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Sweden v. Soliman
(2025)
Case details
Full caption
Kingdom of Sweden v. Samantha Ashhadi Soliman
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Affirmed
Majority
Cody (J.) (unanimous Court)
KINGDOM
OF
SWEDEN,
Plaintiff
and
Respondent,
v....,
Not
Reported
in...
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
1
2025
WL
3442560
Not
Officially
Published
(Cal.
Rules
of
Court,
Rules
8.1105
and
8.1110,
8.1115)
Only
the
Westlaw
citation
is
currently
available.
California
Rules
of
Court,
rule
8.1115,
restricts
citation
of
unpublished
opinions
in
California
courts.
NOT
TO
BE
PUBLISHED
IN
THE
OFFICIAL
REPORTS
Court
of
Appeal,
Second
District,
California.
DIVISION
SIX.
KINGDOM
OF
SWEDEN,
Plaintiff
and
Respondent,
v.
SAMANTHA
ASHHADI
SOLIMAN,
Defendant
and
Appellant.
2d
Civ.
No.
B339545
|
Filed
12/1/2025
Editor's
Note:
This
decision
contains
discussion
of
citation
references
that
are
incorrect
or
do
not
actually
exist.
These
invalid
citations
appeared
in
the
original
court
opinion
and
have
been
preserved
as
written
since
they
are
part
of
the
official
record.
Any
links
to
these
invalid
citations
have
been
removed.
(Super.
Ct.
No.
56-2022-00567870-CU-CL-VTA)
(Ventura
County)
Opinion
CODY
,
J.
*1
This
appeal
arises
from
a
cause
of
action
for
breach
of
contract
due
to
failure
to
pay
student
loans.
Appellant
Samantha
Ashhadi
Soliman
appeals
the
trial
court's
order
granting
respondent
Kingdom
of
Sweden's
Motion
for
summary
judgment
and
entering
judgment
against
appellant
in
the
U.S.
dollar
equivalent
of
885,005
Swedish
Crowns.
We
will
affirm.
FACTUAL
AND
PROCEDURAL
BACKGROUND
The
Swedish
Board
of
Student
Finance
(CSN)
is
a
governmental
agency
of
Sweden
handling
Sweden's
government-sponsored
student
loans.
The
funds
CSN
uses
for
student
loans
come
from
Sweden's
National
Debt
Office,
and
the
student
loans
repaid
by
borrowers
is
sent
by
CSN
to
Sweden's
National
Debt
Office.
When
student
loans
are
not
repaid,
Sweden
sustains
the
loss,
not
CSN.
Beginning
in
December
1998,
appellant
submitted
written
“Applications
for
Study
Aid”
and
documents
titled
“Debt
Obligation/Affirmation,”
to
CSN
promising
to
repay
all
student
loans
according
to
current
repayment
rules
promulgated
by
CSN.
In
response,
CSN
submitted
documents
to
appellant
titled
“Decision”,
in
which
CSN
accepted
her
applications.
CSN
made
several
loan
disbursements
to
appellant
in
the
aggregate
amount
of
589,303
Swedish
Crowns.
Appellant
made
no
repayments
on
her
student
loans.
Sweden
filed
a
First
Amended
Complaint
(FAC)
alleging
breach
of
contract
and
damages
in
the
amount
of
885,005
Swedish
Crowns,
the
U.S.
dollar
equivalent
of
$87,278.59.
Sweden
moved
for
summary
judgment
(MSJ)
contending
it
had
standing
to
pursue
the
action
and
there
were
no
triable
issues
of
material
fact.
Appellant
filed
an
opposition
to
Sweden's
MSJ,
challenging
Sweden's
standing,
contending
there
were
triable
issues
of
material
fact,
and
asserting
the
claim
was
barred
by
the
statute
of
limitations.
After
argument,
the
court
entered
a
detailed
14-page
minute
order
granting
Sweden's
MSJ
and
entering
judgment
in
Sweden's
favor
and
against
appellant.
The
trial
court
found
there
were
no
triable
issues
of
fact
as
to
Sweden's
standing
or
the
elements
of
Sweden's
cause
of
action
for
breach
of
contract,
and
appellant
had
failed
to
demonstrate
a
triable
issue
of
fact
as
to
her
affirmative
defenses
based
on
the
statute
of
limitations,
whether
under
Swedish
or
California
law.
The
trial
court
entered
Judgment
in
favor
of
Sweden
and
against
appellant
for
the
sum
of
$84,057.95,
the
U.S.
dollar
equivalent
of
885,005
Swedish
Crowns
as
of
June
14,
2024,
and
for
post-judgment
interest
on
the
forgoing
sum
at
the
legal
rate.
DISCUSSION
Appellant's
Briefs
Violate
Rules
of
Appellate
Procedure
KINGDOM
OF
SWEDEN,
Plaintiff
and
Respondent,
v....,
Not
Reported
in...
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
2
“Failure
to
comply
with
time-honored
rules
of
appellate
procedure
may
result
in
forfeiture
of
the
issues
on
appeal.”
(
L.O.
v.
Kilrain
(2023)
96
Cal.App.5th
616,
618
.)
Appellant's
opening
brief
violates
several
rules
of
appellate
procedure.
Many
of
the
cases
she
cites
do
not
support
the
propositions
for
which
they
are
cited,
and
do
not
address
the
issues
she
cites
them
for.
For
example,
she
cites
Southern
Cal.
Gas
Co.
v.
Public
Utilities
Com.
(1990)
50
Cal.3d
31,
55
saying
it
held
“that
courts
must
evaluate
standing
based
on
objective
evidence,
not
conclusory
statements.”
Yet
that
case
does
not
discuss
standing
at
all.
As
support
for
her
contention
that
“A
court
cannot
presume
standing
or
allow
a
party
to
establish
standing
solely
through
its
own
conclusory
declarations”
she
cites
Patterson
v.
Superior
Court
(2021)
70
Cal.App.5th
473
disapproved
of
by
Ramirez
v.
Charter
Communications,
Inc.
(2024)
16
Cal.5th
478
,
a
case
that
does
not
mention
standing.
She
also
does
not
inform
us
that
Patterson
was
disapproved
by
Ramirez.
*2
Appellant
includes
alleged
quotes
from
cases
that
do
not
contain
the
quoted
language.
For
example,
she
misrepresents
that
Apartment
Assn.
of
Los
Angeles
County,
Inc.
v.
City
of
Los
Angeles
(2006)
136
Cal.App.4th
119
contains
the
quote
“Standing
is
a
jurisdictional
issue
that
must
be
addressed
before
the
merits
of
a
case
may
be
reached.”
She
falsely
represents
that
Angelucci
v.
Century
Supper
Club
(2007)
41
Cal.4th
160
,
contains
the
quote
“A
plaintiff
must
have
a
real,
present
interest
in
the
outcome
–
not
just
a
theoretical
or
governmental
interest
in
enforcing
its
laws.”
She
also
incorrectly
cites
statutes,
for
example
claiming
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
section
437c,
subdivision
(f)(2)
bars
a
court
from
“granting
summary
judgment
while
a
counter-motion
is
still
pending
and
involves
unresolved
material
factual
disputes.”
1
Her
reply
brief
is
similarly
flawed.
For
example,
she
cites
nonexistent
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
section
2330
stating
it
requires
that
“an
agency
relationship
must
be
established
through
admissible
evidence
of
actual
authority,
such
as
an
express
assignment
or
written
delegation.”
“Simply
stated,
no
brief,
pleading,
motion,
or
any
other
paper
filed
in
any
court
should
contain
any
citations—
whether
provided
by
generative
AI
or
any
other
source—
that
the
attorney
responsible
for
submitting
the
pleading
has
not
personally
read
and
verified.”
(
Noland
v.
Land
of
the
Free,
L.P.
(2025)
114
Cal.App.5th
426,
431
,
italics
omitted.)
Appellant's
status
as
a
pro
per
litigant
does
not
entitle
her
to
special
consideration.
(
Nwosu
v.
Uba
(2004)
122
Cal.App.4th
1229,
1246-1247
.)
A
party
acting
as
their
own
attorney
is
“entitled
to
the
same,
but
no
greater
consideration
than
other
litigants
and
attorneys.”
(
Barton
v.
New
United
Motor
Manufacturing,
Inc.
(1996)
43
Cal.App.4th
1200,
1210
.)
Appellant's
“extensive
reliance
on
nonexistent
legal
authority
would
justify
striking
[her]
opening
brief
or
dismissing
the
appeal.
(
Noland
at
p.
426.)
However,
“[o]nce
the
record
has
been
reviewed
thoroughly,
little
appears
to
be
gained
by
dismissing
the
appeal
rather
than
deciding
it
on
its
merits.”
(
People
v.
Wende
(1979)
25
Cal.3d
436,
443
.)
We
conclude
this
appeal
is
without
merit.
The
Trial
Court
Properly
Granted
Sweden's
MSJ
We
“determine
de
novo
whether
an
issue
of
material
fact
exists
and
whether
the
moving
party
was
entitled
to
summary
judgment
as
a
matter
of
law.”
(
Jones
v.
Awad
(2019)
39
Cal.App.5th
1200,
1206
.)
Applying
“the
same
three-step
analysis
as
the
trial
court
[we]
(1)
identify
the
issues
framed
by
the
pleadings,
(2)
determine
whether
the
moving
party
has
established
facts
justifying
judgment
in
its
favor,
and
(3)
determine
whether
the
nonmoving
party
has
demonstrated
a
triable
issue
of
material
fact.”
(
Id
.
at
pp.
1206-1207
.)
We
“
‘view
the
evidence
in
a
light
favorable
to
...
the
losing
party.’
”
(
Id.
at
p.
1207
.)
*3
Sweden's
FAC
contains
a
single
cause
of
action
for
breach
of
contract
based
on
allegations
appellant
breached
her
student
loan
contract
by
failing
to
repay
her
student
loans.
Sweden's
MSJ
asserts
entitlement
to
summary
judgment
on
the
grounds
it
had
standing
to
assert
the
claim
and
there
were
no
triable
issues
of
material
fact
as
to
any
elements
of
the
claim.
Sweden's
Separate
Statement
of
Undisputed
Material
Facts
establishes
facts
justifying
judgment
in
its
favor.
Sweden
established
standing
by
citing
supporting
evidence
for
the
propositions
that
(1)
CSN
is
an
agency
of
the
Swedish
government
and
handles
all
matters
related
to
student
loans
on
behalf
of
Sweden,
(2)
the
funds
used
to
make
student
loans
come
from
Sweden
and
the
money
repaid
by
students
on
the
loans
is
sent
by
CSN
to
Sweden,
and
(3)
when
student
loans
are
not
repaid
and
result
in
a
loss,
the
loss
is
sustained
by
Sweden,
not
CSN.
These
facts
establish
CSN
enters
student
loan
contracts
as
an
agent
on
behalf
of
Sweden,
only
Sweden
issues
funds
for
student
loans,
and
only
Sweden
suffers
a
loss
when
student
loans
are
not
repaid.
(
Civil
Code
§
2330
;
Wood
Bldg.
Corp.
v.
Griffitts
(1958)
164
Cal.App.2d
559,
565
.)
KINGDOM
OF
SWEDEN,
Plaintiff
and
Respondent,
v....,
Not
Reported
in...
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
3
Sweden
satisfied
its
initial
burden
of
demonstrating
no
triable
issue
of
material
fact
as
to
any
elements
of
its
breach
of
contract
claim
by
setting
forth
material
facts
in
its
Separate
Statement
and
citing
evidence
supporting
(1)
the
existence
of
a
contract,
(2)
Sweden's
performance
of
the
contract,
(3)
appellant's
breach,
and
(4)
Sweden's
resulting
damages.
(
Oasis
West
Realty,
LLC
v.
Goldman
(2011)
51
Cal.4th
811,
821
.)
In
contrast,
appellant
failed
to
demonstrate
any
triable
issues
of
material
fact
related
to
Sweden's
standing
or
its
breach
of
contract
claim.
Instead
of
stating
facts
or
citing
admissible
evidence
to
demonstrate
a
triable
issue
of
material
fact,
she
relied
on
her
own
allegations
and
denials
and
a
hearsay
report
from
CSN.
(
Code
Civ.
Proc.,
§
437c,
subd.
(p)(1)
[a
defendant
“shall
not
rely
upon
the
allegations
or
denials
of
its
pleadings
to
show
that
a
triable
issue
of
material
fact
exists
but,
instead,
shall
set
forth
the
specific
facts
showing
that
a
triable
issue
of
material
fact
exists”].)
2
As
an
example,
appellant's
declaration
opposing
the
motion
for
summary
judgment
stated
respondent
lacked
standing
“to
sue
on
behalf
of
CSN.
CSN
operates
independently
and
is
not
merely
an
extension
of
the
Swedish
government's
functions.
CSN
has
its
own
staff,
procedures,
rules,
laws
and
regulations
it
follows,
independent
with
its
own
mandate
and
organizational
structure.
This
is
supported
by
recent
case
law
....”
The
trial
court
properly
sustained
respondent's
objection
to
this
conclusory
statement
of
opinion.
The
trial
court
also
correctly
noted
even
if
this
were
true
it
did
not
establish
any
facts
to
support
appellant's
contention
that
CSN
could
not
be
acting
as
respondent's
agent.
The
Trial
Court's
Choice-of-Law
Analysis
Was
Proper
*4
Appellant
contends
the
trial
court
improperly
applied
Sweden's
statute
of
limitations
without
conducting
an
independent
interest-balancing
test.
We
disagree.
When
a
choice
of
law
question
is
raised
in
California,
the
trial
court
first
“
‘determines
whether
the
relevant
law
of
each
of
the
potentially
affected
jurisdictions
...
is
the
same
or
different.
Second,
if
there
is
a
difference,
the
court
examines
each
jurisdiction's
interest
in
the
application
of
its
own
law
under
the
circumstances
of
the
particular
case
to
determine
whether
a
true
conflict
exists.
Third,
if
the
court
finds
...
a
true
conflict,
it
carefully
evaluates
and
compares
the
nature
and
strength
of
the
interest
of
each
jurisdiction
in
the
application
of
its
own
law
“to
determine
which
state's
interest
would
be
more
impaired
if
its
policy
were
subordinated
to
the
policy
of
the
other
state”
[citation],
and
then
ultimately
applies
“the
law
of
the
state
whose
interest
would
be
more
impaired
if
its
law
were
not
applied.’
””
(
McCann
v.
Foster
Wheeler
LLC
(2010)
48
Cal.4th
68,
87-88
.)
First,
the
trial
court
found
Sweden's
25-year
statute
of
limitations
very
different
from
California's
four-year
statute
of
limitations.
3
Second,
it
examined
each
jurisdiction's
interest
in
the
application
of
its
own
laws.
It
considered
persuasive
analysis
from
an
unpublished,
but
factually
similar
District
Court
opinion,
Kingdom
of
Sweden
v.
Nowacki
(S.D.
Cal.,
Aug.
28,
2015,
No.
14-CV-1259-H-NLS)
[2015
U.S.
Dist.
Lexis
120740].
Appellant
takes
issue
with
the
court
relying
upon
the
analysis
of
the
same
issue
in
an
unpublished
District
Court
case.
Nowacki
is
citable
as
persuasive
(not
precedential)
authority,
notwithstanding
California
Rules
of
Court,
rule
977
,
which
only
bars
citation
of
unpublished
California
opinions.
(
City
of
Hawthorne
ex
rel.
Wohlner
v.
H&C
Disposal
Co.
(2003)
109
Cal.App.4th
1668,
1678,
fn.
5
;
Cal.
Style
Manual
(4th
ed.
2000)
§
1:34
pp.
35-36.)
Moreover,
the
court
did
not
cite
the
case
as
binding
authority
but
merely
agreed
with
its
analysis
of
the
same
issue
and
adopted
that
analysis
as
its
own.
Third,
the
court
evaluated
which
jurisdiction's
interest
would
be
more
impaired
by
application
of
the
other
jurisdiction's
laws.
It
found
Sweden's
interest
in
applying
its
25-year
statute
of
limitations
to
student
loan
collection
actions
was
stronger
and
more
specific
than
California's
general
interest
in
protecting
residents
against
stale
claims.
Many
Swedish
student
loan
borrowers
who
move
abroad
seek
to
avoid
paying
their
loans
and
Sweden's
long
statute
of
limitations
affords
enough
time
to
locate
and
contact
delinquent
borrowers
residing
abroad,
work
with
them
to
come
up
with
repayment
plans,
and
when
necessary,
pursue
claims
against
them.
On
this
basis,
the
court
correctly
found
Sweden's
interest
would
be
more
impaired
if
its
policy
were
subordinated
by
California's
and
properly
applied
Sweden's
statute
of
limitations.
*5
We
have
considered
appellant's
remaining
claims
and
conclude
each
is
lacking
relevant
or
accurate
legal
authority,
cogent
legal
argument,
and
is
without
merit.
KINGDOM
OF
SWEDEN,
Plaintiff
and
Respondent,
v....,
Not
Reported
in...
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
4
DISPOSITION
Judgment
is
affirmed.
Respondent
shall
recover
their
costs
on
appeal.
NOT
TO
BE
PUBLISHED.
We
concur:
YEGAN
,
Acting
P.
J.
BALTODANO
,
J.
Rebecca
Riley,
Judge
Superior
Court
County
of
Ventura
Samantha
Ashhadi
Soliman,
in
pro
per,
for
Defendant
and
Appellant.
Law
Offices
of
Ernest
Mooney,
W.
Earnest
Mooney,
for
Plaintiff
and
Respondent.
All
Citations
Not
Reported
in
Cal.Rptr.,
2025
WL
3442560
Footnotes
1
Code
of
Civil
Procedure
section
437c,
subdivision
(f)(2)
states:
“A
motion
for
summary
adjudication
may
be
made
by
itself
or
as
an
alternative
to
a
motion
for
summary
judgment
and
shall
proceed
in
all
procedural
respects
as
a
motion
for
summary
judgment.
A
party
shall
not
move
for
summary
judgment
based
on
issues
asserted
in
a
prior
motion
for
summary
adjudication
and
denied
by
the
court
unless
that
party
establishes,
to
the
satisfaction
of
the
court,
newly
discovered
facts
or
circumstances
or
a
change
of
law
supporting
the
issues
reasserted
in
the
summary
judgment
motion.”
2
To
support
her
claim
Sweden
lacks
standing,
appellant
filed
a
request
for
judicial
notice
of
two
letters
purportedly
written
by
the
Swedish
Ministry
of
Education
and
Research
(Exhibits
(A)
and
(B)).
We
agree
with
the
points
raised
in
Sweden's
opposition
that
the
letters
are
not
properly
subject
to
judicial
notice
under
Evidence
Code
section
452,
subdivisions
(c)
,
(f)
,
(h)
,
Evidence
Code
section
459,
subdivision
(a)
,
and
rule
8.252
of
the
California
Rules
of
Court
.
Accordingly,
we
deny
appellant's
request
for
judicial
notice
of
Exhibits
(A)
and
(B).
In
any
event,
nothing
in
these
exhibits
indicates
Sweden
lacks
the
power
to
institute
legal
actions
on
behalf
of
its
agencies,
even
where
those
legal
actions
are
brought
in
foreign
nations.
3
To
support
Sweden's
position
its
claim
is
not
barred
by
its
statute
of
limitations,
Sweden
filed
a
request
for
judicial
notice
in
the
trial
court
on
September
14,
2022,
which
was
granted
in
part
on
June
24,
2024.
On
May
9,
2025,
Sweden
requested
this
court
judicially
notice
three
of
the
statutory,
regulatory,
and
decisional
laws
judicially
noticed
by
the
trial
court.
We
conclude
the
foreign
law/authorities
are
judicially
noticeable
pursuant
to
Evidence
Code,
section
452,
subdivision
(f)
and
we
grant
this
unopposed
request.
End
of
Document
©
2025
Thomson
Reuters.
No
claim
to
original
U.S.
Government
Works.
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