Sanchez v. Chedraui USA, Inc. (2025)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Sanchez v. Chedraui USA, Inc., 2025 WL 3307158 (2025)WESTLAW©2026Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3307158 (Cal.Super.) (Trial Order)Superior Court of California,Civil Division,Central District, Spring Street Courthouse, Department 28.Los Angeles CountyMaricela Sierra SANCHEZ, An Individual,v.CHEDRAUI USA, INC., A Corporation, et al.No. 23STCV26658.November 6, 2025.Editor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.*1 1:30 PMJudicial Assistant: S. WongCourtroom Assistant: NoneCSR: NoneERM: NoneDeputy Sheriff: NoneOrderLillian Sedaghat (Telephonic) by Jennine Nwoko, for plaintiff(s).Matthew Soleimanpour by Justin Lyn (Telephonic), for defendant(s).Honorable Lisa R. Jaskol, Judge.NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Motion for Summary JudgmentCase is called for hearing.The tentative ruling is provided to all parties via posting on the court's website.Counsel make oral arguments.The tentative, modified, ruling becomes the Order of the Court.The Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Chedraui USA, Inc., a corporation on 01/08/2025 is Granted.Having considered the moving, opposition, and reply papers, the Court rules as follows.BACKGROUND
Sanchez v. Chedraui USA, Inc., 2025 WL 3307158 (2025)WESTLAW©2026Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2A. Prior proceedingsOn October 31, 2023, Plaintiff Maricela Sierra Sanchez (“Plaintiff”) filed this action against Defendants Chedraui USA, Inc.(“Defendant”) and Does 1-50 for general negligence and premises liability.On February 7, 2024, Defendant filed an answer.Trial is scheduled for April 22, 2026.B. This motionJanuary 8, 2025, Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment. The motion was set for hearing on June 23, 2025. On June3, 2025, Plaintiff filed an opposition. On June 12, 2025, Defendant filed a reply. The Court continued the hearing to November6, 2025.PARTIES' REQUESTSDefendant asks the Court to grant summary judgment.Plaintiff asks the Court to deny the motion.LEGAL STANDARDA. Summary judgment“‘[F]rom commencement to conclusion, the party moving for summary judgment bears the burden of persuasion that there isno triable issue of material fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”’ (LAOSD Asbestos Cases (2023) 87Cal.App.5th 949, 945, quoting Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 850 (Aguilar).) “[T]he party movingfor summary judgment bears an initial burden of production to make a prima facie showing of the nonexistence of any triableissue of material fact; if he carries his burden of production, he causes a shift, and the opposing party is then subjected to aburden of production of his own to make a prima facie showing of the existence of a triable issue of material fact.” (Aguilar,supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 850.)When the moving party is a defendant, it must show that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of the cause of action.(Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 853.) “The defendant has shown that the plaintiff cannot establish at least one element of thecause of action by showing that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence.” (Id. at p. 854.)The defendant must “present evidence, and not simply point out that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain,needed evidence.” (Ibid.) Thus, “the defendant must ‘support[ ]’ the ‘motion’ with evidence including ‘affidavits, declarations,admissions, answers to interrogatories, depositions, and matters of which judicial notice’ must or may ‘be taken.’ [Citation.]The defendant may, but need not, present evidence that conclusively negates an element of the plaintiff's cause of action. Thedefendant may also present evidence that the plaintiff does not possess, and cannot reasonably obtain, needed evidence—asthrough admissions by the plaintiff following extensive discovery to the effect that he has discovered nothing.” (Id. at p. 855,original emphasis.)*2 “Supporting and opposing affidavits or declarations shall set forth admissible evidence.” (Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd.(d).) “Matters which would be excluded under the rules of evidence if proffered by a witness in a trial as hearsay, conclusionsor impermissible opinions, must be disregarded in supporting affidavits.” (Hayman v. Block (1986) 176 Cal.App.3d 629, 639.)
Sanchez v. Chedraui USA, Inc., 2025 WL 3307158 (2025)WESTLAW©2026Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3In addition, a party moving for summary judgment or summary adjudication must support the motion with “a separate statementsetting forth plainly and concisely all material facts which the moving party contends are undisputed. Each of the material factsstated shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (Parkview Villas Assn. v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.(2006) 133 Cal.App.4th 1197, 1209 (Parkview Villas), quoting Code Civ. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(1).) The party opposing themotion must file with the opposition papers “a separate statement that responds to each of the material facts contended by themoving party to be undisputed, indicating whether the opposing party agrees or disagrees that those facts are undisputed. Thestatement also shall set forth plainly and concisely any other material facts that the opposing party contends are disputed. Eachmaterial fact contended by the opposing party to be disputed shall be followed by a reference to the supporting evidence.” (CodeCiv. Proc., § 437c, subd. (b)(3).) If either party fails to comply with the applicable separate statement requirement, that failuremay in the court's discretion constitute a sufficient ground to decide the motion adversely to the offending party. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c, subds. (b)(1), (3).)In ruling on the motion, the court must consider all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn from it and must viewsuch evidence and inferences in the light most favorable to the opposing party. (Aguilar, supra, 25 Cal.4th at p. 843.)B. Negligence and premises liability“The elements of a negligence claim and a premises liability claim are the same: a legal duty of care, breach of that duty, andproximate cause resulting in injury.” (Kesner v. Superior Court (2016) 1 Cal.5th 1132, 1158.)“It is well established in California that although a store owner is not an insurer of the safety of its patrons, the owner does owethem a duty to exercise reasonable care in keeping the premises reasonably safe.” (Ortega v. Kmart Corp. (2001) 26 Cal.4th1200, 1205 (Ortega).) “A store owner exercises ordinary care by making reasonable inspections of the portions of the premisesopen to customers, and the care required is commensurate with the risks involved.” (Ibid.; see Salinas v. Martin (2008) 166Cal.App.4th 404, 412 [“A landowner ‘has an affirmative duty to exercise ordinary care to keep the premises in a reasonablysafe condition, and therefore must inspect them or take other proper means to ascertain their condition. And if, by the exerciseof reasonable care, he would have discovered the dangerous condition, he is liable.’ ' [Citation]' ”].) ‘Because the owner is not the insurer of the visitor's personal safety [citation], the owner's actual or constructive knowledgeof the dangerous condition is a key to establishing its liability. Although the owner's lack of knowledge is not a defense, “[t]oimpose liability for injuries suffered by an invitee due to [a] defective condition of the premises, the owner or occupier ‘musthave either actual or constructive knowledge of the dangerous condition or have been able by the exercise of ordinary care todiscover the condition, which if known to him, he should realize as involving an unreasonable risk to invitees on his premises....' (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1206.)*3 “[A]n owner must have a reasonable time to make an inspection in order to discover the dangerous condition and correctit.” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at pp. 1210-1211.) ‘[E]vidence that an inspection had not been made within a particular periodof time prior to an accident may warrant an inference that the defective condition existed long enough so that a person exercisingreasonable care would have discovered it.’ (Id. at p. 1210; see id. at p. 1210-1211 [testimony of store's general manager thatmilk could have been on floor for as long as two hours and at best floor was not inspected for 15-30 minutes was “evidence ofdefendant's failure to inspect the premises with a reasonable period of time prior to the accident” which “creates a reasonableinference that the dangerous condition existed long enough for it to be discovered by the owner”].)DISCUSSIONA. The complaintThe complaint includes the following allegations:
Sanchez v. Chedraui USA, Inc., 2025 WL 3307158 (2025)WESTLAW©2026Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4On January 28, 2023, at El Super, 1301 E. Gage Avenue in Los Angeles, Defendant and Does 1-50 negligently, carelessly,recklessly, unskillfully, unlawfully, wantonly, maliciously, and wrongfully, entrusted, permitted, managed, serviced, repaired,inspected, maintained, operated, controlled, cleaned, failed to warn, and managed their premises, proximately causing Plaintiffto slip and fall while shopping at Defendants' premises.Defendant and Does 1-50 negligently owned, maintained, managed and operated the described premises.Defendant and Does 1-50 willfully or maliciously failed to guard or warn against a dangerous condition, use, structure, oractivity.Defendant and Does 1-50 were the agents and employees of the other defendants and acted within the scope of the agency.B. Undisputed factsDefendant owned and operated the El Super grocery store located at 1301 E. Gage Avenue, Los Angeles, CA 90001. (UMF1.) On January 28, 2022, Plaintiff went shopping at the store. (UMF 1.) On entering the store, Plaintiff walked to the chipssection, which was located in aisle #2. (UMF 2.) The store was brightly lit. (UMF 9.) Nothing distracted Plaintiff from lookingwhere she was walking. (UMF 10.)After walking halfway down aisle #2, Plaintiff slipped and fell on red salsa. (UMF 3, 5.) The store's surveillance camera systemrecorded Plaintiff's fall. (UMF 4.)C. Defendant's motion for summary judgment1. Actual noticeJose Dubon (“Dubon”), the director of the store where Plaintiff fell, submitted a declaration stating that “[b]ased on myinvestigation, I am informed and believe that no employees of Store No. 13 had notice or was aware of the red salsa before thealleged fall occurred, nor did any employees have sufficient time to correct or warn against the alleged hazard before the allegedfall occurred.” (Dubon dec. 10.) Dubon also stated that, “[b]ased on the surveillance video footage, incident reports, and sweepsheets I reviewed, Defendant conducted regular, routine, and reasonable inspections of its store on January 28, 2022, and duringthose inspections, Defendant did not find, nor was it notified of the red salsa prior to the alleged slip-and-fall incident.” (Dubondec. 11; see Defendant's Separate Statement 12.)Based on Dubon's declaration, the Court finds that Defendant has carried its initial burden on summary judgment of showingthat it lacked actual notice of the dangerous condition, shifting the burden to Plaintiff.Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's showing that it lacked actual notice, instead arguing that Defendant had constructivenotice.2. Constructive noticeIn his declaration, Dubon stated that, based on his review of the video footage, “Plaintiff slipped on red salsa that was spilledby a third-party customer in a black jacket 3 minutes and 59 seconds prior to the alleged slip-and-fall incident.” (Dubon dec. 7; see Defendant's separate statement 6.)*4 Plaintiff does not dispute Defendant's assertion that Plaintiff fell about four minutes after the salsa spilled. (See Oppositionpp. 2, 6-7, 10.) However, Plaintiff argues that “courts have held that even brief windows of time may support constructive
Sanchez v. Chedraui USA, Inc., 2025 WL 3307158 (2025)WESTLAW©2026Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5notice, particularly in high-traffic areas.” (Opposition p. 10.) To support this assertion, Plaintiff cites “Briganti v. Chow King,Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 776.” (Opposition p. 10.)The Court could not locate Briganti v. Chow King, Inc. (2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 776. The Court issues an order to show causewhy the Court should not sanction Plaintiff's counsel for providing a fabricated case citation.Plaintiff also contends that Defendant has failed to present evidence showing when it last inspected the location before Plaintiff'sfall. In its reply, Defendant argues that it was not required to present evidence about inspection because the four-minute durationof the hazardous condition prevents a finding of constructive notice as a matter of law. Defendant relies on Gonzalez v. InterstateCleaning Corporation (2024) 106 Cal.App.5th 1026 (Gonzalez) and Girvitz v. Boys' Market (1949) 91 Cal.App.2d 827 (Girvitz).In Gonzalez, the trial court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding no triable issue of fact concerning whetherthe defendants had actual or constructive notice of spilled oranges on which the plaintiff slipped and fell. The Court of Appealaffirmed, observing that (1) the plaintiff did not know how long the oranges had been on the floor and (2) “the undisputedevidence showed defendants actively inspected the floor, and the eight-to nine-minute interval between the last inspection andplaintiff's fall was insufficient to demonstrate constructive knowledge.” (Gonzalez, supra, 106 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1030, 1036.)In Girvitz, a customer slipped and fell on a banana peel that had been lying on the floor of a store's grocery department fora minute and a half before the incident. (Girvitz, supra, 91 Cal.App.2d at p. 828.) The store's manager testified there was ajanitor on duty at all times who was instructed to sweep the floors; that there as a “box boy” who was instructed to keep theplace swept between the check stands and the candy department; that there was at all times a porter on duty whose primaryduty was to sweep the floor, and also a boy designated to sweep whenever he saw the necessity therefor; that employees in eachdepartment were required to keep their immediate vicinity as clean as possible. (Id. at pp. 828-829.) The jury entered a verdictfor the plaintiff. The trial court granted the defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict. (Id. at p. 828.)The Court of Appeal affirmed, reasoning “where the only evidence is that the foreign object has been on the floor of the marketfor ‘a minute and a half,’ it must be held that it is insufficient to support an inference that the defendant proprietor failed toexercise the care required of him.” (Girvitz, supra, 91 Cal.App.2d at p. 831.)In Ortega, supra, the Supreme Court asked: “If the plaintiff has no evidence of the source of the dangerous condition or thelength of time it existed, may the plaintiff rely solely on the owner's failure to inspect the premises within a reasonable periodof time in order to establish an inference that the defective condition existed long enough for a reasonable person exercisingordinary care to have discovered it?” (Ortega, supra, 26 Cal.4th at p. 1203.) The Court answered the question by concludingthat “evidence of the owner's failure to inspect the premises within a reasonable period of time is sufficient to allow an inferencethat the condition was on the floor long enough to give the owner the opportunity to discovery and remedy it.” (Ibid.)*5 Based on the reasoning of Ortega, Gonzalez, and Girvitz, the Court concludes that a defendant moving for summaryjudgment is not required to present evidence about its inspection of the premises when it has shown that the dangerous substancewas on the floor for an insufficient amount of time to support an inference that it failed to exercise due care. Here, Defendant haspresented unrefuted evidence that the spilled salsa was on the floor no more than four minutes before Plaintiff's fall. Therefore,Defendant has carried its initial burden on summary judgment of showing it lacked constructive notice of the dangerouscondition. The burden shifts to Plaintiff.Plaintiff has presented no evidence which raises a triable issue of fact. The Court grants the motion.CONCLUSIONThe Court GRANTS Defendant Chedraui USA, Inc.'s motion for summary judgment.
Sanchez v. Chedraui USA, Inc., 2025 WL 3307158 (2025)WESTLAW©2026Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6The Court issues an order to show cause why the Court should not sanction Plaintiff's counsel for providing a fabricated casecitation. Plaintiff's counsel is ordered to file a declaration one week prior explaining whether “Briganti v. Chow King, Inc.(2022) 81 Cal.App.5th 776” is a fabricated case citation. The Court will set the OSC on a date to be provided at the November6, 2025 hearing on Defendant's motion for summary judgment.Order to Show Cause Re: monetary sanctions against counsel for plaintiff for providing a fabricated case citation is scheduledfor 12/11/2025 at 08:30 AM in Department 28 at Spring Street Courthouse.Moving party is ordered to give notice of this ruling.Moving party is ordered to file the proof of service of this ruling with the Court within five days.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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