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Lin v. Leal
(2025)
Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Lin
v.
Leal,
2025
WL
3166009
(2025)
WESTLAW
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
1
2025
WL
3166009
(Cal.Super.)
(Trial
Order)
Superior
Court
of
California,
Civil
Division,
Northeast
District,
Alhambra
Courthouse,
Department
X.
Los
Angeles
County
Hsein
Liang
LIN,
et
al.,
v.
Amado
LEAL,
et
al.
No.
24AHCV00437.
October
23,
2025.
*1
8:30
AM
Judicial
Assistant:
Maria
Vegerano-Nunez
Courtroom
Assistant:
Leslie
Wong
CSR:
None
ERM:
None
Deputy
Sheriff:
None
Editor's
Note:
This
document
contains
discussion
of
unverified
citations,
likely
generated
by
AI
tools
used
by
a
party
or
counsel.
These
citations
are
not
attributable
to
the
Court.
The
unverified
citations
have
been
preserved
as
part
of
the
official
record,
but
links
are
unavailable.
Order
Speros
P.
Maniates
via
LACC
(X),
for
plaintiff(s).
Glenn
Ward
Calsada
via
LACC
(X),
for
defendant(s).
Honorable
Lauren
A.
R.
Lofton
,
Judge.
NATURE
OF
PROCEEDINGS:
Hearing
on
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
(7523)
Matter
is
called
for
hearing.
Counsel
inform
the
Court
that
they
have
read
and
considered
the
Court's
tentative
ruling,
posted
on
the
Los
Angeles
Superior
Court
website,
prior
to
this
hearing.
The
Court's
tentative
ruling
is
heard
and
argued.
Upon
the
conclusion
of
oral
argument
the
Court
rules
as
follows:
The
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
OR,
IN
THE
ALTERNATIVE,
FOR
SUMMARY
ADJUDICATION
(7523)
filed
by
Encarnacion
Gutierrez
on
06/09/2025
is
Granted.
**************************COURT
ORDERS***************************
Lin
v.
Leal,
2025
WL
3166009
(2025)
WESTLAW
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
2
DEFENDANT'S
MOTION
FOR
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT
Defendant
Encarnacion
Gutierrez
filed
a
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment,
or
in
the
alternative,
Summary
Adjudication,
against
Plaintiffs
Hsien
Liang
Lin
and
Pi
Chao
Chen
Lin.
Plaintiffs
assert
claims
for
breach
of
lease,
breach
of
guaranty,
property
damage,
vandalism,
negligence,
emotional
distress,
and
elder
abuse,
arising
from
a
series
of
commercial
lease
agreements
and
related
transactions
involving
the
premises
at
118
W.
Main
Street,
Alhambra,
California.
Defendant
Gutierrez
seeks
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law
on
all
causes
of
action,
contending
that
there
are
no
triable
issues
of
material
fact
and
that
Plaintiffs
cannot
establish
the
essential
elements
of
their
claims.
Plaintiffs
oppose
the
motion,
arguing
that
genuine
disputes
exist
regarding
the
enforceability
of
the
guaranty,
the
effect
of
lease
termination,
notice
requirements,
lease
modifications,
and
the
sufficiency
of
the
tort
allegations.
Ruling
Defendant
has
met
his
initial
burden
of
demonstrating
that
Plaintiffs
cannot
establish
essential
elements
of
their
claims
and
that
complete
defenses
exist.
Plaintiffs
have
not
presented
sufficient
evidence
to
raise
a
genuine
dispute
as
to
any
material
fact.
The
opposition
relies
on
inadmissible
evidence,
unsupported
assertions,
and
theories
outside
the
pleadings.
The
record
is
devoid
of
facts
which
would
create
a
triable
issue
on
any
of
the
claims
asserted
against
Defendant
Gutierrez.
Defendant
Encarnacion
Gutierrez's
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
is
GRANTED.
Order
to
Show
Cause
re:
Sanctions
in
the
Amount
of
$1,000.00
In
reviewing
the
legal
authorities
cited
in
Plaintiffs'
opposing
papers,
Plaintiffs
cite
“Mutual
Benefit
Life
Ins.
Co.
v.
Grigsby
(1988)
200
Cal.App.3d
512,
517.”
(Opp.,
p.
5.)
This
Mutual
Benefit
case
does
not
exist.
The
opposition
also
cites
to
“Sumitomo
Bank
v.
Iwasaki
(1964)
227
Cal.App.2d
1,
6”
for
the
proposition
that
guarantor
liability
may
persist
for
past
obligations
despite
termination.
The
citation
is
incorrect,
with
the
correct
citation
being
Sumitomo
Bank
of
Cal.
v.
Iwasaki
(1968)
70
Cal.2d
81
.
Moreover,
the
Sumitomo
case
cited
by
Plaintiffs
does
not
appear
to
support
the
position
proffered.
Accordingly,
on
its
own
motion,
the
Court
sets
an
Order
to
Show
Cause
hearing
on
why
Plaintiffs'
Counsel,
Speros
Maniates,
should
not
be
sanctioned
in
the
amount
of
$1,000
for
violating
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
section
128.7(b)(2)
by
citing
fake
and/
or
improper
cases.
The
OSC
hearing
is
scheduled
for
December
9,
2025
at
8:30
a.m.
in
Department
X.
Legal
Authority
for
Summary
Judgment
*2
“The
purpose
of
the
law
of
summary
judgment
is
to
provide
courts
with
a
mechanism
to
cut
through
the
parties'
pleadings
in
order
to
determine
whether,
despite
their
allegations,
trial
is
in
fact
necessary
to
resolve
their
dispute.”
(
Aguilar
v.
Atlantic
Richfield
Co.
(2001)
25
Cal.4th
826,
843
.)
“A
party
may
move
for
summary
judgement
in
an
action
or
proceeding
if
it
is
contended
that
the
action
has
no
merit
or
that
there
is
no
defense
to
the
action
or
proceeding.”
(Code
Civ.
Proc.,
§
473c
subd.
(a)(1).)
“The
motion
for
summary
judgment
shall
be
granted
if
all
the
papers
submitted
show
that
there
is
no
triable
issue
as
to
any
material
fact
and
that
the
moving
party
is
entitled
to
a
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law.”
(Id.,
at
§
437c,
subd.
(c).)
A
defendant
moving
for
summary
judgment
bears
an
initial
burden
of
showing
that
the
plaintiff's
causes
of
action
have
no
merit,
and
the
defendant
meets
this
burden
by
making
a
prima
facie
evidentiary
showing
that
one
or
more
elements
of
each
cause
of
action
cannot
be
established,
or
there
is
a
complete
defense
to
each
cause
of
action.
(
Aguilar,
supra,
25
Cal.4th
at
Lin
v.
Leal,
2025
WL
3166009
(2025)
WESTLAW
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
3
pp.
849-851
;
Code
Civ.
Proc.,
§
437c,
subd.
(p)(2)
.)
If
the
defendant
meets
its
initial
burden,
the
burden
shifts
to
the
plaintiff
to
produce
evidence
of
a
triable
issue
of
material
fact
concerning
the
challenged
element
or
defense.
(Aguilar,
supra,
at
pp.
849-851;
Code
Civ.
Proc.,
§
437c,
subd.
(p)(2)
.)
“There
is
a
triable
issue
of
material
fact
if,
and
only
if,
the
evidence
would
allow
a
reasonable
trier
of
fact
to
find
the
underlying
fact
in
favor
of
the
party
opposing
the
motion
in
accordance
with
the
applicable
standard
of
proof.”
(Aguilar,
supra,
at
p.
850.)
Throughout
the
motion,
however,
the
moving
party
bears
an
overall
burden
of
persuasion
that
there
is
no
triable
issue
of
material
fact
and
that
the
moving
party
is
entitled
to
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law.
(
Id.,
at
p.
850
&
fn.
11
.)
Plaintiffs'
Separate
Statement
Is
Procedurally
Defective
As
a
preliminary
matter,
the
Court
finds
that
Plaintiffs'
separate
statement
does
not
comply
with
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
section
437c
.
“The
opposition
papers
[to
summary
judgment]
shall
include
a
separate
statement
that
responds
to
each
of
the
material
facts
contended
by
the
moving
party
to
be
undisputed,
indicating
if
the
opposing
party
agrees
or
disagrees
that
those
facts
are
undisputed....
Each
material
fact
contended
by
the
opposing
party
to
be
disputed
shall
be
followed
by
a
reference
to
the
supporting
evidence.
(
Code
Civ.
Proc.,
§
437c,
subd.
(b)(3)
.)
“‘The
separate
statement
serves
two
important
functions
in
a
summary
judgment
proceeding:
It
notifies
the
parties
which
material
facts
are
at
issue,
and
it
provides
a
convenient
and
expeditious
vehicle
permitting
the
trial
court
to
hone
in
on
the
truly
disputed
facts.”’
(
Beltran
v.
Hard
Rock
Hotel
Licensing,
Inc.
(2023)
97
Cal.App.5th
865,
875
[internal
citation
omitted].)
Failure
to
comply
with
this
requirement
of
a
separate
statement
may
constitute
a
sufficient
ground,
in
the
court's
discretion,
for
granting
the
motion.”
(
Code
Civ.
Proc.,
§
437c,
subd.
(b)(3)
.)
Based
on
the
failure
to
comply
with
section
437c
,
Plaintiffs'
separate
statement
is
stricken.
(
Code
Civ.
Proc.,
§
436,
subd.
(b)
[court
may
strike
any
pleading
not
drawn
or
filed
in
conformity
with
the
laws
of
this
state].)
Validity
and
Enforceability
of
the
Guaranty
Agreements
The
central
dispute
concerns
whether
Defendant
Gutierrez
is
bound
by
an
enforceable
guaranty
for
the
obligations
under
the
2017
and
2019
lease
agreements.
Defendant
Gutierrez
contends
that
the
2017
Guaranty
does
not
expressly
obligate
him
to
guarantee
the
tenant's
(Los
Amigos
SBG,
LLC)
performance,
but
rather
only
covers
debts
and
obligations
of
himself
and
co-signor
Capra.
(Motion,
p.
4.)
This
position
is
supported
by
the
text
of
the
2017
Guaranty
and
Plaintiffs'
own
admissions
in
discovery.
Defendant
further
asserts
that
the
2019
Lease
and
its
Addendum
are
unenforceable
as
a
guaranty
because
they
lack
the
Landlord's
countersignature
and
do
not
contain
express
terms
of
a
guarantee
by
Gutierrez.
(Motion,
p.
9.)
*3
In
opposition,
Plaintiffs
argue
that
the
intent
to
guarantee
the
tenant's
obligations
can
be
inferred
from
the
parties'
conduct,
negotiations,
and
oral
assurances.
(Opp.,
p.
5.)
Plaintiffs
cite
Civil
Code
section
2837
and
Cathay
Bank
v.
Lee
(1993)
14
Cal.App.4th
1533,
1539
for
the
proposition
that
the
scope
of
a
guaranty
may
be
implied
from
circumstances
and
conduct.
Plaintiffs
also
reference
declaration
evidence
of
oral
assurances
by
Gutierrez
during
lease
negotiations.
Defendant's
reply
points
out
that
the
Complaint
pleads
only
written
guaranties,
and
that
oral
assurances
or
implied
terms
outside
the
pleadings
cannot
create
a
triable
issue
for
summary
judgment
purposes.
(Reply,
p.
3.)
The
reply
further
notes
that
the
statute
of
frauds,
Civil
Code
section
1624(a)(2)
requires
a
guaranty
to
be
in
writing,
and
that
the
2017
Guaranty
does
not
guarantee
the
tenant's
obligations
as
it
only
references
debts
of
Gutierrez
and
Capra.
(Reply,
p.
4.)
Here,
the
record
establishes
that
the
2017
Guaranty
does
not
expressly
bind
Gutierrez
to
the
tenant's
obligations,
and
the
2019
Lease
Addendum
lacks
the
operative
guaranty
terms.
Plaintiffs'
reliance
on
oral
assurances
and
implied
intent
is
not
supported
Lin
v.
Leal,
2025
WL
3166009
(2025)
WESTLAW
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
4
by
the
pleadings,
and
their
discovery
responses
do
not
provide
factual
support
for
the
existence
of
an
enforceable
guaranty.
The
evidence
presented
by
Plaintiffs
is
insufficient
to
create
a
genuine
dispute
as
to
the
existence
of
a
binding
guaranty.
Lease
Termination
and
Cancellation
Defendant
asserts
that
Plaintiffs'
actions
in
the
Unlawful
Detainer
proceeding,
specifically
obtaining
a
Clerk's
Judgment
that
“the
rental
agreement
is
canceled,”
constitute
a
binding
judicial
admission
that
the
lease
was
terminated,
thereby
extinguishing
any
obligations
under
the
lease
and
any
associated
guaranty.
Defendant
relies
on
Civil
Code
section
1951.2
and
the
lease's
own
termination
provisions,
which
state
that
upon
written
notice
of
termination,
the
tenant's
liability
for
future
rent
and
charges
ceases.
Plaintiffs
counter
that
the
cancellation
of
the
lease
does
not
automatically
terminate
the
guarantor's
liability,
citing
Mutual
Benefit
Life
Ins.
Co.
v.
Grigsby
(1988)
200
Cal.App.3d
512,
517,
and
arguing
that
a
guaranty
may
survive
lease
termination
unless
expressly
conditioned
otherwise.
(Opp.,
p.
5.)
The
Court
observes
that
neither
the
case
name
nor
citation
appears
to
exist.
Plaintiffs
further
argue
that
the
Lease
Assignment
(Article
5)
contemplates
ongoing
liability
for
the
assignor
(Gutierrez)
in
the
event
of
assignee
breach,
and
that
the
effect
of
cancellation
on
the
guaranty
is
a
disputed
issue
requiring
trial.
(Opp.,
pp.
5-6.)
Defendant's
reply
emphasizes
that
a
guaranty
is
accessory
to
the
principal
obligation
and
is
extinguished
when
the
principal
obligation
is
terminated,
citing
Civil
Code
section
2809
and
Bloom
v.
Bender
(1957)
48
Cal.2d
793,
797.
(Reply,
p.
6.)
The
reply
also
notes
that
Plaintiffs'
own
admissions
and
the
lease
documents
confirm
that
the
lease
was
canceled
and
that
no
further
liability
accrues.
(Reply,
p.
6.)
Because
the
guaranty
terms
do
not
expressly
bind
Gutierrez
to
the
tenant's
obligations
(as
discussed
above),
the
issue
of
whether
termination
of
the
lease
also
terminated
the
guaranty
is
a
moot
point.
Plaintiffs
have
not
presented
sufficient
evidence
to
create
a
triable
issue
as
to
whether
the
guaranty
survives
the
lease's
cancellation.
Notice
Requirements
*4
Defendant
argues
that
the
lease
agreements
and
assignment
require
written
notice
of
breach
to
be
provided
to
the
assignor
(Gutierrez)
as
a
condition
precedent
to
enforcing
any
obligations,
and
that
Plaintiffs
admit
they
never
provided
such
written
notice.
(Motion,
p.
12.)
Defendant
further
contends
that
oral
notice
is
insufficient
under
the
integrated
contract
and
the
parol
evidence
rule.
(Reply,
pp.
3-4.)
Plaintiffs
respond
that
Defendant
Gutierrez
had
actual
notice
of
the
assignee's
default
through
registered
mail.
Plaintiffs
cite
Taylor
v.
J.B.
Hill
Co.
(1948)
31
Cal.2d
373,
375
,
for
the
proposition
that
adequacy
and
timing
of
notice
are
factual
disputes.
Defendant's
reply
maintains
that
the
written
notice
provision
is
controlling,
and
that
Plaintiffs'
discovery
responses
and
declarations
do
not
establish
that
written
notice
was
provided
as
required
by
the
lease.
The
reply
also
notes
that
Plaintiffs'
responses
to
Form
Interrogatory
17.1
were
factually
devoid,
and
similar
denials
of
key
requests
for
admission
deem
the
RFAs
effectively
admitted.
(Reply,
p.
5.)
The
evidence
demonstrates
that
Plaintiffs
did
not
provide
the
contractually
required
written
notice
of
breach
to
Gutierrez,
and
their
assertions
of
actual
notice
are
not
supported
by
admissible
evidence
or
sufficient
factual
detail.
No
genuine
dispute
exists
as
to
the
failure
to
satisfy
the
notice
condition
precedent.
Lease
Modifications
Lin
v.
Leal,
2025
WL
3166009
(2025)
WESTLAW
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
5
Defendant
contends
that
material
modifications
to
the
2019
Lease,
including
Addendum
No.
2
and
the
Payment
Plan
Agreement,
were
made
without
Gutierrez's
consent
and
materially
altered
the
obligations,
thereby
exonerating
him
from
liability
under
Civil
Code
section
2819
.
(Motion,
p.
13;
Reply,
p.
7.)
Defendant
identifies
five
substantial
changes:
restructuring
rent,
taxes,
insurance,
increasing
the
deposit,
repayment
terms,
and
required
repairs.
(Motion,
p.
7.)
Plaintiffs
argue
that
these
modifications
were
minor
adjustments
intended
to
preserve
the
lease,
not
increase
Defendant's
risk.
(Opp.,
p.
7.)
Plaintiffs
further
assert
that
Gutierrez
was
notified
of
the
changes
and
that
the
lack
of
consent
does
not
automatically
discharge
a
guarantor
absent
prejudice.
(Opp.,
p.
7.)
The
record
supports
Defendant's
position
that
the
lease
was
materially
modified
without
his
consent,
and
Plaintiffs
have
not
presented
evidence
sufficient
to
create
a
triable
issue
as
to
whether
the
modifications
were
minor
or
whether
Gutierrez
was
adequately
notified.
Alleged
Tort
Claims
Defendant
asserts
that
the
Complaint
fails
to
plead
specific
facts
or
legal
theories
supporting
the
tort
claims
(property
damage,
vandalism,
negligence,
emotional
distress,
elder
abuse)
against
Gutierrez,
and
that
these
claims
are
derivative
of
the
contract
and
guaranty
obligations,
which
are
unenforceable.
(Motion,
pp.
13-14.)
The
reply
further
notes
that
the
Complaint
does
not
specifically
allege
tort
claims
against
Gutierrez.
(Reply,
p.
7.)
Plaintiffs
respond
that
the
Complaint
alleges
Gutierrez's
negligent
assignment
of
the
lease
to
an
unreliable
tenant,
leading
to
property
damage
and
emotional
distress,
and
that
declaration
evidence
of
the
assignee's
destructive
conduct
is
sufficient
to
state
claims
under
Civil
Code
section
1714
and
CACI
No.
400
.
Plaintiffs
also
assert
that
the
elder
abuse
claim
is
supported
by
evidence
of
Plaintiffs'
age
and
the
distress
caused
by
Gutierrez's
inaction.
The
Court
finds
the
Complaint
does
not
contain
specific
factual
allegations
against
Gutierrez
for
the
tort
claims,
and
Plaintiffs'
opposition
does
not
cure
this
deficiency.
No
genuine
dispute
exists
as
to
the
sufficiency
of
the
tort
claims
against
Gutierrez.
Conclusion
*5
Defendant
Encarnacion
Gutierrez
has
met
his
burden
of
demonstrating
the
absence
of
triable
issues
of
material
fact
as
to
all
causes
of
action
alleged
by
Plaintiffs.
Defendant
Encarnacion
Gutierrez's
Motion
for
Summary
Judgment
is
GRANTED
in
its
entirety.
*****END
OF
COURT
ORDERS
RE
MOTION
FOR
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT****
Order
to
Show
Cause
Re:
Sanctions
for
Plaintiff's
Violation
of
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
section
128.7(b)(2)
is
scheduled
for
12/09/2025
at
08:30
AM
in
Department
X
at
Alhambra
Courthouse.
Moving
party
to
give
notice.
End
of
Document
©
2026
Thomson
Reuters.
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claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
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