County of Los Angeles v. Niblett (Oct. 31, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
County of Los Angeles v. Neill Francis Niblett
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
Oct. 31, 2025
Disposition
Affirmed
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3060520Not Officially Published(Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, restrictscitation of unpublished opinions in California courts.NOT TO BE PUBLISHED INTHE OFFICIAL REPORTSCourt of Appeal, Second District, California.DIVISION ONE.COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES,Plaintiff and Respondent,v.NEILL FRANCIS NIBLETT, Defendant and Appellant.B327744|Filed 10/31/2025Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los AngelesCounty, Valerie L. Skeba, Temporary Judge. Affirmed. (LosAngeles County Super. Ct. No. 22AVRO01811)Attorneys and Law FirmsRobert Lucas Law, Robert W. Lucas; Phillips & Rickards andWendell Phillips1 for Defendant and Appellant.Hausman & Sosa, Jeffrey M. Hausman and Larry D. Strattonfor Plaintiff and Respondent.OpinionBENDIX, Acting P. J.*1 This is an appeal from a three-year workplace violencerestraining order (WVRO) issued pursuant to Code of CivilProcedure section 527.82 that protects nonparty Samuel S.3from defendant and appellant Neill Francis Niblett. Prior tothe issuance of the WVRO, both individuals were employedby plaintiff and respondent County of Los Angeles's (theCounty's) fire department; Samuel was an assistant chiefand Niblett was a senior mechanic. During the WVROproceedings, the County offered evidence showing Nibletthad often raised his voice to Samuel to complain about work-related decisions, Niblett on one occasion shouted profanitiesat Samuel and got so close to Samuel's face that Niblettwas spitting on him while shouting, and, several days afterthat profanity-laden encounter, Niblett had a conversationwith a secretary in which Niblett (a) expressed his frustrationthat one of his mechanics had been transferred without hisknowledge and (b) alluded to an incident in which a firefighterfatally shot another firefighter. The trial court found clearand convincing evidence that Niblett's reference to the priorshooting constituted a credible threat of violence warrantingissuance of the WVRO.On appeal, Niblett's challenge to the evidentiary sufficiencyof the order fails because the trial court could rationallyhave concluded it was highly probable that a reasonableperson would construe Niblett's statement mentioning theshooting as an implied threat to commit an act of violenceagainst fire department management if it continued to makedecisions with which he disagreed. Further, although Niblettdid not expressly threaten to harm Samuel, he was a logicaltarget of Niblett's implied threat who may be named asa protected party pursuant to section 527.8. Our rejectionof Niblett's evidentiary challenge is fatal to his claim theWVRO violates his First Amendment rights. Niblett's claimthe firearm restriction in the restraining order violates hisSecond Amendment rights is also unpersuasive. Niblett hasforfeited the remainder of his claims of error by either failingto raise them adequately or asserting them for the first time inhis reply brief. For all these reasons, we affirm the WVRO.*2 Additionally, this case illustrates that misuse of artificialintelligence threatens the integrity of the appellate process.It appears that Niblett's appellate counsel misused artificialintelligence in preparing his opening brief by misciting theholdings of numerous cases, even those from the principalcases on which he relies, and by citing at least one casethat does not even exist. Further, Niblett's counsel failedto correct those erroneous citations even after the Countyidentified many of them in its appellate brief. Accordingly,in a separate ruling issued concurrently with this opinion, weorder Niblett's appellate counsel to show cause why he shouldnot be sanctioned for misusing artificial intelligence.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND4We summarize facts pertinent to our disposition of this appealin this Factual and Procedural Background and provide moredetail as to facts particularly relevant to certain claims of errorin our Discussion, post.Prior to the commencement of the instant action, Niblettwas employed as a senior mechanic at the County'sfire department and Assistant Chief Samuel was Niblett'ssupervisor.5 According to the County, on October 5, 2022,Niblett acted in a “verbally abusive” manner toward Samuelafter Samuel asked Niblett to pick up parts Niblett had lefton the floor of a fire department facility. The County furtheravers that on October 11, 2022, Niblett made the followingstatement to Cari Hughes, a secretary for the fire department:“If they don't change things in this department, they're goingto have another situation like they had with Tatone.” Thereis no dispute that in June 2021, a firefighter named “Tatone”fatally shot another firefighter at Station 81.On November 18, 2022, the County filed its petition for aWVRO under section 527.8 against Niblett, which namedSamuel as the employee in need of protection. The Countysupported the petition with declarations from Samuel andHughes. Shortly after the County filed the petition, the trialcourt issued a temporary restraining order protecting Samuelfrom Niblett.Niblett filed a verified response denying the allegations inthe petition. Accompanying his response is a declarationfrom Luis Del Cid, a fire equipment mechanic and a unionpresident, who attested that Niblett was a union steward.Although in his declaration Del Cid described an October5, 2022 interaction between Samuel and Niblett in whichSamuel supposedly used “obscene language,” Del Cid wasnot a percipient witness to this event.The trial court heard the County's petition on January18, 2023. Hughes, Samuel, and Del Cid testified at thehearing. Although Niblett appeared, he did not testify. At theconclusion of the hearing, the court granted the petition basedon its finding, by clear and convincing evidence, that Niblett'sOctober 11, 2022 statement referencing Tatone constituted acredible threat of violence under section 527.8. On the samedate as the hearing, the trial court issued the WVRO, whichis set to expire on January 18, 2026. Among other things,the WVRO bars Niblett from harassing Samuel or enteringSamuel's workplace, and prohibits Niblett from possessingfirearms or ammunition.*3 On March 3, 2023, Niblett timely appealed from theWVRO.APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEWA. Section 527.8Section 527.8, subdivision (a) provides: “Any employer,whose employee has suffered unlawful violence or a crediblethreat of violence from any individual, that can reasonablybe construed to be carried out or to have been carried out atthe workplace, may seek a temporary restraining order andan order after hearing on behalf of the employee and, at thediscretion of the court, any number of other employees atthe workplace, and, if appropriate, other employees at otherworkplaces of the employer.” (Stats. 2015, ch. 411, § 2.)6“For purposes of ... section [527.8]: [¶] ... [¶] ... ‘Crediblethreat of violence’ is a knowing and willful statement orcourse of conduct that would place a reasonable person in fearfor his or her safety, or the safety of his or her immediatefamily, and that serves no legitimate purpose.” (See Stats.2015, ch. 411, § 2 [§ 527.8, subds. (b) & (b)(2)].) “This sectiondoes not permit a court to issue a temporary restraining orderor order after hearing prohibiting speech or other activitiesthat are constitutionally protected, or otherwise protected bySection 527.3 or any other provision of law.” (Stats. 2015, ch.411, § 2 [§ 527.8, subd. (c)].)“At the hearing [on a petition under section 527.8], the judgeshall receive any testimony that is relevant and may make anindependent inquiry. Moreover, if the respondent is a currentemployee of the entity requesting the order, the judge shallreceive evidence concerning the employer's decision to retain,terminate, or otherwise discipline the respondent. If the judgefinds by clear and convincing evidence that the respondentengaged in unlawful violence or made a credible threat ofviolence, an order shall issue prohibiting further unlawfulviolence or threats of violence.” (See Stats. 2015, ch. 411, §2 [§ 527.8, subds. (h) & (j).]“In the discretion of the court, an order issued after noticeand hearing under this section may have a duration of notmore than three years ....” (Stats. 2015, ch. 411, § 2 [§ 527.8,subd. (k)(1)].) “A person subject to a protective order issuedunder this section shall not own, possess, purchase, receive,
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3or attempt to receive a firearm or ammunition while theprotective order is in effect.” (Ibid. [§ 527.8, subd. (s)(1)].)“The court shall order a person subject to a protective orderissued under this section to relinquish any firearms he or sheowns or possesses pursuant to Section 527.9.” (Stats. 2015,ch. 411, § 2 [§ 527.8, subd. (s)(2)].) “Every person who owns,possesses, purchases or receives, or attempts to purchase orreceive a firearm or ammunition while the protective order isin effect is punishable pursuant to Section 29825 of the PenalCode.” (Stats. 2015, ch. 411, § 2 [§ 527.8, subd. (s)(3)].)Additionally, to obtain a WVRO, “ ‘a plaintiff must establishby clear and convincing evidence not only that a defendantengaged in unlawful violence or made credible threats ofviolence, but also that great or irreparable harm would resultto an employee if a prohibitory injunction were not issueddue to the reasonable probability unlawful violence will occurin the future.’ [Citation.]” (See City of San Jose v. Garbett(2010) 190 Cal.App.4th 526, 537–538 (Garbett).)B. Standard of review*4 In reviewing an evidentiary challenge to a WVRO, “‘an appellate court must account for the clear and convincingstandard of proof .... [T]he question before the appellate courtis whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidencefrom which a reasonable fact finder could have found it highlyprobable that the fact was true. In conducting its review, thecourt must view the record in the light most favorable tothe prevailing party below and give appropriate deferenceto how the trier of fact may have evaluated the credibilityof witnesses, resolved conflicts in the evidence, and drawnreasonable inferences from the evidence.’ [Citation.]” (SeeTechnology Credit Union v. Rafat (2022) 82 Cal.App.5th 314,323 (Technology Credit Union).)Under this “highly deferential” standard of review, “[i]fsubstantial evidence supports factual findings, those findingsmust not be disturbed on appeal. [Citation.] Inferencesfavorable to appellants may create conflicts in the evidence,but that is of no consequence. [Citation.] When a civilappeal challenges findings of fact, the appellate court's powerbegins and ends with a determination of whether there isany substantial evidence—contradicted or uncontradicted—to support the trial court findings.” (Schmidt v. Superior Court(2020) 44 Cal.App.5th 570, 581–582 (Schmidt).)“ ‘ “A judgment or order of a lower court is presumed to becorrect on appeal, and all intendments and presumptions areindulged in favor of its correctness.” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]Thus, ‘ “ ‘it is the appellant's responsibility to affirmativelydemonstrate error’ ” ’ by ‘ “ ‘supply[ing] the reviewingcourt with some cogent argument supported by legal analysisand citation to the record.’ ” [Citation.]’ [Citations.] Theappellant bears this burden of rebutting the presumption ofcorrectness accorded to the trial court's decision, regardlessof the applicable standard of review.” (Association for LosAngeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 776–777.) A corollary of the presumption of correctness is “‘the doctrine of implied findings,’ ” which requires “ ‘thereviewing court [to] infer, following a bench trial, that thetrial court impliedly made every factual finding necessary tosupport its decision.’ [Citation.]” (See Thompson v. Asimos(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 970, 981.)DISCUSSIONBecause of the length of our opinion, we recap in thisintroduction the conclusions set forth in the succeeding partsof this Discussion.In our Discussion, part B, post, we reject Niblett's challengeto the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the trial court'sfinding that the following statement he made to Hughes onOctober 11, 2022 constitutes a credible threat of violence forthe purposes of section 527.8: “If they don't change things inthis department, they're going to have another situation likethey had with Tatone.”In our Discussion, parts C, D, and E, respectively, post, wereject Niblett's First Amendment challenge to the WVRO,rule that Niblett forfeited his claim that the WVRO violatessection 527.3, and conclude he failed to demonstrate thefirearm restriction in the restraining order infringes on hisSecond Amendment rights.Niblett forfeited his remaining arguments either by failingto raise them adequately in his opening brief or withholdingthem entirely from that initial brief. (Discussion, part F, post.)In our Discussion, part G, post, we discuss Niblett's appellatecounsel's suspected misuse of artificial intelligence.Before turning to these issues, we explain why we reachthe merits of Niblett's appeal notwithstanding the County'sassertion that it is moot.
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4A. Assuming Arguendo This Appeal Is Moot BecauseIt Will Not Be Resolved Before the Restraining OrderExpires, We Exercise Our Discretion To Entertain theAppeal on the Merits*5 “A court is tasked with the duty ‘ “to decide actualcontroversies by a judgment which can be carried into effect,and not to give opinions upon moot questions or abstractpropositions, or to declare principles or rules of law whichcannot affect the matter in issue in the case before it.”’ [Citation.] A case becomes moot when events ‘ “render[ ]it impossible for [a] court, if it should decide the casein favor of [the appellant], to grant him any effect[ive]relief.” ’ [Citation.]” (See In re D.P. (2023) 14 Cal.5th 266,276.) “ ‘ “As a general rule, ‘an appeal presenting onlyabstract or academic questions is subject to dismissal asmoot.’ [Citation.]” [Citation.]’ [Citation.]” (Vernon v. State ofCalifornia (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 114, 120.) “Even when acase is moot, [however,] courts may exercise their ‘inherentdiscretion’ to reach the merits of the dispute.” (D.P., at p.282; see also id. at p. 286 [indicating an appellate court mayentertain a moot appeal to “serve the interest of justice”].)The County argues, “This appeal will probably not beresolved until after th[e] date” the restraining order expires(i.e., January 18, 2026) “or close to that date.” The Countythus maintains, “The case will likely be moot, and this appealshould be dismissed.”Niblett counters, “[A]ny decision on mootness is prematureat this point and turns on factual determinations based onevidence not in the record.” Further, Niblett represents, “TheCounty is seeking to discipline Niblett for the same incidentsgiving rise to the WVRO and [is] using the WVRO asevidence in its proceedings. And even absent the pendingdisciplinary proceedings, the WVRO would remain in hispersonnel file absent reversal.”Whether this appeal will be resolved after the WVRO'sJanuary 18, 2026 expiration date is not clear. (See, e.g.,Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.272(b)(1)–(b)(2) [indicating thedate a remittitur will be issued depends in part on whetherthe Supreme Court decides to review the Court of Appeal'sdecision].) Assuming arguendo the County is correct theappeal will not be resolved before January 18, 2026, weexercise our inherent discretion to reach the merits of Niblett'sappeal. We elect to do so for two reasons: (1) The WVROis based on a finding that Niblett made a credible threat ofviolence (see Factual & Procedural Background, ante), whichmay cause Niblett reputational harm even after the WVROexpires; and (2) the miscitations in Niblett's briefing raiseimportant issues of public interest regarding the impact ofartificial intelligence on the integrity of judicial processesand an attorney's obligation as an officer of the court (seeDiscussion, part G, post).B. Substantial Evidence Supports the Trial Court'sFinding That Niblett Made a Credible Threat ofViolenceNiblett concedes, “[H]e made the statement, ‘If they don'tchange things in this department, they're going to haveanother situation like they had with Tatone’ to ... Hughes.”Niblett argues the trial court erred in finding this statementwas a credible threat of violence. We disagree.71. We reject Niblett's contention the County had to showan “immediate threat of violence” and “intent to harm”to establish a credible threat of violenceAs a preliminary matter, Niblett argues in his opening briefthat a statement is not a credible threat of violence unlessthere is evidence of “an immediate threat of violence” and“intent to harm.” “Immediate threat of violence” and “intentto harm” are not elements of section 527.8, subdivision (b)(2)’s definition of “ ‘[c]redible threat of violence.’ ” (SeeStats. 2015, ch. 411, § 2.) The statutory definition providesin full: “ ‘Credible threat of violence’ is a knowing andwillful statement or course of conduct that would place areasonable person in fear for his or her safety, or the safetyof his or her immediate family, and that serves no legitimatepurpose.” (Ibid.)*6 Notwithstanding the absence of statutory text supportinghis position, Niblett claims that certain case law holds thatan immediate threat of violence and an intent to harm areelements of a credible threat of violence.First, Niblett asserts Garbett held that a credible threat ofviolence “must include evidence of a specific, immediateintent to act.” (Citing Garbett, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p.537.) Garbett did not so hold. Garbett held that a restrainedparty's “subjective intent was not required for his conduct tobe deemed a credible threat.” (See Garbett, at p. 538, italicsadded.) The Court of Appeal further explained section 527.8“requires only a statement made knowingly and willfully,which would place a reasonable person in fear for his or hersafety.” (See Garbett, at p. 539, italics added.)
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Next, Niblett claims “R.D. v. P.M. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th1012” held that “[s]tatements made about workplacegrievances are not credible threats unless accompanied byevidence of intent to harm.” No case with that name appearsat page 1012 of volume 68 of the fifth series of the CaliforniaAppellate Reports, and we were unable to locate a case withthat name decided in 2021.8Furthermore, Niblett cites Scripps Health v. Marin (1999)72 Cal.App.4th 324 for the proposition that “the threatmust show immediacy and specificity, and subjective fearsalone are not enough” to establish a credible threat. (CitingScripps Health, at p. 335.) The page from the Scripps Healthdecision upon which Niblett relies does not address whethera statement must threaten immediate harm to be actionableunder section 527.8. (See Scripps Health, at p. 335.)9 Healso claims page 1228 of Parisi v. Mazzaferro (2016) 5Cal.App.5th 121910 supports his assertion that the “lackof immediacy further undermines the trial court's findingof a credible threat.” His cited excerpt from Parisi doesnot discuss that issue. (See Parisi, at p. 1228.) Apart fromasserting that Scripps Health and Parisi establish that a threatof immediate harm is an essential element of a credible threatof violence, Niblett does not explain how these authoritiessupport that contention. Accordingly, we do not address thatissue further. (See United Grand Corp. v. Malibu Hillbillies,LLC (2019) 36 Cal.App.5th 142, 165, fn. 6 (United GrandCorp.) [“ ‘[A]n appellant is required to not only cite tovalid legal authority, but also explain how it applies in hiscase.’ [Citation.] ‘[W]e may disregard conclusory argumentsthat are not supported by pertinent legal authority or fail todisclose the reasoning by which the appellant reached theconclusions he wants us to adopt.’ ”].)*7 Having rejected Niblett's attempt to add new elements tosection 527.8’s definition of “credible threat of violence,” weturn to whether substantial evidence supports the trial court'sfinding that Niblett made such a threat. (Discussion, partsB.2–B.3, post.)2. Niblett fails to show the trial court erred in finding hemade a knowing and willful statement that would placea reasonable person in fear for his or her safetyNiblett does not dispute, and thus tacitly agrees with, theCounty's assertion that in making the statement in question toHughes on October 11, 2022, Niblett made a “knowing andwillful statement” for the purposes of the statutory definitionof “credible threat of violence.”11 The remainder of thissection analyzes whether Niblett's statement would place areasonable person in fear for his or her safety. We address thelack of legitimate purpose element of the statutory definitionof credible threat of violence in Discussion, part B.3, post.A knowing and willful statement would place a reasonableperson in fear for his or her safety for purposes of section527.8 if “a reasonable person would believe [the personmaking the statement] would resort to violence ....” (SeeTechnology Credit Union, supra, 82 Cal.App.5th at p. 324.)In analyzing an alleged threat, “ ‘ “[c]ontext is critical ... andhistory can give meaning to the medium.” ’ [Citation.]” (SeeGarbett, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 542–543.) Reading therecord in the light most favorable to the WVRO, we concludethere is sufficient evidence from which the trial court couldhave inferred, to a high degree of probability, that a reasonableperson would have interpreted Niblett's reference to Tatone asan expression of his intent to shoot members of departmentmanagement if they continued to make decisions with whichhe disagreed.12First, Hughes testified that Niblett stated, “ ‘If they don'tchange things in this department, they're going to haveanother situation like they had with Tatone’ ” during aconversation in which Niblett was “upset” that managementhad not informed him that a mechanic in Niblett's workgroup had been sent to another work area.13 Hughes alsotestified that shortly before making that statement, (1) Niblett“pointed to [a chief's] door” and said the chief was “ ‘goingto be personally sued’ ”; and (2) Niblett indicated that hewas “able to get rid of ... two chiefs that had work[ed]for [the] department” via a prior lawsuit. The trial courtreasonably could have inferred from these circumstancesthat Niblett was angrily intimating to Hughes he wouldemploy violence to “get rid of” department management ifit did not change course. Further, because Samuel attested inhis declaration accompanying the County's petition that thesheriff's department informed him Niblett was the registeredowner of two rifles, the trial court could rationally have foundNiblett was capable of acting on his threat.14*8 Second, the trial court could have found a reasonableperson hearing this statement would not have construedNiblett's reference to the shooting as an idle threat. Hughestestified that she reported her conversation with Niblettto Samuel, and she later provided a statement to thesheriff's department concerning the incident. Additionally, theshooting at Station 81 occurred just over a year before Nibletthad this conversation with Hughes in October 2022. (See
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Factual & Procedural Background, ante [noting the shootingoccurred in June 2021].) Samuel indicated in his testimonythat the union representing field mechanics had “constantly”been asking for “body armor” since the shooting. Similarly,Niblett's sole witness at trial, Del Cid, characterized theprovision of body armor as a “hot topic” among departmentemployees. Given the heightened state of fear among firedepartment personnel, the trial court could rationally haveinferred that a reasonable employee would have interpretedNiblett's statement as a sincere expression of intent to commitviolent acts.Third, the County presented evidence tending to showthat management's decisions had the potential to triggeran aggressive response from Niblett. In particular, Samuelattested (a) “Niblett ha[d] raised his voice at [Samuel] onnumerous occasions to complain about various work-relateddecisions with which he did not agree,” (b) Samuel had“been advised by office staff that ... Niblett ha[d] spent hourscomplaining about [Samuel] and management personnel,”and (c) “[Niblett's] behavior ha[d] escalated over time fromcomplaints to more aggressive verbal altercations.” Samuelfurther declared that on October 5, 2022, Samuel askedNiblett to “pick up the parts [Niblett] had left on the floor fromworking overtime the past Saturday,” and Niblett respondedby slamming the door of his truck and approaching Samuelwhile yelling profanity at him. Samuel attested Niblett endedup being “in such close proximity to [Samuel's] face that hewas spitting on [Samuel] as he was yelling,” which causedSamuel to feel “threatened” by Niblett's behavior.15 Samueldeclared Niblett “continued to yell expletives until [Samuel]advised ... Niblett that the conversation was over and walkedaway in an attempt to deescalate the situation.”Niblett fails to persuade us that this evidence falls short ofsatisfying our deferential standard of review. Niblett insistshe was not threatening to shoot department management,but instead made “a hypothetical warning about potentialconsequences of poor management ....”To support his contention that his statements were merelyhypothetical, Niblett cites Del Cid's declaration to the effectthat union members “speculated that a contributing factor[in the prior shooting at Station 81] was management'sdecision to only transfer Tatone and not the ... [murdered]firefighter during the investigation of [an] earlier, non-lethal, incident.” Niblett further maintains Del Cid attested(a) Chief Connett told Del Cid Samuel complained that amechanic named David Clutter had threatened Samuel onOctober 5, 2022, and (b) after that incident, “the departmenttransferred Clutter, but not [Samuel], also to a remote locationinvolving a significant commute apparently because Clutterhad threatened” Samuel. Niblett further relies on Del Cid'sdeclaration for the proposition that “this transfer apparentlyviolated the [union's collective bargaining agreement with]the County because transfers are supposed to include twoweeks’ notice and a statement of cause.” Niblett thus appearsto be arguing through the medium of Del Cid's declarationthat Niblett was merely cautioning Hughes that management'sdecision to transfer only Clutter, but not Samuel, could causeClutter to react in much the same way as Tatone did when hewas transferred, that is, by shooting department personnel.*9 Niblett's reliance on Del Cid's testimony is unavailing.“Venerable precedent holds that, in a bench trial, the trialcourt is the ‘sole judge’ of witness credibility.” (Schmidt,supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582.) The trial court thuscould “ ‘disregard’ ” the evidentiary foundations of Niblett'salternative interpretation of his reference to the Station 81shooting—i.e., Del Cid's declaration testimony that unionmembers believed Tatone's transfer may have motivated himto commit murder; Clutter alone had been transferred afterSamuel claimed Clutter threatened him; and Clutter's transferapparently violated the collective bargaining agreement.(See ibid.) Furthermore, Hughes testified Niblett was upsetthat management had sent a mechanic in Niblett's groupto another location without first informing Niblett. Thisevidence suggests that Niblett was angry about the effect thetransfer had on him (see fn. 13, ante [explaining Hughesintimated in her testimony Niblett seemed upset about thetransfer because Niblett is responsible for submitting thetransferred mechanic's time records]), and not that he wasexpressing concern that another purportedly unfairly treatedemployee would commit acts of violence in the future.In addition, Niblett claims Hughes testified “she did notview the comment made to her as a threat or that he wasthreatening” Samuel. He also asserts Hughes's testimonyshows his statement was merely “hypothetical, suggestingthat a similar situation could occur if management didnot address workplace issues.” Niblett further contends,“[Samuel] did not testify that he believed Niblett himselfwould engage in violence, but ‘that somebody’ might.”Niblett's reliance on Hughes's and Samuel's respectivetestimony is unavailing. Hughes's testimony that Niblett didnot threaten Samuel or say he was going to bring in agun and shoot people does not undermine our conclusion
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7there is substantial evidence Niblett made an implied threatto commit an act of violence if management continued tomake decisions he reviled. Hughes's testimony Niblett “justsaid” that “another Station 81” “could happen” and that shedid not believe Niblett “was going to go get a gun andcome down and shoot somebody” (italics added) is likewiseconsistent with our determination Niblett made a threat thatwas conditioned on management's failure to make changeshe desired. Furthermore, Samuel's testimony to the effectthat Niblett's statement to Hughes signaled “[t]hat somebodywas going to come in and shoot up the place” is hardlyexculpatory, especially in light of Samuel's attestation that hedid in fact “t[ake] this statement [from Niblett] as a threat ....”Even if Hughes's or Samuel's testimony could be construed inthe manner Niblett suggests—i.e., that the two witnesses didnot subjectively interpret Niblett's reference to the shooting asa credible threat of violence—Niblett's claim of error wouldstill fail. Section 527.8 requires clear and convincing evidenceof “a knowing and willful statement ... that would place areasonable person in fear for his or her safety” (see Stats.2015, ch. 411, § 2, italics added [subds. (b)(2) & (j) of §527.8]). As explained above, the trial court rationally couldhave inferred it is highly probable that a reasonable personhearing this statement would have feared for his or her safety.Lastly, Niblett contends Hughes “testified Niblett's statementwas vague [and] not directed at any specific individual.”Insofar as Niblett is claiming the trial court lacked authorityto issue the WVRO because he did not direct his threatspecifically at Samuel, Niblett is mistaken. “An employermay seek relief under section 527.8 on behalf of any employeewho is credibly threatened with unlawful violence, whether ornot that employee is identified by the defendant.” (See USS-Posco Industries v. Edwards (2003) 111 Cal.App.4th 436,443.) Put differently, “an employer subjected to generalizedthreats of workplace violence may obtain relief under section527.8 on behalf of an employee who is a logical target of thethreats ....” (See USS-Posco Industries, at p. 438.)There is substantial evidence Samuel was a logical target ofNiblett's threat. As we explained earlier in this section, thetrial court could have rationally found clear and convincingevidence that a reasonable employee would have deducedNiblett threatened to shoot department management if itcontinued to make decisions he found objectionable. Thecourt also could have reasonably inferred when Niblett madethis threat, Samuel was a member of department managementbecause he was an assistant chief and Niblett's supervisor.(Factual & Procedural Background, ante.) As we also haveexplained, Samuel attested that on several occasions, Niblettprotested Samuel's work-related decisions by yelling at him,and that on one such occasion, Niblett got so close toSamuel's face that Niblett was spitting on Samuel as Niblettwas yelling, and Samuel felt threatened by Niblett's closeproximity to him. The court thus could have reasonably foundthat Samuel was the subject of Niblett's ire.*10 In sum, the trial court reasonably could have found ithighly probable that by telling Hughes, “If they don't changethings in this department, they're going to have anothersituation like they had with Tatone,” Niblett made a knowingand willful statement that would place a reasonable person infear for his or her safety.3. Niblett does not demonstrate the trial court erredin finding that his statement did not serve a legitimatepurposeNiblett maintains his “statement [to Hughes] regarding‘Station 81’ served a legitimate purpose: Expressingdissatisfaction with workplace management and systemicissues.” Niblett claims this statement “ar[ose] from his unionduties and involved ongoing workplace grievances pursuedby Local 119,” “the union which represents Fire EquipmentMechanics and Senior Fire Equipment Mechanics,” and thatthe statement “fall[s] squarely within the realm of workplaceadvocacy by a union steward.” In support of this position,Niblett cites pages 12 and 13 of the reporter's transcriptfor the proposition that Hughes “admitted [at trial] that thecomment arose out of labor-management grievances and didnot coincide with any actions or threats to carry out violence.”Niblett also claims Samuel “acknowledged that Niblett oftencomplained about management decisions.”As we explained in our Discussion, part B.2, ante, the recordcontains substantial evidence from which the trial courtreasonably could have found it highly probable that Niblettmade a knowing and willful statement that a reasonableperson would interpret as a threat to shoot fire departmentpersonnel if management continued to make decisions Niblettdisliked. This conclusion is fatal to Niblett's claim he wasmerely criticizing management's decisions.We further conclude Niblett's suggestion he referred tothe shooting at Station 81 to advocate for changes tomanagement's decisions in his capacity as a union steward isbaseless. At trial, Hughes indicated she did not know Niblettwas a union steward. We also fail to see how referencing the
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8shooting in a conversation with Hughes serves the union'sinterests, given that Hughes testified she was a secretary withno supervisory authority over Niblett, and Niblett does notassert she had any management authority.Thus, the trial court did not err in finding Niblett lackeda legitimate purpose for making the statement in questionto Hughes. Consequently, we reject Niblett's evidentiarychallenge to the trial court's finding of a credible threat ofviolence for the purposes of section 527.8.C. Niblett Does Not Show the WVRO Violates His FirstAmendment Rights“The right to free speech is not absolute or unlimited.[Citations.] As our Supreme Court has explained, ‘“[T]he state may penalize threats, even those consistingof pure speech, provided the relevant statute singles outfor punishment threats falling outside the scope of FirstAmendment protection. [Citations.]” ’ ” (Garbett, supra,190 Cal.App.4th at pp. 536–537.) In determining whethera statement is a “ ‘true threat’ ” beyond the scope of theFirst Amendment's protection, courts analyze “ ‘whether areasonable person would foresee that the statement would beinterpreted by those to whom the maker communicates thestatement as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.’” (See id. at p. 540; see also id. at p. 539 [reiterating thisdefinition of “ ‘true threat[s]’ ”].)*11 Niblett argues his October 11, 2022 statement to Hughesreferencing the earlier shooting incident at Station 81 does notconstitute a true threat lacking First Amendment protection.“[I]f the elements of section 527.8 are met by the expressionof a credible threat of violence toward an employee, then thatspeech is not constitutionally protected and an injunction isappropriate.” (Garbett, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 537.)Because we have concluded substantial evidence supports thetrial court's finding Niblett made a credible threat of violencefor the purposes of section 527.8, Niblett's “reliance on theFirst Amendment [is] unavailing.” (See Garbett, at p. 537.)We acknowledge Niblett intimates in the standard ofreview section of his opening brief that the fate of hisFirst Amendment claim is not entirely dependent on ourdisposition of his challenge to the sufficiency of theevidence supporting the WVRO. Specifically, he cites Inre George T. (2004) 33 Cal.4th 620 for the propositionthat we “should review plausible First Amendment issuesindependently.” (Citing In re George T., at p. 632.) Niblettthus appears to maintain the substantial evidence standarddoes not apply to his First Amendment claim.In re George T. held, “[A] reviewing court should makean independent examination of the record in a [PenalCode] section 422 case when a defendant raises a plausibleFirst Amendment defense to ensure that a speaker's freespeech rights have not been infringed by a trier of fact'sdetermination that the communication at issue constitutes acriminal threat.” (In re George T., supra, 33 Cal.4th at p.632; see also id. at pp. 629–630 & fn. 5 [indicating theSupreme Court was referring to Penal Code section 422 inthe text quoted above, and that the statute proscribes “makingcriminal threats”].) The Supreme Court explained, however,this form of “[i]ndependent review is not the equivalent of denovo review ‘in which a reviewing court makes an originalappraisal of all the evidence to decide whether or not itbelieves’ the outcome should have been different.” (See id.at p. 634.) Under this appellate standard, a court “defer[s]to the [lower] court's credibility determinations, but ...review[s] ... the constitutionally relevant facts ‘ “de novo,independently of any previous determinations by the [lowercourt]” ’ [citations] to determine whether [the statement]was ... entitled to no First Amendment protection.” (See ibid.)Niblett makes no effort to show a First Amendment violationunder the principles set forth in In re George T. Niblettdoes not assert, let alone demonstrate, that he raises a“plausible First Amendment defense” for the purposes ofIn re George T. Furthermore, Niblett does not argue thatif we were to conduct an independent review of thetestimony credited by the trial court, we would find theevidence fell short of establishing “ ‘a reasonable personwould [have] foresee[n] that [Niblett's statement to Hughes]would be interpreted as a serious expression of intention toinflict bodily harm.’ [Citation.]” (See Garbett, supra, 190Cal.App.4th at p. 539 [defining true threats].) Accordingly,Niblett's passing reference to In re George T. does notresuscitate his First Amendment claim.16D. Niblett Forfeits His Contention the WVRO ViolatesSection 527.3*12 In his opening brief, Niblett contends, “The WVROissued against Niblett ... suppress[ed] his protected laborspeech in contravention of ... section 527.3.” In particular,Niblett argues his “October 11[, 2022] statement to Hughes”“fall[s] squarely within the scope of protected labor advocacyunder section 527.3” because he “made [the statement] in his
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9capacity as a union representative advocating for systemicworkplace improvements.”As the County notes, although “[s]ection 527.3 sets forthcertain union or labor activities that [cannot] ... be[ ]enjoined,”17 “Niblett fail[s] to quote” section 527.3 in hisopening brief and instead “addresses that [s]ection generally,and without any specifics” or analysis vis-à-vis “how the trialcourt's restraining order violates [s]ection 527.3.” The Countymaintains Niblett “forfeit[ed] th[is] issue on appeal” by“fail[ing] to present authority or develop [this] argument ....”In his reply, Niblett argues, for the first time, that his October11, 2022 statement to Hughes “occurred within a labordispute” for the purposes of section 527.3, subdivision (b)(4)(iii); the WVRO enjoins an activity protected by subdivision(b)(1) of the statute; and “Niblett's speech squarely [falls]within section 527.3's protection” because the statement hemade to Hughes serves the legislative purpose specified insubdivision (a) of the statute.On appeal, our review “ ‘ “is limited to issues which havebeen adequately raised and supported in [the appellant'sopening] brief. [Citations.] ....” ’ [Citation.]” (See GoldenDoor Properties, LLC v. County of San Diego (2020) 50Cal.App.5th 467, 554–555 (Golden Door Properties, LLC),first alteration in original.) We agree with the County thatNiblett forfeited his claim of error predicated on section 527.3by failing to develop adequately that contention in his openingbrief. (See United Grand Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th atp. 156 [holding that an appellant forfeits a contention by“fail[ing] to adequately support ... [it] with cogent argumentor appropriate legal or factual citations”].) Furthermore,Niblett cannot salvage this claim of error by offering newarguments supporting it in his reply, given that the County didnot have an opportunity to respond to these belatedly raisedcontentions. (See Golden Door Properties, LLC, at p. 518 [“‘ “ ‘Obvious considerations of fairness in argument demandthat the appellant present all of his points in the opening brief.To withhold a point until the closing brief would deprive therespondent of his opportunity to answer it or require the effortand delay of an additional brief by permission.’ ” ’ ”].)E. We Reject Niblett's Second Amendment Challenge tothe WVRO's Firearm Restriction*13 As we noted in our Applicable Law and Standardof Review, part A, ante, section 527.8, subdivision (s)(1)provides, “A person subject to a protective order issuedunder this section shall not own, possess, purchase, receive,or attempt to receive a firearm or ammunition while theprotective order is in effect.” (Stats. 2015, ch. 411, § 2.)Subdivision (s)(2) in turn states, “The court shall ordera person subject to a protective order issued under thissection to relinquish any firearms he or she owns orpossesses ....” (Stats 2015, ch. 11, § 2.) In accordancewith these provisions, the WVRO prohibits Niblett frompossessing firearms, firearm parts, and ammunition, andrequires Niblett, insofar as he has “not already done so,” toturn in to law enforcement, or sell to or store with a licensedgun dealer, any firearms or firearm parts in his possession.Niblett argues, “Even if the WVRO is upheld, the firearmrestriction [included in the order] violates Niblett's SecondAmendment rights because the trial court did not conductthe constitutionally required analysis before imposing it.”(Boldface omitted.) He contends that the United StatesSupreme Court's decision in United States v. Rahimi (2024)602 U.S. 680 required the trial court to undertake thefollowing analysis before it could include the firearmrestriction in the order: “[E]valuate the nature of thealleged threat, evidence showing dangerousness, and theproportionality of the restriction to the circumstances.”Rahimi held that in assessing a Second Amendment challengeto the constitutionality of a statute that “regulates arms-bearing conduct,” “the Government must show that therestriction ‘is consistent with the Nation's historical traditionof firearm regulation.’ [Citation.]” (See Rahimi, supra, 602U.S. at pp. 684–686, 689, 691.) There, a defendant chargedwith “one count of possessing a firearm while subject to adomestic violence restraining order, in violation of [title] 18U.S.C. § 922(g)(8),” had challenged the constitutionality ofthat statute. (See Rahimi, at pp. 688, 693.) The high courtheld that “Section 922(g)(8) is constitutional as applied to [thedefendant]” because (1) an order restraining the defendant“met the requirements of Section 922(g)(8)(C)(i)[, as] itincluded a finding that [the defendant] represented ‘a crediblethreat to the physical safety’ of” a parent of the defendant'schild, and (2) “[o]ur tradition of firearm regulation allowsthe Government to disarm individuals who present a crediblethreat to the physical safety of others.” (See Rahimi, at pp.686, 688–689, 700–701.)Rahimi does not hold that even if a court finds the statutoryrequirements for issuance of a restraining order have beensatisfied, it must still undertake Niblett's proffered three-pronged test before including a firearm restriction in the
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10restraining order. Rahimi instead held that title 18 UnitedStates Code section 922(g)(8)(C)(i)’s language “bar[ring]an individual from possessing a firearm if his restrainingorder includes a finding that he poses ‘a credible threat tothe physical safety’ of a protected person” was sufficientlyanalogous to certain “founding era” “surety and goingarmed laws” to survive the defendant's Second Amendmentchallenge to the statute.18Accordingly, the trial court did not err in failing toundertake the three-part test urged by Niblett that Rahimidid not mandate. Furthermore, because Niblett clarifies inhis reply brief he is not raising “a facial challenge tothe constitutionality of the statutory language” requiringthe court to include the firearm restriction in the WVRO,we do not decide whether section 527.8, subdivision(s)’s firearm restriction provisions are, by their terms, “‘consistent with the Nation's historical tradition of firearmregulation.’ [Citation.]” (See Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. atp. 689.) Insofar as Niblett maintains these provisions areunconstitutional as applied to him, we reject that contentionbecause he does not cogently raise it. (See United GrandCorp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 156.) For these reasons,Niblett's Second Amendment challenge fails.F. Niblett Forfeits Multiple Arguments Raised in HisReply Brief*14 Niblett forfeits three appellate claims he levels in hisreply brief.First, Niblett argues the WVRO must be reversed because“the ‘record as a whole’ does not contain ‘substantialevidence from which a reasonable fact finder could havefound it highly probable,’ [citation], that Niblett will inthe future threaten Hughes, [Samuel] (or any other Countyemployee) within the meaning of section 527.8,” and the trialcourt did not make any such finding. (Boldface omitted.)The only point at which Niblett mentions this issue in hisopening brief is a single sentence in the factual and proceduralbackground section in which he states, “[T]he trial court madeno findings on whether Niblett had engaged in a course ofconduct as defined under ... section 527.8 or whether therewas reasonable probability unlawful violence [sic] in thefuture.”Second, Niblett argues in his reply we should review hisevidentiary challenge to the WVRO de novo because hisOctober 11, 2022 statement to Hughes regarding the shootingat Station 81 “raises a mixed question of law and fact asto whether the trial court properly applied the standards forissuing” the order. Although Niblett suggests in his openingbrief we should review independently his First Amendmentclaim (see Discussion, part C, ante), he does not argue inthat brief we must review his sufficiency of the evidenceclaim de novo. In fact, Niblett states in his opening brief,“The Court should review a WVRO issued under ... section527.8 for substantial evidence, resolving all factual conflictsfor the prevailing party, and drawing all reasonable inferencessupporting the trial court's findings.”Third, Niblett contends in his reply, “Workplace criticism,even when strongly worded, remains protected [by the FirstAmendment] absent evidence of intent to threaten.” Inasmuchas Niblett is claiming in his reply that an essential element ofan unprotected “true threat” is the subjective intent to threatensomeone, he is raising a new argument that is absent from hisopening brief.By alluding vaguely in the factual and procedural backgroundsection of his opening brief to the first issue regarding the trialcourt's failure to find a likelihood of future harm and waitinguntil his reply to provide belated analysis and case citations insupport of it, Niblett forfeited that claim of error. (See Cruz,supra, 113 Cal.App.5th at pp. 953–954 [holding that “ ‘ “ourreview on appeal ... ‘is limited to issues which have beenadequately raised and supported in [the appellant's opening]brief[,]’ ” ’ ” italics added, first set of brackets in original];Browne v. County of Tehama (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 704,725–726 [indicating that an issue not raised in the argumentsection of an appellate brief is subject to forfeiture]; UnitedGrand Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 146 [“ ‘In orderto demonstrate error, an appellant must supply the reviewingcourt with some cogent argument supported by legal analysisand citation to the record.’ ”].) Niblett forfeited the othertwo appellate claims by asserting them for the first timein his reply. (See Golden Door Properties, LLC, supra, 50Cal.App.5th at pp. 482, 518 [concluding that an appellant“forfeited [a] point” “[b]y not raising [it] in [the] openingbrief”].)G. It Appears Niblett's Appellate Counsel MisusedArtificial Intelligence In Misciting Several Cases,Including At Least One that Does Not Exist*15 On appeal, the County points out that in the openingbrief, Niblett's appellate counsel, Robert W. Lucas, citesan alleged case designated as “Montebello Unified SchoolDistrict v. State Board of Education (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.111685.” The County states, “[E]ither the citation is inaccurateor the case is fictitious. The latter appears to be the casesince the [County] could not locate any case by that name inany database.” The County also claims that in the openingbrief, Attorney Lucas misrepresented the facts or holdings ofseveral case authorities.For instance, Attorney Lucas represents that in Rahimi, “the[United States Supreme] Court invalidated a federal statutethat prohibited firearm possession by individuals subject tocertain restraining orders because it lacked a historical basisand did not adequately link disarmament to evidence ofdangerousness.” Not so. As the County correctly observes,the Rahimi court “reversed the judgment of the Fifth CircuitCourt of Appeals and upheld the statute.” (Citing Rahimi,supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 700–702.)Other examples of miscited case authority in the openingbrief the County correctly identifies are: (1) Attorney Lucas'sfalse assertion an excerpt from the Scripps Health decisionestablishes that a statement must threaten immediate harmin order to constitute a credible threat of violence; and (2)counsel's citation to “R.D. v. P.M. (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th1012,” which is a case that does not exist, but even assumingcounsel intended to refer to a case with that name issuedin 2011, that decision did not hold that intent to harm isan element of the statutory definition of a credible threat ofviolence. (See Discussion, part B.1, ante [discussing theseerrors in Niblett's opening brief].)After the County filed its respondent's brief, Attorney Lucasfiled a notice of errata to the opening brief. In the notice,Attorney Lucas deletes from page 32 of the opening briefcitations to “Montebello Unified School District v. StateBoard of Education (1991) 226 Cal.App.3d 1685” and“People v. Zermeno (1999) 21 Cal.4th 927.” In so doing,counsel concedes “the County is correct” that the MontebelloUnified School District case “does not appear to exist ....”In the notice of errata, Attorney Lucas asserts he “hasno recollection of how the false citation [to the fictionalMontebello decision] came to be included in the brief, [and]he can only conclude that it was added by the artificialintelligence editing which [he] did not catch before filing.”Attorney Lucas “recognizes that he made a false statement oflaw to the Court,” but he claims he “did not do so knowingly.”Counsel states he filed the notice of errata to “correct[ ] thatfalse statement of law ....” Attorney Lucas further claims “hedid not use artificial intelligence to prepare the Appellant'sReply Brief ....”Attorney Lucas does not explain in the notice of erratawhy he also deleted the Zermeno case from his openingbrief. We have reviewed Zermeno and conclude it does notremotely stand for the principles for which he cited it. Inhis opening brief, Attorney Lucas claimed Zermeno supportsthe following propositions: “Section 527.3 specifically limitsthe use of injunctions to interfere with lawful efforts byemployees to address workplace grievances,” and “[e]venstrongly worded or contentious expressions addressingworkplace concerns are protected unless they cross thethreshold into true threats or violence.” Zermeno, however,involved a criminal defendant's challenge to the sufficiency ofthe evidence supporting a gang enhancement imposed underPenal Code section 186.22. (See Zermeno, supra, 21 Cal.4that pp. 928–929, 933 & fn. 3.)*16 Attorney Lucas does not address the othermisrepresentations identified in the County's brief, includingLucas's representation that Rahimi invalidated a federalstatute when Rahimi contains no such holding, and hisfalse assertions concerning Scripps Health and “R.D. v. P.M.(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 1012.” Additionally, Attorney Lucasasserts in the opening brief that on page 1143 of Bookout v.Nielsen (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1131, “the court reversed arestraining order where the petitioner's subjective fears wereunsupported by evidence of immediate or intentional harm.”Bookout ends at page 1142, and the County correctly pointsout that the Court of Appeal in that case actually affirmed therestraining order before it. (See Bookout, at pp. 1134, 1142.)It thus appears Attorney Lucas used artificial intelligence toprepare the opening brief, filed the brief without verifyingthe accuracy of the case authority it discusses, and failedto correct his miscitation of cases appearing in the openingbrief despite the County's appellate brief noting these errors.Attorney Lucas's behavior is troubling and presents potentialethical issues we cannot ignore. (See People v. Alvarez (2025)114 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1119–1120 [holding that “attorneysmust check every citation to make sure the case[s theycite] exist[ ] and the citations are correct,” and that failureto do so may warrant imposition of sanctions].) It is alsopresumptuous to assume he would not be “caught”; AttorneyLucas apparently believes we do not read cases cited in briefs.More disturbing is his apparent disregard of his duties as anofficer of the court. Our legal system depends on the integrityof counsel and the bench. Citing nonexistent authority or
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12misciting holdings of cases tarnishes the integrity of theprocess.For these reasons, we will order Attorney Lucas to show causewhy sanctions should not be imposed on him for his misuseof artificial intelligence in briefing this appeal. The order toshow cause is issued concurrently with this opinion.DISPOSITIONWe affirm the workplace violence restraining order issuedon January 18, 2023. Plaintiff and respondent County of LosAngeles is awarded its costs on appeal.NOT TO BE PUBLISHED.We concur:WEINGART, J.M. KIM, J.All CitationsNot Reported in Cal.Rptr., 2025 WL 3060520Footnotes1(See Cal. Style Manual (4th ed. 2000) § 5:15[C] [“Once an attorney has appeared of record in the reviewingcourt, his or her name is listed in reporting the decision and cannot be withdrawn at a later date eitherunilaterally or by stipulation.”]; id., § 5:15[A] [“Filing an appellate brief ... constitutes an appearance for listingpurposes.”].)2Undesignated statutory citations are to the Code of Civil Procedure. Although the Legislature made changesto section 527.8 after the trial court issued the WVRO on January 18, 2023 (see, e.g., Stats. 2023, ch. 289,§ 2.5 [filed with Sec'y of State on Sept. 30, 2023]), the parties do not dispute that the version of the statutethat was effective on the date of the order's issuance governs our appellate review (see also Goldstein v.Superior Court (2023) 93 Cal.App.5th 736, 747 [“The general rule is that unless the Legislature expresslystates otherwise, or it is very clear from extrinsic sources that the Legislature must have intended a retroactiveapplication, a newly enacted statutory provision applies prospectively only.”]). For that reason, all referencesin this opinion to section 527.8 are to the version that was in effect on January 18, 2023, which versionappears in Statutes 2015, chapter 411, section 2.3As a person protected by a WVRO, we refer to this individual in the first instance by his first name and lastinitial (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(6)), and thereafter by his first name only for ease of reference. Nodisrespect is intended.4We derive our Factual and Procedural Background in part from the parties’ admissions in their filings andthe County's assertions that Niblett does not dispute in his reply brief. (See Association for Los AngelesDeputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2023) 94 Cal.App.5th 764, 772, fn. 2, 773–774 (Association forLos Angeles Deputy Sheriffs) [employing this approach].)5Samuel testified that the County “placed [Niblett] off of work” because of his threatening conduct and that, asof the January 18, 2023 hearing on the WVRO, Niblett had not returned to work.6(See fn. 2, ante [noting the parties do not dispute the version of § 527.8 found in Stats. 2015, ch. 411, § 2governs our review].)
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.137Given our conclusion, we do not address Niblett's argument the County failed to present sufficient evidencethat he engaged in a course of conduct warranting issuance of the WVRO. (See also Stats. 2015, ch. 411,§ 2 [§ 527.8, subd. (b)(2) provides that either “a knowing or willful statement or course of conduct” can giverise to a finding of a credible threat of violence, italics added].)8The County believes Niblett intended to refer to R.D. v. P.M. (2011) 202 Cal.App.4th 181 (R.D.), and arguesthat case nonetheless does not support Niblett's “assertion that ‘[s]tatements about workplace grievances arenot credible threats unless accompanied by evidence of intent to harm.’ ” The County is correct; R.D. does nothold intent to harm is an element of the statutory definition of credible threats of violence. (See R.D., supra,202 Cal.App.4th at pp. 183–184, 189–190 [instead, in reviewing a restraining order issued under § 527.6, theCourt of Appeal ruled that evidence “demonstrating [the restrained party's] intention to harass” the protectedparty “support[ed] the trial court's implied conclusion ‘that wrongful acts [constituting harassment] are likelyto recur’ ”].) In any event, because Niblett does not address in his reply or notice of errata to the opening briefwhether the 2011 decision found on page 181 of volume 202 of the fourth series of the California AppellateReports establishes that evidence of intent to harm is required, we do not discuss that question further.9Niblett further asserts that pages 335 and 336 of the Scripps Health decision establish that “the absence of ...evidence” of “overt actions, preparation, or specific threats directed at an[ ] individual” “prevents a findingof a credible threat.” This excerpt of the Scripps Health opinion does not address any of those issues. (SeeScripps Health, supra, 72 Cal.App.4th at pp. 334–336 [instead holding that a petitioner must show that withouta WVRO, there is a “reasonable probability unlawful violence will occur in the future,” and reversing the trialcourt's order based on the Court of Appeal's conclusion the evidence there did not satisfy that standard].)10Parisi was overruled in part by Conservatorship of O.B. (2020) 9 Cal.5th 989, 1010, fn. 7.11(See Association for Los Angeles Deputy Sheriffs, supra, 94 Cal.App.5th at pp. 773–774 [holding that theappellants “tacitly concede[d]” a point raised in the respondents’ brief by “failing to dispute it in their reply”].)12Implied credible threats of violence are actionable under section 527.8. (See, e.g., Garbett, supra, 190Cal.App.4th at pp. 530–532, 541–542 [affirming the trial court's issuance of a WVRO based on, inter alia, therestrained party's “suggest[ion] that his only recourse” for a city's refusal to “ ‘change [its] policy’ ” was to “ ‘takematters into [his] own hands like the Black man in Missouri[,]’ ” which was an allusion to an incident severalmonths earlier “when an angry man in a Missouri city shot several people at city hall, killing five of them”].)13Hughes suggested in her testimony that Niblett appeared to be upset the other mechanic had been transferredwithout Niblett's knowledge because, as “the senior mechanic over th[e] group” in which the transferredmechanic was a member, Niblett “turns in the time ... for all of th[ose] mechanics.”14Although Samuel was relaying information from the sheriff's department regarding Niblett's firearm ownership,the trial court could consider such hearsay testimony in ruling on the County's petition. (See Kaiser FoundationHospitals v. Wilson (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 550, 558 [“Hearsay evidence clearly may be relevant, and ifhearsay evidence is relevant, section 527.8 requires that the court receive it.”].)15Niblett cites pages 47 to 48 of the reporter's transcript for the proposition Samuel “stated he did not feelthreatened by Niblett's actions in the ... October 5 incident where he was present.” Niblett's characterizationof Samuel's testimony is misleading. In that portion of the transcript, Niblett's counsel posited that Samuel“never felt threatened to the point ... that [Samuel] called the sheriff's department at the time the [October5th] interaction occurred,” to which Samuel replied, “That's a fair statement.” (Italics added.)16(See United Grand Corp., supra, 36 Cal.App.5th at p. 162 [holding that an appellant forfeited an argumentby citing an authority without “ ‘explain[ing] how it applie[d] in [that] case’ ”]; Cruz v. Tapestry, Inc. (2025)113 Cal.App.5th 943, 953–954 (Cruz) [“ ‘ “Even when our review on appeal ‘is de novo, it is limited to issues
COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.14which have been adequately raised and supported in [the appellant's opening] brief[,]’ ” ’ ” italics added, firstset of brackets in original].)17(See, e.g., § 527.3, subds. (b) & (b)(1) [“The acts enumerated in this subdivision, whether performed singlyor in concert, shall be legal, and no court nor any judge nor judges thereof, shall have jurisdiction to issueany restraining order or preliminary or permanent injunction which, in specific or general terms, prohibits anyperson or persons, whether singly or in concert, from doing any of the following: [¶] ... Giving publicity to, andobtaining or communicating information regarding the existence of, or the facts involved in, any labor dispute,whether by advertising, speaking, patrolling any public street or any place where any person or persons maylawfully be, or by any other method not involving fraud, violence or breach of the peace.”].)18(See Rahimi, supra, 602 U.S. at pp. 693, 698–700.) As used in the Rahimi opinion, the term “ ‘going armed’laws” refers to a type of legal “mechanism for punishing those who had menaced others with firearms.” (Seeid. at p. 697.)End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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