Gezalayan v. BMW North American, LLC, No. 23STCV28112 (2025)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Gezalayan v. BMW North American, LLC, 2025 WL 2528280 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2528280 (Cal.Super.) (Trial Order)Superior Court of California,Civil Division,Central District, Stanley Mosk Courthouse, Department 52.Los Angeles CountyHelen GEZALAYAN, An Individual,v.BMW NORTH AMERICAN, LLC, et al.No. 23STCV28112.August 6, 2025.*1 9:00 AMJudicial Assistant: S. HolmanCourtroom Assistant: T. IsunzaCSR: NoneERM: NoneDeputy Sheriff: NoneEditor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.OrderSteven A. Simons (Telephonic), for plaintiff(s).Honorable Jerrold Abeles, Judge.NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Motion for Summary JudgmentThe Court's Tentative Ruling is posted online for the parties to review.The matter is called for hearing.Plaintiff and defendant submit to the Tentative Ruling via email.Without opposition, the Court adopts its Tentative Ruling as the Final Order as follows:The Motion for Summary Judgment or, alternatively, Summary Adjudication by BMW of North America, LLC [Res. ID #4836]filed by BMW North American, LLC on 04/10/2025 is Denied.Defendant BMW of North America, LLC's Motion for Summary Judgment or, Alternatively, Summary AdjudicationDefendant BMW of North America, LLC (BMW) moves for summary judgment or summary adjudication of the first threecauses of action by plaintiff Helen Gezalayan.
Gezalayan v. BMW North American, LLC, 2025 WL 2528280 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Request for Judicial NoticeBMW requests judicial notice of its Statement of Information filed with California's Secretary of State. (Foote Decl., Ex. C.)The document's existence and legal effects are subject to judicial notice. (See Belen v. Ryan Seacrest Productions, LLC (2021)65 Cal.App.5th 1145, 1161, fn. 2.) The request for judicial notice is granted.Legal StandardSummary judgment should be granted where no triable issues of fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as amatter of law. (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (c); Villa v. McFerren (1995) 35 Cal.App.4th 733, 741.) A defendant moving forsummary adjudication of a cause of action must show “that one or more elements of the cause of action… cannot be established,or that there is a complete defense to the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (p)(2).) Courts use a three-stepanalysis: “(1) identify the issues framed by the pleadings; (2) determine whether the moving party has negated the opponent'sclaims; and (3) determine whether the opposition has demonstrated the existence of a triable, material factual issue.” (Hinesleyv. Oakshade Town Center (2005) 135 Cal.App.4th 289, 294.)Damages or Injury to PlaintiffBMW argues plaintiff cannot establish the element of damages for any cause of action against it. BMW relies on evidencethat plaintiff does not drive the subject vehicle and does not make the monthly lease payments. Plaintiff acknowledges thather partner, Karen Asourian, is the vehicle's “primary driver” and makes “the monthly payments” under the lease. (GezalayanDecl., 2.) BMW, however, cites no authority that under the Song-Beverly Act or Commercial Code, a buyer is only injuredor damaged if she personally drives or pays for the vehicle. The Song-Beverly Act provides for the remedy of “restitution ‘inan amount equal to the actual price paid or payable by the buyer.’ ” (Niedermeier v. FCA US LLC (2024) 15 Cal.5th 792, 800(Niedermeier).) The California Supreme Court held this remedy applies even when it results in an apparent windfall to a buyerwho re-sold the vehicle, thus getting both a full refund and the proceeds from the re-sale. (Id. at pp. 806-810.)*2 General principles of restitution and unjust enrichment further support plaintiff's position that she may recover paymentsmade by Asourian. “If a third person makes a payment to the defendant in respect of an asset belonging to the claimant, theclaimant is entitled to restitution from the defendant as necessary to prevent unjust enrichment.” (Rest.3d Restitution and UnjustEnrichment § 47.) When payments to the lessor would otherwise be refunded to the lessee, permitting the lessor to keep thepayments because a third party paid would unjustly enrich the lessor.Green Wood Industrial Co. v. Forceman Internat. Development Group, Inc. (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th 766 (Green Wood) is alsoinstructive. There, the plaintiff bought goods from defendants for resale to other buyers. (Id. at p. 770.) A defendant argued theplaintiff could not recover damages “for payments to [another defendant] that were funded or transmitted by” the resale buyerinstead of the plaintiff itself. (Id. at p. 772.) The court noted plaintiff “was obligated to pay [seller] for the goods.” (Ibid.) “Thefact that [plaintiff] funded its payments … by instructing its buyer to transmit the funds directly to” the seller “is irrelevantto [plaintiff's] right to recover” damages for the payments. (Ibid.) The court also described persuasive authority from anotherstate as holding “that some of the money was wired to defendant for plaintiff from a third person's account is irrelevant as tothe issue of plaintiff's damages.” (Ibid.)Though Green Wood concerned a cause of action for fraud regarding a contract for sale of goods governed by the UniformCommercial Code, its reasoning applies equally here. Plaintiff was contractually obligated to make monthly payments underthe lease. That someone else directly paid the lessor is irrelevant to plaintiff's damages or other remedies.Moreover, plaintiff presents evidence that the vehicle's alleged defects damaged her because the vehicle was used to benefither household. Plaintiff states her partner Asourian “would also use the vehicle to transport our children to various events like
Gezalayan v. BMW North American, LLC, 2025 WL 2528280 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3doctor's appointments and family functions.” (Gezalayan Decl., 5.) Asourian's “payments were meant to benefit the kids asthis car was bought for the kids to have safe transportation when traveling with my life partner Karen Asourian.” (Id., 6.)The vehicle's “use, value, or safety … to the buyer or lessee” (Civ. Code, § 1793.22, subd. (e)(1)) included use of the vehicleto transport plaintiff's children and partner. Courts liberally construe the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act because it “is‘ “manifestly a remedial measure, intended for the protection of the consumer; it should be given a construction calculated tobring its benefits into action.” ’ ” (Niedermeier, supra, 15 Cal.5th at p. 804.) Construing “use, value, or safety” to apply only tosomeone who personally drives the vehicle or makes the payments would undermine the Act's remedial purpose.Finally, the court cannot grant summary judgment or adjudication based on the element of damages for another reason. Summaryjudgment must dispose of “the entire ‘action.’ ” (Hypertouch, Inc. v. ValueClick, Inc. (2011) 192 Cal.App.4th 805, 834.)Similarly, “summary adjudication shall be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action....” (Code Civ. Proc.,§ 437c, subd. (f)(1).) Assuming BMW is correct about damages or injury as to payments made by Asourian, that would notentirely dispose of this action or any cause of action. BMW acknowledges that plaintiff made some payments for the vehicle:“Plaintiff paid the down payment of $3,500, which consisted of taxes, fees, and charges, along with the first month's leasepayment of $1,300.” (UMF No. 2.) Thus, even if plaintiff could recover nothing for Asourian's payments, she could recoverthe $4,800 she paid.2nd Cause of Action for Breach of Implied Warranty of Merchantability*3 Triable issues of fact preclude summary adjudication of this cause of action. Generally, the implied warranty ofmerchantability applies only to manufacturers and retail sellers of a vehicle: “Unless disclaimed in the manner prescribed bythis chapter, every sale of consumer goods that are sold at retail in this state shall be accompanied by the manufacturer's andthe retail seller's implied warranty that the goods are merchantable.” (Civ. Code, § 1792.) BMW presents evidence that it wasa distributor, not a manufacturer or retail seller, of the subject vehicle. (UMF Nos. 11-12.) The law, however, extends impliedwarranty obligations to others (including distributors) who make express warranties: “If express warranties are made by personsother than the manufacturer of the goods, the obligation of the person making such warranties shall be the same as that imposedon the manufacturer under this chapter.” (Civ. Code, § 1795.) BMW does not dispute that it made an express warranty for thevehicle.Instead, BMW argues Civil Code section 1795 does not extend implied warranties to distributors. That section states thatwhen someone other than the manufacturer, such as a distributor, issues an express warranty, the law treats that distributoras a manufacturer for purposes of warranties “under this chapter.” (Ibid.) The relevant chapter of the Civil Code imposes onmanufacturers the obligation of an “implied warranty that the goods are merchantable.” (Civ. Code, § 1792; accord Rodriguezv. FCA US LLC (2024) 17 Cal.5th 189, 200 [the Song-Beverly “Act also requires consumer goods to be accompanied by themanufacturer's and retail seller's implied warranty of merchantability”].) If the Legislature had intended Civil Code section 1795only to extend express warranty obligations to “persons other than the manufacturer,” it could have done so. It instead extendedthe non-manufacturer warrantor's obligations to those “imposed on the manufacturer under this chapter.” (Ibid.) The statute'splain language extends all warranty obligations under the chapter. That includes the implied warranty of merchantability.DispositionDefendant BMW of North America, LLC's motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is denied.On its own motion, the court orders Steven A. Simons, counsel for plaintiff Helen Gezalayan, to explain the reason for citing thenon-existent case “Steele v. Toyota Motor Sales U.S.A., Inc., 10 Cal. App. 5th Supp. 1, 10 (2016)” in the opposition brief. (Opp.,p. 10.) This non-existent case is the sole authority for plaintiff's argument that the “Constructive Payment Doctrine SupportsRecovery.”
Gezalayan v. BMW North American, LLC, 2025 WL 2528280 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4The court admonishes plaintiff's counsel to refrain from referencing non-existent authority in any future briefings which mayresult in sanctions.Plaintiff is to give notice.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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