Bacurin v. Bacurin (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Northeast District v. Los Angeles County Virginia L. BACURIN
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Bacurin v. Bacurin, 2026 WL 260902 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 260902 (Cal.Super.) (Trial Order)Superior Court of California,Northeast District,Department V.Los Angeles CountyVirginia L. BACURIN, Plaintiff,v.Luis L. BACURIN, et al., Defendants.Nos. 22GDCV00577, 22PDUD00700.January 13, 2026.Editor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.*1 Hearing Date: January 12, 2026Time: 8:30 a.m.Order re: Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Summary AdjudicationSarah J. Heidel, Judge.MOVING PARTIES: Defendant Luis L. BacurinRESPONDING PARTY: Plaintiff Virginia L. BacurinThe court considered the moving papers, opposition and reply filed in connection with this motion.BACKGROUNDOn September 2, 2022, Plaintiff Virginia L. Bacurin (Plaintiff) filed a complaint for reformation pursuant to California CivilCode Section 3399, against Defendants Luis L. Bacurin, an individual; Estate of Adelaida L. Bacurin, deceased; Estate ofLeonora L. Bacurin, deceased (collectively “Defendants”); and DOES 1 through 20, inclusive. Plaintiff alleges the following: OnApril 3, 2008, she acquired an equal ownership interest in joint tenancy with Plaintiff's now deceased sister, Adelaida Bacurin,in the Grange Street property (subject property). Unbeknownst to Plaintiff, her interest in the subject property was reconveyedto Adelaida Bacurin. On February 27, 2013, Adelaida Bacurin conveyed the subject property to herself and Plaintiff's othersiblings, Leonora Bacurin (now deceased) and Defendant Luis Bacurin in joint tenancy. Plaintiff's siblings promised her thatshe would remain an owner of the subject property in effect and that she would be added back as a title holder of record. WhenLeonora Bacurin passed away, Luis and Adelaida Bacurin became owners in joint tenancy of the subject property, pursuant tothe May 22, 2015 deed. When Adelaida Bacurin passed away, Defendant Luis Bacurin became the purported sole owner ofrecord of the subject property pursuant to the April 27, 2022 deed. Plaintiff seeks to have the April 27, 2022 deed reformedto express the true intent of Plaintiff and her siblings for each of them to have an equal joint tenancy ownership interest inthe subject property.
Bacurin v. Bacurin, 2026 WL 260902 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2On October 13, 2022, Defendant Luis L. Bacurin filed an answer to the complaint. On the same day, the Court entered defaultagainst Defendant Luis L. Bacurin.On December 16, 2022, Defendant Luis L. Bacurin filed a motion to set aside/vacate default. The matter came for hearing onJanuary 13, 2023; the motion was granted, Defendant Luis L. Bacurin's October Answer was stricken, and his new answerwas deemed filed.August 6, 2025, the court finds this case 22GDCV00577 and 22PDUD00700, are related within the meaning of California Rulesof Court, rule 3.300(a). 22GDCV00577 is the lead case.On August 12, 2025, Defendant Luis L. Bacurin (Defendant) filed this motion for summary judgment, or in the alternative,summary adjudication.On October 23, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition to Defendant's motion.On October 24, 2025, Defendant filed a reply to Plaintiff's opposition.STATEMENT OF FACTSPlaintiff executed a quitclaim deed on March 29, 2008, transferring her interest in the subject property to Adelaida L. Bacurin,Trustee. (UMF No. 1.) This 2008 Quitclaim deed was recorded on April 3, 2008. (UMF No. 2.) On February 26, 2013, AdelaidaBacurin transferred title of subject property to herself, Leonora Bacurin, and Defendant as joint tenants. (UMF No. 5.) LeonaraBacurin died on March 27, 2015. (UMF No. 6.) On May 22, 2015, an Affidavit – Death of Joint Tenant was recorded transferringLeonora's interest in the subject property to Adelaida and Defendant. (UMF No. 7.) In 2019, Plaintiff was removed from thesubject property following an unlawful detainer action but returned to the subject property in 2021 (UMF Nos. 8, 10.) AdelaidaBacurin died on March 16, 2022 and on April 27, 2022, Defendant recorded an Affidavit – Death of Joint Tenant. (UMF No.11, 12.) Plaintiff was served with a Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit on April 20, 2022. (UMF No. 13.) A second unlawfuldetainer action against Plaintiff was filed on April 27, 2022. (UMF No. 14.)REQUEST FOR JUDICIAL NOTICE*2 Defendant requests that the Court take judicial notice of the following copies of documents.1. Quitclaim Deed dated March 29, 2008, recorded on April 3, 2008 as Document No. 2008573835 in the Official Recordsof Los Angeles County Recorder's Office.2. Schedule A – Real Property filed in In re: Virginia L. Bacurin, United States Bankruptcy Court, Central District ofCalifornia, Case No. 2:10-bk-28245-ER.3. Schedule D – Creditors Holding Secured Claims filed in In re: Virginia L. Bacurin, United States Bankruptcy Court, CentralDistrict of California, Case No. 2:10-bk-28245-ER.4. Discharge of Debtor entered on September 3, 2010 in In re: Virginia L. Bacurin, United States Bankruptcy Court, CentralDistrict of California, Case No. 2:10-bk-28245-ER.5. Order Closing Case entered on September 28, 2010 in In re: Virginia L. Bacurin, United States Bankruptcy Court, CentralDistrict of California, Case No. 2:10-bk-28245-ER.
Bacurin v. Bacurin, 2026 WL 260902 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.36. Quitclaim Deed dated February 26, 2013, recorded on February 27, 2013 as Document No. 20130297094 in the OfficialRecords of Los Angeles County Recorder's Office.7. Affidavit – Death of Joint Tenant executed by Adelaida L. Bacurin on May 21, 2015, recorded on May 22, 2015 asDocument No. 20150603099 in the Official Records of Los Angeles County Recorder's Office.8. Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed on March 12, 2019 in Bacurin v. Bacurin, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No.19PDUD00728.9. Correspondence from DiJulio Law Group dated March 15, 2019, confirming acceptance of service of the 2019 UnlawfulDetainer Complaint10. Stipulated Judgment entered on April 24, 2019 in Bacurin v. Bacurin, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No.19PDUD00728.11. Correspondence from DiJulio Law Group dated May 30, 2019, confirming Plaintiff's surrender of possession and deliveryof keys to the Subject Property.12. Affidavit – Death of Joint Tenant executed by Luis L. Bacurin on April 22, 2022, recorded on April 27, 2022 as DocumentNo. 20220458932 in the Official Records of Los Angeles County Recorder's Office.13. Three-Day Notice to Pay Rent or Quit served on Plaintiff on April 20, 2022, demanding $3,750.00 in unpaid rent.14. Complaint for Unlawful Detainer filed on April 27, 2022 in Bacurin v. Bacurin, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No.22PDUD00700.15. Answer of Virginia Bacurin filed on July 28, 2022 in Bacurin v. Bacurin, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No.22PDUD00700.16. Final Judgment of Quiet Title entered on March 21, 2025 in Bacurin v. Bacurin, Los Angeles Superior Court, Case No.24NNCV00118.The Court finds that documents numbered 9, 11, and 13, are not judicially noticeable under California Evidence Code sections452 and 453. However, the court will consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers, except the evidence to which objectionshave been made and sustained by the court. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) Therefore, while not judicially noticeable,documents numbered 9, 11, and 13 are addressed by the Anthony Marinaccio declaration, and the Court considers them in itsanalysis below.The Court finds documents numbered 1-8, 10, 12, and 14-16 are judicially noticeable pursuant to California Evidence Codesections 452 and 453. The Court takes judicial notice of these documents as requested.LEGAL STANDARD*3 “The purpose of the law of summary judgment is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadingsin order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” (Aguilar v. AtlanticRichfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.)
Bacurin v. Bacurin, 2026 WL 260902 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4A party seeking summary judgment has the burden of producing evidentiary facts sufficient to entitle him/her to judgment as amatter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c).) The moving party must make an affirmative showing that he/she is entitledto judgment irrespective of whether or not the opposing party files an opposition. (Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th733, 743.) The moving party may support its motion by “affidavits, declarations, answers to interrogatories, depositions, andmatters upon which judicial notice shall or may be taken.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(l).)The opposing party on a motion for summary judgment is under no evidentiary burden to produce rebuttal evidence until themoving party meets his or her initial movant's burden. (Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832,840.) Once the initial movant's burden is met, then the burden shifts to the opposing party to show, with admissible evidence,that there is a triable issue requiring the weighing procedures of trial. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(1).) The opposingparty may not simply rely on his/her allegations to show a triable issue but must present evidentiary facts that are substantial innature and rise beyond mere speculation. (Sangster v. Paetkau (1998) 68 Cal.App.4th 151, 163.)As a general rule, in reviewing the evidence presented on summary judgment, the moving party's evidence is strictly construed,and the opposing party's evidence is liberally construed. (Binder v. Aetna Life Insurance Company (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 832,838.) The court is to consider all evidence submitted by the parties, direct and circumstantial, except that to which a properobjection has been sustained. (Code Civ. Proc., §437c, subd. (c).) The court must also consider all reasonable inferences drawntherefrom. (Id.)DISCUSSIONA. Timeliness of OppositionThe original hearing date set for this motion was November 6, 2025. In his reply, Defendant argues that Plaintiff's oppositionwas untimely as it was served on October 23, 2025, while it was due by October 17, 2025. Defendant argues that this deprivedhim of time in preparing the reply as it was due by October 24, 2025.A Court may properly consider papers that are not timely filed pursuant to CCP section 1005(b) unless “substantial rights” areaffected. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1300(d); Code Civ. Proc., § 475.) Although Plaintiff's opposition is untimely, Defendant'ssubstantial rights were not affected as Defendant timely filed a reply addressing the merits of Plaintiff's opposition. Thus, theCourt exercises its discretion in reviewing the opposition to decide the instant motion on the merits.B. Procedural Defects of Motion for Summary JudgmentIn her opposition, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's motion for summary judgment should be denied for its procedural defects.Plaintiff argues without elaboration that Defendant's Separate Statement of Undisputed Material Facts fails to properly citesupporting evidence for each fact as required by California Rules of Court, rule 3.1350. Defendant sufficiently cites supportingevidence for each fact in his Separate Statement.*4 Second, Plaintiff argues that Defendant's request for judicial notice improperly asks the court to take judicial notice ofdisputed facts. The Court notes that it has only taken judicial notice of documents falling within the parameters of CaliforniaEvidence Code section 452 as analyzed above.Third, Plaintiff argues that Defendant improperly relied on the March 21, 2025 default judgment entered against Plaintiff in arelated case and refused to stipulate to continue this motion until after the hearing to set aside the default judgment. The Courtfinds this argument is moot as the hearing for this motion is being heard after the hearing to set aside the default judgment.This is discussed further below.
Bacurin v. Bacurin, 2026 WL 260902 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Not only do Plaintiff's arguments fail to sufficiently show procedural deficiencies in Defendant's motion but Plaintiff's oppositionaddresses the motion on its merits. The appearance of a party at the hearing of a motion and his or her opposition to the motionon the merits is a waiver of any procedural defects or irregularities in a motion. (Carlton v. Quint (2000) 77 Cal.App.4th 690,697.) Thus, the Court exercises its discretion in deciding the instant motion on its merits.C. Motion for Summary JudgmentDefendant requests his motion for summary judgment be granted as there are no triable issues of material fact and Plaintiff'sclaim fails as a matter of law. Defendant claims Plaintiff lacks standing, cannot establish mutual mistake or fraud, and her claimis barred by res judicata and judicial estoppel.a. StandingDefendant states Plaintiff lacks standing to seek reformation of the 2022 Affidavit – Death of Joint Tenant.“One who invokes the judicial process does not have “standing” if he, or those whom he properly represents, does not have a realinterest in the ultimate adjudication because the actor has neither suffered nor is about to suffer any injury of sufficient magnitudereasonably to assure that all of the relevant facts and issues will be adequately presented.... California decisions … generallyrequire a plaintiff to have a personal interest in the litigation's outcome.' ” (Bilafer v. Bilafer (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 363, 370.)“When, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of one party, which the other at the time knew or suspected,a written contract does not truly express the intention of the parties, it may be revised on the application of a party aggrieved,so as to express that intention, so far as it can be done without prejudice to rights acquired by third persons, in good faith andfor value.” (Cal. Civ. Code § 3399.)Plaintiff alleges that by mistake and/or fraud, the 2022 Affidavit - Death of Joint Tenant does not fully and truly express theintention of the parties to include Plaintiff as a titleholder to the subject property, and thus, the document should be reformedto include Plaintiff as a co-equal owner with Defendant. (Complaint, ¶¶ 14, 20.)Defendant argues that Plaintiff's assertion of ownership years earlier does not support reformation of this later 2022 instrumentof which she wasn't a party. Defendant notes previous instruments concerning transfer of the subject property's ownership inwhich Plaintiff was not a party, including the transfer on February 26, 2013, by Adelaida Bacurin to herself, Leonora Bacurin,and Defendant as joint tenants (UMF No. 5, Luis Decl., Ex. 6.), and the May 22, 2015 Affidavit - Death of Joint Tenant whichtransferred Leonora's interest to Adelaida and Defendant. (UMF No. 7, Luis Decl., Ex. 7.) Defendant states that because Plaintiffis not a party to the most recently recorded 2022 Affidavit - Death of Joint Tenant (UMF No. 12, Luis Decl., Ex. 12.), she doesnot have standing under California Civil Code section 3399 to reform the agreement. (UMF No. 12, Luis Decl., Ex. 12.) Insupport of his argument Defendant references pin cites that do not support his contentions, quotes language which does notappear in the cited cases, and cites pages and cases which do not exist.1*5 In fact, “Civil Code section 3399 permits reformation of a contract upon application of any aggrieved party. Under thisstatute, [t]he right to reformation of an instrument is not restricted to the original parties to the transaction.” (Panterra GP, Inc.v. Superior Court of Kern County?(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 697, 714, citations and quotations omitted.) Therefore, the Court findsthat Defendant has failed to show that as a matter of law, Plaintiff does not have standing to her reformation cause of action aseither a party to the agreement or as an aggrieved party, to shift the burden to Plaintiff to establish a triable issue of material fact.b. Mutual Mistake or Fraud
Bacurin v. Bacurin, 2026 WL 260902 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Defendant also argues that Plaintiff cannot establish the 2022 Affidavit - Death of Joint Tenant was based on mutual mistakeor fraud.A reformation action lies when a written instrument does not accurately reflect the oral understanding that gave rise to it. (Civ.Code § 3399; Getty v. Getty (1986) 187 Cal.App.3d 1159, 1178.) The sole purpose of the reformation doctrine is to correct awritten instrument in order to effectuate a common intention of the parties which was incorrectly reduced to writing. (Getty,supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at 1178.) Thus, when, through fraud or a mutual mistake of the parties, or a mistake of one party,which the other at the time knew or suspected, a written contract does not truly express the intention of the parties, it may berevised by the court on the application of a party aggrieved, so as to express that intention, so far as it can be done withoutprejudice to rights acquired by third persons, in good faith and for value. (Civ. Code § 3399; Getty, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at1178.) However, the court cannot, under a theory of reformation, create a new agreement for the parties which conforms tocircumstances other than those that they had mistakenly assumed were true; if the written instrument accurately reflects theagreement of the parties, albeit an agreement based upon a mistaken assumption of fact, an action for reformation does not lie.(Getty, supra, 187 Cal.App.3d at 1178.)Defendant argues that fraud or mistake cannot be established because the parties' intent was not to include Plaintiff as an owner ofthe subject property. Defendant also contends that it was established that Plaintiff was a tenant of the property and not an owner.First, Defendant argues Plaintiff has shown this through her own conduct, which is inconsistent with ownership. Plaintiff claimedshe did not have ownership of the subject property in her Chapter 7 bankruptcy filings. (UMF No. 3, Luis Decl., Exs. 2, 3.)Plaintiff did not assert ownership interest in the subject property when she was evicted from it in 2019 following an unlawfuldetainer action. (UMF No. 9, Marinaccio Decl. 11.) Plaintiff returned to the property in 2021 under a month-to-month tenancy.(UMF No. 10, Luis Decl. 20.) Plaintiff stopped paying rent and was served with a three-day notice to pay rent or quit onApril 20, 2022. (UMF No. 13, Luis Decl., Ex. 13.) Plaintiff did not assert ownership interest in the subject property in heranswer to the second unlawful detainer action filed on April 27, 2022. (UMF No. 15, Marinaccio Decl., Ex. 15; UMF No. 14,Luis Decl., Ex. 14.)Second, Defendant demonstrates the parties intention to not have Plaintiff as an owner of the subject property by multiplechanges in the chain of title, none of which included Plaintiff. On February 26, 2013, Adelaida Bacurin transferred title toherself, Leonora Bacurin, and Defendant as joint tenants. (UMF No. 5, Luis Decl., Ex. 6.) Plaintiff was not included in thisaction. Following Leonara's death, an Affidavit – Death of Joint Tenant was filed on May 22, 2015, transferring her interest toAdelaida and Defendant. (UMF No. 7, Luis Decl., Ex. 7.) Plaintiff was not included in this action. Lastly, following Adelaida'sdeath, the disputed Affidavit – Death of Joint Tenant was filed on April 27, 2022, transferring her interest to Defendant. (UMFNo. 12, Luis Decl., Ex. 12.) Plaintiff was not included in this action.*6 Based on the foregoing, the Court finds Defendant has presented sufficient evidence to show that the 2022 Affidavit was notbased on mutual mistake or fraud. The burden thus shifts to Plaintiff to offer evidence that there is a triable issue of material fact.Plaintiff maintains that her behavior was not inconsistent with that of an owner and the 2022 Affidavit – Death of Joint Tenantwas based on fraud or mistake. Plaintiff states that she and Adelaida and Leonora entered into an agreement prior to thebankruptcy filings, that she would retain ownership of the subject property, despite not being named in the title of the property.(Virginia Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4.) The Court does not find this a satisfactory reason for why Plaintiff would then not list this ownershipright in her subsequent bankruptcy filings, if she believed she had it.Moreover, while Plaintiff does not dispute that she was evicted from the subject property in 2019 following an unlawful detaineraction or that she was served with a three-day notice to pay rent or quit on April 20, 2022, Plaintiff states she never paid rentfor the subject property, and instead she consistently paid the subject property's mortgage. (Virginia Decl. 10.) But payingthe mortgage is not dispositive of Plaintiff's ownership, as mortgages may be paid by someone who is not an owner. Rather,
Bacurin v. Bacurin, 2026 WL 260902 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7“the description in a deed as to how title is held is presumed to reflect the actual ownership interests in the property.” (Carnev. Worthington (2016) 246 Cal.App.4th 548, 556.)Plaintiff argues that she did not assert ownership in either of the two unlawful detainer actions against her as the unlawful detainerproceedings were limited in scope and did not provide a proper forum for her to fully litigate her ownership claims. However,the supporting evidence Plaintiff cites to is insufficient to support this finding. First, Plaintiff cites to her own declaration atparagraph eleven which does not mention the unlawful detainer actions but instead refers to a much later March 21, 2025default judgment. (Virginia Decl. 11.) Second, Plaintiff cites to her answer to the second unlawful detainer action, providedinto evidence by Defendant, in which she did assert Defendant “is not the owner of the Property” as an affirmative defensebut does not claim herself as an owner. (Luis Decl., Ex. 15.) Whereas Plaintiff could have provided a declaration of counselstating it was improper to assert Plaintiff's ownership rights in these proceedings, the Court finds Plaintiff's evidence, as is,does not support such an assertion.Last, Plaintiff contends that the 2022 Affidavit – Death of Joint Tenant was based on mistake or fraud as Adelaida and Leonoratold Plaintiff she retained ownership in the property. Plaintiff states that before she transferred title of the subject property toAdelaida, both Adelaida and Leonora agreed that Plaintiff would maintain ownership. (Virginia Decl. ¶¶ 3, 4.) Plaintiff furtherstates that after Leonora's death in 2015, Adelaida continued to maintain that Plaintiff was still owner of the subject property.(Virginia Decl. 8.) Plaintiff sufficiently shows there is a triable issue of fact on whether the 2022 document was based onmistake and/or fraud as to Adelaida and Leonora's representations that contrast the recorded chain of title.c. Res Judicata*7 Defendant states Plaintiff's claim for reformation is barred by the doctrine of res judicata.The doctrine of res judicata applies when the issues decided in the prior adjudication are identical with those presented in thelater action; there was a final judgment on the merits in the prior action; and the party against whom the plea is raised was aparty in privity with a party in the prior adjudication. (Citizens for Open Access to Sand and Tide, Inc. v. Seadrift Ass'n (1998) 60Cal.App.4th 1053, 1065.) The doctrine of res judicata promotes judicial economy. Under this doctrine, all claims based on thesame cause of action must be decided in a single suit; if not brought initially, they may not be raised at a later date. Res judicataprecludes piecemeal litigation by splitting a single cause of action or relitigation of the same cause of action in a different legaltheory or for different relief.” (Mycogen Corp. v. Monsanto Co. (2002) 28 Cal.4th 888, 897.)Defendant argues that Plaintiff's claim for reformation is barred by res judicata as the Superior Court entered a Final Judgmentof Quiet Title of the subject property in favor of Defendant on March 21, 2025 (UMF No. 16, Luis Decl., Ex. 16.) In case no.24NNCV00118 Defendant brought the quiet title action against Plaintiff, giving Plaintiff the opportunity to assert ownershipof the subject property. On March 21, 2025, the court granted Defendant's motion for default judgment in this case and orderedDefendant the owner of the subject property. A default judgment is treated as a judgment “on the merits” and res judicata as tothe claim involved. (English v. English (1937) 9 Cal.2d 358, 363-364; see also Martin v. Gen. Fin. Co. (1966) 239 Cal.App.2d438, 443.) However on December 16, 2025, the default entered against Plaintiff in case no. 24NNCV00118 was vacated, aswas the default judgment entered against Plaintiff on March 21, 2025. Therefore, Defendant has failed to show that Plaintiff'sclaim is barred by res judicata.d. Judicial EstoppelDefendant states Plaintiff is judicially estopped from asserting ownership of the subject property due to her contradictorybankruptcy disclaimers.
Bacurin v. Bacurin, 2026 WL 260902 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Judicial estoppel precludes a party from gaining an advantage by asserting one position, and then later seeking an advantage bytaking a clearly inconsistent position.? It is only available as relief upon the instant Court's finding “that a court has adopted oraccepted as true the inconsistent position.” (The Swahn Group, Inc. v. Segal (2010) 183 Cal.App.4th 831, 844.) Factors whichmight indicate that judicial estoppel applies are: (1) the same party has taken two positions; (2) in judicial or quasi-judicialproceedings; (3) and found success in asserting the first position (i.e., the tribunal adopted the position as true); (4) the twopositions are totally inconsistent; and (5) the first position was not the result of mistake.? (International Engine Parts, Inc. v.Feddersen & Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th 354, 352.)Defendant argues that the Court should apply judicial estoppel because Plaintiff disclaimed any ownership interest in the subjectproperty when she filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy in 2010. (UMF No. 3, Luis Decl., Ex. 2, 3.) In filing for bankruptcy, onPlaintiff's Schedule A- Real Property form, which directs a debtor to list all real property in which they have any legal, equitable,or future interest, Plaintiff did not claim any interest in the subject property. (Luis Decl., Ex. 2.) Additionally, on Plaintiff'sSchedule D – Creditors Holding Secured Claims form, Plaintiff acknowledged her name was not on the title of the subjectproperty and she had quitclaimed the property out of her name in 1999. (Luis Decl., Ex. 3.) On September 3, 2010, the UnitedStates Bankruptcy Court – Central District of California granted Plaintiff's discharge under section 727 of title 11, United StatesCode. (Luis Decl., Ex. 4.) The Bankruptcy court closed Plaintiff's case on September 28, 2010. (Luis Decl., Ex. 5.) Defendantcontends that the court relied upon Plaintiff's representations on her Schedule A and D forms when entering Plaintiff's bankruptcydischarge and closing her case. (UMF No. 4, Luis Decl., Ex. 4, 5.)*8 Here, factors one, two, and four weigh in Defendant's favor because Plaintiff disclaimed any interest in the subject propertyin her bankruptcy filings but now claims such an interest in this case's complaint. (UMF No. 3, Luis Decl., Ex. 2, 3.) Moreover,factor three is also satisfied because the bankruptcy court granted a discharge of her debt which suggests that her responseswere accepted as true. (UMF No. 4, Luis Decl., Ex. 4, 5.)In support of factor five, Defendant contends that Plaintiff not only passively failed to list the subject property on the Schedule Aform, but she affirmatively stated on the Schedule D form that she was not named on the subject property's title. (Luis Decl., Ex.3.) Additionally, Defendant offers evidence that Plaintiff's conduct was consistent with her not having ownership in the property.For example, Plaintiff was removed from the subject property following an unlawful detainer action in 2019 and did not assert anownership interest during the proceedings. (UMF No. 8, Luis Decl., Exs. 8-11; Luis Decl. 11.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff'scurrent assertion of ownership in the subject property is calculated as it follows a second unlawful detainer action filed on April27, 2022. (UMF No. 14, Luis Decl., Ex. 14.) In light of such evidence, the Court finds Defendant has satisfied factor five.Therefore, the Court finds Defendant has presented sufficient evidence that judicial estoppel applies to Plaintiff's claim forreformation. This shifts the burden to Plaintiff to offer evidence that there is a triable issue of material fact.Plaintiff does not dispute that prior to filing for bankruptcy she signed a quitclaim deed transferring title to the subject premises.(UMF No. 1, Virginia Decl. 4.) Plaintiff does not dispute that she filed for bankruptcy in 2010. (UMF No. 3, Virginia Decl. 5.) Plaintiff does not dispute that her bankruptcy discharge was entered on September 3, 2010, and the case was closed onSeptember 28, 2010. (UMF No. 4.) Therefore, Plaintiff does not raise a triable issue of material fact negating factors one, two,three, or four.Plaintiff attempts to negate factor five and explain the discrepancies between the two inconsistent positions by stating sheentered into an agreement with Leonora Bacurin and Adelaida Bacurin proclaiming Plaintiff would maintain ownership of thesubject property, following its transfer, despite her subsequent bankruptcy filing. (UMF No. 1, Virginia Decl. 3.) Plaintiff saysit was her understanding that she would retain ownership rights following the quitclaim deed. (Virginia Decl. 3.) Plaintiffprovides no explanation for why she failed to then list this ownership right in the bankruptcy filings, when she believed shepossessed it. Regarding factor five of judicial estoppel, the court in International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co., foundno ignorance, fraud, or mistake based on evidence that the appellants had intentionally chosen not to include a potential claim[in their bankruptcy filings] against the respondent. (International Engine Parts, Inc. v. Feddersen & Co. (1998) 64 Cal.App.4th
Bacurin v. Bacurin, 2026 WL 260902 (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9345, 352–353.) Here, Plaintiff provides no evidence that her omission of ownership of the subject property from the bankruptcyfilings, when she believed she had it, was not intentional.Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that Plaintiff fails to raise a triable issue of material fact as to whether Plaintiff's positionin the bankruptcy filings (that she had no ownership rights in the subject property) were due to mistake. The court accordinglygrants summary judgment on these grounds.A. Motion for Summary Adjudication*9 Defendant alternatively moves for summary adjudication “on the issue of ownership” under Code of Civil Procedure section437c, subdivision (f)(1). As the Court grants Defendant's motion for summary judgment, there is no need to address this request.CONCLUSIONBased on the foregoing, the court GRANTS Defendant's motion for summary judgment.Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.IT IS SO ORDERED.DATED: January 13, 2026<<signature>>Sarah J. HeidelJudge of the Superior CourtFootnotes1For example, Defendant cites to “American Home Ins. Co. v. Travelers Indem. Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 138, 145” for the quote“[a] party who is neither a signatory nor a beneficiary of a contract lacks standing to seek its reformation.” (Mot. p. 5.) There is nocase by this name published in 1985. There is a case by this name published in 1981, but the quoted language does not exist within it.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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