California v. Buenzli (Dec. 18, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
California. v. CHRISTINA BUENZLI
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
Dec. 18, 2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Earl (P. J.) (unanimous Court)
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff and Respondent, v.CHRISTINA BUENZLI, Defendant and Appellant.Court of Appeal, Third District, California., (El Dorado). | December 18, 2025 | Not Reported inCal.Rptr. | 2025 WL 3675150Document DetailsKeyCite:KeyCite Red Flag Unpublished/noncitablestandard Citation:JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff & Respondent, v.CHRISTINA BUENZLI, Defendant & Appellant., No. C102530, 2025WL 3675150 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2025)All Citations:Not Reported in Cal.Rptr., 2025 WL 3675150Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:CaliforniaDelivery DetailsDate:December 19, 2025 at 10:19 AMDelivered By:Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineOpinion (p.1)All Citations (p.7)
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff and Respondent,..., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1KeyCite Red Flag Unpublished/noncitable2025 WL 3675150Not Officially Published(Cal. Rules of Court, Rules8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, restrictscitation of unpublished opinions in California courts.NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDCourt of Appeal, Third District, California.(El Dorado).JPMORGAN CHASE BANK,N.A., Plaintiff and Respondent,v.CHRISTINA BUENZLI,Defendant and Appellant.C102530|Filed 12/18/2025Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion ofcitation references that are incorrect or do not actuallyexist. These invalid citations appeared in the originalcourt opinion and have been preserved as written sincethey are part of the official record. Any links to theseinvalid citations have been removed.(Super. Ct. No. 23CV1898)OpinionEARL, P. J.*1 Defendant Christina Buenzli, proceeding inpropria persona, appeals a $32,314.34 judgmententered against her and in favor of plaintiff JPMorganChase Bank, N.A. (the Bank). Because Buenzli has notprovided us with either an adequate record or reasonedarguments with citations to authority, we affirm.BACKGROUNDThe record on appeal is sparse. It consists of a clerk'stranscript that contains only three of the underlyingdocuments in this case1 and an incomplete reporter'stranscript. Although we know the Bank sued Buenzli,the complaint is not included in the clerk's transcript(because Buenzli did not ask that it be included). Fromthe register of actions, it appears the Bank assertedsome type of contract claim against Buenzli, and in herbrief she states it sued her “for an alleged credit carddebt.”Buenzli filed a form answer to the complaint, andthe answer is part of the clerk's transcript. Theanswer neither admits nor denies the allegations inthe complaint.2 Attached to the answer are severalunauthenticated documents that purportedly relate toaffirmative defenses. The first is an “Affidavit ofTruth” signed by Buenzli with attached exhibits.3 Ifwe understand the affidavit and the exhibits correctly,it appears Buenzli had a credit card issued by theBank, and the Bank sent her a bill in or aroundSeptember 2022 stating the balance on the card was$28,820.51, and a minimum payment of $645 was dueby October 7, 2022. Buenzli detached the payment stubfrom the bottom of the bill, wrote “$28,820.51” in thespace marked “Amount Enclosed,” and mailed it tocardmember services. Buenzli referred to this as the“coupon payment,” and it appears she contends thiswas sufficient to pay the bill in full, as she subsequentlywrote in a letter to the Bank's chief executive officer,which is also attached to the answer. There is nothingin the record that suggests Buenzli ever remitted anyform of payment.Also attached to the answer is a document titled “Writin the Nature of Discovery,” which is addressed tothe superior court judge assigned to the case, with a“cc” to the Bank's counsel. The writ seeks variousdocuments, including “the ‘Original PromissoryNote’ ... associated with the loan,” “BookkeepingJournal Entries associated with the Loan,” and “the‘Deed of Trust’ associated with the loan.” We notethat a writ is not the proper procedure for requestingdiscovery in California, which is instead governedby the Civil Discovery Act, Code of Civil Procedure
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff and Respondent,..., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2section 2016.010 et seq. We also note that discoveryshould be addressed to the opposing party, not thejudge.*2 Also attached to the answer is a letter addressed tothe judge, once again with a “cc” to the Bank's counsel,seeking any “competent evidence that I, Christina-Louise: Buenzli, Beneficiary, have any legal obligationto pay you.” A letter addressed to the judge is also notthe proper procedure for requesting discovery.Also attached to the answer is a document titled“Notice of Intent—Fee Schedule.” Buenzli fails toexplain what this document is or how it is relevant tothis case.The last attachment to the answer is an InternalRevenue Service (IRS) form (Form 56) titled “NoticeConcerning Fiduciary Relationship.” According tothe IRS's Web site, this form must be filed by“[a] fiduciary ... who seeks to act on behalf ofa taxpayer before the IRS, or to inform the IRSthat the fiduciary capacity has terminated.” (https://www.irs.gov/instructions/i56 [as of December 16,2025], archived at https://perma.cc/3KPG-329J.) Theform designates the judge to act as Buenzli's fiduciary.Again, we are not told how this document is relevantto the case, or, for that matter, why Buenzli woulddesignate the judge to act as her fiduciary before theIRS.The second document in the clerk's transcript is adeclaration filed by Buenzli that states “Judicial Noticeis a Form of Evidence—See Attached Ruling byJustice Gorsuch.” Attached to the declaration is a one-page document that contains various quotations, mostunattributed.4 The relevance of this document, and thequotations it contains, is unclear.The final document in the clerk's transcript is thejudgment after trial, which states the following: “Proofhaving been made to the satisfaction of the courtthat the defendant had proper notice of the timeand place fixed for trial of this action, the courtheard the testimony and considered the evidence, andgood cause appearing therefore; [¶] IT IS HEREBYORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED thatplaintiff JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. have judgmentagainst defendant CHRISTINA L BUENZLI in theprincipal sum of $32314.34 plus costs of $0.00 ... fora total judgment of $32,314.34.”In addition to the clerk's transcript, we have beenprovided with a reporter's transcript for a proceedingheld on September 17, 2024. From that transcript, itappears this was the second day of a two-day trial,and the first day of trial was held on August 23 (andwe note Buenzli confirms in her opening brief thatthe trial was held on August 23 and September 17). Itfurther appears that, on the first day of trial, MarianaEchaverria-Licona, a senior authorized signing officerfor the Bank, testified on its behalf; that Buenzli hadan opportunity to cross-examine her; and that Bankrecords were admitted into evidence. We have not beenprovided with a reporter's transcript for the August23 trial date and thus do not know what Echaverria-Licona testified to or what records were admitted intoevidence.*3 Buenzli was given an opportunity to presenther case on September 17. The reporter's transcriptshows that, rather than providing testimony about theunderlying facts, she made arguments that are difficultto follow, attacked the Bank's witness, complained thatthe information requested in the “Writ of Discovery”was never provided, and discussed her exhibits, whichare not part of the clerk's transcript. She also threatenedto sue the judge “under the common law for violating[her] rights under the UCC.”After Buenzli finished her presentation, the judgefound that the Bank's witness “provided competenttestimony and properly authenticated the records thatwere admitted into evidence and that they did establishthat the debt owed by defendant is $32,314.34. [¶] ...[¶] I also believe she's established that the debt has notbeen paid in full.... [¶] So I do find that ... the evidenceestablishes that Ms. Buenzli owes $32,314.34 basedon her account with J.P. Morgan Chase, so I'm goingto order judgment for plaintiff in that amount.” Thejudgment described above was entered that same day.This appeal followed.DISCUSSION
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff and Respondent,..., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3We note at the outset that, although Buenzli isproceeding in propria persona, she “ ‘is to be treatedlike any other party and is entitled to the same,but no greater consideration than other litigants andattorneys.’ [Citation.] Indeed, ‘ “the in propria personalitigant is held to the same restrictive rules of procedureas an attorney.” ’ ” (First American Title Co. v.Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.)Buenzli argues the judgment must be reversed because:the Bank failed to prove a valid and enforceablecontract or to validate the debt; billing statements arelegally insufficient to establish credit card debt andthey thus should not have been admitted; the Bank'switness was not qualified and her testimony wasinadmissible and thus legally insufficient to support thejudgment; the Bank (or perhaps the trial court) ignored“unrebutted affidavits” and “conditional acceptance”;“no standing, no injured party, no jurisdiction”; andshe was not given sufficient time to present her case.The gist of many (if not most) of her arguments is thatthe evidence was insufficient to support the judgment.For the reasons explained below, we find all of herarguments unpersuasive.We begin our discussion with some principles ofappellate review because they are dispositive of thisappeal. First, “it is a fundamental principle of appellateprocedure that a trial court judgment is ordinarilypresumed to be correct and the burden is on anappellant to demonstrate, on the basis of the recordpresented to the appellate court, that the trial courtcommitted an error that justifies reversal of thejudgment. [Citations.] ‘This is not only a generalprinciple of appellate practice but an ingredient of theconstitutional doctrine of reversible error.’ [Citations.]‘In the absence of a contrary showing in the record,all presumptions in favor of the trial court's actionwill be made by the appellate court.’ ” (Jameson v.Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 608-609.) “It is the burdenof the party challenging a judgment on appeal toprovide an adequate record to assess error.” (Nielsen v.Gibson (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 318, 324.) Because ajudgment or order is presumed correct, “ ‘if the recordis inadequate for meaningful review, the appellantdefaults and the decision of the trial court should beaffirmed.’ ” (Gee v. American Realty & Construction,Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.) “ ‘Failure toprovide an adequate record on an issue requires that theissue be resolved against [the appellant].’ ” (Jameson,at p. 609.)*4 These rules are dispositive of most of Buenzli'sarguments because we do not have a reporter'stranscript or other record of the first day of trial, whichis when the Bank presented its evidence. “Where noreporter's transcript has been provided and no error isapparent on the face of the existing appellate record,the judgment must be conclusively presumed correctas to all evidentiary matters. To put it another way,it is presumed that the unreported trial testimonywould demonstrate the absence of error.” (Estate ofFain (1999) 75 Cal.App.4th 973, 992, italics omitted.)And again: “[A]n appellant who attacks a judgmentbut supplies no reporter's transcript will be precludedfrom raising an argument as to the sufficiency of theevidence.” (Ibid.) And again: “ ‘ “[I]f any matterscould have been presented to the court below whichwould have authorized the order complained of, itwill be presumed that such matters were presented.”’ ” (Jameson v. Desta, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.)What this all means is that we must presume theevidence presented by the Bank on the first day of trialwas sufficient to support the trial court's finding thatBuenzli owed the Bank $32,314.34.These rules also effectively dispose of any argumentthat the trial court erroneously admitted evidence.For example, Buenzli contends the Bank's witnesswas unqualified and her testimony was inadmissible.5She also appears to contend the trial court erred(1) in admitting certain business records (perhapsbecause they were not properly authenticated asrequired by Evid. Code, § 1271), and (2) whenit overruled (or “[r]efused”) her “valid objections.”These arguments fail because all of the evidenceBuenzli challenges was admitted on the first dayof trial, and we have no reporter's transcript forthat day. We thus do not know what testimony wasgiven, what records were admitted, what foundationwas laid for any records admitted, whether Buenzlimade any objections to the testimony or the records,and, if so, on what grounds she objected and whatthe trial court ruled. “We review the trial court'srulings on relevance and admission or exclusionof evidence ... for abuse of discretion.” (Peoplev. Cole (2004) 33 Cal.4th 1158, 1198.) “It is theappellant's burden on appeal to establish an abuse of
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff and Respondent,..., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4discretion and prejudice.” (People v. Albarran (2007)149 Cal.App.4th 214, 225.) And, as noted above, anappellant also bears the burden of “provid[ing] anadequate record to assess error.” (Nielsen v. Gibson,supra, 178 Cal.App.4th at p. 324.) Buenzli has notprovided us with a reporter's transcript for the firstday of trial, and no evidentiary error “is apparent onthe face of the existing appellate record.” (Estate ofFain, supra, 75 Cal.App.4th at p. 992.) As a result, “thejudgment must be conclusively presumed correct asto all evidentiary matters.” (Ibid., italics omitted.) Putanother way, without a reporter's transcript and withno error appearing on the face of the record, we mustpresume the trial court only allowed admissible andrelevant evidence.The lack of an adequate record is not Buenzli'sonly deficit. Her brief is also wholly inadequateand her citations to legal authority are at bestincorrect, at worse fabricated. As the appellant, it isBuenzli's responsibility “to support claims of errorwith meaningful argument and citation to authority.[Citations.] When legal argument with citation toauthority is not furnished on a particular point, wemay treat the point as forfeited and pass it withoutconsideration. [Citations.] In addition, citing caseswithout any discussion of their application to thepresent case results in forfeiture. [Citations.] We arenot required to examine undeveloped claims or tosupply arguments for the litigants. [Citations.]” (Allenv. City of Sacramento (2015) 234 Cal.App.4th41, 52.) “[A]sserted grounds for appeal that areunsupported by any citation to authority and thatmerely complain of error without presenting a coherentlegal argument are deemed abandoned and unworthyof discussion.” (Wright v. City of Los Angeles (2001)93 Cal.App.4th 683, 689.) “A court need not consideran issue where reasoned, substantial argument andcitation to supporting authorities are lacking.” (Woodsv. Horton (2008) 167 Cal.App.4th 658, 677.) “ ‘Whenan issue is unsupported by pertinent or cognizable legalargument it may be deemed abandoned and discussionby the reviewing court is unnecessary.’ ” (Okorie v. LosAngeles Unified School Dist. (2017) 14 Cal.App.5th574, 600, disapproved on another ground in Bonniv. St. Joseph Health System (2021) 11 Cal.5th 995,1012, fn. 2.) These rules are also dispositive of manyof Buenzli's arguments because her brief is rife withcitations to cases that either do not exist or do not standfor the proposition she cites them for. It should gowithout saying that one cannot “support claims of errorwith meaningful argument and citation to authority” byciting cases that do not exist or that do not stand for thepropositions for which they are cited. (Allen, at p. 52.)*5 For example, Buenzli cites “Discover Bank v.Boone (2014) 166 Cal.Rptr.3d 897” and attributesthe following quote to it: “ ‘Without the originalcontract, billing statements alone are insufficient tosupport judgment.’ ” The cited case does not exist. TheCal.Rptr.3d citation refers to Gonzalez v. Seal Methods,Inc. (2014) 223 Cal.App.4th 405 [166 Cal.Rptr.3d895], but that case deals with workers’ compensation,not billing. We have searched Lexis for the quoteattributed to the case, but it does not appear in anypublished or unpublished case reported in Lexis.Most of the other cases Buenzli cites in her briefsuffer from similar problems. She cites “Unifund CCRPartners v. Dear (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 892” andattributes the following quote to it: “ ‘[Debt buyer]failed to show a complete chain of ownership ...Billing statements did not prove the debt's validity.’” The cited case does not exist. The Cal.App.5thcitation refers to Abir Cohen Treyzon Salo, LLP v.Lahiji (2019) 40 Cal.App.5th 882, which involved alawsuit dismissed under the anti-SLAPP statute (CodeCiv. Proc., § 425.16), and which has nothing to dowith billing or credit card debt. The quote Buenzliattributes to the case does not appear in any casereported in Lexis. There is a case called Unifund CCR,LLC v. Dear (2015) 243 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1 thatinvolved credit card debt, but it does not support theproposition that billing statements are insufficient toprove a debt's validity. Indeed, it strongly suggeststhat billing statements can be sufficient to provecredit card debt. The defendant in that case incurred$25,000 in Citibank credit card charges. Citibanksold the account to a third party, which assignedthe account to another third party, which ultimatelyassigned the account to the plaintiff, and the plaintiffsued the defendant to recover the charges. (Id. at pp.4-5.) At trial, the plaintiff submitted a declaration inlieu of testimony from its custodian of records, andattached to the declaration were the monthly billingstatements from the Citibank account. The defendantobjected to the declaration and the attachment basedon lack of foundation, lack of authentication, and
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff and Respondent,..., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5hearsay. The trial court overruled the objections andentered judgment for the plaintiff for $25,000, andthe defendant appealed, arguing the trial court erredin admitting the declaration to establish the debt. (Id.at p. 5.) The appellate court disagreed and affirmedthe judgment, finding the trial court did not abuse itsdiscretion in admitting the billing statements becausethey qualified as business records pursuant to EvidenceCode section 1271. (Unifund CCR, LLC, at pp. 6-9.)Although the case does not hold that billing statementsare always sufficient to prove the validity of credit carddebt, it certainly does not hold that they are insufficientto prove a debt's validity.Buenzli also cites “Garcia v. Bank of America Corp.(N.D.Cal. 2012) No. C 11-5537 CW, 2012 WL1657111,” and attributes the following quote to it: “‘The court found that billing statements alone do notmeet the standard for debt validation under federal law.The same applies under state law when fundamentalelements like the underlying agreement and itemizedaccounting are absent.’ ” The cited case does notexist. The Westlaw citation refers to Das v. WMCMortg. Corp. (N.D.Cal. 2012) 2012 WL 1657111, butthat case does not mention billing statements or debtvalidation. The quote Buenzli attributes to the casedoes not appear in any case reported in Lexis.*6 Buenzli also cites JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A.v. Ward (2019) 33 Cal.App.5th 678 and attributes thefollowing quote to it: “ ‘The court held that billingstatements alone are insufficient to prove the existenceor amount of a debt.’ ” The case exists, but it does notcontain the quote attributed to it, and there is nothingin the case about billing statements or whether they aresufficient to prove the existence or amount of a debt.The quote attributed to the case does not appear in anycase reported in Lexis.Buenzli also cites Greene v. Bank of America (2013)216 Cal.App.4th 454 and attributes the following quoteto it: “ ‘Creditors must provide verifiable and completetransaction-level records, not summaries.’ ” The caseexists but it does not contain the quote attributed toit, and there is nothing in the case about what recordsa creditor must provide to establish a debt. The quotedoes not appear in any case reported in Lexis.Buenzli also cites Professional Collection Consultantsv. Lauron (2017) 8 Cal.App.5th 958 and attributesthe following quote to it: “ ‘Confirms dismissal iswarranted when a creditor fails to validate.’ ” The caseexists but it does not contain the quote attributed toit. Moreover, although the case involved an attemptto collect credit card debt, the issue was whether theclaim was time-barred and when it accrued, and it hadnothing to do with validating a debt or dismissing acase for failing to validate. The quote does not appearin any case reported in Lexis.Buenzli also cites “Midland Funding, LLC v. Madden(2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1” and attributes thefollowing quote to it: “ ‘An affidavit without personalknowledge and unsupported by underlying records isinsufficient to prove the debt.’ ” The case does notexist. The Cal.App.4th cite refers to Jones v. CreditAuto Center, Inc. (2015) 237 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, butthat case has nothing to do with affidavits, personalknowledge, or debt. The quote does not appear in anycase reported in Lexis, and even if it did, Buenzli failsto explain how it is relevant because it appears theBank's witness testified at trial and did not submit anaffidavit.Buenzli also cites “Portfolio Recovery Assoc. v. King(2012) 55 Cal.4th 659” to support the propositionthat the Bank “failed to present an injured party(required under Common Law), failed to establishlegal ownership of the debt, and failed to showstanding under California Evidence Code § 403.”6 Thecited case does not exist. The Cal.4th citation refers toPeople v. Rutterschmidt appearing at 55 Cal.4th 650,which is a criminal case dealing with the constitutionalright to confront adverse witnesses and has nothing todo with injured party requirements, ownership of debt,or standing.Buenzli also cites “Cach LLC v. Rodgers (2011) 195Cal.App.4th Supp. 1” and attributes the followingquote to it: “ ‘A debt buyer must show how and whenit acquired the debt, or it lacks standing.’ ” The citedcase does not exist. There is a case called CACH LLC v.Rodgers (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th Supp. 1, but it dealswith Code of Civil Procedure section 98, which allowsa party to offer testimony from relevant witnessesin the form of affidavits or declarations in certain
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff and Respondent,..., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6circumstances. Section 98 does not appear applicablehere.*7 We note the court in Noland v. Land of the Free,L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426 recently addressedthe issue of the filing of an appellate brief “repletewith fabricated quotes and citations.” (Id. at p. 441.)In response to the submitted brief, the Noland courtissued an order to show cause (OSC) why it shouldnot sanction plaintiff's counsel. (It ultimately did inthe amount of $10,000.) The plaintiff's counsel fileda written response to the OSC acknowledging that hehad relied on artificial intelligence (AI) to “ ‘supportcitation of legal issues’ and that the fabricated quoteswere AI-generated.” (Ibid.) While we suspect the samehere, we dispense with an OSC because regardlessof whether Buenzli has relied on AI to providesome of her legal citations, we would be justified instriking the opening brief or dismissing the appealunder our inherent authority to do so. (Id. at pp.442-443.) The filing of a brief that rests on nonexistentlegal authority makes this appeal frivolous. (Id. at p.447.) Additionally, the reference to nonexistent legalauthority violates rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) of the CaliforniaRules of Court, which requires parties to support eachpoint in a brief “if possible, by citation of authority.”Citation to nonexistent legal authority cannot satisfysaid rule.Despite our admonishment at the outset of our analysisthat Buenzli, as a propria persona litigant, “ ‘ “isheld to the same restrictive rules of procedure as anattorney” ’ ” (First American Title Co. v. Mirzaian,supra, 108 Cal.App.4th at p. 958, fn. 1), we declineto pursue the issuance of sanctions, for now. Therespondent in this case has not participated in thisappeal. Thus, the burden of verifying the cited legalauthority has only fallen upon this court. While notunder emphasizing the impact of this burden, we notethat reading and verifying support for legal positionsis our job. Though in the current state of affairs, onemuch more complicated.In addition to citing cases that do not exist, Buenzlialso cites statutes without explaining their relevance.For example, she cites title 15 United States Codesection 1692g and Civil Code section 1788.58, butshe fails to explain how either section is relevantto this case.7 She also cites three provisions of theUniform Commercial Code, title 18 United StatesCode section 8, and two unattributed “commerce lawmaxims,” but, again, with no argument explainingtheir relevance or applicability. “A court need notconsider an issue where reasoned, substantial argumentand citation to supporting authorities are lacking.[Citations.] The mere assertion of a statutory orconstitutional violation, followed by simply a citationto the statute or constitutional provision, does not merita judicial response.” (Woods v. Horton, supra, 167Cal.App.4th at p. 677.)*8 Finally, Buenzli claims the judge cut the trial shortand denied her sufficient time to present her case. Shecites Elkins v. Superior Court (2007) 41 Cal.4th 1337,albeit with no discussion. In that case, our SupremeCourt held, “ ‘One of the elements of a fair trial isthe right to offer relevant and competent evidence ona material issue.... [Citations.]’ [Citation.] Ordinarily,parties have the right to testify in their own behalf[citation], and a party's opportunity to call witnesses totestify and to proffer admissible evidence is central tohaving his or her day in court.” (Id. at p. 1357.) Buenzlifails to convince us she was deprived of the right tooffer relevant and competent evidence on any materialissues. We do not have a transcript or other record ofwhat happened on the first day of trial, and it does notappear from the transcript of the second day of trial thatthe judge would not let Buenzli present evidence. Thejudge allowed her to make a lengthy statement, andshe concluded her statement by asking that the case bedismissed. The judge then asked her, “Is there anythingelse you needed to add that you did not already tellme?” And she responded, “No.” There is nothing in therecord before us that suggests Buenzli was denied theright to present her case.DISPOSITIONThe judgment is affirmed. The Bank shall recover itscosts on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(1),(2).)We concur:ROBIE, J.
JPMORGAN CHASE BANK, N.A., Plaintiff and Respondent,..., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7MESIWALA, J.All CitationsNot Reported in Cal.Rptr., 2025 WL 3675150Footnotes1It also contains the notice of appeal, the notice designating the record on appeal, the register of actions,and clerk's certificates regarding the record.2“When a fact alleged in the complaint is not denied, it is deemed admitted and no evidence need be offeredto prove the existence of that fact.” (Carew v. Carew (1959) 175 Cal.App.2d 706, 707; see also Code Civ.Proc., § 431.20, subd. (a) [“Every material allegation of the complaint ..., not controverted by the answer,shall, for the purposes of the action, be taken as true”].)3An affidavit must be signed under penalty of perjury. (See Code Civ. Proc., § 2015.5.) This one is not. Instead,it is signed, “Sincerely and without ill will, vexation, or frivolity.” An affidavit or declaration “not signed underpenalty of perjury under the laws of California has ‘no evidentiary value’ and can be disregarded.” (Safieddinev. MBC FZ, LLC (2024) 103 Cal.App.5th 1086, 1094, fn. 9.)4The following quote is attributed to Justice Gorsuch: “We don't usually say the government can avoid aconstitutional mandate merely by relabeling or moving things around. It's as much a violation to do somethingindirectly as it is directly, we usually say, right?” The quote is followed by a reference to “SEC v. Jarkesy,Docket Number: 22-859 Date Argued: 11/29/2023.” In SEC v. Jarkesy (2024) 603 U.S. 109, the SupremeCourt held that when the Securities and Exchange Commission seeks civil penalties against a defendant forsecurities fraud, the Seventh Amendment entitles the defendant to a jury trial. The opinion of the court waswritten by Chief Justice Roberts. Justice Gorsuch wrote a concurring opinion. The quote attributed to himdoes not appear in his concurring opinion (or anywhere in the case). Perhaps it was a statement he madeduring oral argument. In any event, it is unclear how this quote is relevant to this case.5Buenzli contends the witness “lacked competency and foundation to testify under California Evidence Code§§ 720, 801.” That is the extent of her argument on this issue. The two cited Evidence Code sections bothdeal with expert testimony. The Bank's counsel stated the witness was not called as an expert, and the trialcourt acknowledged, “I'm aware ... I didn't take her as an expert witness.”6Evidence Code section 403 does not deal with standing; it deals with determining foundational or otherpreliminary facts where relevancy, personal knowledge, or authenticity are disputed.7Title 15 United States Code section 1692g requires debt collectors to provide certain information toconsumers in connection with the collection of a debt, including: the amount of the debt; the name of thecreditor; a statement that unless the consumer timely disputes the validity of the debt it will be assumed to bevalid; a statement that if the consumer notifies the debt collector that the debt is disputed, the debt collectorwill obtain verification of the debt or a copy of the a judgment against the debtor and mail it to the consumer;and a statement that the consumer may request the name and address of the original debtor if differentthan the current creditor. (15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a).) Buenzli appears to contend section 1692g requires a debtcollector to provide “a complete accounting of the debt,” a “chain of title,” and “verification of the amountdue,” but we see nothing in that section that supports her contention. Civil Code section 1788.58 providesa complaint in “an action brought by a debt buyer on a consumer debt” must contain certain allegations.Here, there is nothing in the record that suggests the Bank is a “debt buyer,” and even if we assume it is,the complaint is not part of the record on appeal, and we thus have no way of knowing whether it containedthe required allegations.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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