In re D.X. (Sept. 30, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
Sept. 30, 2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Rodriguez (J.) (unanimous Court)
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v. S.P.,Appellant.Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California. | September 30, 2025 | Not Reported in Cal.Rptr. | 2025WL 2778379Document DetailsKeyCite:KeyCite Red Flag Unpublished/noncitablestandard Citation:In re the Marriage of D.X. & S.P. D.X., Respondent, v. S.P., Appellant.,No. H052599, 2025 WL 2778379 (Cal. Ct. App. Sept. 30, 2025)All Citations:Not Reported in Cal.Rptr., 2025 WL 2778379Search DetailsSearch Query:adv: (openai "artificial intelligence" chatgpt "google gemini" "westlawcocounsel" "large language model") (hallucinat! fake fictitious spuriousnonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined /p (gpt ai "artificialintelligence" chatgpt chaton perplexity openai copilot "google gemini""google bard" grok "mata v. avianca" claude llm llms)) (hallucinat! fakefictitious spurious nonexistent "non-existent" "made up" imagined) +3(precedent case "legal authority" "legal case") & DATE(aft 1/1/2023)Jurisdiction:CaliforniaDelivery DetailsDate:October 2, 2025 at 3:37 AMDelivered By:Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineOpinion (p.1)All Citations (p.14)
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1KeyCite Red Flag Unpublished/noncitable2025 WL 2778379Not Officially Published(Cal. Rules of Court, Rules8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, restrictscitation of unpublished opinions in California courts.NOT TO BE PUBLISHEDIN OFFICIAL REPORTSCalifornia Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a),prohibits courts and parties from citingor relying on opinions not certified forpublication or ordered published, exceptas specified by rule 8.1115(b). This opinionhas not been certified for publication orordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P.D.X., Respondent,v.S.P., Appellant.H052599, H052679, H052763|Filed 09/30/2025Editor's Note: This decision contains citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist.These invalid citations appeared in the original courtopinion and have been preserved as written since theyare part of the official record. Any links to these invalidcitations have been removed.(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 23FL002803)OpinionRODRIGUEZ, J.**1 In this high-conflict marital dissolution actionbetween appellant S.P. and respondent D.X., the trialcourt entered a status-only judgment terminating theparties' marriage, granted D.X.'s request for a domesticviolence restraining order (DVRO), and denied S.P.'srequests for a DVRO pursuant to the DomesticViolence Prevention Act.1 (Fam. Code, § 6200 2,et seq. (hereafter DVPA).) Representing herself,S.P. appealed each of those rulings (appeal Nos.H052599, H052679, H052763), which we ordered tobe considered together for disposition.As to appeal No. H052679, S.P. challenges the status-only judgment on multiple grounds, including lackof jurisdiction, constitutional violations, and improperapplication of the law. As to appeal Nos. H052599and H052763, S.P. seeks reversal of the orders relatedto each party's DVRO requests. She contends thatthe trial court acted with judicial bias, violated herconstitutional rights, and abused its discretion bymisapplying the law and basing its decision oninsufficient evidence. For the reasons stated below, weaffirm the judgment and each of the challenged orders.I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURALBACKGROUNDS.P. is a U.S. citizen, and D.X. is a Chinese citizen.They married in China in 2007 and have two childrenwho were born in 2008 and 2012. In 2014, S.P.returned to the United States with the children andhas resided in Milpitas, California, since then. D.X.remained in China, where he worked, and traveledbetween California and China several times a yearto visit the children. In 2019, while in California,the parties signed a notarized separation agreementwhich included provisions on custody and propertydivision. By the end of 2020, because of the COVID-19pandemic, D.X. moved to California. He lived withS.P. and the children until December 2022.In August 2023, represented by counsel, D.X. filed apetition for dissolution of marriage in the court below.D.X. also filed a request for order (RFO) for sole legaland physical custody of the children, child and spousalsupport, and attorney fees and costs. In September2023, S.P. filed her responses to the petition and toD.X.'s RFO. In October 2023, after the trial courtentered orders requiring S.P. to pay temporary spousalsupport, she filed a RFO to modify support, to compel
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2D.X. to submit to a vocational examination, and soughtother financial orders from the court.Thereafter, the parties filed multiple requests for reliefwith the court on various issues related to custody,support, property division, the termination of maritalstatus, and mutual restraining orders. We recite onlythe facts relevant to the challenged orders relatedto D.X.'s request to terminate marital status andthe parties' respective requests for domestic violencerestraining orders.A. D.X.'s RFO to Bifurcate and Terminate MaritalStatus (H052679)*2 In February 2024, D.X. filed a RFO to bifurcatethe issue of marital status and enter a status-onlyjudgment to terminate the marriage. D.X. stated therewas no possibility of reconciliation, and he wantedto move on with his life. As required by section2337, D.X. served S.P. with his preliminary declarationof disclosure, schedule of assets and debts, and hisincome and expense declaration. D.X. agreed to bebound by certain conditions pending the final judgmentto protect S.P.'s interests.In response, representing herself, S.P. claimed thatthe parties had been separated since 2014 when shemoved to California, that D.X. “fully controlled” theirassets and income in China and refused to disclosesuch information to her, and that the parties signed anotarized separation agreement in 2019. S.P. requestedthe court to make various orders prior to bifurcation,including a determination on the date of separation,division of stock, and a ruling on her separate property.In July 2024, S.P. filed a RFO requesting thecourt to “Dismiss Dissolution Application due tono Jurisdiction, Void Petitioner's Green Card andUS Citizenship.” S.P. claimed that all communityassets were located in China, that the parties hadpreviously agreed to initiate dissolution proceedingsin China, and that the parties had “never maintaineda marriage relationship” in California since theirpurported separation in 2014. Therefore, she claimed,the trial court lacked jurisdiction and their dissolution“should be appropriately handled by” the court inChina. S.P. also requested the court “void” D.X.'simmigration status which she claimed he obtained byfraudulent means.At the hearing on September 5, 2024, the trial courtgranted D.X.'s RFO, terminated the parties' maritalstatus, imposed conditions pending the final judgment,and reserved jurisdiction over all other issues in thecase. The status-only judgment was filed on September12, 2024. S.P. timely appealed.B. The Parties' DVRO Requests (H052599)3In January 2024, D.X. filed a request for domesticviolence restraining orders (DVRO request). D.X.alleged that, during their marriage, S.P. would loseher temper, shout, and destroy personal property whenupset. In December 2022, unable to endure the conductany longer, D.X. moved out of the family residence.He alleged that S.P. subsequently closed their jointbank accounts, cancelled his credit cards, and beratedhim whenever he used “her” credit cards for expenses.Because D.X. was unemployed at that time, herconduct caused him to ask friends and families forloans. When she found out, she harassed their friendsand families for helping him. D.X. also alleged that,in 2019 and 2023, S.P. expressed suicidal thoughtsand made comments that she wanted to “die withmy children” to coerce him into acquiescing to herfinancial demands. As for recent abuse, he claimedthat, in January 2024, S.P. disparaged him at theirlocal golf club and made false claims that she hada restraining order against him. The court issuedtemporary restraining orders against S.P. pending thehearing.*3 S.P. filed multiple pleadings denying theallegations. On February 9, 2024, she sought adomestic violence restraining order protecting herfrom D.X. S.P. alleged that D.X. engaged in financialabuse by refusing to financially support the familyduring marriage and was emotionally abusive andneglectful towards her and the children. S.P. alleged,without specifying the date, D.X. strangled and chokedher, and she had to be “rushed to the hospital.”On other occasions, D.X. smashed her company'slaptop and their son's video game console. She alsoalleged D.X. tried to isolate her by harassing herfriends and repeatedly calling the police on herafter he initiated the dissolution action. While S.P.acknowledged expressing suicidal thoughts, she stated
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3she stopped after August 2023 and sought professionalhelp. A hearing on S.P.'s request for a DVRO was set.In March 2024, based on the agreement of theparties, the court continued the hearing to June 18,2024, stating that the hearing would address bothparties' respective DVRO requests. On June 18, thecourt reiterated that the court would hear the parties'respective DVRO requests and allotted an hour to eachparty to present their case.At that hearing, D.X. testified about the allegations inhis declaration supporting his DVRO as summarizedabove. He claimed he was prompted to move outin December 2022 after S.P. purposefully cut offthe electricity because she did not want him on hiscomputer. When D.X. attempted to testify about S.P.'smotives for shutting off the electricity, the courtsustained its own objection based on speculation. Thecourt admonished D.X. to “stay away from making anycommentary on the other party's motives.” As to recentabuse, he testified that S.P. made false claims to theirlocal golf club that she had a restraining order againsthim, and the club thereafter cancelled the birthdayparty he had planned for their youngest child.D.X. also testified regarding text messages he receivedfrom S.P. in 2019 and 2023 expressing suicidalthoughts in relation to the parties' purported separationin 2019 and dissolution proceeding in 2023. S.P.'smessages in 2019 included the following: “I think itwould be better if I were dead,” “I'm too depressedand not fit to raise children. I haven't decided to[sic] whether to seek treatment or to simply end itall with suicide,” “I'm somewhat worried that I mightend up committing suicide along with the children,”and “[p]erhaps I should give up the children foradoption and join you in my death to ease the painand resentment in my heart.” In 2023, S.P.'s textmessages included the following: “I will burn all thehard earned money that I have and end my life,” “It'sokay. I can go to jail, to a mental hospital or evendie,” and “I'm saying that I will die with my money.”4D.X. testified that her messages made him fearful,tormented, anxious, and he felt obligated to concede toher demands regarding their separation.When D.X. cross-examined S.P., she testified that shethrew objects during their marriage, but only in self-defense and never towards his body. S.P. admitted toturning off the electricity in the house in December2022 because she wanted D.X. to go outside to look fora job. S.P. also admitted to cancelling their credit cardsand removing D.X.'s name from their bank accountswhen he moved out, but testified she did so at hisrequest. She conceded that she had made suicidalcomments to D.X., but denied they were intendedas threats. She said she made the comments due tohis “psychological abuse” and as a symptom of herdiagnosed depression in 2019.*4 During S.P.'s presentation of her case, shequestioned D.X. and provided testimony from twowitnesses, but did not offer her own testimony orseek to admit any of her exhibits into evidence.During her cross-examination of D.X., she focusedon demonstrating that the January 2024 incident attheir local golf club was a misunderstanding. She alsostated she never made the false claims alleged byD.X. The trial court suggested she focus on the moreserious allegations of abuse. S.P. then questioned D.X.about prior incidents in which he allegedly physicallyrestrained her, and he responded that he only did soto prevent her from hitting him and to calm her down.D.X. denied ever hitting S.P.As to S.P.'s suicidal thoughts, D.X. testified he knewshe had “major depression symptoms” since 2019.During her cross-examination of D.X., S.P. attemptedto introduce evidence that the medication she took in2019 for her depression caused suicidal thoughts asa side-effect. The court sustained D.X.'s objectionsbased on hearsay, and informed S.P. that she couldintroduce such evidence during her own testimony. S.P.thereafter attempted to establish that D.X. triggeredher suicidal thoughts by filing for dissolution andrequesting sole custody of the children. The court, onits own motion, ruled such testimony to be irrelevantand subject to the litigation privilege. The court thenasked S.P. to move on to a different subject. S.P.resumed questioning D.X. about custody issues, andthe court again asked her to move to a different topic.S.P. spent the remainder of her time asking questionsfocused on D.X.'s former attorney. First, she tried toinquire as to when D.X. stopped using the services ofthe prior attorney. The court found that the decision tocease a professional relationship was not relevant and
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4urged S.P. to move on. S.P. then tried to ask questionsabout whether his former attorney was his currentgirlfriend. On its own motion, the court ruled testimonyrelated to D.X.'s romantic relationship irrelevant to thedomestic violence allegations. S.P. then asked D.X.when he first had intercourse with his former attorney.At that point, the court ended S.P.'s cross-examinationof D.X.S.P. then called her next witness, the estrangedhusband of D.X.'s former attorney. In an offer ofproof, S.P. stated the witness had knowledge D.X.manufactured the domestic violence allegations. OverD.X.'s objection, the court allowed S.P. to lay afoundation with the witness. After the witness failed toprovide any relevant testimony, the court stated, “I'mnot hearing anything about the alleged fabrication ofthe DVRO. And this is, frankly, turning into testimonythat I don't want my courtroom to be used for.” S.P.then asked the witness when D.X. began living with hisformer attorney, the spouse of the witness. The courtstopped the examination and excused the witness.S.P. also called the children's golf coach as a witness.The coach testified that he was not aware of anyrestraining order banning D.X. from the golf club.Throughout the hearing, the court repeatedly informedthe parties of the time remaining to present theirevidence and cautioned them both to focus onrelevant, material evidence. S.P. interrupted thecourt and witnesses, disputed the court's evidentiaryrulings, attempted to introduce hearsay statements andwritings, and responded to questions with explanationsand narratives instead of a direct answer.Following closing arguments from the parties, thecourt continued the hearing to issue the ruling. Whenthe hearing resumed on August 13, 2024, D.X.'scounsel made a motion to reopen evidence, which thecourt denied.5 The court stated its ruling from thebench. It found D.X. to be “credible on the allegationsof conduct by [S.P.] that would disturb his peace underFamily Code section 6203,” which the court defined as“anything that destroys the mental or emotional calm.”The court stated that it “was troubled by the contentof the text messages sent by [S.P. to D.X.] in whichsuicide was threatened,” and found it concerning inthe way such threats “were tethered to the litigation in[D.X.'s] attempts at wanting a separation.” The courtfound S.P.'s text messages to qualify as conduct thatwould disturb the peace and destroy the emotionalcalm of the other party. The court noted “[t]here's alot of other disputed matters in the case. I don't thinkI need to reach those to find that [D.X.] has sustainedhis burden of proving abuse.” The court issued therestraining orders against S.P. for a period of two years.*5 As to S.P.'s DVRO request, the court did notfind sufficient evidence in support of her request.The court stated to S.P., “I think I mentioned theuse of your time and presentation and the issues youfocused on and I did not see persuasive evidence that[D.X.] had engaged in any of the allegations that youwere alleging.” S.P. stated that she had not finishedpresenting her case and questioned whether the courtread the documents she filed. The court denied S.P.'sDVRO request.The court thereafter asked the parties to address section3044 and whether the presumption against sole or jointcustody to S.P. had been rebutted.6 After hearing fromthe parties and minor's counsel, the court found that thepresumption had been rebutted, analyzed each of thefactors under section 3044, and maintained the samecustody and visitation orders previously entered in thecase.S.P. filed a notice of appeal of the court's orders onOctober 4, 2024.C. The Order Denying S.P.'s Subsequent Requestsfor Restraining Orders and Other Requests forOrders (RFO) (H052599)While the hearing on the parties' respective DVROrequests was pending, S.P. continued to file newrequests for domestic violence restraining orders.Based on the record provided, it appears that, betweenFebruary 2024 and October 2024, S.P. made at least 12requests—filed either as DVRO requests or ex parteRFOs—for restraining orders against D.X. (hereafterreferred to as “subsequent DVRO requests”).7 Exceptfor her declaration filed in support of her last October2024 request, S.P. did not include the moving papersfor her other requests in her appendix.
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5The court set S.P.'s subsequent DVRO requests forhearing in October 2024, after ruling on the parties'first DVRO requests. The court declined to issuetemporary orders pending the hearing, stating therewas insufficient evidence of recent abuse to warranttemporary orders, and noting most of S.P.'s allegationsrelated to the same conflict already raised in the parties'previous DVRO requests.On October 14, 2024, the court proceeded with thehearing on S.P.'s subsequent DVRO requests. Bythis time, D.X. was also representing himself in theproceedings. At the onset of the hearing, D.X. arguedthat he was not personally served with any of S.P.'s12 DVRO requests, and the trial court agreed withS.P. that D.X.'s former counsel had previously waivedpersonal service in March 2024.S.P. stated that she needed an hour to present herevidence, which the court gave her. S.P. admittedher medical records from 2019 to show that shewas diagnosed with depression and that her doctorsbelieved that her depression and suicidal thoughtswere due to what she had described to them asintimate partner abuse. She also provided D.X.'s priordeclaration to show that he had knowledge of herdiagnosis. S.P. stated she also had “ all the evidenceindicating that there was child abuse as well,” but thecourt indicated that it would need to wait until thenext hearing due to time constraints. The court thenset the continued hearing date based on the parties'availability.*6 When the hearing resumed on November 27,2024, S.P. stated that she had submitted all herevidence and she had no further arguments. The courtinformed her, “I can't review anything until it goes intoevidence. I have the exhibits from October 14 withme, and I will be reviewing those.” The court gaveeach party another hour to argue their position, askedthem to focus on the allegations of abuse as so definedunder the Family Code, and informed them that theonly evidence admitted thus far had been S.P.'s medicalrecords.S.P. again focused on her medical records to claim thatD.X.'s abuse caused her depression, and that D.X. andhis former attorney were aware of her mental healthissues. The court stated to S.P., “you're focusing yourpresentation on the effects that you are alleging .... Iwould be interested in your description of the conductby [D.X.] that qualifies” as abuse under the DVPA.For most of the hearing, S.P. read from a 581-pageexhibit which included D.X.'s prior declaration filed inthe case, the parties' text messages, portions of a policereport following her arrest in July 2024 for allegedlyviolating the temporary DVRO, and statements fromthe parties' oldest child regarding a game console thatD.X. purportedly broke. She also read various textmessages from D.X. in 2019 to support her claim thathe did not view her suicidal comments as threats, andthat he also expressed suicidal thoughts to her.S.P. also claimed that, since August 2024, D.X.continued to disturb her peace by serving her withcourt documents, responding to emails concerning thedissolution proceedings, and messaging her regardingthe children. S.P. testified that D.X. engaged infinancial abuse because he never financially supportedthe family nor contributed to the children's expenses.S.P. claimed that her friends were “too scared to cometo court to testify,” because of D.X.'s threats.Throughout the hearing, S.P. attempted to introducehearsay statements as well as interrupted and spokeover the court. At one point, when the trial courtreminded S.P. to focus on her claims of abuse, shecomplained of the court's interruptions and stated, “Itdoesn't matter. I want to talk for an hour. If you keepinterrupting, both of you, then I have to talk for threehours.”D.X. testified that S.P. misstated his prior textmessages regarding his suicidal remarks. He statedthat, in the text messages, he was expressing frustrationthat his business was dying, and such statements werenot made to coerce or control S.P.'s conduct. D.X.denied intimidating S.P.'s friends from testifying anddenied making false claims against her. D.X. arguedthat she was the one engaging in harassing conduct byfiling continuous pleadings in the case and initiating aseparate civil suit to change their children's names.Following closing arguments from the parties, thecourt stated its ruling on the record: “I am denying allof [S.P.'s] requests for a restraining order.” The courtstated that while the evidence presented underscoresthe “supreme conflict between the parties” and
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6S.P.'s “frustrations about [D.X.'s] behavior, his newrelationship, his, in her mind, poor prioritizations as afather,” the court “did not receive evidence sufficientto make a finding that [D.X.] engaged in abusiveconduct....” The court denied all her subsequently filedDVRO requests. S.P. timely appealed.II. DISCUSSION8*7 S.P. challenges the status-only judgmenton multiple grounds, arguing that the courtlacked jurisdiction, violated her constitutional rights,misapplied the law, and failed to give full faith andcredit to international laws. As to the orders relatedto each party's DVRO requests, S.P. contends thecourt exhibited judicial bias, misapplied the law, andviolated her constitutional rights. She further arguesthat the orders must be reversed for insufficientevidence. D.X., in conclusory terms and withoutcitation to the record, argues that the trial courtproperly exercised its discretion and did not commitany of the errors alleged by S.P.We address the issue of jurisdiction first. We thenconsider whether S.P. has demonstrated error in thestatus-only judgment and the orders made as to theparties' DVRO requests. We conclude S.P. has not mether burden. We affirm the judgment and the ordersrelated to each party's DVRO request.A. The Order Bifurcating and Terminating MaritalStatus1. JurisdictionS.P. contends the trial court lacked jurisdiction over thedissolution proceedings because the parties' marriageand separation occurred in China, D.X. was domiciledin China, and all marital assets were in China.“ ‘ “[J]urisdiction” to adjudicate matters in a maritalcase involves three requirements: 1) that the court haveauthority to adjudicate the specific matter raised bythe pleadings (subject matter jurisdiction) [citation]; 2)that the court have ‘in rem’ jurisdiction over the marital‘res’ to terminate marital status (‘in rem’ jurisdiction)[citation]; and 3) that the court have jurisdiction overthe parties to adjudicate personal rights and obligations(personal jurisdiction).’ ” (In re Marriage of Thompson(2022) 74 Cal.App.5th 481, 487, quoting Muckle v.Superior Court (2002) 102 Cal.App.4th 218, 225.)First, the trial court had “in rem” jurisdiction toterminate marital status based on S.P.'s uncontesteddomicile in California, irrespective of the locationof the parties' marriage, separation, marital assets orD.X.'s domicile. A court has “in rem” jurisdiction toterminate marital status if either spouse is domiciledin California at the time of the proceeding. (Goodwinev. Superior Court of Los Angeles County (1965) 63Cal.2d 481, 483 [“The state in which one spouseis domiciled is deemed to have sufficient interest toterminate the marriage”].); In re Marriage of Gray(1988) 204 Cal.App.3d 1239, 1250; see also § 2320,subd. (a) [requiring at least one spouse to have been aresident of this state for six months and of the countyin which the proceeding is filed for three months priorto filing the petition].) There was no dispute that, at thetime D.X. filed the petition for dissolution of marriagein 2023, S.P. and the children had been living inMilpitas, California since 2014, and D.X. since 2020.Accordingly, the trial court had “in rem” jurisdictionto determine and terminate the parties' marital status.S.P.'s assertion that the parties allegedly agreedto initiate dissolution proceedings in China is notrelevant. The parties' alleged agreement to litigateelsewhere did not deprive the superior court of subjectmatter jurisdiction. Notably, neither party had soughtto invoke China's jurisdiction, as neither claimed norprovided evidence that dissolution proceedings hadbeen initiated there.Next, because the trial court had the requisitejurisdiction over the marriage, it had jurisdiction toterminate marital status. Specifically, section 2010,subdivision (a), confers subject matter jurisdictionto the superior courts “to inquire into and renderany judgment and make orders that are appropriateconcerning ... [¶] [t]he status of the marriage.”Section 2337 further provides that, “[i]n a proceedingfor dissolution of marriage, the court, upon noticedmotion, may sever and grant an early and separatetrial on the issue of the dissolution of the status of themarriage apart from other issues.” (§ 2337, subd. (a).)
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7*8 Further, S.P. waived any challenges over personaljurisdiction and “in rem” jurisdiction because thechallenge was not timely raised. (Zaragoza v. SuperiorCourt (1996) 49 Cal.App.4th 720, 725 (Zaragoza)[husband waived in rem jurisdictional challenge byfailing to timely proffer out of state dissolutionjudgment]; see also rule 5.63(b)(2)-(3), (e) [party mustfile a motion to quash to challenge jurisdiction withinthe time permitted to file a response].) A generalappearance in an action waives a party's challenge tothe court's jurisdiction. (Zaragoza, at p. 725.) Filinga response to the petition for dissolution of marriageconstitutes a general appearance. (Id. at pp. 722, 726;rule 5.62(b).) A general appearance also occurs whenthe responding party seeks affirmative relief from thecourt or participates in the action in some manner otherthan challenging jurisdiction. (Marriage of Torres(1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 1367, 1381 [respondent waivedjurisdictional challenges by filing a request for orderfor child support]; In re Marriage of Obrecht (2016)245 Cal.App.4th 1, 7 [respondent waived jurisdictionalchallenges by opposing the petitioner's request forsupport orders on the merits].)Here, S.P. generally appeared in the action and waivedany challenges to the court's “in rem” jurisdiction andpersonal jurisdiction over her. Although the recorddoes not contain her response to the petition, theregister of actions shows that she filed her responseon September 25, 2023. S.P. did not file any motionto quash in the underlying action. Instead, throughout2023, she participated in the action by opposingD.X.'s request for orders on the merits and seekingaffirmative relief from the court, such as filing requestsfor orders to modify support and seeking otherfinancial relief from the court. S.P. did not raise herjurisdictional challenges until July 2024, 11 monthsafter filing her response to the petition and whilealready actively participating in the case. By that time,S.P.'s jurisdictional challenges had been waived.To the extent S.P.'s argument that D.X. lacks minimumcontacts with California is a challenge of the trialcourt's exercise of personal jurisdiction over D.X., heconsented to the court's jurisdiction by initiating thedissolution action in this state. (Sea Foods Co., Ltd.v. O.M. Foods Co., Ltd. (2007) 150 Cal.App.4th 769,786.) Thus, S.P. has not established a viable argumentthat the trial court lacked jurisdiction to terminate theparties' marriage.We conclude the trial court had the requisitejurisdiction to enter the status-only judgmentterminating the parties' marital status.2. S.P.'s Other ArgumentsS.P.'s other arguments also do not establish error.First, she contends that the court violated her dueprocess rights at the hearing because it denied her anopportunity to be heard, disregarded her statements,engaged exclusively with D.X.'s counsel, advocatedfor D.X., and ignored her presence and her concerns.S.P. also contends the trial court made a proceduralerror by failing to address her jurisdictional challengesat the hearing before ruling on D.X.'s RFO.S.P., however, did not provide a court reporter'stranscript from the hearing or an authorized substituteof the oral proceedings.9 (See rules 8.134-8.137.) It isa “fundamental principle of appellate procedure thata trial court judgment is ordinarily presumed to becorrect....” (Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594,608-609 (Jameson).) Therefore, “[a]ll intendmentsand presumptions are indulged to support [thejudgment] on matters as to which the record issilent” (Denham v. Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d557, 564 (Denham)), including the presumption that“ ‘the record contains evidence to support everyfinding of fact....’ ” (Marriage of Fink (1979) 25Cal.3d 877, 887.) We do not presume error on asilent record. (Denham, at p. 564; Wagner v. Wagner(2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 249, 259.) S.P. has the burdenof providing an adequate record for review, and thefailure to do so requires this court to resolve the issueagainst her. (Jameson, supra, 5 Cal.5th at p. 609.) Weare mindful of the difficulties posed by S.P. as a self-represented litigant. But we are required to treat a partywho acts as her own attorney like any other party andhold her to the rules of procedure. (Nwosu v. Uba(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1247.) Accordingly,based on the face of this record, we discern no error orjudicial misconduct from the hearing on D.X.'s RFO.10
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8*9 Second, S.P. contends the status-only judgmentshould be reversed because D.X. submitted falseinformation in his preliminary declaration ofdisclosure regarding the parties' assets. However,she did not identify how the status-only judgmentfollowing D.X.'s purported “false” disclosuresprejudiced her. The trial court expressly reserved itsjurisdiction to decide all other issues in the case,including each party's property claims. (§ 2337, subd.(f).) It is well established that matters not resolvedin the status-only judgment remain subject to futureadjudication by the court. (Irwin v. Irwin (1977) 69Cal.App.3d 317, 320.) Thus, S.P. has not demonstratedthat the status-only judgment prejudiced her claimsagainst D.X. (See Cal. Const., art. VI, § 13 [reversal notwarranted unless alleged error resulted in a miscarriageof justice]; Property Reserve, Inc. v. Superior Court(2016) 6 Cal.App.5th 1007, 1020 [the appellate courtcannot presume prejudice].)Next, S.P. asserts the trial court failed to complywith section 2337 because it did not impose anystatutory conditions to protect her interests. The recorddoes not support her contention. Pursuant to section2337, when issuing a status-only judgment, a courtmay impose a variety of conditions designed toprotect the nonmoving party from potentially adverseconsequences from the loss of marital status pendingthe final judgment. (§ 2337, subd. (c).) Here, thestatus-only judgment provided in the record is missingthe last two pages of the attachment to the judgment(Judicial Council Form FL-347) that would show whatsection 2337 conditions the court imposed. Based onthe incomplete copy provided, it appears that the trialcourt did impose some statutory conditions related tothe division of property pending the final judgment. Wepresume that the missing pages include the remainderof the statutory conditions ordered by the court. As thereviewing court, “[a]bsent an indication to the contrary,we are required to presume a court was aware of, andfollowed, the applicable law and considered all therelevant facts and arguments. [Citations.]” (Peake v.Underwood (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 428, 447.)Finally, S.P. contends the status-only judgment violatesinternational law governing the recognition of foreignmarriages and disregards the full faith and credit clauseof the United States Constitution. The record showsthat the trial court recognized the parties' marriage inChina as a valid marriage. Additionally, the full faithand credit clause applies to the judgments of sisterstates, not foreign judgments. (Metropolitan CreditorsService v. Sadri (1993) 15 Cal.App.4th 1821, 1828.)Rather, the recognition and enforcement of anothernation's judgments or decrees turn on principles ofcomity, in which the court may, but is not requiredto, recognize the judgment of a foreign nation. (In reStephanie M. (1994) 7 Cal.4th 295, 314.) S.P. has notprovided any legal authority to show otherwise.At the outset, we note that the trial court recognizedthe validity of the foreign marriage. The issue S.P.raises is whether the valid marriage may now bedissolved under California law. Citing to Marriage ofBaragry (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 444, S.P. contends thelaw requires courts to uphold foreign marriages unlessit is against public policy. That case, however, did notinvolve a foreign marriage, nor foreign country, anddealt solely with the date of separation. (Id. at p. 448.)S.P. also cites “Agarwal v. State of California (1986)179 Cal.App.3d 577,” “Marriage of Duffy (2007) 151Cal.App.4th 1442”; and “Gilbert v. California (1993)505 U.S. 115.” However, these cases are not publishedor unpublished opinions of our state courts or the U.S.Supreme Court.11*10 Moreover, there was no foreign judgment ordecree for the trial court to consider in this case.The parties' purported agreement to initiate dissolutionproceedings in China is not a foreign judgment ordecree, and there was no evidence that a dissolutionaction had been filed in China. The record here revealsno violation of international law.In summary, S.P. has not demonstrated error requiringreversal of the status-only judgment.B. The Court's Orders Related to the Parties'DVRO RequestsAs to the orders granting D.X.'s DVRO request anddenying her DVRO requests, we address each of S.P.'scontentions and affirm.1. Standard of Review
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9We review for abuse of discretion the trial court's ordergranting or denying a DVRO and, to the extent weare called upon to review the court's factual findings,for substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Nadkarni(2009) 173 Cal.App.4th 1483, 1495; Curcio v. Pels(2020) 47 Cal.App.5th 1, 12 (Curcio).) In reviewingthe sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e must accept astrue all evidence supporting the trial court's findings,resolving every conflict in favor of the judgment.[Citation.]” (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.)“The trial court is the sole judge of witness credibilityand may disregard the testimony, contradicted oruncontradicted, of any witness if there is any rationalground for doing so. (Schmidt v. Superior Court 44Cal.App.5th 570, 582 (Schmidt).) On appellate review,“[w]e do not determine credibility or reweigh theevidence. [Citation.] If substantial evidence supportsthe judgment, reversal is not warranted even iffacts exist that would support a contrary finding.[Citation.]” (Curcio, at p. 12.)Whether a restraining order infringes constitutionalrights or violates procedural fairness are questionsof law subject to de novo review, independent ofthe trial court's findings. (Evans v. Evans (2008) 162Cal.App.4th 1157, 1166; In re Marriage of D.S. & A.S.(2023) 87 Cal.App.5th 926, 933.)2. Judicial Bias, Misconduct, and Violation ofConstitutional RightsS.P. contends she was denied due process and a fair trialbecause the trial court demonstrated bias,12 treatedher unequally as a self-represented litigant, obstructedher ability to present her case, improperly severed theparties' DVRO requests into separate hearings, andrepeatedly denied her multiple DVRO requests.On questions of judicial bias and unfairness, the testis whether the trial court's conduct “ ‘would causea reasonable person to doubt the impartiality of thejudge or would cause us to lack confidence in thefairness of the proceedings....’ [Citation.]” (Haluck v.Ricoh Electronics, Inc. (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 994,1008.) “It is ‘extraordinary’ for an appellate court tofind judicial bias amounting to a due process violation.[Citation.]” (Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p.589; see also People v. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th993, 996 [“[O]nly the most ‘extreme facts’ ... justifydisqualification based on the due process clause”].)The party must show the court violated the dueprocess clause “which sets an exceptionally stringentstandard.” (Schmidt, at p. 589.) S.P. has not met thatstandard.*11 Our review of the transcript from all hearingsrelated to the parties' DVRO requests and S.P.'ssubsequent DVRO requests does not indicate bias. Thetrial court allotted equal time to each party to presenttheir case and reminded each party throughout thehearings of the time remaining, sustained objectionsduring each party's presentation of their case whereappropriate, and made similar comments to bothparties to focus on the relevant issues. The recorddoes not reflect favoritism towards D.X. or his trialcounsel. Notably, at the hearing on the parties' DVROrequests, the court denied the request made by D.X.'scounsel to reopen evidence related to S.P.'s arrest forallegedly violating the temporary restraining order. Atthe hearing on S.P.'s subsequent DVRO requests, thecourt agreed with her and denied D.X.'s claim thathe had not been properly served. S.P.'s complaint thatthe trial court made rulings against her is not a basisfor finding bias. (Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p.589; Moulton Niguel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003)111 Cal.App.4th 1210, 1219 [“every statement a judgemakes to explain his or her reasons for ruling againsta party [does not] constitute[ ] evidence of judicialbias”].)The trial court also did not unduly interrupt S.P. ineither of the hearings. Because S.P. represented herselfin the proceedings, it was reasonable for the trial courtto be more involved during the hearings. “[T]he factthat DVRO litigants are frequently self-represented‘influences how these hearings should be conducted—with the judge necessarily expected to play a far moreactive role in developing the facts....’ [Citation.]” (Inre Marriage of D.S. & A.S., supra, 87 Cal.App.5th at p.935.) S.P. had difficulty identifying the relevant issuesand evidence, as demonstrated by her questions relatedto D.X.'s romantic relationship, custody issues, and herattempts to introduce hearsay letters and statements. Itis also clear from the record the court's interruptionsand remarks were intended to ensure both parties wereable to present their case in a logical and efficientmanner. Such conduct does not demonstrate bias. (See
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10also Code Civ. Proc., § 128, subd. (a); Rutherford v.Owens-Illinois, Inc. (1997) 16 Cal.4th 953, 967 [courtshave inherent power to control litigation before them].)Likewise, we discern no evidence in the record tosupport S.P.'s contentions that the trial court restrictedher time, obstructed her from presenting her case, orprevented her from speaking at either hearing. Thecourt imposed a one-hour time limit on both partiesat the hearings, which was a proper exercise of itsinherent authority in this high-conflict case. (See Evid.Code § 765, People v. Gonzalez (2006) 38 Cal.4th 932,951 [“ ‘A trial court has inherent as well as statutorydiscretion to control the proceedings to ensure theefficacious administration of justice.’ [Citations].”])Judicial officers have an “obligation to be protective ofthe court's time and resources as well as the time andinterests of trial witnesses, jurors and other litigantswaiting in line to have their cases assigned to acourtroom.” (California Crane School, Inc. v. NationalCom. for Certification of Crane Operators (2014) 226Cal.App.4th 12, 19, fn. omitted.) “[T]he court has thepower to expedite proceedings which, in the court'sview, are dragging on too long without significantlyaiding the trier of fact.” (Id. at p. 22.)At the hearing on the parties' respective DVROrequests, S.P. was able to present testimony fromtwo witnesses, cross-examine D.X., and make herclosing argument. At the hearing on her subsequentDVRO requests, the court gave S.P. more time thanthe hour she requested to present her case. Therecord shows that, for most of the hearing, S.P. waspermitted to read uninterrupted from various portionsof a 581-page exhibit, which she did not seek to beadmitted as evidence. S.P. presented no witnesses, and,other than her medical records from 2019 identifyingher depression, she offered no further exhibits intoevidence. Based on this record, we discern no evidencethat the trial court hindered S.P.'s ability to present hercase at either hearing.*12 S.P.'s assertion that the trial court improperlysevered the parties' respective DVRO requests intoseparate hearings is also not supported by the record.13In March 2024, while both parties were present incourt, the trial court informed them that their DVROrequests would be continued and set for a singlehearing on June 18, 2024. At the start of the June18 hearing, the court reiterated “... we are here todayfor father's domestic violence restraining order requestfiled January 22, 20224 and mother's comparablerequest filed February 9, 2024.” Despite the trial court'srepeated warnings that it had yet to hear her testimonyor evidence to support her allegations, S.P. electedto concentrate her time addressing D.X.'s DVROrequest and his relationship with his former attorney.Thus, at all times before and during the hearing, therecord clearly shows that the trial court informed theparties that their respective DVRO requests wouldbe heard together and proceeded to hear the matterstogether. It is possible that S.P., a nonlawyer, struggledwith understanding trial procedures and did not fullyappreciate the court's warnings; however, this lackof understanding is not attributable to any fault ofthe court. (Kobayashi v. Superior Court (2009) 175Cal.App.4th 536, 543 [“[Self represented] litigants areheld to the same standards as attorneys”].)The record also shows that the trial court, at all times,informed S.P. that her subsequent requests were to beset for a separate hearing after the parties' respectiveDVRO requests. We discern no error in the trialcourt's decision, particularly considering that S.P.'ssubsequent DVRO requests were based on similarallegations already pending before the court. (§ 245,subd. (b) [court may continue DVRO hearings on itsown motion].)In summary, nothing in the record from eitherhearing would cause a reasonable person to doubt theimpartiality of the trial court or would cause us tolack confidence in the fairness of the proceedings. Therecord shows that the trial court treated S.P. and D.X.with respect, demonstrated patience, and imposed thesame rules and procedures for both parties during eachof the hearings.3. First Amendment Right to PetitionS.P. also contends the trial court violated her FirstAmendment right to petition by denying each one ofher subsequent DVRO requests.The right of access to the courts is an aspect of theFirst Amendment right to petition the government forredress of grievances. (U.S. Const., 1st Amend.; Cal.
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.11Const., art. I, § 3.) The right to petition includes “ ‘“the basic act of filing litigation” ’ [Citations.]” (Briggsv. Eden Council for Hope & Opportunity (1999) 19Cal.4th 1106, 1115.)Here, the court did not deny or deprive S.P. of herability to petition the court for relief, as evidenced bythe numerous DVRO requests she filed in the case.The court declined to issue any temporary restrainingorders against D.X. pending the hearing, stating thatmany of S.P.'s allegations were already included in thepending hearing on the parties' prior DVRO requestsand there was insufficient evidence of recent abuse.At the hearing on her subsequent DVRO requests, thecourt gave S.P. the time she requested to present hercase, but she focused most of her time relitigatingthe DVRO already issued against her. The recorddemonstrates that the trial court considered each of herclaims, provided her an opportunity to be heard, and,after reviewing the evidence, found her claims to bewithout merit. It cannot be said on this record that S.P.was denied access to the courts. That the court declinedto grant S.P. the relief she wanted is not a violationof her First Amendment right to petition. (See, e.g.,Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc. v. N.L.R.B. (1983) 461U.S. 731, 743 [“[B]aseless litigation is not immunizedby the First Amendment right to petition.”]; Smithv. Arkansas State Highway Employees, Local 1315(1979) 441 U.S. 463, 465 [the right to petition does notcompel the government to listen or respond].)*13 The cases cited by S.P. do not support herargument. (See California Motor Transport Co. v.Trucking Unlimited (1972) 404 U.S. 508, 513-516[pattern of baseless, repetitive claims is not immunizedby the First Amendment]; McDonald v. Smith (1985)472 U.S. 479, 482 [First Amendment right to petitiondoes not grant absolute immunity from liability forlibel]; Pennekamp v. Florida (1946) 328 U.S. 331, 348[issue decided related to the First Amendment right tofree speech].)4. Misapplication of the DVPAChallenging the DVRO issued against her, S.P.contends the court misapplied the law to find that hersuicidal expression constituted abuse under the DVPA.S.P. asserts that “[e]quating mental illness with abusenot only distorts legislative intent but also stigmatizesindividuals seeking help,” and “[s]uicidal ideation,especially when rooted in documented mental illness,does not meet the DVPA standard.”S.P. did not provide relevant legal authorities to supporther assertions. The first case, “Quinn v. Levine (2021)62 Cal.App.5th 366,” is neither a published nor anunpublished case and appears to be fictitious. Shenext cites Gonzalez v. Munoz (2007) 156 Cal.App.4th413 (Gonzalez), for the proposition that it purportedlycautioned “against using the DVPA as a tool formanaging interpersonal or psychological struggles.”The issue in Gonzalez, however, related to the trialcourt's authority to issue a permanent custody order inDVPA proceedings and did not address mental healthissues in any way. (Id. at p. 423.) The third case,a district court opinion, Doe v. Gallinot (C.D. Cal.1979) 486 F.Supp.983, relates to the constitutionalityof California statutes governing the involuntary civilcommitment of persons to mental institutions, which isirrelevant here. In the final case cited by S.P., S.M. v.E.P. (2010) 184 Cal.App.4th 1249, the Court of Appealreversed a DVRO because the trial court had expresslyfound that the restrained party had not made a threat tokill the petitioner but issued a DVRO nonetheless for“badgering,” which the appellate court concluded wasinsufficient. The case did not involve any allegationsof mental illness, depression, or suicidal expressions.The definition of abuse under the DVPA “is notlimited to the actual infliction of physical injury orassault.” (§ 6203, subd. (b).) Abuse includes conductthat “disturb[s] the peace of the other party.” (§ 6320,subds. (a), (c).) The term “refers to conduct that,based on the totality of the circumstances, destroysthe mental or emotional calm of the other party,”and includes “coercive control, which is a patternof behavior that in purpose or effect unreasonablyinterferes with a person's free will and personalliberty.” (§ 6320, subd. (c).) The conduct “may becommitted directly or indirectly ... and by any methodor through any means including, but not limited to,telephone, online accounts, text messages....” (Ibid.)“The statute should ‘be broadly construed in orderto accomplish [its] purpose' of preventing acts ofdomestic violence. [Citation.]” (In re Marriage of F.M.& M.M. (2021) 65 Cal.App.5th 106, 115.)
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12One court has held that sending a video of a mocksuicide “is indisputably conduct that would disturbplaintiff's peace of mind within the meaning ofthe act and be the basis for granting a restrainingorder.” (Hogue v. Hogue (2017) 16 Cal.App.5th833, 839, (Hogue).) Another court has held that arestrained party's struggles with mental health issues,such as major depressive disorder, does not negatethe reasonableness of the requesting party's fear.(Navarro v. Cervera (2025) 108 Cal.App.5th 229, 240(Navarro).)*14 In Navarro, following a breakup, Navarroobtained a five-year DVRO against her former partner,Cervera, after Cervera broke into her apartmentand admitted she had intentions to kill Navarro.(Navarro, supra, 108 Cal.App.5th at pp. 233-234.)Years later, Navarro requested a permanent renewalof the DVRO, alleging that, a year after the initialDVRO, Cervera violated the DVRO by sending herunwanted communications. (Id. at p. 234.) At therenewal hearing, Cervera argued that Navaro's fearswere not reasonable because the past events were“triggered by a mental health crisis and medication thatmade her feel paranoid and suicidal,” and Cervera hassince resolved those issues. (Id. at p. 236.) Navarrotestified she continued to be fearful of Cervera,and that changes to Cervera's medication did notalleviate her concerns. (Ibid.) The trial court acceptedCervera's statements and denied Navarro's requestfor renewal. (Id. at p. 237.) The court of appealreversed and held there was no substantial evidencethat the incidents which triggered the initial DVROwere caused by Cervera's mental health crisis. (Id. atp. 241.) Cervera's testimony, by itself, was insufficient.(Ibid.) Additionally, Cervera's testimony that she wasreceiving treatment for her mental health issues did notnegate the reasonableness of Navarro's fear of futureharm. (Ibid.) “[B]y giving greater weight to Cervera'sunsubstantiated justifications for her abuse and DVROviolations rather than considering the impact of thoseactions on Navarro's sense of safety, the court abusedits discretion.” (Id. at p. 242.)Here, the trial court did not misinterpret the law.As stated in Hogue, supra, 16 Cal.App.5th at page839, abuse under the DVPA may include makingsuicidal threats, particularly when such commentsare made following a breakup or separation. S.P.admits that she sent the text messages in 2019 and2023 expressing suicidal thoughts, some of whichreferenced her dying along with the children. (See Gouv. Xiao (2014) 228 Cal.App.4th 812, 818 [placing aparent in reasonable apprehension of imminent seriousbodily injury to their child disturbs their peace andmay constitute abuse under the DVPA].) S.P., however,contends that suicidal expressions caused by mentalillness could never, as a matter of law, meet theDVPA standard of abuse. The DVPA contains nosuch exception. As the court in Navarro concluded,a restrained party's struggles with mental illness—especially absent corroborating evidence that themental illness contributed to the restrained party'sconduct—does not negate the reasonableness ofthe requesting party's fear. (Navaro, supra, 108Cal.App.5th at pp. 241-242.) We do not concludethat a court may never consider mental illness whenevaluating DVRO requests. Our conclusion is limitedto the facts of this case.In this case, D.X. testified that S.P.'s text messagesof suicide made him fearful, tormented, and anxious.S.P. did not present any evidence that her depressionor medication caused her to make the suicidalthreats. Based on the evidence presented, her suicidalcomments were all made in response to discussionsconcerning their separation and dissolution, whichsupports D.X.'s contentions that she made suchcomments to control his conduct and to disturb hismental and emotional calm. S.P. contends she stoppedexpressing such thoughts in August 2023 and soughtprofessional help. However, as in Navarro, the factthat S.P. was receiving treatment for her depressiondoes not negate the reasonableness of D.X.'s fearfor himself, S.P., and their children, particularlyconsidering S.P. made those threats in 2023 after shebegan receiving treatment in 2019 when she firstexpressed suicidal thoughts. (Navarro, supra, 108Cal.App.5th at p. 241.) The court found that the textmessages qualified as conduct which would disturbthe peace and destroy the emotional calm of the otherparty. Accordingly, we conclude that the trial courtcorrectly understood the law, and we discern no abuseof discretion in its application of the law to the factsof this case.
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.135. Insufficient EvidenceS.P. argues that the orders must be reversed becausethey were based on D.X.'s purportedly false statementsand perjury, and the trial court ignored her evidence ofD.X.'s alleged psychological, emotional, and financialabuse against her and the children. S.P. essentiallyrequests that we reevaluate D.X.'s credibility, reweighthe evidence, and consider facts outside the appellaterecord, which we have no authority to do.*15 Here, as to the orders related to the parties'respective DVRO requests, S.P. admitted sending thenumerous suicidal messages to D.X., which he claimeddestroyed his mental and emotional calm. The trialcourt considered the totality of the circumstances,found D.X.'s testimony to be credible, and determinedthat S.P.'s suicidal messages disturbed his peace andconstituted abuse under the DVPA. S.P. presented notestimony herself to support her DVRO request andfocused primarily on D.X.'s DVRO request and hisromantic relationship. The court therefore found S.P.failed to meet her burden to establish abuse. Under ourdeferential standard of review, the record here compelsthe conclusion that substantial evidence supported thecourt's orders. (Curcio, supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.)As to the orders denying S.P.'s subsequent DVROrequests, the court heard testimony from both parties.S.P.'s testimony focused on issues already adjudicatedin the parties' DVRO requests, her depression, herbelief that D.X. was harassing her by serving her withcourt documents,14 and her claims that D.X. failed tofinancially support their children.The hearing on S.P.'s subsequent DVRO requests wasnot the forum to relitigate issues already decidedby the trial court on the parties' respective DVROrequests, nor does the law permit litigants to repeatedlyrelitigate issues until a desired result is achieved.(See Smith v. ExxonMobil Oil Corp. (2007) 153Cal.App.4th 1407, 1414 [principles of res judicata andcollateral estoppel].) Moreover, by the time of thehearing on her subsequent DVRO requests, S.P. hadalready filed a notice of appeal from the trial court'sorders related to the parties' first DVRO requests(appeal No. H052599). Accordingly, while appeal No.H052599 remained pending, the trial court lackedsubject matter jurisdiction over the matters embracedwithin that appeal, notwithstanding S.P.'s testimony atthe subsequent hearing concerning those same issues.(Varian Medical Systems, Inc. v. Delfino (2005) 35Cal.4th 180, 197 [trial court is without power toproceed further as to any matter embraced within thepending appeal until the appeal is determined].)As to S.P.'s other claims of abuse, D.X. denied theallegations, explained that his prior suicidal commentsrelated to his dying business, and claimed that he wasthe one subjected to S.P.'s continued abuse throughher litigation conduct. The record shows that the trialcourt considered the totality of the circumstances andfound that, while the evidence underscored the parties'“supreme conflict” in the dissolution proceedings andS.P.'s frustrations with D.X., she did not satisfy herburden to show abuse. Applying the principles ofappellate review, we conclude that the trial court'sorder denying S.P.'s subsequent DVRO requests islikewise consistent with the evidence in the record.S.P. references multiple cases that allegedlydemonstrate how the evidence she providedregarding her depression and D.X.'s actions constitutepsychological, emotional, and financial abuse underthe DVPA. Upon our review of S.P.'s case citations,however, the cases either cannot be found or do notstand for the proposition asserted. Specifically, S.P.cites the following cases to support her contention thatevidence of her depression warrants the issuance of aDVRO: “In re Marriage of L.B. (2018) 30 Cal.App.5th1076,” “In re Marriage of C.T. and R.T. (2017) 12Cal.App.5th 982,” and “People v. Garrett (2015) 61Cal.4th 789.” We were not able to locate any of thesecases as published or unpublished opinions of thecourt. The same result occurred for S.P.'s citations to“In re Marriage of Mathews (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th1407,” and “In re Marriage of Facter (2016) 1Cal.App.5th 526,” for the purported proposition thatneglect and abandonment constituted abuse under theDVPA.*16 S.P. also asserts that, In re Marriage of Leonard(2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 546, “held that a failure toprovide financial support for children could constitutefinancial abuse and thus violate the [DVPA].” Thatcase, however, relates solely to child support issuesand does not include any discussion of abuse or the
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.14DVPA. (Id. at p. 550.) S.P. makes similar unsupportedassertions regarding the definition of abuse under theDVPA by citing inapplicable cases, In re Marriageof Manfer (2006) 144 Cal.App.4th 92515 (date ofseparation issue), and People v. Hughes (2002) 27Cal.4th 287 (criminal appeal of convictions formurder, robbery, burglary and sodomy). Likewise, S.P.contends that “[i]n In re Marriage of Rossi (2001)90 Cal.App.4th 34, the court emphasized that neglect,especially when accompanied by abandonment, canresult in substantial emotional harm to the childreninvolved.” Marriage of Rossi, supra, 90 Cal.App.4th34, however, relates solely to the division of lotteryproceeds and contains no discussion of child neglect,abandonment, or abuse. (Id. at p. 36.) Thus, even ifwe assume there was substantial evidence of S.P.'sdepression or D.X.'s financial and emotional neglectof the children, she has not shown that such conductconstitutes abuse under the DVPA.In summary, S.P. has not demonstrated error thatjustifies a reversal of the DVRO issued against herand the orders denying her DVRO requests againstD.X. As discussed above, we defer to the trial court'sdetermination of credibility and other factual issuesbecause it had the benefit of observing the demeanorof witnesses and is therefore in a better positionthan an appellate court to make such determinations.(Schmidt, supra, 44 Cal.App.5th at p. 582; Curcio,supra, 47 Cal.App.5th at p. 12.) We only assesswhether substantial evidence exists to support the trialcourt's orders, and in this case, as stated above, there is.III. DISPOSITIONAs to appeal No. H052679, the status-only judgmentfiled on September 12, 2024 is affirmed.As to appeal No. H052599, the domestic violencerestraining order after hearingentered on August 13, 2024 protecting D.X. isaffirmed. The court's order denying S.P.'s request fordomestic violence restraining orders entered on August13, 2024 is affirmed.As to appeal No. H052763, the court's order denyingS.P.'s requests for domestic violence restraining orderentered on November 27, 2024 is affirmed.D.X. is awarded his costs on appeal for all threeappeals. (Rule 8.278(a)(1)-(2).)WE CONCUR:GREENWOOD, P. J.LIE, J.All CitationsNot Reported in Cal.Rptr., 2025 WL 2778379Footnotes*Judge of the San Diego County Superior Court, assigned by the Chief Justice pursuant to article VI, section6 of the California Constitution.1Because this case involves proceedings under the DVPA, we refer to the parties by their initials to protect theprivacy interests of protected persons. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.90(b)(1), (11).) Subsequent undesignatedreferences to rules of court are to the California Rules of Court.2Unless otherwise specified, all undesignated statutory references are to the Family Code.3S.P. filed identical requests for judicial notice of the trial court's minute orders and the court reporter'stranscripts in her appeals related to the DVRO requests (appeal Nos. H052599, H052763). We grant S.P.'srequest for judicial notice in appeal No. H052763. (Evid. Code, §§ 452, subd. (d), 459, subd. (a).) We denyher request for judicial notice filed in appeal No. H052599 because the exhibits are not paginated, andbecause the request is redundant.
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.154The parties' text messages were written in Chinese with certified English translations provided by D.X. Thetrial court asked S.P. whether she had any objections to the translations. She argued that “a lot of theChinese saying is old saying,” but confirmed that the translations of her suicidal statements were correct.5D.X. sought to introduce evidence of an incident that occurred after the June 18 hearing. Specifically, in July2024, police officers arrested S.P. for purportedly violating the temporary DVRO.6Section 3044, subdivision (a) provides that “[u]pon a finding by the court that a party seeking custody of achild has perpetrated domestic violence within the previous five years ... there is a rebuttable presumptionthat an award of sole or joint physical or legal custody of a child to [that party] is detrimental to the bestinterest of the child.” To overcome the presumption, the court must make specific findings identified in thestatute. (Id., subd. (b).)7Specifically, based on the register of actions, the subsequent DVRO requests appeared to have been filedon the following dates in 2024: February 15, March 18, March 27, June 21, June 25, June 27, July 9, July10, July 12, July 23, August 1, and October 3.8In her briefs, S.P. makes numerous references to events that occurred after the filing of her appeals andfactual assertions without record citation. We do not consider facts or events outside the record on appeal.(Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007) 42 Cal.4th 531, 544, fn. 4.; Barri v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd. (2018)28 Cal.App.5th 428, 437.) We will also disregard all unsupported factual assertions. (Falcon v. Long BeachGenetics, Inc. (2014) 224 Cal.App.4th 1263, 1267.)9The trial court entered the status-only judgment on September 12; the hearing related to that judgmentoccurred on September 5. The court reporter's transcript submitted by S.P. was from the September 12,2024 hearing related to her contempt allegations against D.X.10Even if we assume the trial court ignored S.P.'s jurisdictional challenges, she has not established prejudiceto justify a reversal of the judgment. For the reasons stated above, S.P.'s jurisdictional arguments werewithout merit and waived.11Throughout her briefs, S.P. referenced multiple cases that either do not exist or do not support the propositionasserted, which appears to be a common issue associated with using AI tools to generate legal arguments.(See, e.g., Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (Sep. 12, 2025, No. B331918) ___ Cal.App.5th___ [p. 26],[discussing the increase of fraudulent legal citations in court filings resulting from generative AI]; UnitedStates v. Hayes (E.D. Cal. 2025) 763 F.Supp.3d 1054, 1065 [citation to nonexistent case “has all themarkings of a hallucinated case created by generative [AI]”].)We recognize that AI tools can be a helpful resource for self-represented litigants attempting to presenttheir arguments more clearly in a legal forum. But, AI tools can just as easily produce flawed arguments.(See Wadsworth v. Walmart Inc. (D.Wyo. 2025) 348 F.R.D. 489, 493 [explanation of AI hallucinations].) Wereiterate the rule that all litigants who appear before the court, whether or not represented by counsel, havean obligation to confirm that the case citations submitted in their briefs are citable, published opinions. (Seerule 8.1115(a).)12We note that S.P. made several attempts to disqualify the underlying judicial officer pursuant to Code ofCivil Procedure sections 170.1 and 170.6, which were all denied and stricken. S.P. appealed one of thoserulings, and this court dismissed the appeal as taken from a nonappealable order, without prejudice for herto seek appropriate writ relief. (D.X. v. S.P., H052778.) S.P. did not thereafter seek writ relief. Because thecurrent appeal is based on S.P.'s constitutional arguments—as opposed to the denial of a statutory judicialdisqualification motion—she may present this argument on appeal. (People v. Brown (1993) 6 Cal.4th 322,335; People v. Panah (2005) 35 Cal.4th 395, 445 fn. 16 [“notwithstanding the exclusive-remedy provision[by writ of mandate] of Code of Civil Procedure section 170.3, ‘a defendant may assert on appeal a claimof denial of the due process right to an impartial judge.' [Citation].”].)
In re the Marriage of D.X. and S.P. D.X., Respondent, v...., Not Reported in... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.1613S.P.'s reliance on section 6305 is misplaced. Section 6305 prohibits a court from issuing mutual restrainingorders unless certain statutory conditions are met. It does not prohibit courts from hearing competingrestraining order requests against each other at the same time. Because the court did not issue mutualrestraining orders in this case, section 6305 is inapplicable.14As stated above, by the time of the hearing on the subsequent DVRO requests, both parties wererepresenting themselves in the proceedings.15S.P. also cites this case as “In re Marriage of Manfer (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 11.” We were unable to locatea case with that citation but were able to locate a 2006 court of appeal opinion with the same title, whichwe assume was the case S.P. meant to include.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access