Patterson v. Digital Fed. Credit Union (June 23, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Trina R. Patterson v. Digital Federal Credit Union
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
June 23, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
TRINA R. PATTERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DIGITAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,..., Not Reported inCal.Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1803128Not Officially Published(Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, restrictscitation of unpublished opinions in California courts.NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTSCalifornia Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibitscourts and parties from citing or relying onopinions not certified for publication or orderedpublished, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).This opinion has not been certified for publicationor ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.TRINA R. PATTERSON,Plaintiff and Appellant,v.DIGITAL FEDERAL CREDITUNION, Defendant and Respondent.E085332|Filed 06/23/2026Editor's Note: This document contains discussion ofunverified citations, likely generated by AI tools used by aparty or counsel. These citations are not attributable to theCourt. The unverified citations have been preserved as part ofthe official record, but links are unavailable.(Super.Ct.No. CVCO2403624)APPEAL from the Superior Court of Riverside County.Daniel A. Ottolia, Judge. Affirmed with directions.Attorneys and Law FirmsTrina R. Patterson, in pro. per., for Plaintiff and Appellant.Katten Muchin Rosenman, Stuart M. Richter, and AshleyTaylor Brines for Defendant and Respondent.OPINIONMENETREZ J.*1 Trina Patterson appeals from a judgment of dismissalfollowing an order sustaining with leave to amend a demurrerfiled by Digital Federal Credit Union (Digital Federal).Patterson did not file an amended pleading. We affirm thejudgment.BACKGROUNDIn June 2024, Patterson filed a pro se “petition for entryof default administrative judgment, satisfaction of lien,damages, and injunctive relief” against Digital Federal.(Capitalization omitted.) The pleading was accompanied by44 pages of exhibits.We assume the truth of the material allegations in theoperative pleading for present purposes, because this case ison appeal at the demurrer stage. (Roe v. Hesperia UnifiedSchool Dist. (2022) 85 Cal.App.5th 13, 18 (Roe).)According to the petition and attachments, in June 2019Patterson signed three loan agreements with Digital Federal,concerning an auto loan, a personal loan, and a credit card.In 2023, Digital Federal sent Patterson past due notices on allthree accounts. In September 2023, Patterson had (1) a pastdue balance of $799.69 on her auto loan, which had a principalbalance of $7,605.35, (2) a past due balance of $376.54 onher personal loan, which had a principal balance of $2,774.04,and (3) a past due balance of $9,500.85 on her credit card.Each notice contained a section with the heading “PLEASEDETACH AND SEND BOTTOM PORTION WITH YOURREMITTANCE,” including a statement of the amount dueand a blank space for Patterson to fill in the “AMOUNTENCLOSED.”On October 10, 2023, Patterson sent Digital Federal “Non-Negotiable Notices of Acceptance, for each account ... withthe accepted presentments attached to the Notices ....” Thenotices were signed by Patterson. Patterson stated that shehad received Digital Federal's “[p]resentment” of the pastdue notices and “return[ed] [Digital Federal's] offer hereinattached to you.” She attached Digital Federal's past duenotices, on which she had written the full outstanding balancefor each loan in the blank “AMOUNT ENCLOSED” box.Underneath that box on each notice, she wrote, “ ‘Accepted’October 7, 2023,” followed by her signature. Patterson“request[ed] discharge,” advised Digital Federal to “[p]lease
TRINA R. PATTERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DIGITAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,..., Not Reported inCal.Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2respond within three (5) days from the date you receivethis non-negotiable notice of acceptance,” and warned that“[d]ishonor may result if you fail to respond and comply.”Digital Federal did not respond to those notices.Over the next several months, Patterson sent Digital Federalnumerous additional notices. Those notices advised DigitalFederal that it was in default because it did not respondto Patterson's previous notices, and the subsequent noticesgave Digital Federal an opportunity to cure that default.Digital Federal did not respond to those notices. Pattersonthen notified Digital Federal that by failing to respond tonotices of acceptance, Digital Federal had tacitly agreed to theterms of those notices. In early December 2023, Patterson sentDigital Federal final statements and a notarized affidavit. Inthe final statements, Patterson advised Digital Federal that its“letter [was] not in compliance with U.C.C. § 9-208(2)” andthat each of her accounts consequently had a balance of zero.Patterson directed Digital Federal to remove “all negativereporting to all credit bureaus.”*2 In January 2024, a notary public sent Digital Federala “notice of protest and opportunity to cure,” alongwith a notarized affidavit from Patterson. (Capitalization,boldfacing, and underscoring omitted.) Later that month, thesame notary public signed a “certificate of dishonor,” whichshe also notarized. (Boldfacing and capitalization omitted.)On the basis of information provided by Patterson, the notarystates in the certificate that Digital Federal had “dishonoredTrina R. Patterson's three presentments by non-acceptanceand/or non-performance and have therefore assented to theTerms and Conditions of said non-negotiable notice ofacceptance contract.” (Capitalization omitted.)In April 2024, Patterson filed a form entitled “UCC FinancingStatement (UCC-1)” with the California Secretary of State.It identifies Digital Federal as the debtor and Patterson asthe secured party. In the form, Patterson asserted that shehad “exhausted her Administrative Process in accordancewith the Uniform Commercial Code” and that “[d]ue toDebtor's default, non-response and failure to rebut SecuredParty's Affidavit, Debtor has tacitly agreed to the termsand conditions of Secured Party's Non-Negotiable Notice ofAcceptance and have agreed to pay Secured Party damages”totaling $128,625.Patterson filed her petition in the superior court two monthslater. The petition alleges a single cause of action for“judgment for satisfaction of lien and damages.” Pattersonpetitioned the court “to render a Judgment that directs[Digital Federal] to release all claims on [her] SubjectPersonal Property and pay [Patterson] damages in theamount requested on the filed UCC.-1 Financing Statement.”Patterson alleged that Digital Federal had “lost their right tocontest this Petition via estoppel through acquiescence” andhad “abandoned their right to answer, oppose and appeal.”She alleged that the matter had been resolved by the “privateadministrative process” that she initiated, apparently via thevarious notices that she sent to Digital Federal.The petition's prayer for relief sought a judgment statingthat all three loan accounts were paid in full, requiringremoval of all “derogatory reporting with the credit bureaus”in relation to all three loans, awarding damages in the amountof $128,625, and directing Digital Federal to take no furtheraction against Patterson.Digital Federal demurred to the single cause of action inthe petition on several grounds. Digital Federal argued thatthe cause of action and the entire pleading were uncertain.Digital Federal also argued that the petition failed to statea cause of action because “judgment for satisfaction of lienand damages” is not a cognizable claim. Digital Federaladditionally argued that even if it were a cognizable claim,the petition still failed to state a claim upon which reliefcould be granted, because Patterson did not allege that shehad repaid the loans, and she could not unilaterally modifythe loan agreements to discharge her obligation to pay theoutstanding balances. Patterson opposed the demurrer.The trial court held a combined hearing in August 2024on Patterson's request for entry of default judgment and onDigital Federal's demurrer. No court reporter was present.According to the minute order on the demurrer, the courthad issued a tentative ruling, and neither party requested oralargument. The court ordered the tentative ruling to becomeits final ruling and sustained the demurrer with 30 days leaveto amend.After 30 days had passed since the court sustained thedemurrer, Digital Federal filed an ex parte application todismiss the action because Patterson did not file an amendedpleading. The court deemed the filing a motion and gavePatterson an opportunity to file written opposition, whichshe did not do. At a later hearing on the motion, the courtadopted its tentative ruling, granted the motion, and dismissedthe action with prejudice for failure to amend the pleadingafter the demurrer was sustained. The tentative ruling is not
TRINA R. PATTERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DIGITAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,..., Not Reported inCal.Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3included in the record on appeal. The court entered judgmentin favor of Digital Federal.DISCUSSIONI. Governing principles of appellate law*3 We presume that an appealed judgment is correct.(Jameson v. Desta (2018) 5 Cal.5th 594, 609; Denham v.Superior Court (1970) 2 Cal.3d 557, 564.) The appellantbears the burden of affirmatively demonstrating error andproviding an adequate record on appeal. (Jameson, at p.609.) To carry that burden, the appellant must provide “thereviewing court with some cogent argument supported bylegal analysis and citation to the record.” (City of Santa Mariav. Adam (2012) 211 Cal.App.4th 266, 286-287; Cal. Rulesof Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) & (C).) The appellant cannotcarry that burden by citing broad ranges of pages in therecord, rather than the specific pages on which particularfacts can be found, because we are “unable to adequatelyevaluate which facts the parties believe support their positionswhen nothing more than a block page reference is offeredin the briefs.” (Bernard v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. (1991) 226Cal.App.3d 1203, 1204-1205; Duarte v. Chino CommunityHospital (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th 849, 856.) All of thoseprinciples apply to self-represented litigants. (Nwosu v. Uba(2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246; First American Title Co.v. Mirzaian (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 956, 958, fn. 1.)II. Failure to state a claimPatterson contends that the trial court erred by sustainingDigital Federal's demurrer.1 We are not persuaded.We independently review a trial court's ruling on a demurrer.(Roe, supra, 85 Cal.App.5th at p. 23.) We accept the truthof properly pleaded material facts and consider any mattersthat may be judicially noticed. (Consumer Cause, Inc. v.Arkopharma, Inc. (2003) 106 Cal.App.4th 824, 827; LosAngeles Waterkeeper v. State Water Resources Control Bd.(2023) 92 Cal.App.5th 230, 264.) We determine whether thefacts are sufficient as a matter of law “to state a cause of actionunder any legal theory.” (T.H. v. Novartis PharmaceuticalsCorp. (2017) 4 Cal.5th 145, 162.)“In order to prevail on appeal from an order sustaining ademurrer, the appellant must affirmatively demonstrate error.Specifically, the appellant must show that the facts pleadedare sufficient to establish every element of a cause of actionand overcome all legal grounds on which the trial courtsustained the demurrer.” (Scott v. JPMorgan Chase Bank,N.A. (2013) 214 Cal.App.4th 743, 752 (Scott).) “We willaffirm the ruling if there is any ground on which the demurrercould have been properly sustained.” (Ibid.)If a plaintiff is given the opportunity to amend the pleadingand elects not to, then we presume that the plaintiff stated “asstrong a case as” they could. (Le Mere v. Los Angeles UnifiedSchool Dist. (2019) 35 Cal.App.5th 237, 243 (Le Mere).)Under those circumstances, “ ‘we will affirm the judgmentif the complaint is objectionable on any ground raised in thedemurrer.’ ” (Ibid.)The single cause of action alleged in the pleading is “judgmentfor satisfaction of lien and damages.” Patterson has not carriedher burden of demonstrating what facts are sufficient toestablish every element of that purported cause of action.(Scott, supra, 214 Cal.App.4th at p. 752.) Digital Federalargued in its demurrer that the cause of action does not exist.In her opening brief, Patterson has not provided any legalauthority for the proposition that such a cause of action doesexist. We are aware of none. Moreover, even if we were toassume that such a cause of action does exist, Patterson hasnot identified the elements of the cause of action, so she hasnot carried her burden of showing that her pleading allegedsufficient facts as to each element. (Ibid.)In her opening brief, Patterson asserts that she sufficientlypled a claim for declaratory relief. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1060.)Patterson's entire argument on the point reads as follows:“Additionally, Civil Code § 1060 [sic] allows a party to seekdeclaratory relief to determine rights and duties under law.Appellant sufficiently stated in her Petition facts establishinga real and substantial controversy. Her claims were notonly adequately pleaded—they were proven by unrebuttedevidence. The trial court's denial constituted legal error.” Theargument fails. Patterson does not identify the elements ofa claim for declaratory relief under Code of Civil Proceduresection 1060 and does not identify the factual allegations inher pleading that correspond to those elements. (Scott, supra,214 Cal.App.4th at p. 752.) We will not develop Patterson'sargument for her. (Pacific Bell Telephone Co. v. County ofPlacer (2025) 111 Cal.App.5th 634, 640 (Pacific Bell).)*4 More generally, Patterson's opening brief does not citeany specific factual allegations in her pleading. The onlycitations to the clerk's transcript are in the introduction andstatement of the case. The statement of the case contains two
TRINA R. PATTERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DIGITAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,..., Not Reported inCal.Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4citations to her pleading: One citation is to the entire 62-pagepetition, including exhibits, and the other is to the 44 pagesof exhibits. Similarly, the introduction cites all 44 pages ofexhibits and then separately cites one exhibit, the “certificateof dishonor.” (Boldfacing and capitalization omitted.) Thebrief never cites any specific factual allegations that couldstate a claim under any legal theory. Again, we will notdevelop Patterson's arguments for her. (Pacific Bell, supra,111 Cal.App.5th at p. 640.)III. Remaining argumentsPatterson makes numerous additional arguments challengingthe trial court's ruling. None is meritorious.First, many of the arguments Patterson makes are notsupported by citation to any legal authority or supportedby any legal analysis. For example, Patterson contends thatthe demurrer was procedurally and substantively improperbecause she filed a petition and not a complaint. Patterson'sexplanation of the allegedly material differences between thetwo types of pleadings is not supported by citation to legalauthority or legal analysis. Arguments that are not supportedby citation to legal authority and analysis are forfeited. (Tellezv. Rich Voss Trucking, Inc. (2015) 240 Cal.App.4th 1052,1066 (Tellez).) Again, we will not develop an appellant'sarguments for them. (Pacific Bell, supra, 111 Cal.App.5th atp. 640.)Second, Patterson's opening brief contains citations to casesthat do not exist, citations to cases that do not stand for thepropositions for which they are cited, and quotations that donot appear in the authorities cited.2 For example, Pattersonerroneously cites People v. Superior Court (Romero) (1996)13 Cal.4th 497, 518 for the proposition that both the UniformCommercial Code and the California Uniform CommercialCode are binding statutory authority, so “[o]nce invoked,courts are obligated to enforce their provisions.” (Emphasisomitted.) Romero is a criminal case that has nothing to dowith either the Uniform Commercial Code or the CaliforniaUniform Commercial Code. (Romero, at pp. 504-532.) Inaddition, Patterson cited numerous cases that do not exist,including: Hagood v. Sony Corp. of America (7th Cir. 1988)846 F.2d 1145; Dantzler Lumber & Export Co. v. ColumbiaForest Products, Inc. (5th Cir. 2004) 116 Fed.App'x 632;In re White (Bankr. D. Mass. 2002) 287 B.R. 577; In rePrevo's Market, Inc. (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1990) 12 UCC Rep.Serv. 2d 1177; In re Clark (Bankr. N.D. Iowa 2001) 2001WL 1806036; West Covina Healthcare v. Superior Court(2007) 153 Cal.App.4th 1241; Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. French(1901) 94 F. 600; People v. Casas (1999) 72 Cal.App.4th599; Zack v. Board of Pension Commissioners (1947) 30Cal.2d 195; Moulton Nigel Water Dist. v. Colombo (2003)111 Cal.App.4th 1201; and Rappaport v. Gelfand (1961)197 Cal.App.2d 611. Finally, by way of example, Pattersonerroneously cites Strong v. County of Santa Cruz (1975) 15Cal.3d 720, 725 as the source of the following quotation: “‘Where a party has, with knowledge of the facts, acquiescedin a transaction or has remained silent when he ought to havespoken, equity will estop him from later asserting a claim.’” Strong does not contain that quotation. Nonexistent casesand nonexistent quotations do not support the propositionsand arguments for which they are cited (Noland, supra, 114Cal.App.5th at p. 447), so we consider those argumentsforfeited too (Tellez, supra, 240 Cal.App.4th at p. 1066).*5 Third, Patterson contends that the trial court erred byfailing to grant summary judgment in her favor, because thefacts were undisputed. Patterson did not move for summaryjudgment, so the argument fails.Fourth, Patterson contends that the trial judge acted withbias against her at the August 7, 2024, hearing and thusdeprived her of her right to due process. Even if we were toassume for the sake of argument that Patterson has shownerror, the argument would still fail because she has failedto show that the error was not harmless. Again, Patterson'spetition alleged a single cause of action. She declined to filean amended pleading, so we must presume that her petitionalleges the strongest case that she can allege. (Le Mere, supra,35 Cal.App.5th at p. 243.) Patterson has provided no legalauthority for the proposition that the single cause of actionalleged in her petition exists, and we are aware of none.Because the only cause of action alleged in the petition doesnot exist, it was impossible for Patterson to prevail on DigitalFederal's demurrer. Patterson has therefore failed to showthat it is reasonably probable that she would have obtaineda more favorable result in the absence of any putative errorrelating to alleged judicial bias. (Myrick v. Mastagni (2010)185 Cal.App.4th 1082, 1092.)IV. Vexatious litigantA “vexatious litigant” is a person who “[i]n the immediatelypreceding seven-year period has commenced, prosecuted,or maintained in propria persona at least five litigationsother than in a small claims court that have been ... finallydetermined adversely to the person ....” (Code Civ. Proc, §391, subd. (b)(1).) “ ‘Litigation’ ” includes “any civil action
TRINA R. PATTERSON, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. DIGITAL FEDERAL CREDIT UNION,..., Not Reported inCal.Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5or proceeding, commenced, maintained or pending in anystate or federal court.” (Code Civ. Proc, § 391, subd. (a).) “Alitigation includes an appeal or civil writ proceeding filed inan appellate court.” (Garcia v. Lacey (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th402, 406.) “A litigation is finally determined adversely to aplaintiff if he [or she] does not win the action or proceeding he[or she] began, including cases that are voluntarily dismissedby a plaintiff.” (Ibid.)At oral argument, Patterson represented that she has beeninvolved in litigation for 16 years. Given the frivolous natureof Patterson's litigation in this case, and given Patterson'sclaim that she has a 16-year litigation history, we directthe trial court on remand to consider whether to declarePatterson to be a vexatious litigant within the meaning ofCode of Civil Procedure section 391, subdivision (b), andwhether to enter a prefiling order against her under Code ofCivil Procedure section 391.7. (In re Marriage of Kouvabina& Veltman (2025) 115 Cal.App.5th 293, 296.) In makingits determination, the trial court may wish to consider ouropinion in this case (which will be final upon issuance of theremittitur), as well as the following matters: (1) Pattersonv. U.S. Bank N.A. (Super. Ct. San Bernardino County,2022, CIVSB2203518) [judgment entered on September28, 2022, after order sustaining demurrer without leave toamend]; (2) Patterson v. Sunova Energy Corp. (Super. Ct.San Bernardino County, 2022, CIVSB2125388) [voluntarilydismissed without prejudice on March 8, 2022, by Patterson];(3) Patterson v. Select Portfolio Servicing, Inc. (Mar. 9,2021, E072068) [nonpub. opn.]; and (4) Patterson v. SelectPortfolio Servicing, Inc. (U.S. Supreme Ct., 2020, No.19-734), cert. denied [petition for writ of certiorari in federallitigation denied on February 24, 2020]. The trial courtmust conduct a noticed hearing and must give Patterson theopportunity to present evidence and argument. (Bravo v. Ismaj(2002) 99 Cal.App.4th 211, 225.) We express no opinion onhow the trial court should rule.DISPOSITION*6 The judgment is affirmed. Digital Federal shall recoverits costs of appeal. The trial court is directed to conducta noticed hearing to consider whether to declare Pattersona vexatious litigant and whether to enter a prefiling orderagainst her.NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTSWe concur:MILLER Acting P. J.LEE J.All CitationsNot Reported in Cal.Rptr., 2026 WL 1803128Footnotes1Patterson states that the trial court sustained the demurrer without leave to amend. That is incorrect.2Patterson's citations to nonexistent or inapposite cases and her use of nonexistent quotations bear the hallmarks offabricated legal authority created by generative artificial intelligence (AI), commonly referred to as AI hallucinations.(Schlichter v. Kennedy (2025) 116 Cal.App.5th 24, 27.) As is true for attorneys, pro se litigants are free to use generativeAI to assist in drafting briefs, but, like attorneys, pro se litigants must check and verify every citation to ensure that thecited case exists and that any proposition cited or quoted material is accurate. (Sheerer v. Panas (2026) 119 Cal.App.5th367, 371; Schlichter, at p. 33; People v. Alvarez (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 1115, 1119.) Attorneys who have filed briefscontaining AI hallucinated citations have been sanctioned (Schlichter, at p. 33; Alvarez, at p. 1120; Noland v. Land of theFree, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 449 (Noland)), a pro se litigant has been warned of the same possible outcome(Sheerer, at p. 371), and extensive reliance on nonexistent legal authority may justify striking a party's briefs or dismissingthe appeal (Noland, at p. 436).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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