California v. Panas (2026)

Case details
Full caption
California v. THOMAS PANAS
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Reversed and Remanded
ANNA SHEERER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THOMAS..., --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 776268Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.CERTIFIED FOR PARTIAL PUBLICATION*Court of Appeal, First District, California.DIVISION FOUR.ANNA SHEERER, Plaintiff and Appellant,v.THOMAS PANAS, Defendant and Respondent;CALIFORNIA DEPARTMENT OF CHILDSUPPORT SERVICES, Intervener and Respondent.A171804|Filed 3/19/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.(San Mateo County Super. Ct. No. 19FAM02588A)OpinionMoorman, J.**1 Appellant Anna Sheerer appeals a trial court ordermodifying the child support payments owed by her ex-husband, respondent Thomas Panas. She contends thatthe court failed to account for Panas's bonus income indetermining child support. Relatedly, Sheerer argues the courtviolated her due process rights by failing to hold an adequatehearing on her request to account for Panas's bonus income.Intervener California Department of Child Support Servicesagrees with the former argument and does not take a positionon the latter.1 In the unpublished portion of this opinion, wehold the court erred on the merits and reverse the order.Unfortunately, we must address another issue, which we do inthe published portion of this opinion. As an in propria personalitigant, Panas submitted a respondent's brief that attributesquotes to published cases in which no such quote appearsand to cases that do not exist, and Panas's nonmanufacturedauthorities do not discuss the topics for which they are cited.His brief also does not conform to the California Rules ofCourt (hereinafter Rules) regarding its contents, formatting,and directive to provide support for factual assertions withcitations to the record. (See Rule 8.204.) In a declarationsubmitted to this court, Panas explained the fabrications weredue to his use of a generative artificial intelligence (AI) toolto write the brief.Division Three of the Second District Court of Appealrecently published an opinion “warning” that “no brief,pleading, motion, or any other paper filed in any court shouldcontain any citations—whether provided by generative AI orany other source—that the attorney responsible for submittingthe pleading has not personally read and verified.” (Nolandv. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 431(Noland).) The court emphasized that any attorney who failsto heed the warning faces sanctions and potential discipline.(Id. at p. 445.) We partially publish this opinion to extend thatwarning to in propria persona litigants.I. BACKGROUNDSheerer and Panas were a married couple that begandissolution proceedings in 2019. The couple have twochildren from their marriage and have joint physical custodyof them on a 50/50 time share.In 2020 and 2021, the trial court issued several childsupport orders following hearings on the matter. Initially,in September 2020, the court ordered Panas to pay childsupport of varying monthly amounts, which were calculatedas a function of the parties’ relative incomes each month.In November 2020, the court entered a new order withadditional findings regarding Panas's fluctuating income,and the court included a Smith-Ostler provision,2 ordering“additional income received by either party in excess ofthe base income used in the initial support order” to beincluded in calculating additional child support. In December2021, the court entered another new order, detailing theSmith-Ostler provision's mechanics, calculating retroactivepayments, and reaffirming that the Smith-Ostler provisionwould be prospectively “calculated on a monthly basis.”*2 In June 2023, Sheerer moved to modify the existing childsupport order due to a change in both parties’ incomes and heremployment status. At a hearing in November 2023, the courtstated that it would adopt the DCSS's guideline calculationthat Panas pay $2,388 in monthly child support to Sheerer,
ANNA SHEERER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THOMAS..., --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2retroactive to July 1, 2023. Because of the retroactive natureof the order, the court found Panas in arrears and ordered himto make monthly payments until the balance was paid. DCSSraised the point that “there are going to be other arrears inthis case relating to a Smith Ostler calculation,” and the courtclarified that the arrears payments were only “towards theorder for child support that the Court just made today.”The trial court's subsequent written order filed November15, 2023 was substantively identical to what the court hadstated at the hearing and consequently lacked a Smith-Ostler provision. The accompanying DCSS calculation didnot include Panas's bonus income, nor did it reference anyincome from Panas's restricted stock units (RSUs). Rather,it listed Panas's “Monthly Taxable & Non-Taxable GrossIncome” as $19,640, which matched the most recent monthlywage that Panas declared on his October 2023 income andexpenses (I&E) declaration. Thus, the DCSS's guidelinecalculation excluded the $4,500 average monthly commissionor bonus income that Panas declared on his October 2023 I&Edeclaration.The trial court held hearings in February 2024 and May2024, each of which focused on factual disputes regardingboth parties’ financial limitations and Sheerer's difficulties infinding employment. The February 2024 hearing resulted ina formal seek work order directed at Sheerer, and the courtretained retroactive jurisdiction on child support and Panas'spayment of arrears. At the May 2024 hearing, it was broughtto the trial court's attention that the November 2023 order “didnot include a Smith Ostler provision” despite there being one“in the prior order.” After hearing the parties’ arguments, thecourt found Sheerer in compliance with the seek work order,reduced Panas's monthly payments on arrears, and otherwiseleft the November 2023 order in place, reserving jurisdiction“with regard to the request for the Smith Ostler [provision].”In the meantime, Panas filed an updated I&E declarationin March 2024 which listed his average monthly grosssalary as $19,640 and his average monthly commissionsor bonuses as $25,925. The March 2024 I&E declarationalso appended three earnings statements from mid-March,two of which revealed that Panas was compensated withRSUs valued at $8,387.26 and $45,918.74 on March 12 andMarch 14, respectively, bringing his total year-to-date RSUcompensation to $121,531.41.3 In May 2024, Panas filed anew I&E declaration that again listed his average monthlygross salary as $19,640 but changed his average monthlycommissions or bonuses to $2,160.4*3 At the next hearing in July 2024, DCSS explained tothe trial court that Sheerer was still complying with theseek work order yet she remained unemployed, preventingthe recalculation of child support. Sheerer then relayed herdifficulties finding employment and again requested a newcalculation for child support that accounted for Panas's bonusand RSU compensation. In response, Panas asserted thatSheerer was not complying with the seek work order, and hesought a reduction in child support payments and clarity ona Smith-Ostler provision. The parties traded accusations thatthe other was harming the children's interests until the courtinterjected.The trial court stated: “[T]his is obviously a very contentioussituation. What this court's concern is ... the support and theamount of time Ms. Sheerer has been unemployed. Certainlyif the tables were turned, Ms. Sheerer, you would want Mr.Panas to be employed and contributing to the children's livesand financially contributing. [¶] So at this time, I'm goingto deny the request for a Smith-Osler. [¶] I'm going to denythe request to cut support in half.” The court also increasedSheerer's obligations under the seek work order. The court didnot mention Panas's total compensation in either its verbal orwritten order. Sheerer appealed.II. DISCUSSIONA. The Trial Court Erred By Failing to Account forPanas's Bonus and RSU Compensation in the ChildSupport CalculationsThe abuse of discretion standard applies to child supportawards and a trial court's determination to grant or denya request to modify child support. (In re Marriage ofHein (2020) 52 Cal.App.5th 519, 529.) The abuse ofdiscretion standard is not a unified standard. (Ibid.) Inapplying it, appellate courts will uphold the trial court'sfactual determinations that are supported by substantialevidence, assess the trial court's legal interpretations denovo, and consider “whether the trial court reasonablyexercised its discretionary authority—that is, whether anyjudge reasonably could have made such an order.” (Ibid.)“California has a strong public policy that favors adequatechild support.” (In re Marriage of Cheriton (2001) 92Cal.App.4th 269, 283, superseded by statute on anotherground as stated in In re Marriage of Morton (2018) 27Cal.App.5th 1025, 1049; see Fam. Code, §§ 4050–40765.)
ANNA SHEERER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THOMAS..., --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3The Legislature expressed that policy through the uniformchild support guideline. (Cheriton, at p. 283.; see § 4053,subd. (e) [“ ‘The guideline seeks to place the interests ofchildren as the state's top priority’ ”].)Guideline child support is calculated by applying amathematical formula to the relative incomes of the parents,and it “is presumed to be the correct amount of child supportto be ordered.” (§§ 4055, 4057; see § 4053, subd. (c) [“Theguideline takes into account each parent's actual income andlevel of responsibility for the children”].) Section 4053 furtherlays out principles the trial court must adhere to, principleswhich emphasize that each parent must prioritize and providesupport commensurate with their individual ability so that hisor her children share in the standard of living of both parentsacross two homes with relative parity.Section 4058 broadly defines a parent's “annual grossincome” to mean “income from whatever sourcederived” (other than child support payments and incomefrom public assistance programs based on need). (§ 4058,subds. (a), (c).) The statute includes “bonuses” as incomein a non-exhaustive list of examples (id., subd. (a)(1)), andcompensation in the form of stock options is also treatedas income for purposes of calculating child support oncethere are no legal restrictions on the parent's ability toexercise the option and sell the shares. (In re Marriageof Macilwaine (2018) 26 Cal.App.5th 514, 530–532.) Eachparent's annual gross income is used to compute their annualnet disposable income (§ 4059), which in turn is used tocalculate each parent's monthly net disposable income (§4060), which is the key input to the guideline's formulafor determining the amount of child support (§ 4055).However, if a parent's monthly income fluctuates—such asfrom discretionary bonuses—the court may adjust the childsupport order as appropriate. (§§ 4060, 4064.) A court mayaccommodate unpredictable income through a Smith-Ostlerprovision, but the method a court fashions to account for suchincome is left to the court's discretion so long as a parent'ssupport obligations include all income that the parent actuallyreceives. (In re Marriage of Mosley (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th1375, 1387.)*4 Here, the trial court erred because it failed to accountfor Panas's bonus income and RSUs in calculating childsupport. The November 2023 order ended the Smith-Ostlerprovision that had been in place, and the court did notimplement another method for requiring Panas to pay supportobligations based on income that included any bonuses orRSUs that he received. The court did not make any findingsunder subdivision (b) of section 4057 that would permit thecourt to deviate from the presumptively correct statewideuniform guideline formula amount, which must include allincome. Nor did the court state in writing or on the record theinformation required in subdivision (a) of section 4056 to doso. The court's stated concern regarding the amount of timethat Sheerer has been unemployed does not allow it to excludePanas's bonus or RSU income from his annual gross incomefor the purposes of child support obligations. For this reason,we reverse the trial court's order of September 9, 2024.6Because we reverse the trial court's order on the merits, weneed not reach Sheerer's contention that the court violated dueprocess by depriving her of a meaningful hearing. However,we disagree with Sheerer's characterization that the court“refused to engage” with her requests or with the evidence.The record reveals that the court was patient in hearing eachparty's arguments and provided ample opportunity for Sheererto be heard. While it took several hearings over the courseof half a year for the court to rule on Sheerer's requestto reimpose a Smith-Ostler provision after the November2023 order, there is no basis for Sheerer's assertion that thecourt impeded her ability to develop the facts. Instead, therecord shows that the matter was continued several times forvarious reasons, none of which suggest the court disregardedprocedural safeguards.7 The court merely made an error,which we instruct it to correct on remand.B. Panas's Violations of the California Rules of CourtDespite his self-representation, we hold Panas to the samestandard as an attorney. (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009)175 Cal.App.4th 536, 543; see also Keitel v. Heubel (2002)103 Cal.App.4th 324, 334–335 [“A party, no less than hisattorney, should not be permitted to escape the consequencesof his or her abusive litigation tactics”].) Over three decadesago, our high court explained that “[a] doctrine generallyrequiring or permitting exceptional treatment of partieswho represent themselves would lead to a quagmire in thetrial courts, and would be unfair to the other parties tolitigation.” (Rappleyea v. Campbell (1994) 8 Cal.4th 975,985.) This statement has grown truer in an age where litigantscan access AI tools that purport to do lawyering. “In thelast two [and a half] years, many courts have confrontedbriefs populated with fraudulent legal citations resulting from[parties’] reliance on generative AI.” (Noland, supra, 114Cal.App.5th at p. 443.)
ANNA SHEERER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THOMAS..., --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4*5 In his respondent's brief, Panas cited at least two casesthat do not exist: “In re Marriage of Thomson (1984) 157Cal.App.3d 568, 578” and “Marriage of Mendlowitz (2019)40 Cal.App.5th 990.” He further fabricated quotes that appearnowhere in the (real) cases cited. In his declaration “clarifyingfacts” filed in this Court after Sheerer filed a motion tostrike respondent's brief, Panas explained that his “error” inproviding fake quotations and citing nonexistent case law wascaused by his use of an AI tool and his failure to verify hiscitations. He averred that he “did not knowingly submit falseinformation to the Court.” His lack of knowledge, of course,is a direct result of his failure to verify citations, a requirementof all attorneys and self-represented litigants responsible forbriefs filed in this Court. Respondent's conduct in this regardis a patent violation of the Rules of Court and alone, meritsstriking his brief. (See Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at pp.442–443, and cases cited.)But aside from Panas's purported obliviousness to the falsityof his legal citations and quotes, he also referenced hearingsin the present case that appear nowhere in the record butwe will not expend judicial resources verifying whether thehearings or their purported contents are AI hallucinationstoo. Further, Panas failed to format the brief in accordancewith Rule 8.204 by omitting a table of authorities, pagenumbers, and citations to the record for each reference tothe proceedings below. (See Rule 8.204(a)(1)(A), (C), (b)(7).) Many of Panas's (unsupported) factual assertions areirrelevant, not least his allegations that the court sanctionedSheerer and that Sheerer failed to comply with court orders.He then had the temerity to request this court to “[r]efer thismatter to the trial court for consideration of sanctions” againstSheerer.“Our legal system, indeed the social compact of a civilizedsociety, is predicated upon respect for, and adherence to,the rule of law.” (People v. Chong (1999) 76 Cal.App.4th232, 243.) The rule of law is founded upon the principlethat courts must impartially apply the law to facts. Thatfoundation is threatened when litigants falsify the truth,especially when done by using technological innovationsthat can spin persuasive webs of untruths and invent legalprinciples or authorities.Thus, our warning to litigants is not merely an admonitionto double-check citations and otherwise fastidiously complywith the Rules of Court; it is to be at all times truthful and to beresponsible in crafting any written arguments presented in thisCourt. (See People v. Alvarez (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1115,1119 [“ ‘Honesty in dealing with the courts is of paramountimportance, and misleading a judge is, regardless of motives,a serious offense’ ”].) We further caution that our redressfor false and missing citations is not limited to disregardinga brief. “We may impose monetary sanctions pursuant toour own motion for unreasonable violations of the rulesgoverning appeals.” (Keitel v. Heubel, supra, 103 Cal.App.4that p. 340; Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 442; Rule8.276(a)(4).) However, given Panas's admission of his errorand considering that it would not be in the best interest of thechildren at the heart of the underlying proceedings, we choosenot to do so here.III. DISPOSITIONThe child support order of September 9, 2024 is reversedand we remand with instructions to the trial court to reassessPanas's child support obligation based on a consideration ofhis full income, including bonuses and RSU compensation.Sheerer is entitled to her costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules of Court,rule 8.278(a)(1).)WE CONCUR:Brown, P. J.Streeter, J.Trial Court: San Mateo County Superior CourtTrial Judge: Hon. Cristina MazzeiAttorneys:Covington & Burling, BreannaKatherine Jones; Family ViolenceAppellate Project, Cory DelfinHernandez, Arati Vasan, JennaferDorfman Wagner for Petitioner andAppellant.*6 Thomas Panas, in pro. per., for Defendant andRespondent.Rob Bonta, Attorney General of California, Cheryl LynnFeiner, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Maureen Chinyere
ANNA SHEERER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THOMAS..., --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Onyeagbako, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, PabloNicholas Rossenblum, Deputy Attorney General forIntervenor and Respondent.All Citations--- Cal.Rptr.3d ----, 2026 WL 776268Footnotes*Pursuant to California Rules of Court, rules 8.1105(b) and 8.1110, this opinion is certified for publication withthe exception of parts I, II.A, and III.*Judge of the Superior Court of California, County of Mendocino, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant toarticle VI, section 6 of the California Constitution.1The California Department of Child Support Services submitted its brief on behalf of the public interest inaccordance with a transfer of interest from the San Mateo County Department of Child Support Services(the DCSS).2A child support order that requires a percentage of bonus income to be paid as additional child support iscommonly referred to as a “Smith-Ostler provision” because it is derived from In re Marriage of Ostler & Smith(1990) 223 Cal.App.3d 33, 41–42 (Smith-Ostler).)3The other statement showed that Panas was paid a salary of $9,064.99 for 80 hours for the period fromMarch 4 to March 17, 2024, bringing his year-to-date salary earnings to $45,389.94. While the statementsdid not list any bonuses earned in that period, they all showed that Panas had received $25,925.87 in theyear to date for “AIP Payout.”4We observe that $2,160 is mathematically equivalent to dividing $25,925—the amount listed on Panas'sMarch I&E declaration as his average monthly bonus (and the same amount listed on his March 2024 earningsstatements as his year-to-date “AIP Payout”)—by 12 months. The May 2025 I&E declaration also appendedthree earning statements for pay periods in 2024 from April 1 to April 14, April 15 to April 28, and April 29 toMay 12. Those statements revealed that Panas was paid $9,307.02 for each 80 hour period, but he had notreceived any more earnings categorized as RSUs or AIP Payout.5Further statutory references are to the Family Code unless otherwise specified.6Panas's “extensive reliance on nonexistent legal authority” in his respondent's brief justifies disregarding thebrief in toto, which we do. (Noland, supra, 114 Cal.App.5th at p. 436.) We address this issue further postsection B. We acknowledge Panas's admission that his respondent's brief contains fabrications as stated inhis declaration submitted to the court. We otherwise grant Sheerer's motion to strike the remainder of thedeclaration as an improper sur-reply. (See Rule 8.200(a)(4).)7The first hearing on Sheerer's request to modify child support in August 2023 was continued becausethe parties and DCSS had failed to meet and confer beforehand and because DCSS had not receivedinformation regarding Sheerer's unemployment benefits. At the February hearing, Sheerer noted that Panas'scompensation included a “bonus and stock options,” but she admitted that he had not submitted an updatedI&E declaration, stating: “so we don't know what his current salary is.” Panas submitted updated I&Edeclarations prior to the next hearing in May 2024, and therefore Sheerer had the opportunity to argue thatPanas had taken a new job with a reduced salary but received “most of his income via RSUs and bonus.”The court then allowed Panas and Sheerer to respond to each other's arguments before it addressed the
ANNA SHEERER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. THOMAS..., --- Cal.Rptr.3d ---- (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6seek work order and Panas's payment on arrears, and the court reserved retroactive jurisdiction on a Smith-Ostler provision, which it ruled on at the next hearing.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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