Kuigoua v. Sacks (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Arno Kuigoua v. Adam Michael Sacks
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Chavez (J.) (unanimous Court)
ARNO KUIGOUA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ADAM..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 673409Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, restrictscitation of unpublished opinions in California courts.NOT TO BE PUBLISHED INTHE OFFICIAL REPORTSCourt of Appeal, Second District, California.DIVISION TWO.ARNO KUIGOUA, Plaintiff and Appellant,v.ADAM MICHAEL SACKS etal., Defendant and Respondent.B345468|Filed 3/10/2026APPEAL from an order of the Superior Court of Los AngelesCounty, Daniel S. Murphy, Judge. Affirmed. (Los AngelesCounty Super. Ct. No. 20STCV19534)Attorneys and Law FirmsArno Kuigoua, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.Adam Michael Sacks, in pro. per.; and Law Office of AdamMichael Sacks for Defendant and Respondent.* * * * * *CHAVEZ, J.*1 Arno Kuigoua (appellant) appeals from an order denyinghis motion to set aside the dismissal of his case against AdamMichael Sacks and the Law Offices of Adam Michael Sacks(respondent).1 We affirm the order.BACKGROUNDOn May 21, 2020, appellant filed an action against respondentalleging (1) professional negligence, (2) breach of fiduciaryduty, and (3) promissory fraud. Respondent is an attorney whorepresented appellant in a family law matter. Appellant alsoapproached respondent with a request to represent him in anemployment law matter. Appellant alleged respondent orallypromised to provide legal representation in the employmentmatter in exchange for monetary payment. The action arosefrom respondent's alleged failure to appear at an eight-dayhearing in the employment matter.On March 14, 2022, appellant's then-attorney of record,Michael Labrum, filed a “Notice of Settlement and Requestfor Dismissal” in the professional negligence matter againstrespondent, which was granted.On January 7, 2025, appellant filed a “Notice of Motionand Motion to Set Aside Dismissal Based on ExtrinsicFraud and Lack of Attorney Authority.” Appellant claimedhe never authorized the settlement or dismissal of thecase, which was done without his consent and throughthe alleged wrongful conduct of his attorney, Labrum, andrespondent. Appellant further asserted he was excluded fromall settlement negotiations and never received any payment.He sought reinstatement of the case.Appellant asserted he was first informed of the allegedlyunauthorized dismissal of his case against respondent inApril 2022, but Labrum informed him the dismissal wasirreversible. Because of this alleged misrepresentation,appellant did not file a motion under section 473, subdivision(b) (section 473(b)) within six months of the dismissal.Appellant alleged he reasonably relied on his attorney'smisrepresentations and trusted his attorney to provideaccurate advice.Respondent opposed the motion, arguing it was untimely andappellant made no showing of mistake, surprise, inadvertenceor excusable neglect in support of the motion. Becauseappellant had not met the statutory requirements of section473(b), respondent argued the motion must be denied aslegally and factually impossible.In his opposition, respondent asserted the professionalnegligence matter was settled and “reduced to a writtenagreement which was signed by [appellant], [appellant'sattorney] and [respondent] on March 2, 2022.” The settlementfully resolved the case and all issues related thereto.2Appellant's counsel filed a notice of settlement with the courton March 14, 2022. On the same date, appellant's counselfiled a request for dismissal, which was entered on March15, 2022. Respondent pointed out appellant's present motionfailed to include an affidavit of fault and argued appellant's
ARNO KUIGOUA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ADAM..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2remedy, if any, was against his former counsel, Labrum.Because nearly three years passed since the matter was settledand dismissed, respondent argued all remedies for appellantagainst respondent had long lapsed or expired.*2 Appellant's motion was heard on February 10, 2025.Appellant appeared in propria persona, as did respondent. In awritten order filed the same date, the court denied the motion,noting appellant presented no credible evidence the settlementwas entered into without his consent. Moreover, the courthad no authority to excuse appellant's noncompliance withthe inflexible time limit set forth in section 473(b). (CitingArambula v. Union Carbide Corp. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th333, 344.) The court found appellant's claims regarding hisformer attorney did not affect the finality of the judgment.On February 13, 2025, appellant filed a motion forreconsideration of the court's order denying his motion toset aside the dismissal. Appellant argued that while section1008, subdivision (a) (section 1008(a)) governs motionsfor reconsideration generally, it does not limit the court'sequitable power to set aside judgments or dismissals obtainedby extrinsic fraud. Appellant argued the court should exerciseits equitable power to set aside the dismissal due to his formerattorney's unauthorized settlement and dismissal of the matter.Appellant argued the court's order overlooked the extrinsicfraud argument. Appellant attached a declaration detailing hisversion of the events leading up to the filing of his motion, aswell as a copy of a complaint, filed January 7, 2025, againsthis former attorney Labrum. Respondent opposed the motionfor reconsideration.On March 7, 2025, the trial court entered an orderdenying appellant's motion for reconsideration. The courtacknowledged it had the power to grant relief on equitablegrounds after the six-month period for statutory relief haspassed. (Citing Manson, Iver & York v. Black (2009) 176Cal.App.4th 36, 47.) However, in order to have a final orderset aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, a party must showthat he or she has a meritorious case, a satisfactory excuse fornot presenting this defense to the original action and that heor she has exercised diligence in seeking to set aside the orderonce the fraud had been discovered. (Citing Hudson v. Foster(2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 640, 664.)The trial court found appellant failed to meet the requirementsfor equitable relief. Appellant focused on extrinsic fraudby Labrum, without discussion of the merits of the legalmalpractice case against respondent. In addition, appellantfailed to demonstrate diligence in seeking relief. Appellantadmitted he learned of the purportedly unauthorizedsettlement in March or April 2022 and last heard from Labrumthat the dismissal was irreversible in March 2023. Appellantmade a vague statement that he later learned this was untrue,which was insufficient to warrant equitable relief.On March 11, 2025, appellant filed a second request forreconsideration of the court's denial of his motion to set asidethe dismissal. Appellant asserted he was unfairly deprivedof his opportunity to litigate his meritorious case. Appellantremained vague about his own diligence, stating “it was notuntil 2024” that he discovered the “full extent” of Labrum'salleged deception. Respondent opposed the motion.On April 2, 2025, the trial court filed a written order denyingappellant's second motion for reconsideration. The courtnoted appellant presented no authority allowing him to movefor reconsideration twice on the same grounds. Moreover,the motion was filed more than 10 days after the challengedorder, in violation of the time requirements set forth in section1008(a). In addition, the court found the motion suffered fromthe same defects as the previous motion. Appellant failed todemonstrate diligence in seeking relief and offered no newfacts or circumstances, only realleging facts the court hadpreviously deemed insufficient. The court found the motion“both procedurally improper and substantively meritless.”*3 On April 2, 2025, appellant filed his notice of appeal fromthe orders denying his motion to set aside the dismissal andhis motions for reconsideration.DISCUSSIONI. Applicable law and standard of reviewThe discretionary relief provided in section 473(b) allows acourt to “relieve a party ... from a judgment, dismissal, orderor other proceeding taken against the party through the party'smistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect.” Arequest for relief under section 473(b) must be made “withina reasonable time, in no case exceeding six months, afterthe judgment, dismissal, order, or proceeding was taken.”Our review of the trial court's order denying relief under thediscretionary portion of section 473(b) is “highly deferential”and will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of abuse ofdiscretion. (McClain v. Kissler (2019) 39 Cal.App.5th 399,413.)
ARNO KUIGOUA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ADAM..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3“[E]ven where relief is no longer available under statutoryprovisions, a trial court generally retains the inherent powerto vacate a ... judgment or order on equitable grounds wherea party establishes that the judgment or order ... resultedfrom extrinsic fraud ....” (County of San Diego v. Gorham(2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1215, 1228.) “In order to set asidea final order based on extrinsic fraud, ‘the moving partymust demonstrate that he or she has a meritorious case, that[they have] a satisfactory excuse for not presenting a defenseto the original action and that [they] exercised diligence inseeking to set aside the default once the fraud had beendiscovered.’ ” (Hudson v. Foster (2021) 68 Cal.App.5th 640,664.) An order denying equitable relief is also reviewedfor abuse of discretion. (Id. at p. 661.) In reviewing suchan order, “ ‘we determine whether the trial court's factualfindings are supported by substantial evidence [citation] andindependently review its statutory interpretations and legalconclusions [citations].’ ” (Ibid.)An order denying a motion for reconsideration under section1008(a) is generally not appealable. (Association for LosAngeles Deputy Sheriffs v. County of Los Angeles (2008) 166Cal.App.4th 1625, 1632–1633.) “However, if the underlyingorder that was the subject of reconsideration is appealable, thedenial of reconsideration is reviewable as part of an appealfrom the underlying order.” (Young v. Tri-City HealthcareDist. (2012) 210 Cal.App.4th 35, 51.)II. The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denyingreliefAppellant argues the trial court erred in applying the six-month deadline found in section 473(b) instead of using itsinherent equitable power to vacate the dismissal on the groundof extrinsic fraud.The record shows the trial court considered appellant's claimsof extrinsic fraud, despite appellant's failure to meet thestatutory deadline set forth in section 473(b). In addressingthe issue of extrinsic fraud, the trial court correctly appliedthe three-part test requiring the moving party to demonstratehe or she has a meritorious case, a satisfactory excuse for notpresenting the defense to the original action, and that he orshe exercised diligence in seeking to set aside the default oncethe fraud had been discovered. (Hudson v. Foster, supra, 68Cal.App.5th at p. 664.)*4 The record supports the trial court's determinationthat appellant failed to meet these requirements. First, thecourt noted appellant failed to demonstrate the underlyingcase against respondent had merit. Instead, the motion wasfocused on appellant's claims of extrinsic fraud by Labrum.Further, the court found appellant failed to demonstratediligence. He presented no facts surrounding his discoveryof Labrum's alleged fraud. Instead, he provided only a vaguestatement that he later learned Labrum's representations thatthe dismissal was irreversible were untrue.Appellant's second motion for reconsideration, filed March11, 2025, was filed more than 10 days after service uponappellant of the court's ruling denying his motion to setaside the dismissal, therefore it was untimely. (§ 1008(a).)Further, as the trial court noted, appellant cited no authorityallowing him to move for reconsideration twice on the samegrounds. As the second motion for reconsideration raisedissues identical to those set forth in the first motion forreconsideration and failed to raise new or different materialfacts, circumstances, or law, it failed to comply with therestrictions of section 1008. (§ 1008, subds. (a), (b).)Although the trial court had discretion to consider appellant'sclaims of extrinsic fraud, we note appellant's more extensiveallegations in the second motion for reconsideration stillfailed to meet the requirements to set aside a judgmenton the grounds of extrinsic fraud. Appellant repeated thevague representation that at some point after March 12, 2023,he learned Labrum's representations were untrue. Appellantfailed to describe the way he learned of Labrum's allegedfraudulent misrepresentations or the precise date he learnedof such alleged misrepresentations. The trial court did noterr in denying reconsideration where appellant filed anuntimely, repetitive motion and continued to provide onlyvague information concerning his own diligence.Under the abuse of discretion standard of review, the trialcourt's ruling will not be disturbed ““ ‘except on a showing thetrial court exercised its discretion in an arbitrary, capricious,or patently absurd manner that resulted in a manifestmiscarriage of justice.’ ”” (People v. Case (2018) 5 Cal.5th1, 46.) The record supports the trial court's determinationthat appellant failed to meet the requirements of a claim ofextrinsic fraud, therefore the trial court's ruling will stand.3DISPOSITIONThe order is affirmed. Respondent is awarded his costs ofappeal.
ARNO KUIGOUA, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. ADAM..., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4We concur:LUI, P. J.RICHARDSON, J.All CitationsNot Reported in Cal.Rptr., 2026 WL 673409Footnotes1Appellant also purports to appeal from the court's denials of his two motions for reconsideration of the court's orderdenying his motion to set aside the dismissal, which are not appealable orders. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1008, subd. (g).)However, because the order that was the subject of the motions for reconsideration is appealable, the denials of themotions for reconsideration are reviewable as part of this appeal. (Ibid.)All further unattributed statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.2The settlement agreement was referenced as “Exhibit A” to respondent's opposition but was not attached to theopposition. Instead, a note read, “Redacted due to confidentiality clause will release by court order as necessary.”3As respondent points out, appellant has cited three apparently nonexistent or miscited cases in his opening brief. Whilethis court is permitted to impose sanctions for relying on nonexistent legal authority (Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P.(2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 436), we decline to do so as appellant's opening brief was otherwise comprehensible.However, we caution appellant that any subsequent cases containing miscites will likely result in sanctions.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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