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Huynh v. Desimone
(2025)
Case details
Full caption
Nga Huynh v. Joseph Desimone
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Opinion Delaney (J.) (unanimous Court)
NGA
HUYNH,
Plaintiff
and
Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH...,
Not
Reported
in...
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
1
2025
WL
2641314
Only
the
Westlaw
citation
is
currently
available.
California
Rules
of
Court,
rule
8.1115,
restricts
citation
of
unpublished
opinions
in
California
courts.
NOT
TO
BE
PUBLISHED
IN
OFFICIAL
REPORTS
California
Rules
of
Court,
rule
8.1115(a),
prohibits
courts
and
parties
from
citing
or
relying
on
opinions
not
certified
for
publication
or
ordered
published,
except
as
specified
by
rule
8.1115(b).
This
opinion
has
not
been
certified
for
publication
or
ordered
published
for
purposes
of
rule
8.1115.
Court
of
Appeal,
Fourth
District,
Division
3,
California.
NGA
HUYNH,
Plaintiff
and
Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH
DESIMONE,
JR.,
Defendant
and
Respondent.
G063687
|
Filed
9/15/2025
(Super.
Ct.
No.
23P000437)
Appeal
from
an
order
of
the
Superior
Court
of
Orange
County,
Eileen
Solis,
Temporary
Judge.
(Pursuant
to
Cal.
Const.,
art.
VI,
§
21
.)
Affirmed.
Respondent's
Motion
to
Dismiss.
Denied.
Respondent's
Request
for
Judicial
Notice.
Denied.
Respondent's
Motion
for
Sanctions.
Denied.
Appellant's
Request
to
File
Late
Reply
Brief.
Denied.
Attorneys
and
Law
Firms
Nga
Huynh,
in
pro.
per.
Stegmeier,
Gelbart,
Schwartz
&
Benavente,
and
Jason
M.
Schwartz
,
and
Garrett
C.
Dailey
,
for
Defendant
and
Respondent.
OPINION
DELANEY
,
J.
*1
Nga
Huynh
appeals
from
the
California
family
court's
(the
court)
order
determining
the
State
of
Nevada
has
jurisdiction
of
her
son
pursuant
to
the
Uniform
Child
Custody
Jurisdiction
and
Enforcement
Act
(UCCJEA),
Family
Code,
§§
3400
et
seq.
1
Respondent
Joseph
DeSimone
argues
the
appeal
should
be
dismissed
because
Nevada
has
exclusive
jurisdiction.
We
disagree
because
whether
Nevada
has
exclusive
jurisdiction
is
subject
to
appellate
review.
Turning
to
the
merits,
we
conclude
Huynh
forfeited
her
appellate
claims
by
failing
to
cite
to
the
full
record
or
to
proper
legal
authority.
Accordingly,
we
affirm
the
court's
order.
In
reply,
in
support
of
their
motion
to
dismiss
the
appeal,
DeSimone
requests
this
court
sanction
Huynh,
including
for
citing
nonexistent
cases,
a
practice
which
creates
inefficiencies
for
lawyers
and
the
courts
and
promotes
cynicism
about
the
legal
profession
and
the
American
judicial
system.
Although
citation
of
fictitious
cases
is
sanctionable
conduct,
we
conclude
sanctions
are
not
warranted
in
this
case.
2
STATEMENT
OF
THE
CASE
Huynh,
a
California
resident,
and
DeSimone,
a
Nevada
resident,
never
married,
but
have
a
son,
who
was
born
in
July
2022.
On
January
3,
2023,
DeSimone
filed
a
complaint
to
establish
paternity
and
child
custody
in
Nevada
family
court.
On
April
21,
2023,
Huynh
filed
a
Petition
to
Determine
Parental
Relationship
(Petition)
in
California.
She
requested
child
custody
and
visitation
orders,
as
well
as
an
order
shortening
the
time
for
an
UCCJEA
conference
with
the
Nevada
family
court
to
determine
jurisdiction.
At
the
time,
Huynh
was
represented
by
attorneys
in
California
and
Nevada.
On
May
25,
2023,
DeSimone
filed
a
request
for,
among
others,
an
order
quashing
Huynh's
Petition.
Alternatively,
he
requested
a
stay
of
the
California
action
and
a
conference
with
the
Nevada
family
court
to
determine
the
more
appropriate
forum.
Subsequently,
Judge
Mary
Perry
of
the
Nevada
family
court
and
Temporary
Judge
Solis
held
an
initial
discussion
to
discuss
the
case
.
On
June
15,
2023,
a
UCCJEA
conference
was
held
jointly
by
the
Nevada
family
court
and
the
court.
The
parties'
California
attorneys
were
physically
present
in
the
California
courtroom,
and
their
Nevada
attorneys
and
Judge
Perry
appeared
remotely.
The
proceedings
spanned
several
days
over
two
months.
During
this
period,
Huynh
changed
attorneys
multiple
times.
NGA
HUYNH,
Plaintiff
and
Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH...,
Not
Reported
in...
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
2
Following
the
hearing,
at
Huynh's
request,
the
court
issued
a
written
statement
of
decision.
The
court
summarized
the
parties'
evidence
before
ruling
on
various
issues
under
the
UCCJEA.
First,
the
court
determined
that
neither
California
nor
Nevada
has
“home
state”
jurisdiction
under
the
UCCJEA
because
the
child
did
not
reside
six
consecutive
months
in
either
state
prior
to
the
commencement
of
the
Nevada
or
California
actions.
The
court
stated
the
parties
agreed
with
this
determination.
Because
there
is
no
home
state
jurisdiction,
the
court
analyzed
the
significant
connections
the
child
and
parents
have
with
the
relevant
states
and
whether
any
substantial
evidence
is
available
in
the
states
concerning
the
child's
care,
protection,
training,
and
personal
relationships.
*2
The
court
concluded
the
child
had
more
significant
connections
to
Nevada
than
California.
Substantial
evidence
included
the
child
seeing
doctors,
receiving
immunization
shots,
and
being
fitted
for
a
custom
helmet
to
correct
skull
formation
issues
in
Nevada.
He
also
was
baptized
in
Nevada,
played
the
role
of
baby
Jesus
at
Christmas
Mass
in
Nevada,
and
attended
football
games
and
holiday
celebrations
in
Nevada.
His
half-sister
lived
with
the
child
for
over
five
months
in
Nevada,
and
DeSimone
has
substantial
connections
to
Nevada.
As
to
California
connections,
the
child
was
born
in
California
and
saw
doctors
in
California
following
his
birth.
Huynh
enrolled
him
in
swim
and
sign
language
classes
in
California,
but
provided
no
details.
As
to
Huynh's
connections
to
the
two
states,
she
does
not
own
property
in
California,
but
during
the
time
period
in
question,
co-owned
a
Nevada
condominium
with
DeSimone.
She
has
worked
for
DeSimone
in
Nevada,
but
there
is
no
evidence
that
she
worked
in
California.
Finally,
the
court
concluded
that
Nevada
was
not
an
inconvenient
forum
because,
among
other
factors,
it
is
normal
to
hold
remote
hearings
in
Nevada,
which
is
advantageous
to
Huynh
because
it
reduces
the
significant
wealth
disparity
between
the
parties.
Additionally,
California
and
Nevada
are
neighboring
states,
and
the
respective
family
courts
have
equal
knowledge
of
the
facts
and
issues.
Based
on
its
findings,
the
court
concluded
that
Nevada
should
have
full
jurisdiction
over
the
matter.
DISCUSSION
I.
APPLICABLE
LAW
“The
UCCJEA
is
the
exclusive
method
of
determining
subject
matter
jurisdiction
in
child
custody
cases”
(
Schneer
v.
Llaurado
(2015)
242
Cal.App.4th
1276,
1287
(
Schneer
).)
“The
UCCJEA
is
designed
to
avoid
jurisdictional
conflicts
between
states
and
relitigation
of
custody
decisions,
promote
cooperation
between
states,
and
facilitate
enforcement
of
another
state's
custody
decrees.”
(
In
re
R.L.
(2016)
4
Cal.App.5th
125,
136
.)
“Subject
matter
jurisdiction
over
a
child
custody
dispute
either
exists
or
does
not
exist
at
the
time
the
petition
is
filed,
and
jurisdiction
under
the
UCCJEA
may
not
be
conferred
by
mere
presence
of
the
parties
or
by
stipulation,
consent,
waiver,
or
estoppel.”
(
Schneer
,
at
p.
1287.)
Section
3421,
subdivision
(a)
,
sets
forth
four
alternative
bases
for
subject
matter
jurisdiction
under
the
UCCJEA:
“(1)
This
state
is
the
home
state
of
the
child
on
the
date
of
the
commencement
of
the
proceeding,
or
was
the
home
state
of
the
child
within
six
months
before
the
commencement
of
the
proceeding
and
the
child
is
absent
from
this
state
but
a
parent
or
person
acting
as
a
parent
continues
to
live
in
this
state.
“(2)
A
court
of
another
state
does
not
have
jurisdiction
under
paragraph
(1),
or
a
court
of
the
home
state
of
the
child
has
declined
to
exercise
jurisdiction
on
the
grounds
that
this
state
is
the
more
appropriate
forum
under
Section
3427
or
3428
,
and
both
of
the
following
are
true:
[¶]
(A)
The
child
and
the
child's
parents,
or
the
child
and
at
least
one
parent
or
a
person
acting
as
a
parent,
have
a
significant
connection
with
this
state
other
than
mere
physical
presence.
[¶]
(B)
Substantial
evidence
is
available
in
this
state
concerning
the
child's
care,
protection,
training,
and
personal
relationships.
“(3)
All
courts
having
jurisdiction
under
paragraph
(1)
or
(2)
have
declined
to
exercise
jurisdiction
on
the
ground
that
a
court
of
this
state
is
the
more
appropriate
forum
to
determine
the
custody
of
the
child
under
Section
3427
or
3428
.
“(4)
No
court
of
any
other
state
would
have
jurisdiction
under
the
criteria
specified
in
paragraph
(1),
(2),
or
(3).”
“Home
state”
under
the
UCCJEA
means,
“the
state
in
which
a
child
lived
with
a
parent
or
a
person
acting
as
a
parent
for
at
least
six
consecutive
months
immediately
before
the
commencement
of
a
child
custody
proceeding.
In
the
case
of
NGA
HUYNH,
Plaintiff
and
Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH...,
Not
Reported
in...
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
3
a
child
less
than
six
months
of
age,
the
term
means
the
state
in
which
the
child
lived
from
birth
with
any
of
the
persons
mentioned.
A
period
of
temporary
absence
of
any
of
the
mentioned
persons
is
part
of
the
period.”
(
§
3402,
subd.
(g)
.)
“Temporary
absence”
requires
consideration
of
the
parents'
intentions,
as
well
as
other
factors
relating
to
the
departure
circumstances.
(See,
e.g.,
In
re
Marriage
of
Nurie
(2009)
176
Cal.App.4th
478,
493,
fn.
12
(
Nurie
)
[“both
parents
intended
for
Son
to
return
to
California
....
Because
the
trip
at
least
began
as
a
‘temporary
absence,’
under
any
applicable
standard,
the
time
Son
spent
in
Pakistan
before
Wife
informed
Husband
that
she
would
not
return
to
California
should
be
considered
part
of
Son's
period
of
residence
in
California”].)
*3
“
‘The
UCCJEA
takes
a
strict
“first
in
time”
approach
to
jurisdiction.
Basically,
subject
to
exceptions
not
applicable
here
[citations],
once
the
court
of
an
appropriate
state
(
Fam.
Code,
§
3421,
subd.
(a)
)
has
made
a
“child
custody
determination,”
that
court
obtains
“exclusive,
continuing
jurisdiction....”
(
Fam.
Code,
§
3422,
subd.
(a)
.)
The
court
of
another
state:
[¶]
(a)
Cannot
modify
the
child
custody
determination
(
Fam.
Code,
§§
3421,
subd.
(b)
,
3422,
subd.
(a)
,
3423
,
3446,
subd.
(b)
);
[and]
[¶]
(b)
Must
enforce
the
child
custody
determination
(
Fam.
Code,
§§
3443
,
3445
,
3446
,
3448
,
3453
)....’
”
(
Nurie,
supra
,
176
Cal.App.4th
at
p.
491
.)
“[A]s
with
any
statute,
interpretation
of
the
UCCJEA
is
a
question
of
law
we
review
de
novo.”
(
Schneer,
supra
,
242
Cal.App.4th
at
p.
1287
.)
However,
the
findings
of
fact
made
by
the
family
court
in
determining
jurisdiction
under
the
UCCJEA
are
“reviewed
under
the
deferential
substantial
evidence
standard”
and
its
“resolution
of
conflicts
in
the
evidence
and
credibility
assessments
are
binding
on
this
court.”
(
Id.
at
pp.
1286–1287,
fn.
omitted.)
The
family
court's
decision
to
decline
jurisdiction
on
the
ground
of
inconvenient
forum,
as
well
as
its
failure
to
do
so,
is
reviewed
for
an
abuse
of
discretion.
(
In
re
Stephanie
M.
(1994)
7
Cal.4th
295,
311–
313
.)
II.
DISCUSSION
A.
Motion
to
Dismiss
Appeal
DeSimone
argues
this
court
should
dismiss
the
appeal
because
Nevada
has
exclusive
jurisdiction
under
the
UCCJEA.
Section
3422
provides
that
“a
court
of
this
state
that
has
made
a
child
custody
determination
consistent
with
Section
3421
or
3423
has
exclusive,
continuing
jurisdiction
over
the
determination,”
until
it
determines
jurisdiction
has
been
lost.
(See
Segal
v.
Fishbein
(2023)
89
Cal.App.5th
692,
704
[“[S]ection
3422
‘unambiguously
gives
the
decree
state
sole
power
to
decide
whether
jurisdiction
has
been
lost
on
this
basis’
”].)
Nevada
made
the
initial
custody
determination
on
November
30,
2023,
after
the
California
and
Nevada
family
courts
held
the
joint
UCCJEA
conference.
Thus,
DeSimone
argues,
California
courts
cannot
entertain
any
challenges
to
Nevada's
jurisdiction
over
the
child.
We
disagree.
DeSimone's
dismissal
motion
is
predicated
on
the
initial
custody
determination
being
“consistent
with
Section
3421
or
3423
,”
which
requires
appellate
review
of
the
court's
determination.
Accordingly,
we
have
appellate
jurisdiction
to
review
the
court's
order
finding
Nevada
has
subject
matter
jurisdiction
over
the
child
under
the
UCCJEA.
3
B.
Forfeiture
of
Appellate
Claims
Huynh
challenges
the
court's
determination
that
Nevada
has
jurisdiction
over
her
son
on
several
grounds.
First,
she
contends
California
is
the
home
state
because
her
presence
and
the
child's
presence
in
Nevada
during
the
relevant
time
periods
were
temporary
absences.
She
does
not
address
her
counsel's
concessions
during
the
hearing
that
California
does
not
have
home
state
jurisdiction.
Second,
she
argues
the
court
erred
in
its
analysis
of
the
significant
connections
test.
She
cites
several
facts
supporting
significant
connections
to
California,
but
did
not
cite
to
the
record.
Instead,
her
appellate
brief
left
the
record
citations
incomplete,
stating
“(CT
[insert
reference])”
numerous
times.
She
also
does
not
cite
the
evidence
supporting
the
court's
ruling.
Third,
she
argues
the
court
erred
by
not
recognizing
Nevada
as
the
inconvenient
forum.
In
connection
with
this
appellate
claim,
Huynh
cites
two
nonexistent
cases.
The
first
fictitious
case
(
In
re
Marriage
of
Handley
)
was
cited
for
the
argument
that
the
standard
of
review
is
abuse
of
discretion.
The
second
case
(
In
re
Marriage
of
Akins
)
was
cited
for
the
proposition
that
substantial
wealth
disparity
is
a
factor
in
determining
the
convenient
forum.
Finally,
Huynh
contends
the
court
erred
when
it
held
an
unrecorded
conference
call
with
the
Nevada
family
court
without
the
participation
or
presence
of
the
parties.
She
acknowledges
the
court
referenced
this
call
in
its
statement
of
decision,
but
does
not
address
why
she
failed
to
raise
any
objection
below.
She
also
asserts
this
alleged
procedural
error
was
prejudicial
without
any
further
argument.
NGA
HUYNH,
Plaintiff
and
Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH...,
Not
Reported
in...
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
4
*4
Huynh's
first
three
claims
of
error
implicate
the
court's
factual
findings.
Whether
an
absence
is
temporary
for
home
state
jurisdiction,
whether
there
are
significant
connections,
and
whether
a
forum
is
more
appropriate
than
another
forum
all
require
findings
of
facts
and
weighing
those
facts.
Here,
both
parties
presented
facts
that
would
lead
to
differing
results.
As
noted,
in
UCCJEA
proceedings,
where
jurisdictional
facts
are
disputed,
we
review
the
court's
factual
determinations
for
substantial
evidence.
(See
Schneer,
supra
,
242
Cal.App.4th
at
pp.
1286–1287
.)
A
party
challenging
a
ruling
for
lack
of
substantial
evidence
must
“
‘set
forth,
discuss,
and
analyze
all
the
evidence
on
that
point,
both
favorable
and
unfavorable.
’
”
(
Pope
v.
Babick
(2014)
229
Cal.App.4th
1238,
1246
.)
“Unless
this
is
done
the
error
is
deemed
to
be
waived.”
(
Ibid.
)
Additionally,
“[a]n
appellant
who
fails
to
cite
accurately
to
the
record
forfeits
the
issue
or
argument
on
appeal
that
is
presented
without
the
record
reference.”
(
Alki
Partners,
LP
v.
DB
Fund
Services,
LLC
(2016)
4
Cal.App.5th
574,
589
.)
By
failing
to
cite
evidence
supporting
the
order
and
explain
why
such
evidence
is
insufficient,
Huynh
has
forfeited
her
first
three
appellate
claims.
Her
third
claim
also
is
forfeited
for
the
separate
reason
that
she
cites
fictitious
cases,
which
is
sanctionable.
Finally,
her
fourth
and
last
claim
of
error
relating
to
the
initial
conference
call
between
the
judicial
officers
is
forfeited
because
she
does
not
explain
why
she
failed
to
object
below
or
why
the
alleged
procedural
error
is
prejudicial.
(See
Doers
v.
Golden
Gate
Bridge
Etc.
Dist.
(1979)
23
Cal.3d
180,
184,
fn.
1
,
overruled
in
part
on
other
grounds
by
Quach
v.
California
Commerce
Club,
Inc.
(2024)
16
Cal.5th
562,
573,
582,
fn.
4
.)
[“
‘An
appellate
court
will
ordinarily
not
consider
procedural
defects
or
erroneous
rulings,
in
connection
with
relief
sought
or
defenses
asserted,
where
an
objection
could
have
been
but
was
not
presented
to
the
lower
court
by
some
appropriate
method’
”];
Badie
v.
Bank
of
America
(1998)
67
Cal.App.4th
779,
784–785
[“When
an
appellant
fails
to
raise
a
point,
or
asserts
it
but
fails
to
support
it
with
reasoned
argument
and
citations
to
authority,
we
treat
the
point
as
waived”].)
In
sum,
Huynh
has
forfeited
her
appellate
claims.
C.
Request
for
Sanctions
DeSimone
requests
this
court
sanction
Huynh
for
filing
the
appeal.
He
argues
the
appeal
is
frivolous
because
(1)
the
appeal
is
moot
for
lack
of
jurisdiction,
as
argued
in
his
Motion
to
Dismiss,
(2)
Huynh
failed
to
comply
with
the
rules
of
appellate
procedures
by
fairly
summarizing
the
evidence
or
presenting
cogent
arguments,
and
(3)
Huynh
cited
nonexistent
cases.
As
we
concluded
above,
the
appeal
is
not
moot
because
we
have
appellate
jurisdiction
to
review
whether
the
Nevada
family
court
has
jurisdiction
under
the
UCCJEA.
As
for
Huynh's
failure
to
present
reasoned
arguments
or
record
citations,
her
resulting
forfeiture
of
those
claims
on
appeal
is
a
sufficient
sanction.
(Cf.
Kabbe
v.
Miller
(1990)
226
Cal.App.3d
93,
98
[“We
do
not
believe
it
is
appropriate
to
hold
a
propria
persona
appellant
to
the
standard
of
what
a
‘reasonable
attorney’
should
know
is
frivolous
unless
and
until
that
appellant
becomes
a
persistent
litigant”].)
As
for
Huynh's
references
to
nonexistent
cases,
substantial
authority
supports
sanctions
for
such
misconduct,
even
when
committed
by
a
self-represented
litigant.
“[Self-
represented]
litigants
are
held
to
the
same
standards
as
attorneys.”
(
Kobayashi
v.
Superior
Court
(2009)
175
Cal.App.4th
536,
543
.)
Moreover,
self-represented
litigants
have
been
sanctioned
for
citing
fictitious
cases.
(See,
e.g.,
United
States
v.
Hayes
(E.D.
Cal.
2025)
763
F.Supp.3d
1054,
1071
[collecting
cases,
including
Maine
case
imposing
sanctions
“to
deter
other
litigants
from
‘blindly’
relying
on
AI-generated
filings];
Kruse
v.
Karlen
(Mo.Ct.App.
2024)
692
S.W.3d
43,
54
[sanctioning
propria
persona
party
who
cited
fictitious
cases
in
appellate
brief
$10,000
in
attorney
fees
because
it
is
“a
necessary
and
appropriate
message
in
this
case,
underscoring
the
importance
of
following
court
rules
and
presenting
meritorious
arguments
supported
by
real
and
accurate
judicial
authority”].)
*5
Nevertheless,
we
concluded
sanctions
are
not
warranted
in
this
case.
DeSimone's
request
for
sanctions
was
made
not
by
formal
motion,
but
in
reply
to
Hyunh's
opposition
to
the
motion
to
dismiss
and
referenced
again
in
the
respondent's
brief.
Neither
is
appropriate.
(See
Cowan
v.
Krayzman
(2011)
196
Cal.App.4th
907,
919
[denying
sanctions
request
because
litigant
“has
not
filed
a
separate
sanctions
motion
as
required
by
California
Rules
of
Court,
Rule
8.276(b)(1)
.
Sanctions
cannot
be
sought
in
the
respondent's
brief”
].)
Moreover,
the
requested
sanctions
in
the
amount
of
$10,000
is
grossly
excessive
in
terms
of
what
was
necessary
to
correct
the
inaccuracy.
Indeed,
although
fictitious,
the
cases
were
cited
to
support
legal
contentions
that
are
correct
statements
of
the
law
and
supported
by
extant
cases.
This
fact
mitigates
against
the
amount
of
the
requested
sanctions
and
sanctions
in
general.
In
addition,
we
recognize
Huynh
promptly
removed
the
challenged
citations
in
corrected
filings
after
being
apprised
of
her
errors.
NGA
HUYNH,
Plaintiff
and
Appellant,
v.
JOSEPH...,
Not
Reported
in...
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
5
It
is
a
serious
and
sanctionable
action
to
cite
fictitious
cases
on
appeal.
All
parties,
whether
self-represented
or
not,
must
strive
to
include
proper
legal
authorities
in
support
of
their
arguments.
Blind
reliance
on
cases
generated
by
artificial
intelligence
damages
the
litigant's
credibility
with
the
court
when
the
cases
are
fictitious.
Responding
to
the
fictitious
cases
wastes
the
limited
resources
of
the
courts.
Although
we
decline
to
impose
sanctions
in
this
case,
self-represented
litigants
who
cite
fictitious
cases
in
future
appeals
may
not
be
so
fortunate
to
avoid
monetary
or
other
sanctions.
DISPOSITION
The
order
is
affirmed.
Respondent
is
awarded
his
costs
on
appeal.
WE
CONCUR:
MOTOIKE
,
ACTING
P.J.
MOORE
,
J.
All
Citations
Not
Reported
in
Cal.Rptr.,
2025
WL
2641314
Footnotes
1
All
further
statutory
references
are
to
the
Family
Code,
unless
stated
otherwise.
2
Prior
to
her
appearance
on
the
day
of
oral
argument,
Huynh
attempted
to
file
a
late
reply
brief,
which
we
rejected.
During
oral
argument,
she
requested
leave
to
file
a
late
reply
brief.
We
deny
leave
because
she
did
not
present
sufficient
reasons
to
explain
her
lack
of
diligence
and
overcome
the
prejudice
to
the
other
party.
3
We
deny
the
related
Request
for
Judicial
Notice
because
it
concerns
documents
not
relevant
to
the
issues
in
this
appeal.
End
of
Document
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
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