the order denyingher motion for satisfaction of judgment “has as its object todelay, vex or harass the opposing party or the court” and “isbased upon wholly sham or frivolous grounds.” (Ferguson,supra, 4 Cal.3d at p. 658.) We exercise our inherent powerto dismiss the appeal. (See, e.g., Deal, supra, 80 Cal.App.5that pp. 79–81 [dismissing appeal as frivolous when appellantchallenged prior final judgments and orders and took appealfor purpose of delay]; Zimmerman, supra, 205 Cal.App.3d atp. 162 [dismissing appeal as frivolous when record and caselaw “abundantly support[ed]” challenged rulings].)D. SanctionsWe notified the parties we were considering imposingmonetary sanctions against Rota for prosecuting a frivolousappeal and unreasonably violating the California Rules ofCourt by citing nonexistent legal authorities (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 907; Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.276), and ordered themto submit supplemental briefs on whether this court shouldimpose sanctions and, if so, in what amount. Rota contendsno sanctions should be imposed because the appeal is notfrivolous and her citation errors were inadvertent. HMScontends sanctions should be imposed on Rota for taking afrivolous appeal and for citing fabricated legal authorities,and it requests $59,741.70 in attorney fees and costs payableto HMS and $10,000 payable to this court. Attached to itssupplemental brief, HMS submitted a declaration from itscounsel describing the tasks he performed in respondingto Rota's appeals, stating the number of hours spent onthe appeals (107.7) and the discounted hourly rate charged($550), and listing the costs incurred ($506.70). For reasonswe discuss below, we impose sanctions against Rota in theamounts of $59,235 payable to HMS and $15,000 payable tothis court.
Howell Management Services, LLC v. Vashisht-Rota, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr. (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7*9 A reviewing court may impose monetary sanctions on anappellant when an “appeal was frivolous or taken solely fordelay.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 907; accord, Cal. Rules of Court,rule 8.276(a)(1).) We determined in part II.C., ante, that Rota'sappeal of the order denying her motion for satisfaction ofjudgment was frivolous and taken for delay.Another ground for imposing monetary sanctions is an“unreasonable violation” of the California Rules of Court.(Id., rule 8.276(a)(4).) One rule required Rota to supporther arguments with citation of authority. (Id., rule 8.204(a)(1)(B).) As we noted in footnote 2, ante, Rota cited casesthat do not exist, quoted from statutes and cases languagethey do not contain, and cited cases for propositions theydo not support. Her reliance on fabricated legal authoritiesis sanctionable as an unreasonable violation of rule 8.204(a)(1)(B). (Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 445, 447.)Rota says imposing sanctions for those violations would be“inappropriate” because she “is still learning how to use thecases,” she used artificial intelligence tools for parts of herbrief, and any citation errors were due to “inadvertence, notintentional misrepresentation.” We disagree. Rota stated inher motion for satisfaction of judgment that “[s]he is in lawschool,” and we know from her numerous and voluminousfilings in this court that she is not an inexperienced litigant.She may use artificial intelligence tools to prepare briefs, butshe “must check every citation to make sure the case existsand the citations are correct.” (People v. Alvarez (2025) 114Cal.App.5th 1115, 1119.) “Even though [Rota] is in propriapersona, [she] is held to the same ‘restrictive proceduralrules as an attorney’ [citation], and we may impose sanctionsupon [her]” for violating those rules. (Leslie, supra, 234Cal.App.3d at p. 121.)The remaining issue for determination is the amount ofmonetary sanctions to impose on Rota. We may awardas sanctions “such damages as may be just” (Code Civ.Proc., § 907), including sums to compensate the respondentfor the attorney fees incurred in defending against theappeal, to compensate the reviewing court for the expenseincurred in processing the appeal, and to discourage futurefrivolous litigation. (Morales v. City and County of SanFrancisco (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 43, 53; Foust v. SanJose Construction Co., Inc. (2011) 198 Cal.App.4th 181,189 (Foust); Summers v. City of Cathedral City (1990)225 Cal.App.3d 1047, 1079.) We have broad discretion todetermine the amount of the sanctions. (Champlin/GEI WindHoldings, LLC v. Avery (2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 218, 228;Harris v. Sandro (2002) 96 Cal.App.4th 1310, 1316.)As compensation for defending against Rota's appeals, HMSasks us to award as sanctions $59,235 in attorney fees and$506.70 in costs. The amount of attorney fees requested isbased on the time counsel spent addressing all three ordersRota appealed, however, not just the order the appeal fromwhich we have determined to be frivolous. “Sanctions foran appeal which is partially frivolous are appropriate if thefrivolous claims are a significant and material part of theappeal.” (Maple Properties v. Harris (1984) 158 Cal.App.3d997, 1010.) That criterion is satisfied here. Among the threeorders involved in these appeals, Rota devoted the largestportion of her briefing to an attack on the order denying hermotion for satisfaction of judgment, and HMS devoted thelargest portion of its briefing to defending against that attack.Based on “the protracted length of this litigation and the delayin the resolution of the appeal,” “the need to deter this typeof conduct in the future” (id. at p. 1011), and “the ‘degree ofobjective frivolousness’ of [the] appeal” (Foust, supra, 198Cal.App.4th at p. 189), we find the $59,235 in attorney feesHMS has requested is a reasonable amount of sanctions forRota to pay HMS. We do not impose costs incurred on appealas sanctions because HMS is entitled to those costs as a matterof right. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1), (2).)*10 HMS is not the only entity harmed by Rota's frivolousappeal. “[T]he appellate system and the taxpayers of thisstate are [also] damaged by what amounts to a waste ofthis court's time and resources.” (Finnie v. Town of Tiburon(1988) 199 Cal.App.3d 1, 17.) “Because a frivolous appeal ...harms the court, not just the respondent, a growing number ofcourts are ordering appellants to pay sanctions directly to thecourt clerk to compensate the state for the cost of processingsuch appeals.” (Pierotti v. Torian (2000) 81 Cal.App.4th 17,35.) More than 12 years ago, we noted sanctions imposedto compensate courts for processing frivolous appeals thenroutinely ranged between $6,000 and $12,500. (Kleveland v.Siegel & Wolensky, LLP (2013) 215 Cal.App.4th 534, 560.)A few years later, we imposed $25,000 in sanctions payableto this court on appellants who, like Rota, “required this courtto needlessly expend precious resources on their frivolousclaims.” (Bucur v. Ahmad (2016) 244 Cal.App.4th 175, 195;see Bank of California v. Varakin (1990) 216 Cal.App.3d1630, 1640 [imposing $25,000 in sanctions payable to court“to reimburse the taxpayers victimized by this unremittinglyfrivolous litigation and to deter such conduct in the future”].)We also may impose sanctions payable to this court forRota's citation of fabricated legal authorities in unreasonableviolation of the California Rules of Court. (Id., rule 8.276(a)
Howell Management Services, LLC v. Vashisht-Rota, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr. (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8(4); Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp. 445, 447; Huschkev. Slater (2008) 168 Cal.App.4th 1153, 1161–1162.) We find$15,000 is an appropriate amount of sanctions for Rota to paythis court for violating the Rules of Court and forcing us toexpend resources on a frivolous appeal.This opinion shall constitute the written statement of ourreasons for imposing monetary sanctions against Rota.(Flaherty, supra, 31 Cal.3d at p. 654; Banks v. DominicanCollege (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 1545, 1558.)III.DISPOSITIONThe appeals are dismissed. As sanctions for prosecuting afrivolous appeal and for unreasonably violating the CaliforniaRules of Court, appellant is ordered to pay $59,235 torespondent and $15,000 to the clerk of this court within 30days of issuance of the remittitur. Respondent is entitled tocosts on appeal.WE CONCUR:CASTILLO, J.RUBIN, J.All CitationsNot Reported in Cal.Rptr., 2025 WL 3628442Footnotes1Code of Civil Procedure section 724.050, subdivision (a) authorizes a judgment debtor who has satisfied amoney judgment to demand the judgment creditor file an acknowledgement of satisfaction of judgment withthe court or deliver to the debtor an executed acknowledgment of satisfaction of judgment. The demand mustinclude a warning that if the judgment creditor does not comply with the demand within 15 days and thejudgment debtor commences a court proceeding to compel compliance, the judgment creditor will be liable forthe judgment debtor's reasonable attorney fees and, if the court finds the judgment creditor's noncompliancewas without good cause, for the judgment debtor's damages and a $100 penalty. (Id., subd. (b).) If thejudgment creditor does not comply with the demand, the judgment debtor may move the court for an orderrequiring compliance. (Id., subd. (d).)2Rota contends she sought satisfaction not through an “offset credit” against the judgment under Wade, supra,168 Cal.App.4th 1039 but “through ‘performance of an obligation other than that specified in the judgment’ ”under Code of Civil Procedure section 724.010, subdivision (c). She argues the judicially confirmed award inher arbitration against a business associate with whom she had a referral agreement (Michael Hernandez)“established the precise value of her performance,” and the “unbroken chain of value flowing to HMS” fromthat performance “constitutes ‘payment in another form’ sufficient to satisfy [the] judgment under [the statute].”The only difference between this theory and the setoff theory we reject as frivolous in the text is the additionof a detour through the award in Rota's arbitration against Hernandez.Rota's statutory theory is frivolous for another reason: It is built entirely on fabricated legal authority. Thestatutory provision she relies on concerns satisfaction of a judgment “by check or other form of noncashpayment that is to be honored upon presentation by the judgment creditor for payment.” (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 724.010, subd. (c).) It does not contain the language about “performance of an obligation other than thatspecified in the judgment” that Rota attributes to it. Three of the five cases she cites as purported supportfor her theory do not exist. The other two exist but do not contain the language or involve the legal pointsascribed to them. Rota's reliance on nonexistent legal authority justifies dismissal of her appeal as frivolous.(Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 436 (Noland).)
Howell Management Services, LLC v. Vashisht-Rota, Not Reported in Cal.Rptr. (2025) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.93We are not the first court to find Rota's motives in her litigation against HMS to be improper. The United StatesDistrict Court for the Southern District of California found “overwhelming” evidence that “most of [Rota's]litigation tactics were substantively meritless, meant to harass, or both,” and entered an order declaringher a vexatious litigant and restricting her filing privileges. (Vashisht-Rota v. Howell Management Services(S.D.Cal. Jan. 22, 2025, No. 20-cv-0321-AGS-KSC) 2025 WL 268855 p. *4.) Rota has also been declareda vexatious litigant in Utah. (See Vashisht-Rota v. Howell Mgmt. Services (Utah App. 2021) 503 P.3d 526,529, 533.) In its findings in support of the Utah judgment, the Utah court stated her “litigation efforts havebeen wholly unsuccessful” and “have no apparent purpose but to place scandalous allegations against ...HMS on the public records.”End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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