In re Marriage of Joanne Rodrigues and Nathan Craig (2026)

Case details
Full caption
In re the Marriage of Joanne Rodrigues and Nathan Craig
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Affirmed
In re the Marriage of JOANNE RODRIGUES and NATHAN..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1102361Not Officially Published(Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, restrictscitation of unpublished opinions in California courts.NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTSCalifornia Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibitscourts and parties from citing or relying onopinions not certified for publication or orderedpublished, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).This opinion has not been certified for publicationor ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.In re the Marriage of JOANNERODRIGUES and NATHAN CRAIG.JOANNE RODRIGUES, Appellant,v.NATHAN CRAIG, Respondent.H051992, H052487, H052559|Filed 4/22/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.(Santa Clara County Super. Ct. No. 20FL000750)vOpinionGrover, Acting P. J.*1 In this marital dissolution action, appellant JoanneRodrigues1 has filed three appeals challenging the trialcourt's division of community property, denial of her separateproperty claim, denial of her spousal support request, andthe sanction imposed for her breaches of fiduciary duty andviolations of Family Code section 271 (unspecified statutoryreferences are to this Code, and unspecified rule referencesare to the California Rules of Court). We have ordered thatthe three appeals be considered together for purposes ofbriefing, oral argument and decision. Other than submittinga letter brief in response to our question to the parties aboutthe correct calculation of the net equalizing payment fromappellant, respondent is not participating in the appeals. Forthe reasons discussed here, we will affirm.I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDThe following factual and procedural history is derivedfrom the limited record contained in appellant's incompleteappendix, which omits nearly all of respondent's filings andevidence the parties submitted to the trial court.2 Appellantwas married to respondent for six years eight months. Shepetitioned for dissolution in February 2020. The partiesstipulated to July 1, 2013 as the date of marriage and March 1,2020 as the date of separation. They have two minor childrenborn during the marriage. Additional relevant backgroundfacts are set forth in the discussion.A. PROCEDURAL HISTORYAccording to the register of actions, a court trial washeld over several dates between July 2022 and July 2024.At the conclusion of presentation of evidence, the courtgranted judgment of dissolution as well as judgment onreserved issues, including division of community propertyand sanctions against appellant under section 271 andfor violating Automatic Temporary Restraining Orders(ATROs).3 We summarize the court's relevant findings anddeterminations below.1. July 2022 And March 2023 Hearings RegardingDivision Of Community Property And Appellant'sSeparate Property Claim*2 The trial court held a hearing in July 2022 regarding,among other issues, appellant's separate property claim.Appellant's expert forensic accountant, Kerry Kamita,testified regarding his tracing analysis of her claim.4Appellant claimed a total of $52,000 of separate property:$26,000 in wedding gifts and $26,000 in funds she broughtinto the marriage. That $52,000 was eventually commingledwith community property funds in a jointly controlledVanguard investment account (x1643) valued at $117,000 at
In re the Marriage of JOANNE RODRIGUES and NATHAN..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2the date of separation. Kamita testified appellant's $52,000contribution entitled her to $102,000 of the Vanguardaccount's $117,000 value.On cross-examination, however, Kamita agreed that there hadbeen two large fund transfers ($21,000 and $198,000) fromthe Vanguard account into other accounts over the course ofthe marriage. He acknowledged that he had not attemptedto allocate those transfers between separate and communityproperty, but rather assumed (without documentation) thatonly community property funds were transferred outof the Vanguard account, preserving appellant's separateproperty interest in the high-return account. He alsoassumed respondent shared appellant's intent to transfer onlycommunity funds.The trial court conducted another hearing in March 2023,at which it denied appellant's separate property claim forwedding gifts. The court also ruled appellant had failed tocarry her burden of tracing the funds she brought into themarriage because the court did not find Kamita's tracinganalysis credible.The trial court issued its Findings and Order After Hearingin April 2023. The order expressly denied appellant's“request for wedding gifts as separate property,” but didnot specifically mention appellant's separate property claimfor $26,000 in funds. In response to the parties' uncertaintyregarding the separate property ruling, the court clarified ata later hearing that it had denied both of appellant's separateproperty claims.2. April 3, 2024 Findings And Order AfterHearing Transferring Community Property Accounts ToRespondent (H051992)After a hearing at which both parties testified and presentedevidence, the trial court issued its April 3, 2024 Findingsand Order After Hearing, which ordered appellant to transferall bank, investment and retirement accounts containingcommunity property funds to respondent, and ordered him toprovide an accounting.5 The court ordered the transfer afterfinding appellant had failed to perform an accounting and hadviolated both the ATROs and an express order by withdrawingcommunity property funds without respondent's consent orcourt approval. Her withdrawals included $6,000 to pay anattorney, $50,000 (to fund an educational savings account forthe couple's children), and $68,000 (later revised to $48,000)in “pre-rent” paid to her father to stay in a house owned byher parents. On the issue of spousal support, after weighingthe section 4320 factors on the record, the court set spousalsupport at zero and retroactively terminated spousal supportas of April 22, 2022.3. July 9, 2024 Findings And Order After Hearing OnDivision Of Community Property (H052487)The court conducted another hearing on division ofcommunity property on June 21, 2024 at which both partiestestified and presented evidence.6 The court issued itsFindings and Order After Hearing on July 9, 2024. The orderdirected that the entire balances in appellant's Customersand VIO Bank accounts be transferred into new accountsopened by respondent. The order also directed the parties torecalculate the applicable tax rate for the retirement accounts,denied appellant's request for an accounting of the AlliantCredit Union account, and denied her request to characterizerespondent's post-separation bonus as community property.The court reserved jurisdiction on the parties' respectiverequests for sanctions.4. September 4, 2024 Judgment After Court Trial(H052559)*3 A final hearing on the division of property, sanctionsand other reserved issues was held on July 31, 2024. Afterconsidering the parties' competing evidence, the judgmentreflects that the court credited respondent's evidence overappellant's to value the community property cash accountson the date of separation, including interest, at $604,106.66.After subtracting $200,000 for the previously orderedadvances from community property ($100,000 to each party),the community property cash accounts balance remaining tobe divided was $404,106.66.Neither party having requested a statement of decision onprincipal controverted issues, the court made few expressfactual findings on the valuation and division of what itdetermined was community property. (See Nellie Gail RanchOwners Assn. v. McMullin (2016) 4 Cal.App.5th 982, 996[waiver of objection to trial court's failure to make all findingsnecessary to support its decision].) The court expressly foundrespondent's testimony and schedules of the communityproperty accounts to be credible. The court also creditedrespondent's testimony over appellant's about the dissipation
In re the Marriage of JOANNE RODRIGUES and NATHAN..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3of community property, finding appellant made unauthorizedpost-separation withdrawals of community funds (including$60,000 to fund an educational savings plan; prepayment ofone year's rent to her father; and $50,000 for her brother'smedical school tuition). Under the doctrine of impliedfindings (see ibid.; see also In re Marriage of Arceneaux(1990) 15 Cal.3d 1130, 1133), we understand the courtto have credited respondent's testimony that appellant hadreduced the $404,106.66 value of the community propertycash accounts to $90,817.96 by the date of trial—a differenceof $313,288.70. The court further credited respondent'stestimony, based on a number of schedules he offered intoevidence, that appellant had also withdrawn funds fromcommunity property investment accounts.The record does not disclose how the court valued eachaccount as of the date of trial. But after questioningappellant about the schedules admitted into evidence, thecourt adopted respondent's bottom-line contention that even ifall community account balances were awarded to him withoutfurther division, appellant's withdrawals would still entitlehim to a net “offset” of $247,357.99. We accordingly infer thatthe trial court credited the details of respondent's testimonyand his exhibits. Starting with that “offset” amount7, thecourt then factored in outstanding sanctions, attorney fees,and other adjustments (consisting of $85,000 in attorneyfees previously awarded to appellant from respondent'sseparate property; a $4,500 credit to respondent for thedifference in value of the parties' respective vehicles; and$7,500 in previously ordered but unpaid sanctions againstappellant for changing the children's residence without courtauthorization). To that amount the court added a new $10,000sanction for appellant's “multiple breaches of fiduciary dutyand the lack of candor when it came to accounting of monies.”It also added a new $25,000 sanction under section 271for appellant's repeated refusal to participate in settlementconferences.Based on evidence that the community cash accountscontained only $90,817.96 at date of trial (i.e., $111,235.37less than respondent's one-half share of the balance at dateof separation), the trial court appears to have awardedrespondent (1) the $90,817.96 remaining community cashaccounts balance already transferred to him (exceptingthe VIO Bank account); (2) his one-half share of theVanguard (x1860) investment account plus appellant's one-half share in the same amount ($86,431.13); and (3) theentire $47,916.81 balance of his Vanguard (x9815) retirementaccount. Respondent agreed to accept the resulting total of$311,597.03 as satisfying his full $319,593.36 communityproperty entitlement. The judgment reflects that “the offset toRespondent is $208,357.99.”II. DISCUSSION*4 Appellant challenges (1) the denial of her request forspousal support for a period equaling half the length ofthe marriage; (2) the denial of her separate property claimfor funds brought into the marriage; (3) the division ofcommunity property (including the order transferring controlof community bank accounts to respondent); and (4) thesanctions imposed for breach of fiduciary duty and violatingsection 271.A. APPEALABILITY OF THE APRIL AND JULY2024 ORDERSAs a threshold matter, we must address the appealability ofthe April and July 2024 orders. (Doran v. Magan (1999)76 Cal.App.4th 1287, 1292.) Appeal of the spousal supportportion of the April 2024 order is authorized by statute. (SeeIn re Marriage of Grimes & Mou (2020) 45 Cal.App.5th406, 419, fn. 12.); Code Civ. Proc., § 904.1, subd. (a)(10); Fam. Code, § 3554.) However, the remaining portionsof the April and July 2024 orders are not independentlyappealable because they are neither final nor exempted fromthe “one final judgment rule” by application of the collateralorder doctrine. (Grimes, at p. 419, fn. 12.) Aside from theimmediately appealable denial of spousal support, the April2024 order directed appellant to transfer the communityaccounts to respondent's control and directed respondent toprovide an accounting. To effect that transfer of funds, theJuly 2024 order directed respondent to open two new accountsand to enable the banks (Customers and VIO) to transferappellant's entire balance to those new accounts.B. APPELLANT HAS PRESENTED ANINADEQUATE RECORD FOR REVIEW“It is a fundamental rule of appellate review that a judgment ispresumed correct and the appealing party must affirmativelyshow error.” (In re Marriage of Khera & Sameer (2012) 206Cal.App.4th 1467, 1484.) All intendments and presumptionsare indulged to support the judgment or order beingappealed, and ambiguities are resolved in their favor. (Cityof Santa Maria v. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286.)Accordingly, if the judgment or order is correct on anylegal theory, the reviewing court must affirm it regardless
In re the Marriage of JOANNE RODRIGUES and NATHAN..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4of the trial court's reasoning. (Estate of Beard (1999) 71Cal.App.4th 753, 776–777.) The presumption of correctnessis particularly applicable here because appellant did notrequest a statement of decision setting forth the factual andlegal basis for the court's rulings that her appeal challenges.(Code Civ. Proc., § 632; Acquire II, Ltd. v. Colton RealEstate Group (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 959, 970–971.) “Aparty's failure to request a statement of decision when oneis available has two consequences. First, the party waivesany objection to the trial court's failure to make all findingsnecessary to support its decision. Second, the appellate courtapplies the doctrine of implied findings and presumes the trialcourt made all necessary findings supported by substantialevidence. [Citations.]” (Acquire II, at p. 970.) Accordingly, ifthe record is inadequate for meaningful review, the decisionof the trial court must be affirmed. (Gee v. American Realty& Construction, Inc. (2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 1412, 1416.)Appellant has not provided a complete record of materialevidence relating to the determinations she challenges. Theappellant's appendix omits most of respondent's briefs andexhibits. In particular, respondent's testimony at the June 2024hearing regarding his community property accounting andoffset calculations refers to an exhibit and a schedule that hesubmitted to the court. Appellant's testimony also refers tobank statements she submitted as exhibits to her April 2024trial brief. The appellant's appendix contains her trial brief butnot the account statement exhibits.8*5 “The California Rules of Court require an appellant whoelects to proceed by appendix to include, among other things,any document filed in the trial court which ‘is necessary forproper consideration of the issues, including ... any item thatthe appellant should reasonably assume the respondent willrely on.’ ” (Jade Fashion & Co., Inc. v. Harkham Industries,Inc. (2014) 229 Cal.App.4th 635, 643; rule 8.124.) At oralargument, appellant was asked whether she believed she hadprovided in the appellate record all the evidence submittedby both parties in the trial court regarding the division ofcommunity property. Appellant stated she was not obligatedto advocate for respondent and that she did not includehis accounting in the appendix because he “did not hire aforensic accountant or produce tracing that made any sensewhatsoever” and in her opinion “had no basis” because itshowed “no real forensic expertise”.After argument, appellant submitted a purported request for“augmentation of the record under rule 8.155 if necessary”,although she also maintains in that filing that “the currentrecord on appeal is complete and sufficient to allow fullreview of the issues.” Appellant suggests that we orderaugmentation of the record under rule 8.155(a) or (b)(1)“should the Court determine any portion of the recordis incomplete or missing.” Although appellant states thatshe “stands ready to identify, locate, and promptly submitany additional materials the Court deems necessary forfair review,” we reject appellant's invitation to remedyher record deficiencies in this manner. Appellant cannotavoid the consequences of intentionally filing an incompleteappendix—which largely omits respondent's evidence—andthen expect the court itself to comb through the registerof actions and identify the documents that appellant wasrequired to include in the appendix. Even when, as here, norespondent's brief is filed, it remains appellant's burden toshow prejudicial error. (See Lee v. Wells Fargo Bank (2001)88 Cal.App.4th 1187, 1192, fn. 7; rule 8.220(a)(2).) Theopening brief must “[p]rovide a summary of the significantfacts limited to matters in the record” (rule 8.204(a)(2)(C)),and must summarize the facts fairly in light of the judgment.(Jones & Matson v. Hall (2007) 155 Cal.App.4th 1596, 1607.)All briefs on appeal must also “[s]upport any reference toa matter in the record by a citation to the volume and pagenumber of the record where the matter appears” (rule 8.204(a)(1)(C)); the reviewing court is not required to search therecord on its own seeking error. (Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246.) The requirement to include allrelevant documents and citations to the record applies withequal force to self-represented litigants. (See Rappleyea v.Campbell (1994) 8 Cal. 4th 975, 984–985.)Appellant's brief does not accurately or clearly summarizethe relevant facts. The brief's statement of facts focusesmostly on events and proceedings that are irrelevant to theissues on appeal. To the extent the brief addresses relevantfacts, it does not cite to the record. The brief fails to evenacknowledge the evidence respondent presented in the trialcourt, the arguments he made, and many of the trial court'srulings. As appellant contends that substantial evidence doesnot support the court's findings, she is required to set forth inher brief all the material evidence on the point, and not merelyher own evidence. (Foreman & Clark Corp. v. Fallon (1971)3 Cal.3d 875, 881.) By not doing so, she has severely limitedour ability to address her contentions.As an example, appellant challenges the division ofcommunity property by asserting the court provided noaccounting or justification for its equalizing calculationand instead relied on purportedly arbitrary figures from
In re the Marriage of JOANNE RODRIGUES and NATHAN..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5respondent's forensic accounting (which as we have noted isnot included in the appellant's appendix).9 Appellant assertsan unexplained math error of $45,000, but fails to spell outhow she arrived at that figure or identify a correspondingmath error by the trial court. She also contends the sanctionsmust be set aside because of a lack of “transparency regardingthe calculation of the offset or the basis for the sanctionsimposed” on her. And she challenges the court's denial of herseparate property claim by contending the court never ruledon that claim. Our review of what is in the record showsthat respondent testified and submitted exhibits regarding hisaccounting, and also that the court explained its reasons forsanctioning appellant. The court also considered and deniedher separate property claim, and later confirmed its denial ofthat claim during the June 21, 2024 hearing.*6 Finally, notwithstanding appellant's self-representedstatus in the trial court and on appeal, appellate briefsmust provide argument and legal authority for the positionstaken. When an appellant asserts a point but fails to supportit with reasoned argument and citations to authority, wemay treat it as forfeited. Further, the arguments should betailored to address our applicable standard of review. (Ewaldv. NationstarMortgage, LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947,948.) “When they are not so tailored, the appellant fails toshow error in the judgment.” (People v. Foss (2007) 155Cal.App.4th 113, 126.)Appellant's brief does not engage with the applicablestandards of review. It contains little if any legal argumentor citations to relevant authority. Instead, the brief citesauthorities that do not support the propositions for whichthey are cited; decisions that have been disapproved bythe Supreme Court;10 and numerous nonexistent cases.11Extensive reliance on nonexistent legal authority could alonejustify dismissing an appeal as “frivolous because it ‘rests onnegligible legal foundation’ [Citations] and is peppered withfabricated legal citations[,] ... [and also] unreasonably violatesthe Rules of Court because it does not support each point withcitations to real (as opposed to fabricated) legal authority. (Seerule 8.204(a)(1)(B).)” (Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025)114 Cal.App.5th 426, 447.)C. APPELLANT'S ARGUMENTS AREUNAVAILING, EVEN WHEN CONSIDERED ONTHE MERITSWe review a trial court's division of community propertyand imposition of sanctions in dissolution proceedings forabuse of discretion. (In re Marriage of Schleich (2017) 8Cal.App.5th 267, 276; In re Marriage of Pearson (2018)21 Cal.App.5th 218, 233 [factual underpinnings of § 271sanctions reviewed for substantial evidence, and the decisionto impose sanctions for an abuse of discretion].) We alsoreview spousal support orders for an abuse of discretion. (SeeIn re Marriage of Ciprari (2019) 32 Cal.App.5th 83, 110.)A trial court's characterization of property as eithercommunity or separate is a factual finding that we reviewfor substantial evidence. (In re Marriage of Campi (2013)212 Cal.App.4th 1565, 1572.) Under the substantial evidencestandard of review, “[o]ur sole inquiry is ‘whether, on theentire record, there is any substantial evidence, contradictedor uncontradicted,’ supporting the court's finding. [Citation.]‘We must accept as true all evidence ... tending to establishthe correctness of the trial court's findings ..., resolving everyconflict in favor of the judgment.’ [Citation.]” (Sabbah v.Sabbah (2007) 151 Cal.App.4th 818, 822–823.) As the trierof fact, the trial court “ ‘is the sole judge of the credibilityand weight of the evidence.’ ” (In re Marriage of Greenberg(2011) 194 Cal.App.4th 1095, 1099.)1. No Abuse Of Discretion In Spousal SupportDetermination*7 Appellant asserts section 4330 legally entitles herto spousal support for 40 months (representing half themarriage's duration). The family court has broad discretionin awarding spousal support. (In re Marriage of Blazer(2009) 176 Cal.App.4th 1438, 1442–1443.) The court mustconsider the factors set forth in section 4320, includingthe parties' earning capacities (Fam. Code, § 4320, subd.(a)), contributions to education and training (id., subd.(b)), abilities to pay (id., subd. (c)), needs (id., subd. (d)),obligations and assets (id., subd. (e)), and ages and health(id., subd. (h)). It must also consider the duration of themarriage (id., subd. (f)), the supported spouse's ability tofind gainful employment (id., subd. (g)), the balance ofhardships (id., subd. (k)), and any other factor deemed “justand equitable.” (id., subd. (n.)).The court may “ ‘fix spousal support at an amount greaterthan, equal to[,] or less than what the supported spouse mayrequire to maintain the marital standard of living’ ” so longas it considers the factors in section 4320. (In re Marriageof Williamson (2014) 226 Cal.App.4th 1303, 1315–1316.)“ ‘[T]he ultimate decision as to amount and duration of
In re the Marriage of JOANNE RODRIGUES and NATHAN..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6spousal support rests within [the trial court's] broad discretionand will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of thatdiscretion. [Citation.]’ ” (In re Marriage of Ackerman (2006)146 Cal.App.4th 191, 207.) According to section 4330, thecourt “may order a party to pay for the support of the otherparty an amount, for a period of time, that the court determinesis just and reasonable.” And under section 4320, although areasonable time for support “generally shall be one-half thelength of the marriage ... nothing in this section is intendedto limit the court's discretion to order support for a greater orlesser length of time, based on any of the other factors listedin this section, Section 4336, and the circumstances of theparties.” (§ 4320, subd. (l).)In her disagreement with the trial court's assessment of thesection 4320 factors (including her financial dependencyand employment history during the marriage, standard ofliving, medical and disability considerations, health and age),appellant is ultimately asking us to reweigh those factorsin her favor, which we cannot do. The factual findingsinforming the trial court's discretionary balancing of thesection 4320 factors are subject to substantial evidencereview. (In re Marriage of Smith (2015) 242 Cal.App.4th529, 532 (“Applying the abuse of discretion standard, we ...will uphold any findings of fact supported by substantialevidence.”) “On substantial evidence review, we do not‘weigh the evidence, consider the credibility of witnesses,or resolve conflicts in the evidence or in the reasonableinferences that may be drawn from it.’ ” (Do v. Regents ofUniversity of California (2013) 216 Cal.App.4th 1474, 1492(Do).)We also reject appellant's assertion that the court “failed toaddress the domestic violence present in this case.” The courtconsidered both parties' domestic violence allegations andconcluded that no police or medical reports substantiated theallegations. Absent any such documentation, we find no errorin the court's determination.2. No Judicial Bias Or DiscriminationAppellant (who was born in Bangalore, India and identifiesas East Indian) contends that the court's spousal support andother determinations were the product of racial, gender anddisability bias. Specifically, appellant accuses the court ofdisregarding her invisible disability, falsely accusing her of“malingering”, referring to her “looting” funds (based onher withdrawals from community property accounts), andrepeatedly questioning her credibility.12*8 Appellant cites the court's comments during an April2022 hearing regarding her failure to comply with a “seek-work” order. In that instance, the court referred to appellantas “malingering when it comes to trying to find a job” byapplying for positions for which she was not qualified, andthe court found the evidence showed “she has malingeredin those attempts.” Appellant points to an instance at theApril 3, 2024 hearing in which the court repeated the term“malingered” when referring to its earlier determination thatappellant was not sincerely attempting to find work. Thecourt's comments do not appear to have been directed atappellant's race, gender or disability, but rather to the evidenceof whether she was seriously attempting to obtain appropriateemployment. Appellant also cites an instance during the June2024 hearing in which the court addressed her stating, “Icannot recall a party who was as dishonest in their testimony”and “intentionally manipulative in your efforts to prolong thelitigation in this case, really.” The court commented that basedon its own observations of appellant over multiple hearings,it believed she was “malingering” during the hearing bystaring at the real-time reporting screen, when she hadrarely looked at the screen during past hearings. Appellantfurther cites the court's questioning of her expert witnesson learning disabilities, in which the court asked whether itwas possible to manipulate performance in disability testing.The court appears to have been attempting to reconcile theexpert's testimony with appellant's impressive academic andprofessional credentials13 and her demonstrated litigationskills in representing herself.We understand the court's comments not as reflecting bias,but rather as a credibility determination in the context ofappellant's prospects for employment and earning. Credibilityis always a matter for the factfinder to decide based onsuch factors as demeanor, motives, background, previousconsistent or inconsistent statements, and whether a witness'sstatements possess the essential “ ‘ring of truth.’ ” (People v.Melton (1988) 44 Cal.3d 713, 744–745.) It is not improperto consider a litigant's courtroom or litigation behavior inmaking a credibility determination.We reach the same conclusion regarding the trial court'suse of the term “looted” at the April 3, 2024 hearing.Appellant argues this language, “coupled with [the court's]pattern of questioning her credibility without evidentiarybasis, constitutes judicial bias.” We again conclude the
In re the Marriage of JOANNE RODRIGUES and NATHAN..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7court's comments were not inappropriate. The court statedrespondent had “probably used the term you looted thoseaccounts historically” to describe her unauthorized andsubstantial withdrawals of community property funds andher lack of candor about the timing and purpose of thosewithdrawals. We cannot review appellant's assertion thatrespondent never used the term looted because she omittedfrom the appellate record nearly all of his filings, testimony,and trial exhibits.Nor are we persuaded by appellant's assertion that the courtlacked an evidentiary basis to criticize her litigation conductand question her credibility with respect to her unauthorizedwithdrawals of community funds. There was ample evidencethat appellant made substantial unauthorized withdrawals ofcommunity funds and that she gave evasive answers whenquestioned by the court about those withdrawals. We havecarefully reviewed the record and conclude appellant has notshown that this is “ ‘the exceptional case presenting extremefacts’ ” that demonstrate actual bias on the part of the trialcourt. (Today's Fresh Start, Inc. v. Los Angeles County Officeof Education (2013) 57 Cal.4th 197, 219.)3. No Abuse Of Discretion In Community PropertyDivision“ ‘[T]he disposition of marital property is within the trialcourt's discretion, by whatever method or formula will“achieve substantial justice between the parties.” ’ ” (Inre Marriage of Gowan (1997) 54 Cal.App.4th 80, 88; seealso In re Marriage of Connolly (1979) 23 Cal.3d 590,603 [court is vested with “considerable discretion in thedivision of community property in order to assure that anequitable settlement is reached”].) Appellant argues thatrather than award her half the value of the communityproperty accounts, the court improperly relied on respondent'saccounting and failed to justify the apparent equalizingpayment to respondent. The argument ignores the ampleevidence of appellant's substantial withdrawals of communityproperty funds, the court's ruling that those withdrawalsviolated the ATROs, and her own forensic accountant'sagreement that respondent would be entitled to an equalizingpayment if appellant's withdrawals violated the ATROs. Andwe reject appellant's assertion that the court improperlyawarded respondent the Alliant Credit Union accounts as hisseparate property. As she acknowledges, respondent did notclaim the Alliant Credit Union accounts were his separateproperty; rather, the court awarded those funds to respondentto equalize the community property distribution.*9 Respondent was entitled to an equalizing paymentbecause the court determined that appellant had withdrawnsubstantial funds from community property accounts. As wehave noted, the trial court permitted respondent to retainthe community property cash accounts (other than the VIOBank account) that had been transferred to him to performan accounting ($90,817.96); the entire Vanguard investmentaccount balance ($172,862.26) which included appellant'sone-half share; and respondent's entire retirement accountbalance ($47,916.81) for a total of $311,597.03. In additionto the $313,288.70 appellant had already received from thecommunity cash accounts, the trial court permitted her toretain her Vanguard retirement account ($92,301.25) and the$170.75 in the VIO Bank account, for a total of $405,760.70(or $8,167.34 more than the $397,593.36 to which she wasentitled).We see no abuse of discretion in the division of communityassets in equal shares of $358,593.36, nor in the trialcourt's further credits and debits totaling $39,000.00 as wehave described. The judgment appears to use respondent'sproposed figure of $247,357.99 as the basis from whichthe trial court then calculated and ultimately awarded himan “offset” of $208,357.99 in the judgment. Accordingto respondent's testimony, the $247,357.99 represented hiscalculation of the additional amount he would receive ifall of the community property cash balance and all of thecommunity investment and retirement account balances wereawarded to him. In other words, respondent's proposed figureappears to have been his accounting of the total amountavailable for appellant to make an equalizing payment tocompensate for taking more than her one-half share of thecommunity cash accounts.We assume that a reasonable factfinder considering theparties' testimony and all the trial evidence could plausiblyhave rejected respondent's calculation or the foundation onwhich it was based. But the record appellant has provideddoes not permit more detailed examination of the trialcourt's equalizing calculation, as the record does not containrespondent's trial exhibits and other relevant filings.144. No Error Denying Appellant's Separate Property Claim
In re the Marriage of JOANNE RODRIGUES and NATHAN..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Appellant incorrectly asserts the court conflated her claim forfunds she brought into the marriage with the court's denial ofanother claim for a similar amount of cash wedding gifts. Shecontends the court failed to rule and then “improperly dividedthe funds equally without addressing her expert's tracinganalysis or providing a legal basis for rejecting the claim.”But as we have noted, the court rejected her separate propertyclaim because it did not find her expert's tracing analysisconvincing. As the spouse claiming a separate interest inthe Vanguard investment account, it is appellant's burden totrace her separate interest. (In re Marriage of Cochran (2001)87 Cal.App.4th 1050, 1057–1058.) “ ‘Whether the spouseclaiming a separate property interest has adequately traced anasset to a separate property source is a question of fact forthe trial court, and its finding must be upheld if supported bysubstantial evidence.’ ” (In re Marriage of Brandes (2015)239 Cal.App.4th 1461, 1484.)*10 Other than claiming that her forensic accounting expert“meticulously traced” her separate property claim, appellantneither explains nor defends her expert's tracing analysis.Appellant cannot simply “assert error and leave it to theappellate court to search the record and the law books to test[her] claim.” (L.O. v. Kilrain (2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 619–620.) Because appellant is challenging the sufficiency of theevidence, she must “set forth all the relevant evidence, notjust the evidence favorable to the appellant, and show how theevidence does not support the judgment[.]” (Steele v. YouthfulOffender Parole Bd. (2008) 162 Cal.App.4th 1241, 1251.)Appellant has not attempted to do so.5. No Abuse Of Discretion In Imposing SanctionsWe also reject appellant's challenges to the sanctions imposedfor her breaches of fiduciary duty and litigation conduct undersection 271. Aside from appellant's forfeited and factuallyincorrect argument that the trial court failed to explain anditemize its sanctions, she challenges the court's rejection ofher claims that the unauthorized withdrawals of communityfunds were for legitimate “necessities of life.” (§ 2040, subd.(a)(2)(A). She also challenges the $7,500 sanctions imposedfor violating the order not to relocate the children to Newark.We see no abuse of discretion in the determinationthat appellant breached her fiduciary duty to respondentby withdrawing community funds without consent orauthorization. (McTiernan, supra, 133 Cal.App.4th at p.1102.) The evidence regarding appellant's withdrawals isuncontroverted and includes her own testimony, respondent'stestimony and respondent's accounting. Appellant cites nolegal authority that funding an educational savings plan orpaying a sibling's medical school tuition fall within the“necessities of life” exception to the ATROs. Appellantargues she paid her brother's $50,000 medical school tuitionfrom the court-approved community property advance shereceived, over which she asserts the court did not maintainjurisdiction or impose any restrictions. But appellant citesto no record evidence that she paid the tuition from theearlier advance rather than from the remaining communityfunds while they were under her control. And the trial court'srejection of the claim that appellant was required to prepay ayear of rent in order to live in a home owned by her parents inNewark ultimately derived from a credibility determinationthat we do not second-guess on appeal. (Do, supra, 216Cal.App.4th at p. 1492.)We also are unpersuaded by appellant's challenge to thesanction imposed under section 271 due to her litigationconduct. Section 271 provides the court with broad discretionto impose sanctions on a party who engages in conductthat “frustrates the policy of the law to promote settlementof litigation and ... reduce the cost of litigation.” (§ 271,subd. (a).) Contrary to appellant's assertion that the sanctionlacked evidentiary support or justification, the court explainedit was based on appellant's repeated refusal to participatein settlement conferences, including an instance where sheagreed to participate if a specific mediator conducted theconference, but then objected to that mediator sitting as atemporary judge. We see no abuse of discretion in the courtsanctioning appellant for refusing to participate in settlementconferences.Nor do we see an abuse of discretion in sanctioning appellant$7,500 for moving the children out of the county in violationof an order not to do so. In late October 2020, appellantinformed respondent that in a few days she intended tomove with the children from their Sunnyvale home (wherethe family had lived together) to a home her parents hadpurchased in Newark. Respondent objected and applied exparte for an order preventing the move pending a hearing.After the hearing, the court ordered appellant not to changethe children's residence out of the county, referred the partiesto mediate the children's domicile, denied appellant's requestto temporarily move the children to Newark, and directed herto pursue a formal move away motion. The court sanctionedher $7,500 after she changed the children's residence toNewark anyway.
In re the Marriage of JOANNE RODRIGUES and NATHAN..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9*11 Appellant incorrectly characterizes the October 29,2020 temporary emergency order and the November 20, 2020order as “ex parte move-away” orders. The orders maintainedthe status quo pending the parties' child custody mediationregarding appellant's desire to change the children's countyof residence.15 The court acknowledged it lacked authorityto dictate appellant's residence or to require her continuedpresence in the county; it ordered only that she maintain aresidence for the children in Santa Clara County. The courtnoted respondent's objection to the children's relocation andcorrectly ordered appellant not to change their residencewithout first mediating the dispute and receiving permissionfrom the court. (See In re Marriage of Brown & Yana,37 Cal.4th 947, 961; Andrew V. v. Superior Court (2015)234 Cal.App.4th 103, 108.) Appellant's argument that thecourt violated rule 5.151(d) and section 7501 (regarding acustodial parent's presumptive right to relocate with children)is therefore unavailing.III. DISPOSITIONThe April 3, 2024 order and the September 4, 2024 judgmentare affirmed. In the interests of justice, the parties shall beartheir own appellate costs. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.278(a)(5).)WE CONCUR:Lie, J.Wilson, J.All CitationsNot Reported in Cal.Rptr., 2026 WL 1102361Footnotes1In keeping with rule 8.90 of the California Rules of Court, it is our usual practice to refer to family court litigants by givenname and last initial in the interest of their privacy. In this instance, however, appellant has specifically objected to anyanonymization and has asked that we use her full name. We grant that request. Appellant has also asked at oral argumentthat we publish our decision. Seeing no issues meeting the standards of rule 8.1105, we decline that request.2Appellant elected to file an appendix pursuant to rule 8.124. We grant appellant's request for judicial notice of six trialcourt transcripts from this case. (Evid. Code, § 452, subd. (d).)3Upon filing and service of a petition for dissolution and related summons, the parties become subject to certain ATROs,one of which restrains “both parties from transferring ... or in any way disposing of, any property ... without the writtenconsent of the other party or an order of the court, except in the usual course of business or for the necessities oflife[.]” (§§ 2040, subd. (a)(2), 233, subd. (a); see In re Marriage of McTiernan & Dubrow (2005) 133 Cal.App.4th 1090,1102 (McTiernan).) The ATROs remain “in effect against the parties until the final judgment is entered or the petition isdismissed, or until further order of the court.” (§ 233, subd. (a).)4The appellate record does not contain Kamita's June 29, 2022 report (admitted as Petitioner's Exh. 1 at the July 2022hearing).5The court ordered transfer of the following eight community property accounts: Customers Bank (x2069); VIO Bank(x1991); Popular Direct (x8853); Alliant Credit Union (x1997); Vanguard Money Market (x1992); Vanguard BrokerageAccounts (x1643, x1992).6Respondent's evidence included an accounting. He refers in his testimony to an exhibit B (apparently relating to hisaccounting of the community property accounts previously controlled by appellant) and to a schedule 4 (apparently hisproposed equalizing figures). Appellant also refers to those documents in her direct examination of her forensic accountingexpert. Neither document is in the appellate record.7We note the judgment ultimately reduces the figure by $1000 without explanation.8We also observe that appellant's request for judicial notice includes only the first day of a two-day hearing on accountdivision and tracing (consisting almost exclusively of her accountant's testimony), and omits the transcript of the second
In re the Marriage of JOANNE RODRIGUES and NATHAN..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10day, at which respondent would have presented his tracing (even though appellant claimed the cost of preparing a roughdraft of the second day).9Appellant notes that respondent's accounting was filed only 5 days before the hearing. The trial court acknowledged theuntimeliness and repeatedly offered appellant a continuance, which she declined.10For example, Appellant cites to Hall v. Harker (1999) 69 Cal.App.4th 836, and Catchpole v. Brannon (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th237, to support her argument that the trial court was biased against her. The California Supreme Court disapproved bothHall and Catchpole to the extent they suggest due process may be violated by the mere appearance of bias. (Peoplev. Freeman (2010) 47 Cal.4th 993, 1006, fn.4.)11Appellant's brief supplies fictitious citations for: “In re Marriage of Brewster,”; “In re Marriage of Dorn,” “In re Marriage ofFreeman,” “In re Marriage of Gowan,” “In re Marriage of Mele,” “In re Marriage of Olson,” “In re Marriage of Rivera,” “Inre Marriage of Spector,” and “Moore v. California State Bd. of Equalization”.12Appellant also claims that the trial court failed to grant her reasonable accommodations by refusing to allow her to usea note-taker at the April 2022 hearing and reprimanding her for using a note-taker on other occasions. She cites nothingin the record that supports her contention. Our search of the record has found no specific support for her contention;however we have found a single instance in which the trial court permitted appellant's mother to serve as appellant'snote-taker during a hearing, even though her mother was also a witness.13Appellant has an undergraduate degree in International Political Economy from Georgetown University, a Master'sDegree in Political Science and in Demography from UC Berkeley, and a Master's of Science Degree in AppliedMathematics from the London School of Economics. She has written technical books in the field of mathematics.14Beyond disputing the trial court's factual findings, appellant maintains that its calculation of the equalizing payment wasalso mathematically incorrect. Given both the absence of express findings and appellant's omission of respondent'sexhibits, we asked appellant to supply her calculation of the equalizing payment, assuming certain predicate facts.Because appellant had not included such a calculation in her opening brief, we permitted respondent under GovernmentCode section 68081 to offer a calculation of his own. Both parties complain of error in the trial court's calculation, but wefind neither party's response to be persuasive. In his only participation here, respondent asserts in his letter brief that thetrial court miscalculated the final equalizing payment. Specifically, he contends appellant was awarded $15,631.34 morethan she should have received, which exceeds the difference respondent had consented to. As for respondent's claimthat the trial court erroneously permitted appellant to retain her Vanguard retirement account ($92,301.25) and the VIOBank account balance ($170.75) although the $247,357.99 offset the court adopted was premised on his being awardedall community account balances, respondent forfeited the claim first by failing to object in the trial court and then by failingto appeal the judgment or taking a cross-appeal. His claim that the accounts awarded him proved to be of less valuethan he had assumed is likewise not properly before us.15Such interim orders are generally not appealable. (See Banning v. Newdow (2004) 119 Cal.App.4th 438, 456; Lester v.Lennane (2000) 84 Cal.App.4th 536, 559 [temporary custody orders are “interlocutory” by definition and not appealable];Enrique M. v. Angelina V. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1371, 1377 [“[T]he right to appeal a child custody determination isgenerally limited to final judgments and orders made after final judgments”].)End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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