Roman v. County of Los Angeles, No. 24CMCV00355 (2025)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
Roman v. County of Los Angeles, 2025 WL 2677642 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2677642 (Cal.Super.) (Trial Order)Superior Court of California,Civil Division,South Central District, Compton Courthouse, Department E.Los Angeles CountyAntonia Meza ROMAN,v.COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, et al.No. 24CMCV00355.August 27, 2025.*1 8:30 AMJudicial Assistant: R. AspirasCourtroom Assistant: M. KinneyCSR: NoneERM: NoneDeputy Sheriff: NoneEditor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.OrderHonorable Michael B. Wilson, Judge.NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Motion for Summary JudgmentThe Court's tentative ruling is posted on the Court's website.The matter is called for hearing.There is no appearance by or for any party this date.Having considered all documents pertaining to the motion, the Court adopts its tentative ruling as the final order of the Court,as follows:The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Doe 3, Doe 2 on 04/25/2025 is Denied.I. BACKGROUNDThis is an action for personal injury arising from an alleged slip-and-fall in the common area in a residential apartment buildinglocated at 2052 East 99th Place, Apartment 213, Los Angeles, CA 90002, including the structure that is publicly identified as“Park Place at Jordan Downs” (the “Subject Premises”).
Roman v. County of Los Angeles, 2025 WL 2677642 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2On March 13, 2024, Plaintiff Antonia Meza Roman (“Plaintiff”) filed her original Complaint against Defendants County ofLos Angeles (the “County”), City of Los Angeles (the “City”), State of California (the “State”), and Does 1 through 100,inclusive, alleging the following causes of action: (1) (Government Code §§ 820(a), 815.2(a) and 815.4); (2) Vicarious Liability(Government Code 815.2(a) and 815.4); and (3) Dangerous Condition of Public Property (Government Code § 835).On May 21, 2024, Plaintiff filed an Amendment to Complaint, identifying the true name of Doe 1 as “Housing Authority ofthe City of Los Angeles” (“HACLA”).On August 27, 2024, HACLA filed its Answer to the Complaint.On August 30, 2024, Plaintiff filed two Amendments to Complaint, identifying the true name of Doe 2 as “Bridge HousingCorporation” (“Bridge”) and the true name of Doe 3 as “Jordan Downs 2B, LP” (“Jordan Downs”)On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed her operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”) against Defendants the County, the City,the State, HACLA (collectively, with the County, the City, and the State, the “Government Defendants”), Jordan Downs, Bridge(collectively, with Jordan Downs, the “Managerial Defendants”) (collectively, with the Government Defendants, “Defendants”),and Does 1 through 100, inclusive. Plaintiff's FAC alleges the same three causes of action against the Government Defendants asthe original Complaint, including: (1) (Government Code §§ 820(a), 815.2(a), and 815.4; (2) Vicarious Liability (GovernmentCode 815.2(a) and 815.4); and (3) Dangerous Condition of Public Property (Government Code § 835). Plaintiff's FAC alsoalleges the following causes of action against the Managerial Defendants: (4) Negligence, and (5) Premises Liability.Plaintiff's FAC alleges that, around March 15, 2023, at approximately 7:45 am, Plaintiff suffered significant injuries when sheslipped and fell, while walking through a portion of the common area in the Subject Premises (the “Incident”). (FAC 15.)Plaintiff alleges that the Incident occurred in a portion of the common area where there was significant water puddling, primarilynear or around the elevator (the “Subject Location”). (Id. at 4.) Plaintiff alleges that the significant water puddling at theSubject Location was a dangerous condition because it constituted a concealed trap or hazard that posed a substantial risk ofinjury to tenants of the Subject Premises, including Plaintiff. (Id. at ¶¶ 18-19.) Plaintiff alleges that Defendants breached theirduty of care by failing to maintain or operate the Subject Premises in due care, which caused or contributed to the existenceof the dangerous condition at the Subject Location. (Id. at ¶¶ 16-17.) Plaintiff alleges that the Defendants had actual notice, orshould have had constructive notice, of the dangerous conditions at the Subject Premises caused by the water pooling at theSubject Location. (Id. at 15.)*2 On October 21, 2024, the Court granted Plaintiff's request to dismiss HACLA from the case, without prejudice.October 23, 2024, the Managerial Defendants filed their Answer.On April 25, 2025, the Managerial Defendants filed the instant Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative, Motionfor Summary Adjudication, regarding Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for Negligence and Fifth Cause of Action for PremisesLiability.On August 7, 2025, Plaintiff filed her original Opposition, as well as supporting documentation.On August 11, 2025, Plaintiff filed her Amended Opposition, as well as supporting documentation. For this ruling, the Courtwill consider Plaintiff's Amended Opposition and supporting documentation as the relevant opposition papers.On August 15, 2025, the Managerial Defendants filed their Reply.II. ANALYSIS
Roman v. County of Los Angeles, 2025 WL 2677642 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3A. Legal StandardThe purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication “is to provide courts with a mechanism to cutthrough the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve theirdispute.” (Aguilar v. Atl. Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) “Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c),requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and ‘all inferences reasonably deducible fromthe evidence’ and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material factand that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th1110, 1119.)“On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that thereare no triable issues of material fact.” (Scalf v. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal.App.4th 1510, 1519.) A defendant movingfor summary judgment or summary adjudication “has met his or her burden of showing that a cause of action has no merit if theparty has shown that one or more elements of the cause of action … cannot be established, or that there is a complete defenseto the cause of action.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(p)(2).) “Once the defendant … has met that burden, the burden shifts to theplaintiff … to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto.” (Ibid.)“If the plaintiff cannot do so, summary judgment should be granted.” (Avivi v. Centro Medico Urgente Med. Ctr. (2008) 159Cal.App.4th 463, 467.)A motion for summary judgment must be granted “if all the papers submitted show that there is no triable issue as to any materialfact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” (Code Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).) On the other hand, amotion for summary adjudication must be granted only if it completely disposes of a cause of action, an affirmative defense,a claim for damages, or an issue of duty. (Id. at § 437c(f)(1).)“When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (exceptevidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from thatevidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment.” (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 467; seealsoCode Civ. Proc. § 437c(c).)B. Evidentiary Objections*3 In support of her Opposition, Plaintiff objects to each paragraph of the Declaration of Jerold Smith (“Smith”) (the “SmithDeclaration”), filed in support of the Managerial Defendants' motion.The Court OVERRULES the following objections: (1) – (5), and (9).Plaintiff's first and second objections relate to Smith's attestation that the facts set forth in his declaration are of his own personalknowledge (Smith Decl. 1), and setting forth that he is employed as the Building Manager of the Subject Premises (Id. at 2). Plaintiff's objections are not well taken; Smith has personal knowledge of his employment with the Managerial Defendants.Plaintiff's third, fourth, fifth, and ninth objections relate to Smith's attestations regarding the Managerial Defendants' ownershipinterest in the Subject Premises through their lease agreement with HACLA (Smith Decl. 3); Smith's description of where theIncident occurred (Id. at 4); Smith's attestation that the Subject Location, including the Subject Premises' hallways and patios,are used daily by residents (Id. at 5); and Smith's attestation that, prior to Plaintiff's Incident, no falls or slips at the SubjectPremises were reported to the Managerial Defendants (Id. at 9). Plaintiff's objections to these statements are not well taken.These declarations are well within Smith's personal knowledge in his capacity as Building Manager of the Subject Premises.However, the Court SUSTAINS Plaintiff's following objections: (6) – (8).
Roman v. County of Los Angeles, 2025 WL 2677642 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Plaintiff's sixth, seventh, and eighth objections relate to Smith's attestations that the Managerial Defendants “had no notice,knowledge, or information regarding” any trips or falls at the Subject Location, any dangerous condition at the Subject Location,or “any external factors which may have posed a risk of injury” at the Subject Location. (See Smith Decl. ¶¶ 6-8.) Thesestatements do not recount any facts or personal knowledge of Smith but are merely recitations of the relevant legal standards.Accordingly, the Court finds that these statements are impermissible opinion testimony regarding ultimate issues to be decidedby the trier of fact. (Evid. Code § 805.)C. Procedural RequirementsIn support of its reply papers, the Managerial Defendants submit two different replies to Plaintiff's Separate Statement ofDisputed and Undisputed Material Facts in Support of Her Opposition to Defendants Motion for Summary Judgment.There is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure for a “reply separate statement.” (See, generally, Code Civ. Proc. § 437c;see also Nazir v. United Airlines, Inc. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 243, 252.) Accordingly the Court disregards the ManagerialDefendants' separate statements submitted with their reply; neither will be considered.D. Summary of the Managerial Defendants' Undisputed FactsThe Court provides the following summary of the material, undisputed facts, for the purpose of this motion:Plaintiff moved into her apartment at the Subject Premises prior to the Incident, around May of 2022. (Defendants' SeparateStatement of Undisputed Material Facts (“Def SSUMF”) #5.)1 The Incident that caused Plaintiff's injuries occurred atapproximately 7:50 am on March 15, 2023. (Id. # 5.) The Incident occurred in the Subject Location, while Plaintiff was walkingout of her apartment and towards the Subject Premises' exit at Century Street. (Id. # 8.) The weather conditions for two to threedays prior to Incident, including the morning of the Incident, were windy and rainy. (Id. # 9.)2*4 Plaintiff's Incident occurred while she was walking from the area of the Subject Premises near the patio to the hallway atthe Subject Location where she fell; the flooring at the Subject Location changes from exterior-concrete-flooring to interior-laminate-flooring, and such flooring areas are separated by a threshold. (Def. SSUMF #10.)3 Plaintiff made this same walk fromher apartment to the Century Street exit approximately twice a day. (Id. #11.)4 Prior to the Incident, Plaintiff did not observewetness on the laminate-wood-floor at the Subject Location of the Incident. (Id. # 12.)5 And Plaintiff had walked in the SubjectLocation where the Incident occurred two days prior to the Incident. (Id. # 13.) Plaintiff had multiple routes available to herfrom her apartment to leave the Subject Premises. (Id. # 14.)6At the time of the Incident, the surface of the wood-laminate floor where the Incident occurred had water on the surface. (Id.# 16.)7 And, at the time of the Incident, Plaintiff was not directly looking down at the ground when she walking on the wood-laminate flooring at the Subject Location where the Incident occurred. (Id. # 17.)8Prior to the Incident, Plaintiff never talked with the building manager about slipperiness in the Subject Location where theIncident occurred. (Def. SSUMF, # 15.) And prior to Plaintiff's Incident, no slips or falls at the Subject Premises had beenreported to the Managerial Defendants. (Id. # 20.)9E. Summary of Plaintiff's Additional Material Facts in Opposition
Roman v. County of Los Angeles, 2025 WL 2677642 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5*5 The wood-laminate flooring at the Subject Location where the Incident occurred becomes unreasonably dangerous andslippery when exposed to water; testing at the Subject Location indicates that the flooring has a slip resistance measurementof 0.34, which is below the industry safety standard of 0.50. (Plaintiff's Additional Material Facts (“Plf. AMF”), # 1.) Industrysafety standards also provide that walkway surface must be slip resistant when exposed to expected environmental conditions,and interior walkways that are not slip resistant when wet must be maintained dry during periods of pedestrian use. (Id. # 2.)Prior to the Incident and at the time of the Incident, Managerial Defendants failed to implement industry-standard safetymeasures to remediate or reduce the safety hazard posed by the slipperiness of the wood-laminate flooring at the SubjectLocation by installing mats, runners, or carpet tiles to prevent water from being tracked from the exterior concrete area onto theinterior laminate-wood flooring. (Plf. AMF # 3, 20.) Managerial Defendants knew that various areas in the Subject Premises,including the exterior concrete area adjacent to the Subject Location, had issues of recurring water pooling issues. (Id. ## 3, 5,19.) Additionally, the Managerial Defendants failed to implement proper written policies or procedures to maintain the SubjectLocation where the Incident occurred. (Id. # 4, 15.)Prior to the Incident, rainwater pooled on the exterior concrete area adjacent to the Subject Location and was transferred to theinterior wood-laminate flooring through pedestrian foot traffic and windy weather conditions, creating a dangerous conditionthat was visually camouflaged and difficult to detect. (Plf. AMF, ## 6-7, 14, 16.) Prior to the Incident, there were no visiblewarning signs or “wet floor” signage positioned near the Subject Location where residents would see them; “wet floor” signagewas only posted at the Subject Location after the Incident already occurred. (Id. ## 8-10.) However, the Subject Locationwas a high-traffic area along the main evacuation route of the Subject Premises, and it was reasonably foreseeable that thecombination of foot traffic and pooling rainwater on the exterior concrete surfaces would create a slip hazard during the rainyweather conditions that persisted for 2-3 days prior to the Incident, including the morning of the Incident. (Id. ## 11-13.)F. DiscussionThe Managerial Defendants move for summary judgement, or summary adjudication, as to each cause of action asserted againstthem, including Plaintiff's Fourth Cause of Action for Negligence and Fifth Cause of Action for Premises Liability.“The elements of a cause of action for premises liability are the same as those for negligence: duty, breach, causation, anddamages.” (Castellon v. U.S. Bancorp (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 994, 998.) However, the elements shift to proving the fact relatedto a premises liability claim, including (1) Defendant's duty, based on control of the property; and (2) Defendant's breach, basedon its negligent use or maintenance of the property. Accordingly, a premises liability claim is essentially a claim for negligencebased on the defendant's use or maintenance of the subject property. (See Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158(cleaned up); CACI No. 1000.)The Managerial Defendants' moving papers address only two arguments. First, the Managerial Defendants argue that Plaintifffails to establish that the Managerial Defendants had a duty to warn or remediate any dangerous conditions at the SubjectLocation. Second, the Managerial Defendants argue that that Plaintiff fails to establish that the Managerial Defendants hadactual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous conditions at the Subject Location. Accordingly, the Court limits itsdiscussions to these arguments.1. The Managerial Defendants Fail to Establish No Duty to Warn*6 The Managerial Defendants claim that Plaintiff's negligence and premises liability claims fail because the ManagerialDefendants had no duty to warn Plaintiff about the allegedly dangerous condition at the Subject Location where the Incidentoccurred.
Roman v. County of Los Angeles, 2025 WL 2677642 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6i. Open and Obvious ConditionThe Managerial Defendants first assert that landowners do not have a duty to remedy or warn about a condition where “a dangeris so obvious that a person could reasonably be expected to see it.” (Jacobs v. Coldwell Banker Residential Brokerage Co.(2017) 14 Cal.App.5th 438, 447.) The Managerial Defendants cite Sanchez v. Swinerton & Walberg Co. (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th1461, where the court found that defendant-contractors and subcontractors- had no duty to remediate an open and obviousdangerous condition, where defective construction resulted in water pooling on a landing, because the condition could havebeen observed and remedied by either the plaintiff or the defendant-owner. (Id. at p. 1471.) The Court lays out its holding, inrelevant part, as follows:[T]he defendant ‘constructed and poured concrete and performed labor on [the landing at the top of the entrance stairway]not confirming [sic] to the plans and specification prepared by the architect for said landing. This negligence resulted inwater ponding and accumulating on the landing which water was a caused of Plaintiff David Sancehz's slip and fall accident.Furthermore the defective construction of the landing resulted in water draining from the landing into the transportation officefloor on which Mr. Sanchez fell, which was another cause of Mr. Sanchez's slip and fall accident.’ In other words, defectiveconstruction of the landing allowed water to pool on the landing and drain into the transportation office, thus creating adangerous condition. Plaintiffs do not allege, and there in no evidence, that the defective construction of the landing createdany danger when water was not present.The uncontradicted evidence shows that water formed ponds on the landing. These ponds had a depth of one-half inch. Inthese circumstances, the presence of standing water and the manner in which it drained into or toward the transportationoffice would have been obvious and apparent to any reasonably observant person, as would the danger that the water mightcreate slippery surfaces and cause one to slip and fall. … The obvious nature of the defect would allow the owner and usersto take steps to remedy the condition or to take precautions against injury.In fact, it is undisputed that the dangerous condition was observed the owner's agents, and the risk it entailed was appreciated,on several occasions preceding plaintiff David Sanchez's accident. … That the owner failed to take precautions until afterplaintiff was injured does not change the nature of the defect.Inasmuch as the defective condition that was reasonably dangerous to life and limb was not latent, the contractor andsubcontractor had no liability to a third person injured thereby after the owner's acceptance of the structure. [Citations.]…A slip and fall injury clearly was foreseeable when the landing was wet; it is also certain that plaintiff David Sancehz wasinjured. These factors weigh in plaintiffs' favor, but do not in themselves establish a duty. Given the obviousness of the dangerboth to the owner and to users, there no longer is a close connection between defendants' conduct and plaintiff's injury. Thefailure to take precautions against injury and steps to remedy the problem are far more closely connected. … Accordingly,under this analysis, … the contractors owed no duty to plaintiffs.*7 (Id. at p. 1470-72 (emphasis added).)Here, the Court emphasizes that the Jacobs court's holding primarily applied to the duties owed by defendant contractors andsubcontractors to a third-party plaintiff after the building had been handed over to the defendant building owner because “[t]heobvious nature of the defect would allow the owner and users to take steps to remedy the condition or to take precautions againstinjury.” (Id. at p. 1471 (emphasis added).) Accordingly, this case does not conclusively establish, as the Managerial Defendantsimplicitly argue, that a defendant-building-owner does not owe a plaintiff-tenant a duty to repair open and obvious hazards.
Roman v. County of Los Angeles, 2025 WL 2677642 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7Moreover, the Managerial Defendants argue, without any legal support, that “[a]ny reasonable person, knowing that conditionsoutside were wet would have been prudent enough to have looked at the floor near the outdoor areas of the apartment complexand observed the pooling water at the location of the fall.” (Mot., at p. 4:25-28.) As extensively described in the Summaryof Plaintiff's Additional Material Facts in Opposition, the undisputed expert testimony of Eris Barillas (“Barillas”) establishesthat the water pooling at Subject Location, which created the dangerous condition that caused Plaintiff's Incident, was visuallycamouflaged and difficult to detect. (Plf. AMF, ## 6-7, 14, 16.) This proposition is bolstered by Plaintiff's deposition testimony,where she attests that the water could not be seen on the floor surface at the Subject Location (Libbey Decl., Exh. B (RomanDeposition), pp. 32-33, 37-38, 55-56), and Barillas' undisputed expert opinion that “the subject flooring was an interior walkingsurface, where most pedestrians expect the flooring to be dry during inclement weather.” (Barillas Decl. 11, lines 22-23.)10Accordingly, the Court finds that the Managerial Defendants have failed to meet their initial burden of proof to establish that theManagerial Defendants had no duty to warn or remediate the allegedly dangerous condition because it was open and obvious.ii. Existence of Alternative RoutesThe Managerial Defendants also argue that they had no duty to warn or remediate the allegedly dangerous condition becausethere were alternative routes available to Plaintiff at the time of the Incident. The Managerial Defendants cite Martinez v.Chippewa Enterprises, Inc. (2004) 121 Cal.App.4th 1179, where the court held that a duty to remediate or warn regardingan open and obvious condition still exists where “necessity requires persons to encounter” and danger and thus renders harmforeseeable. (Id. at p. 1184.) In Martinez, the court found that there was a triable issue of material fact regarding the necessityto use a sidewalk that was obviously wet because “the pavement appears to have provided a principal if not sole access wayfrom the street to defendant's building, which housed a government office serving the public.” (Id. at p. 1185.)*8 Here, in contrast to Martinez, the Managerial Defendant argues that Plaintiff's use of the route was not necessary becauseshe “acknowledged that she was aware of the condition, as indicated by her knowledge that it had been raining the nightbefore.” (Mot., p. 5:10-11.) And, citing Def. SSUMF # 14, the Managerial Defendants argue that “[P]laintiff, by her ownadmission, had alternative routes to exit the building available to her. [Citation.] There was no necessity to encounter thisparticular danger as multiple other, more safe, routes could have been taken out of the building.” (Id., p. 5:12-15.)However, as extensively described in the Summary of Plaintiff's Additional Material Facts in Opposition, Barillas' undisputedexpert testimony establishes that the Subject Location was a high-traffic area along the main evacuation route of the SubjectPremises and served as one of the primary hallways connecting apartments, stairways, and elevators. (Plf. AMF, # 11.) Moreover,Plaintiff's deposition testimony states that she needed to use the route that she took because it was raining on the day of theIncident, and the alternative route available to her was uncovered. (Libbey Decl., Exh. B (Roman Deposition), p. 41:20-23.)11Accordingly, the Court finds that the Managerial Defendants have failed to meet their initial burden of proof to establish that theManagerial Defendants had no duty to warn or remediate the allegedly dangerous condition because Plaintiff had alternativeroutes to avoid the dangerous condition.2. The Managerial Defendants Fail to Meet to Establish No Actual or Constructive Notice of the Dangerous ConditionFinally, the Managerial Defendants argue that Plaintiff's premises liability claim fails because the Managerial Defendants hadno actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition.In order to succeed on a premises liability claim, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant-owner had “actual or constructivenotice of the dangerous condition” with sufficient time for the defendant-owner to take corrective action. (Ortega v. KmartCorp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 1200, 1203 (citations omitted).)
Roman v. County of Los Angeles, 2025 WL 2677642 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Because the owner is not the insurer of the visitor's personal safety the owner's actual or constructive knowledge of thedangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability. Although the owner's lack of knowledge is not a defense, to imposeliability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to a defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier must have eitheractual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care to discoverthe condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises.…The plaintiff need not show actual knowledge where evidence suggests that the dangerous condition was present for asufficient period of time to charge the owner with constructive knowledge of its existence. Knowledge may be shown bycircumstantial evidence which is nothing more than one or more inferences which may be said to arise reasonably froma series of proven facts. Whether a dangerous condition has existed long enough for a reasonably prudent person to havediscovered it is a question of fact for the jury, and the cases do not impose exact time limitations. … The owner must inspectthe premises or take other proper action to ascertain their condition, and if, by exercise of reasonable care, the owner wouldhave discovered the condition, he is liable for failing to correct it.*9 (Id., at p. 1206-07 (internal citations and quotation marks omitted) (cleaned up).)Here, the Managerial Defendants argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the ManagerialDefendants' actual notice of the allegedly dangerous condition at the Subject Location that caused Plaintiff's Incident. TheManagerial Defendants cite that, prior to the Incident, Plaintiff never complained to the Managerial Defendants aboutslipperiness at the Subject Location. (Def. SSUMF, # 15.) The Managerial Defendants further cite that Plaintiff's Incident was thefirst slip and fall incident during the Managerial Defendants' management of the Subject Premises. (Id. # 20.) No other residentsmade any complaints about the Subject Location of the Incident to building management, and no prior slipping incidents hadbeen reported. (Id.)The Managerial Defendants also argue that Plaintiff cannot establish a genuine dispute of material fact regarding the ManagerialDefendants' constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition at the Subject Location that caused Plaintiff's Incident.The Managerial Defendants argue that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden of proof to present evidence demonstrating howlong the water was present at the Subject Location, or that the water accumulated at the Subject Location with sufficient time forthe Managerial Defendants to take remedial action. (See Perez v. Ow (1962) 200 Cal.App.2d 559, 561.) Although it is allegedthat it had been raining for multiple days prior to the Incident, the Managerial Defendants emphasize that there is no availableevidence demonstrating when the area began to accumulate the water, or to describe the conditions of the Subject Locationprior to the fall. Rather, the Managerial Defendants argue that the undisputed facts show that Plaintiff routinely used the routeshe took on the day of the Incident, including two days prior to the Incident, and never encountered such dangerous conditions.(Def. SSUMF, ## 11-13.)However, the Managerial Defendants cannot shift the burden to Plaintiff by merely suggesting the possibility that Plaintiffcannot prove her case. (See Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co., supra, 25 Cal.App.4th at p. 854-55, fn. 23.) The ManagerialDefendants must make an affirmative showing in support of their motion. (Addy v. Bliss & Glennan (1996) 44 Cal.App.4th 205,214; see also Gaggero v. Yura (2003) 108 Cal.App.4th 884, 891 (“Pointing out the absence of evidence to support a plaintiff'sclaim is insufficient to meet the moving defendant's initial burden of production. The defendant must also produce evidencethat the plaintiff cannot reasonably obtain evidence to support his or her claim.”) Here, without citing any evidence in support,the Managerial Defendants argue that “[t]he plaintiff can provide no evidence to show that the hazard existed for a sufficientamount of time to put the defendants on notice of the hazardous condition.” (Mot., at p. 7:10-11.) Even if there had not beenany prior slips or falls at the Subject Premises, that does not mean that Plaintiff cannot produce evidence that the undisputedlywindy and rainy weather conditions for two to three days prior to the Incident, including the morning of the Incident, couldhave put the Managerial Defendants on notice of the allegedly dangerous condition. (Def. SSUMF, # 9.)12
Roman v. County of Los Angeles, 2025 WL 2677642 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9*10 Moreover, the Court finds that Plaintiff has presented sufficient circumstantial evidence to show that a reasonableinvestigation by the Managerial Defendants may have been sufficient to put the Managerial Defendants on notice of the allegedlydangerous condition. (See Ortega v. Kmart Corp., supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206-07.) As extensively described in the Summary ofPlaintiff's Additional Material Facts in Opposition, the Managerial Defendants knew that various areas in the Subject Premises,including the exterior concrete area adjacent to the Subject Location, had issues of recurring water pooling issues. (Id. ##3, 5, 19.) Moreover, both prior to at the time of the Incident, Managerial Defendants failed to implement industry-standardsafety measures to remediate or reduce the safety hazard posed by the slipperiness of the wood-laminate flooring at the SubjectLocation by installing mats, runners, or carpet tiles to prevent water from being tracked from the exterior concrete area ontothe interior laminate-wood flooring. (Plf. AMF # 3, 20.) Additionally, the Managerial Defendants failed to implement properwritten policies or procedures to maintain the Subject Location where the Incident occurred. (Id. # 4, 15.)Although Barillas' undisputed expert testimony is not sufficient to impute actual knowledge of the dangerous condition ofthe Subject Location on the Managerial Defendants, it is sufficient to create the reasonable inference that the ManagerialDefendants may have been able to discover the dangerous condition with reasonable investigation or safety procedures in place.Additionally, the undisputed fact that the weather conditions were windy and rainy for two to three days prior to the Incident,including the morning of the Incident, is sufficient circumstantial evidence to suggest that the Managerial Defendants shouldhave been on notice that some areas of the Subject Premises may have been subject to abnormally wet or slippery conditions.(Def. SSUMF, # 9.)Accordingly, the Court finds that the Managerial Defendants have failed to meet their initial burden of proof to establish thatthe Managerial Defendants had not actual or constructive notice of the allegedly dangerous condition of the Subject Locationwhere the Incident occurred prior to the Incident.III. CONCLUSIONIn all, the Court DENIES the Managerial Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment or in the Alternative Motion for SummaryAdjudication.Finally, as described in the Discussion section above, Plaintiff's opposition cites legal authority that either does not exist ordoes not stand for the cited propositions. Counsel is admonished that any further citation to nonexistent legal authority ormisrepresentation as to the import of cited authority will result in the Court setting an OSC re: sanctions and referral to the StateBar for disciplinary action for providing false citations of legal authority.Clerk hereby gives notice to Moving Party, who is directed to give notice to all other parties.Certificate of Service is attached.Footnotes1Plaintiff disputes that the specific year she moved into the apartment was 2022 because Plaintiff's deposition testimony states: “it wasMay, and it was May 19 when I signed the contract, but I don't remember the year. Was it 2021? It was '22.” (Plaintiff's Responseto Defendants' Statement of Undisputed Facts (“Plf. RDSUF”), # 5; Plaintiff's Compendium of Exhibits (“Plf. COE”), Exh. 3, p.24:14-16.) However, Plaintiff's speculative objection, that Plaintiff may not have moved into the apartment in 2022, is insufficientto create a genuine dispute that Plaintiff moved into the Subject Premises prior to the Incident. (See Doe v. Salesian Society (2008)159 Cal.App.4th 474, 481 (opposing party does not controvert moving party's evidence with evidence that is “based on speculation,imagination, guess work, or mere possibilities.”) (citing Yuzon v. Collins (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 149, 163).)
Roman v. County of Los Angeles, 2025 WL 2677642 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.102Plaintiff does not dispute that it was raining two to three days prior to the Incident, only that it was also raining the morning of theIncident. (Plf. RDSUF, # 9.)3Plaintiff does not dispute that the Incident occurred when she stepped from an area with concrete flooring to an area with laminate-wood flooring. Plaintiff only disputes that the deposition makes no mention of a “hallway area” or “patio area.” (Plf. RDSUF, # 10.)However, Plaintiff's deposition testimony confirms that “the area where the concrete transition – the transition between the concreteand the wood flooring” was a sort of “hallway” with “[o]nly a small portion on top. .... It's narrow. It's the width of the woodenhallway.” (Libbey Decl., Exh. B (Roman Deposition), p. 42:13-18.)4Plaintiff only disputes this fact to the extent that the original deposition question included the word “approximately.” (Plf. RDSUF,# 11.)5Plaintiff only disputes this fact to the extent that Plaintiff did not observe the wetness on the surface of the wooden floor, implyingthat the pooling on the wooden floor was a camouflaged hazard. (Plf. RDSUF, # 12.) This fact is undisputed to the extent that Plaintiffdid not observe the water on the wooden floor.6Plaintiff only disputes this fact to the extent that the relevant portion of Plaintiff's deposition pertains to “entrances” to the SubjectPremises, not “routes available from [Plaintiff's] apartment to leave the building.” (Plf. RDSUF #14.) This is a distinction without adifference—Plaintiff's testimony describing different entrances to the Subject Premises reasonably implies to existence of differentroutes from Plaintiff's apartment to those different entrances.7Plaintiff only disputes this fact to the extent that the water on the surface of the wood-laminate flooring where the Incident occurredconstitutes a dangerous condition. (Plf. RDSUF, # 16.) This fact is undisputed to the extent that the wood-laminate floor at the SubjectLocation where the Incident occurred had water on the surface.8Plaintiff disputes this fact to the extent that the relevant question from Plaintiff's deposition testimony states, “[w]ere you lookingdown at the ground?” (Plf. RDSUF, # 17 (emphasis added).) And Plaintiff presents undisputed expert testimony that a person'snormal line of sight while walking, unless they expect a hazard, is “about 15° below horizontal relative to the eyes.” (Id.) This factis undisputed to the extent that Plaintiff was not directly looking down at the ground while walking at the Subject Location wherethe Incident occurred.9Plaintiff only disputes this fact to the extent that this assertion is a legal conclusion and is vague and ambiguous as to the terms “slipsor falls.” (Plf. RDSUF, # 20.) However, the Court has overruled Plaintiff's objection to the evidence supporting this material fact.(See Smith Decl., 9.) And Plaintiff has not presented any evidence that would controvert or dispute this fact. (See Doe v. SalesianSociety, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at p. 481.)10The Managerial Defendants correctly assert that Plaintiff's case law cited in support of their opposition, including Krongos v. PacificGas & Electric Co. (1992) 7 Cal.App.4th 387 and Osborn v. Mission Ready Mix (1990) 224 Cal.App.3d 104 do not stand for theproposition cited by Plaintiff. However, the Managerial Defendants failed to describe the distinction in the Sanchez court's rulingbetween the duty owed by the defendant contractors and the defendant owner. Moreover, the Managerial Defendants entirely fail todispute or distinguish the Barillas' expert testimony filed in support of Plaintiff's opposition.11The Managerial Defendants correctly assert that Plaintiff's case law cited in support of their opposition, including Alcaraz v. Vece(1997) 14 Cal.4th 1149 and Sprecher v. Adamson Companies (1981) 30 Cal.3d 358, do not stand for the proposition cited by Plaintiff.However, the Managerial Defendants entirely fail to dispute or distinguish Barillas' expert testimony filed in support of Plaintiff'sopposition. Moreover, the Managerial Defendants fail to address Plaintiff's deposition testimony that she had to take the route shetook because the alternative route was exposed and uncovered. (Libbey Decl., Exh. B (Roman Deposition), p. 41:20-23)12The Managerial Defendants correctly note that Plaintiff's opposition cites legal authority does not exist. This includes Plaintiff'scitation to Fairchild v. Park County (2000) 108 Cal.App.4th 1305 and Corgain v. Kmart Corp. (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 1547. TheCourt cannot verify the existence of either case; no case exists with either name, and neither cited case exists at either reporter location.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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