subserved his own interest at the expense of his co-adventurer and hence breached his fiduciary duty. Moreover, appellant asserts that when respondent committed the joint-venture potatoes to this limited market program, without assigning the potato-processing contracts to the joint venture, he placed himself in a “heads I win, tails you lose position” which should not be tolerated; appellant argues that if the price of potatoes had dropped Skone would have used other potatoes to fulfill his contractual obligations.
The fiduciary duty between partners and joint adventurers is a rule of ethics and fairness and is essentially similar to the duty owed by an agent to his principal or by a trustee to his cestui que trust. Thus, under the law each partner must act in the highest good faith toward the other, and one must not take any advantage over the other by the slightest misrepresentation or concealment (Laux v. Freed, supra, 53 Cal. 2d 512; 37 Cal.Jur.2d, Partnership, §46, p. 613). However, there is no breach of a fiduciary duty if there has been a full and complete disclosure, if the partner who deals with partnership property first discloses all of the facts surrounding the transaction to the other partners and secures their approval and consent (Corp. Code, §15021).2 In fact, it would be incongruous to hold that a partner who consented to a partnership transaction, with full knowledge of all of the facts, may later complain and seek damages against the other partner simply because he benefited by the transaction.
Admittedly, appellant’s argument that respondent was in an advantageous position when he committed the joint-venture potatoes to his potato-processing contracts without assigning these contracts to the joint venture is persuasive. Nevertheless, we conclude that there was substantial evidence for the court to find that respondent did not breach his fiduciary duty to appellant. There was substantial evidence for the court to find that respondent fully and fairly disclosed his plans to appellant’s of6cers, Carl Quandt, and H. F. Beckerdite, and secured their approval and consent.
First, appellant was having financial difficulties due to prior farming losses when its officers elected to join respondent in the joint venture to market the 1965 potato crop. Moreover, respondent testified that he informed Carl Quandt of his
2
For a comparable situation, see Fisher v. Losey, 78 Cal.App.2d 121 [177 P.2d 334], where the court held that an agent who fully and fairly disclosed Ms interest in the transaction to his principal did not breach his fiduciary duty to the principal.