Mareiorozyan v. Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC (2025)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Mareiorozyan v. Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, 2025 WL 3669607 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3669607 (Cal.Super.) (Trial Order)Superior Court of California,Civil Division,Northwest District, Van Nuys Courthouse East, Department U.Los Angeles CountySargis MAREIOROZYAN,v.AUTOMOBILI LAMBORGHINI AMERICA, LLC, et al.No. 23VECV04028.November 19, 2025.*1 8:30 AMJudicial Assistant: R. DuronCourtroom Assistant: E. Vince CruzCSR: Jewlie Weldon #10098 via LACCERM: NoneDeputy Sheriff: NoneEditor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.OrderJim WhitworthVia LACourtConnect, for plaintiff(s).Shaun Kim Via LACourtConnect; Nicholas Moss and Anthony Angelo MolinoVia LACourtConnect, for defendant(s).Honorable Valerie Salkin, Judge.NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Trial Setting Conference; Hearing on Motion for Summary Judgment; Hearing on Motionto Disqualify CounselPursuant to Government Code sections 68086, 70044, and California Rules of Court, rule 2.956, Jewlie Weldon #10098 viaLACC, certified shorthand reporter is appointed as an official Court reporter pro tempore in these proceedings, and is orderedto comply with the terms of the Court Reporter Agreement. The Order is signed and filed this date.The matters are called for hearing.The Court reads and considers the moving papers, opposition, and reply, if any.The Court's tentative is emailed to parties.TENTATIVE RULING
Mareiorozyan v. Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, 2025 WL 3669607 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2BACKGROUNDThis case is a lemon law action filed by Plaintiff Sargis Mareiorozyan against Defendants Automobili Lamborghini America,LLC (“ALA”) and Midway HFCA LLC (“Midway”).On September 12, 2023, Plaintiff filed his complaint against Defendants, alleging breaches of express and implied warrantiesin violation of the Song-Beverly Consumer Warranty Act.On October 23, 2023, ALA filed its answer to the complaint.On July 29, 2024, Midway filed its answer to the complaint.On February 28, 2025, the Court granted ALA's motion for an order compelling Plaintiff's deposition. The Court awarded ALAsanctions against Plaintiff in the total amount of $1,920.00.On May 5, 2025, Cross-Complainant Midway filed its cross-complaint against Cross-Defendant ALA, seeking/alleging: (1)equitable indemnification; (2) comparative contribution; and (3) declaratory relief.On May 23, 2025, Midway filed its motion for summary judgment.On June 13, 2025, Midway filed its motion to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel.On June 24, 2025, ALA filed its answer to Midway's cross-complaint.On October 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed his brief in opposition to the disqualification motion. Plaintiff's opposition brief wasuntimely given that the disqualification motion was originally calendared for October 13, 2025. See Code Civ. Proc., § 1005(b) (opposition due 9 court days before hearing).Also on October 10, 2025, Midway filed its objection to Plaintiff's untimely opposition.On October 13, 2025, the Court continued the hearing on the disqualification motion to give the Court time to review Plaintiff'sbelated opposition brief based on Plaintiff's counsel's representation that the brief was late due to his ongoing health issues.On October 16, 2025, Midway filed its reply brief as to the disqualification motion.On October 30, 2025, Plaintiff filed his opposition as to the summary judgment motion.On November 7, 2025, Midway filed its reply brief as to the summary judgment motion.LEGAL STANDARDMotion for Summary JudgmentThe purpose of a motion for summary judgment “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadingsin order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute.” Aguilar v. AtlanticRichfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843; Code Civ. Proc., § 437c (c). Courts “liberally construe the evidence in support ofthe party opposing summary judgment or summary adjudication and resolve doubts concerning the evidence in favor of thatparty.” Dore v. Arnold Worldwide, Inc. (2006) 39 Cal.4th 384, 389. However, if all inferences reasonably deducible from thesubmitted evidence are uncontradicted by other inferences and there is no triable issue as to any material fact, the moving party
Mareiorozyan v. Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, 2025 WL 3669607 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. Code Civ. Proc., § 437c (c); Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7Cal.App.4th 1110, 1119.Motion to Disqualify Counsel*2 “A trial court's authority to disqualify an attorney derives from the power inherent in every court to control in furtheranceof justice, the conduct of its ministerial officers, and of all other persons in any manner connected with a judicial proceedingbefore it, in every matter pertaining thereto.” Kennedy v. Eldridge (2011) 201 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1204 (Kennedy), quotingGreat Lakes Construction, Inc. v. Burman (2010) 186 Cal.App.4th 1347, 1355.OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCEPlaintiff objects to evidence submitted in support of Midway's motion for summary judgment. Midway objects to evidencesubmitted by Plaintiff in opposition to the motion.For purposes of the instant motion for summary judgment, both sides' objections are overruled. See Reid v. Google, Inc. (2010)50 Cal.4th 512, 531-533 (written evidentiary objections made before hearing avoid waiver regardless of trial court determinationas to admissibility of evidence subject to said objections).DISCUSSIONMidway moves for summary judgment. Midway also moves to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel.The motion for summary judgment will be granted. The motion to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel will be denied as moot, butwithout prejudice.Review of Allegations in the ComplaintPlaintiff pleads ALA manufactured the vehicle that is the subject of this lemon law dispute (the “Vehicle”). Plaintiff pleads heleased the Vehicle for personal or household purposes from an authorized dealer. Plaintiff pleads the Vehicle came with a “newcar” warranty. Plaintiff pleads the “new car” warranty covered “any repairs or replacement of parts necessary to ensure that the[Vehicle] and [its] components [] were free from all defects in material and workmanship.” (Complaint, ¶¶ 6-9.)Plaintiff pleads he returned the Vehicle to the dealer for repairs. Plaintiff pleads the Vehicle continued to exhibit defects andmalfunctions. Plaintiff pleads he notified the dealer. Plaintiff pleads Defendants failed to make the Vehicle conform to theapplicable warranty after a reasonable number of repair attempts. Plaintiff pleads that in April of 2023, he discovered Defendantswere unable or unwilling to make the Vehicle conform to the applicable warranty. (Complaint, ¶¶ 10-14.)Review of Midway's Submitted EvidenceMidway submits the following evidence in support of its motion for summary judgment:The declarations of Nicholas Moss, counsel for Midway;The declaration of Thomas Murphy, counsel for Midway;A copy of a purchase agreement reflecting Midway's purchase of the Vehicle (Exh. 1);
Mareiorozyan v. Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, 2025 WL 3669607 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4A copy of a lease agreement by which Plaintiff leased the Vehicle from Midway (Exh. 2);A copy of an auto debit authorization form related to Plaintiff's lease (Exh. 3);A copy of a statement of information form (Exh. 4);A copy of Plaintiff's business tax form provided upon entering the lease (Exh. 5);Copies of discovery demands and document productions (Exhs. 6, 8, 9);A copy of a repair order produced in discovery (Exh. 7);A copy of a document wherein Plaintiff refused to allow Midway to sell the Vehicle (Exh. 10);A copy of Plaintiff's 998 offer with ALA (Exh. 11);Copies of federal authorities (Exhs. 12-17, 27);Copies of Westlaw search queries wherein Midway's counsel attempted to locate authorities cited in Plaintiff's opposition briefand copies of legal authorities located thereby (Exhs. 18-23);*3 Copies of search pages from Justia.com and Google Scholar and a copy of a legal authority located thereby (Exhs. 24-26);andA copy of email communication between counsel for Midway and counsel for ALA confirming ALA's performance of itsobligations under the 998 offer (Exh. 28).Midway's submitted evidence shows Midway primarily engages in the business of leasing vehicles to retail buyers. On June14, 2021, Midway purchased the Vehicle (a new 2021 Lamborghini Urus) from Lamborghini Rancho Mirage (the “Dealer”).On June 14, 2021, the Dealer performed a pre-delivery inspection of the Vehicle, which revealed no issues. (SUMF #1-3.)On June 15, 2021, Midway leased the Vehicle to Plaintiff under the terms of a Motor Vehicle Lease Agreement (the “MVLA”).The MVLA states, “The vehicle will be used for personal, family or household purposes. However, if you initial below, theVehicle will be used primarily for business purposes.” Plaintiff initialed in the noted area to indicate the Vehicle would be usedprimarily for business purposes. (SUMF #4-5.)When Plaintiff entered the Lease, Midway required that Plaintiff sign an “Auto Debit Authorization” form to provide details ofa bank account from which the monthly Lease payments would be debited. In lieu of completing the Auto Debit Authorizationform, Plaintiff provided a voided check associated with an account held in the name of Picasso Auto Collision, Inc. (“Picasso”),Plaintiff's business. Upon entering the Lease, Plaintiff provided Midway with a tax return and Statement of Information fromthe Secretary of State to prove Plaintiff was Picasso's sole owner. The $30,000.00 down payment for the Lease was drawn fromPicasso's bank account. Plaintiff purchased the Vehicle primarily for business purposes. (SUMF #6-10.)Page two (2) of the Lease states, “You expressly agree and understand that you have selected and agreed to lease the vehicle ‘AsIs'. Even if the vehicle is subject to a warranty, WE MAKE NO WARRANTY EITHER EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, AS TO THECONDITION OF THE VEHICLE OR ANY PART OR ACCESSORY OF THE VEHICLE, ITS MERCHANTABILITY ORFITNESS FOR ANY PARTICULAR PURPOSE, or as to any obvious or hidden defects in material, workmanship or otherwise.No such defect or unfitness shall in any way affect your obligations to comply with terms of this Lease.” (SUMF #11.)
Mareiorozyan v. Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, 2025 WL 3669607 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Page four (4), paragraph 20(a) of the Lease states, “MAINTENANCE, REPAIRS, AND OPERATING EXPENSES. You, at yoursole cost and expense, will: (1) maintain the Vehicle In accordance with the manufacturer's warranty maintenance schedule andkeep documentation as proof; (2) Immediately make all necessary and required repairs and purchase only manufacturer approvedparts which will accrue to our benefits and become our property; (3) pay all costs and expenses of whatever nature resulting fromthe use and operation of the Vehicle, including, but not limited to, expenses for gasoline, oil, lubrication, antifreeze, adjustments,tune-ups, repairs, tires, tubes, storage, parking, washing, tools, tolls, fines, towing and servicing of any kind; and (4) complywith all recall notices.” Plaintiff's signature appears directly under paragraph 20(A) of the Lease. (SUMF #12.)*4 On May 24, 2022, Plaintiff or Plaintiff's agent brought the Vehicle to Lamborghini of Beverly Hills where a certifiedtechnician performed an inspection and determined there were no issues. On October 6, 2022, Plaintiff brought the Vehicleto Lamborghini of Westlake Village (the “Repair Facility”) complaining of issues with the transmission and safety system.The transmission issue was caused by a wrong tire fitted on the Vehicle by Plaintiff. The safety warning light was a one-timeoccurrence according to the Vehicle fault log and possibly occurred when Plaintiff modified the Vehicle's driver seat. Plaintifftook the Vehicle to the Repair Facility at multiple points to address these issues. (SUMF #13-16.)In December of 2023, Plaintiff missed a monthly payment due to Midway. Midway then used a vehicle tracking device todetermine the Vehicle was being stored at the Repair Facility. The Repair Facility reported to Midway that the Vehicle had beenabandoned there by Plaintiff. The Repair Facility informed Midway that it intended to sell the Vehicle because of its apparentabandonment. (SUMF #17-20.)In January of 2024, Midway paid $6,120.00 to the Repair Facility to recover possession of the Vehicle. After Midway recoveredpossession, Plaintiff paid the overdue balance arising from his missed Lease payment. On February 2, 2024, Midway sentPlaintiff a notice of intent to dispose of the Vehicle based on Plaintiff's missed payment. Midway continues to maintainpossession of the Vehicle. On February 11, 2025, Midway requested, though counsel, that Plaintiff consent to Midway sellingthe Vehicle. Plaintiff refused. (SUMF #21-27.)On April 25, 2025, Plaintiff signed a 998 offer from ALA whereby Plaintiff agreed to dismiss his case against ALA in exchangefor $150,000.00, including attorneys' fees. There is an outstanding balance on the Lease of $230,264.10 owed to Midway.Midway agreed to forgo its right to collect on the Lease in exchange for Plaintiff's dismissal of Midway. Plaintiff did not respondto Midway's offer. (SUMF #28-30.)There is no duration for the express warranty stated in the Lease, thus the warranty expired after one year. See Civ. Code, §1791.1 (c). (SUMF #31.)Review of Plaintiff's Submitted EvidencePlaintiff submits the following evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment:Plaintiff's declaration;Copies of repair orders (Exh. A);Copies of ALA's responses to Plaintiff's discovery demands (Exh. B); andA copy of an account statement showing Plaintiff's account as paid in full (Exh. C).Plaintiff's submitted evidence shows that he purchased the Vehicle from Midway on June 15, 2021, for $235,113.04. Plaintiffpresents declaration testimony stating that all repairs were performed under warranty. Repair orders produced by ALA alsoindicate the Repair Facility's repairs were performed under warranty. (SUMF #1-5.)
Mareiorozyan v. Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, 2025 WL 3669607 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Plaintiff attests, “The vehicle was not repaired after 30 days.” Plaintiff does not explain why he left the Vehicle with the RepairFacility for several months. After several months, Midway took possession from the Repair Facility. (SUMF #6-7.)Plaintiff provides testimony that he has never been late on his payments under the Lease. Plaintiff provides a copy of screenshotof an account statement for amounts owed under the Lease. Though the account statement is incomplete and does not show ahistory of all payments made, the account statement indicates no payment is currently due. (SUMF #8; Plaintiff decl., Exh. C.)Plaintiff attests, “I used this vehicle for personal reasons as I testified to. I ran a body shop there was no way to help me repairvehicles and use for business purposes. All boxes were checked because Midway said check here as the arrows show.” (SUMF#9-11; Plaintiff decl., 10.)*5 The Court will not deny the motion on grounds of untimeliness.Plaintiff argues the Court should deny Midway's motion because Midway did not file its motion before the first trial date asrequired under Code of Civil Procedure section 437c (a)(3). Plaintiff misstates the law regarding when a motion for summaryjudgment must be filed and heard.A motion for summary judgment “shall be heard no later than 30 days before the date of trial, unless the court for good causeorders otherwise. The filing of the motion shall not extend the time within which a party must otherwise file a responsivepleading.” Code Civ. Proc., § 437c (a)(3). “[T]he 30-day time limit on summary judgment hearings should be calculated basedon the trial date in existence when the motion is noticed regardless of whether that date is the original trial date or not.” Greenv. Bristol Myers Co. (1988) 206 Cal.App.3d 604, 609 (emphasis added).There is a trial setting conference set for November 19, 2025. No trial date is currently set. Nor was there a trial date set as ofMay 23, 2025, when Midway filed its motion. Midway's motion was timely filed.The motion for summary judgment will be granted.Midway moves for summary judgment on several grounds, including that Plaintiff is not entitled to protection under the Song-Beverly Act because Plaintiff leased the Vehicle primarily for business purposes. The Court agrees with Midway.Only buyers or lessees of consumer goods are entitled to protection under the Song-Beverly Act. Atkinson v. Elk Corp. (2003)109 Cal.App.4th 739, 757 (Atkinson). “‘Consumer goods' means any new product or part thereof that is used, bought, or leasedfor use primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, except for clothing and consumables. ‘Consumer goods' shallinclude new and used assistive devices sold at retail.” Civ. Code, § 1791 (a).Midway leased the Vehicle to Plaintiff under the terms of the MVLA. The MVLA states, “The vehicle will be used for personal,family or household purposes. However, if you initial below, the Vehicle will be used primarily for business purposes.” Plaintiffinitialed in the noted area to indicate the Vehicle would be used primarily for business purposes.Plaintiff attests, “I used this vehicle for personal reasons as I testified to. I ran a body shop there was no way to help me repairvehicles and use for business purposes. All boxes were checked because Midway said check here as the arrows show.” (Plaintiffdecl., 10.) Plaintiff presents no other evidence to support his position that the Vehicle was purchased primarily for personal use.Plaintiff's self-serving declaration testimony is insufficient to raise a triable fact issue as to whether the Vehicle was leasedprimarily for personal or business purposes. On the face of the MVLA, Plaintiff warranted to Midway that he intended to use theleased Vehicle for business purposes. If, as Plaintiff attests, Plaintiff subsequently used the Vehicle for personal purposes, that
Mareiorozyan v. Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, 2025 WL 3669607 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7does not change the fact that Plaintiff's contract with Midway was for the lease of a Vehicle to be used for business purposes. Asa matter of law, such a Vehicle is not a “consumer good” within the meaning of the Song-Beverly Act. See Civ. Code, § 1791 (a).*6 Other evidence supports Midway's position that Plaintiff agreed to use the Vehicle for primarily business purposes. WhenPlaintiff entered the Lease, Midway required that Plaintiff sign an “Auto Debit Authorization” form to provide details of a bankaccount from which the monthly Lease payments would be debited. In lieu of completing the Auto Debit Authorization form,Plaintiff provided a voided check associated with an account held in the name of Picasso, Plaintiff's business. Upon entering theLease, Plaintiff provided Midway with a tax return and Statement of Information from the Secretary of State to prove Plaintiffwas Picasso's sole owner. The $30,000.00 down payment for the Lease was drawn from Picasso's bank account.Aside from a single, self-serving paragraph in Plaintiff's declaration, all evidence indicates Plaintiff purchased the Vehicleprimarily for business purposes. Plaintiff's opposition brief includes no legal or factual argument to support his position that hepurchased the Vehicle primarily for personal use. Under these circumstances, there is no genuine triable fact issue as to whetherthe Vehicle was used primarily for business purposes. Plaintiff has no Song-Beverly Act claim against Midway as a matter oflaw. See Atkinson, supra, 109 Cal.App.4th at p. 757.The motion for summary judgment will be granted.The Court strongly admonishes Plaintiff's counsel for including citations to a nonexistent case to support a legal position inPlaintiff's opposition brief.Plaintiff's opposition brief cites to “FCA US LLC v. Superior Court, 51 Cal.App.5th 1069 (2020).” (Opposition, p. 11:10.) Nosuch case exists. Midway persuasively argues Plaintiff's citation to a nonexistent case resulted from counsel's improper use ofartificial intelligence to draft the opposition brief. (See Moss decl., ¶¶ 8-30.)“There is no room in our court system for the submission of fake, hallucinated case citations, facts, or law. And it is entirelypreventable by competent counsel who do their jobs properly and competently.” Noland v. Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114Cal.App.5th 426, 449, quoting Versant Funding LLC v. Teras Breakbulk Ocean Navigation Enters., LLC (S.D.Fla. May 20,2025, No. 17-cv-81140) 2025 LX 86303.Midway's counsel makes a compelling argument that Plaintiff's use of a nonexistent case citation was the result of Plaintiff'scounsel's improper use of artificial intelligence to draft the opposition brief.The Court considered imposing sanctions on Plaintiff's counsel and ordering reporting to the State Bar. However, in light ofthe Court's ruling against Plaintiff on the summary judgment motion, the Court elects not to impose monetary sanctions againstPlaintiff's counsel at this time and not to report Counsel's misconduct to the State Bar. The Court strongly admonishes Plaintiff'scounsel for including a citation to a nonexistent case to support a legal position in Plaintiff's opposition brief. If the nonexistentcitation was the result of counsel using AI, counsel is warned that such conduct clearly falls below acceptable standards ofconduct for attorneys working in our court system. Repeated instances of this misconduct will result in sanctions.The motion to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel will be denied as moot but without prejudice.Midway moves to disqualify Plaintiff's counsel.The Court originally sent out at tentative ruling granting Midway's disqualification motion on the following grounds:“Upon review of Midway's submitted evidence, it is apparent that Mr. Whitworth has a personal grievance against opposingcounsel that has affected his judgment in this case. Mr. Whitworth has specifically tied his client's prospects for a settlement tohis feelings about opposing counsel having pursued a debt against his wife. Mr. Whitworth has repeatedly used unprofessional
Mareiorozyan v. Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, 2025 WL 3669607 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8language to respond to opposing counsel and malign their client. Mr. Whitworth illegally recorded opposing counsel's phonecall without their consent.*7 “In sum, the Court agrees with Midway that Mr. Whitworth is improperly embroiled and conflicted in this case. An orderdisqualifying Mr. Whitworth from representing Plaintiff in this action is warranted in the furtherance of justice. Neither Plaintiffnor Mr. Whitworth filed a brief to argue the Court should find otherwise. Under these circumstances, the Court elects to exerciseits inherent power to control the conduct of this judicial proceeding by disqualifying Mr. Whitworth from representing Plaintiffand from further participation in this case. See Kennedy, supra, 201 Cal.App.4th at p. 1204.”On October 10, 2025, Plaintiff filed his untimely brief in opposition to the disqualification motion. On October 13, 2025, theCourt continued the hearing on the disqualification motion to give the Court time to review Plaintiff's belated opposition briefbased on Plaintiff's counsel's representation that the brief was late due to his ongoing health issues.The Court has now reviewed and considered Plaintiff's opposition brief. The opposition brief cites Rules of Professional Conductand several legal authorities related to motions to disqualify counsel. The opposition brief does not set forth any cogent rationalefor why the motion for disqualification should be denied.Given that the Court is granting the motion for summary judgment, there will likely be no further proceedings in this case. Ifthere is additional litigation in this case, the Court will revisit the issue of whether Plaintiff's counsel should be disqualified. Inthe meantime, the motion to disqualify will be denied (without prejudice) as moot.CONCLUSIONDefendant Midway HFCA LLC's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Sargis Mareiorozyan's Complaint is GRANTED.Defendant Midway HFCA LLC's motion to disqualify Attorney Jim Whitworth from representing Plaintiff Sargis Mareiorozyanand/or further participating in this action is DENIED without prejudice as moot.Defendant Midway HFCA LLC is ORDERED to give notice.The Court hears arguments.The Court having fully considered the arguments of all parties, both written and oral, now rules as follows:The Court adopts its tentative ruling as the order of the Court.Defendant Midway HFCA LLC's motion for summary judgment as to Plaintiff Sargis Mareiorozyan's Complaint is GRANTED.The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by MIDWAY HFCA LLC on 05/23/2025 is Granted.Defendant Midway HFCA LLC's motion to disqualify Attorney Jim Whitworth from representing Plaintiff Sargis Mareiorozyanand/or further participating in this action is DENIED without prejudice as moot.The Court sets the case for trial.Final Status Conference is scheduled for 05/28/2026 at 09:00 AM in Department U at Van Nuys Courthouse East.Jury Trial is scheduled for 06/08/2026 at 10:00 AM in Department U at Van Nuys Courthouse East.
Mareiorozyan v. Automobili Lamborghini America, LLC, 2025 WL 3669607 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9All parties and counsel are advised that the Court will not continue this trial including by stipulation, unless there is good causedue to extenuating circumstances. Failure to prepare does not constitute good cause.All counsel and all self-represented litigants are ordered to visit the court's website at www.lacourt.org, and under the Civil tabto access the courtroom documents for Department U which give deadlines and instructions regarding case management andtrial orders as well as orders related to the final status conference and preparation and service of all trial documents. All counseland all self-represented litigants are ordered to be in compliance with all posted orders contained within that portal. Counseland all self-represented litigants are ordered to submit all trial documents including Motion in Limine notebooks, Joint Exhibitbooks (All exhibits must be pre-numbered and internally paginated), Joint Jury Instructions, and Joint Statement of thecase, at least ten (10) days prior to the Final Status Conference.*8 Motions in Limine shall be in Joint integrated notebooks tabbed Motion, Opposition, and Reply.Non-Appearance Case Review Entry of Judgment is scheduled for 12/17/2025 at 08:30 AM in Department U at Van NuysCourthouse East.Defendant Midway HFCA LLC is ORDERED to give notice.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access