T-Alexander v. Baass (Apr. 14, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Michael T-Alexander v. Michelle Baass et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
Apr. 14, 2026
Disposition
Affirmed
MICHAEL T-ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v...., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1004593Not Officially Published(Cal. Rules of Court, Rules 8.1105 and 8.1110, 8.1115)Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.California Rules of Court, rule 8.1115, restrictscitation of unpublished opinions in California courts.NOT TO BE PUBLISHED IN OFFICIAL REPORTSCalifornia Rules of Court, rule 8.1115(a), prohibitscourts and parties from citing or relying onopinions not certified for publication or orderedpublished, except as specified by rule 8.1115(b).This opinion has not been certified for publicationor ordered published for purposes of rule 8.1115.Court of Appeal, Sixth District, California.MICHAEL T-ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant,v.MICHELLE BAASS et al., Defendants and Respondents.H052046|Filed 04/14/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.(Santa Cruz County Super. Ct. No. 23CV01552)OpinionWilson, J.*1 Michael T-Alexander challenges an order declaring him avexatious litigant pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section391.11 and imposing a prefiling order on him pursuant tosection 391.7. T-Alexander argues that California's vexatiouslitigant statutes violate the supremacy clause of the UnitedStates Constitution and are preempted by federal lawgoverning disability rights. He further argues that improperconduct by the trial court denied him due process andnecessitates reversal.We reject the arguments and affirm.I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDA. Underlying petitionOn July 3, 2023, T-Alexander2 filed a petition for awrit mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctiverelief (petition) against Michelle Baass and Kim Johnson(respondents), in their respective capacities as the directorsof the Department of Health Care Services (DHCS) andthe Department of Social Services (CDSS).3 The petitionalleges that T-Alexander is a Medi-Cal beneficiary who ispermanently disabled. After moving from San Mateo Countyto Santa Cruz County, T-Alexander allegedly requested inJanuary 2022 that his benefits be transferred to Santa CruzCounty, pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section10003. However, he alleges, after he made that request, theSanta Cruz County CDSS “used a defective process andpolicy that had been outdated and expired by two years andreplaced by [Welfare and Institutions Code section 10003],the ‘inter-county transfer (ICT) process.’ ” According to T-Alexander, by improperly shifting the transfer-of-benefitsprocess back to the Social Security Administration, the SantaCruz CDSS violated federal and state law and his due processrights.The petition further alleges that respondents refused to enrollhim in the required managed care plan, unenrolled him fromthe San Mateo County managed care plan without notice, anddenied his request for a hearing.B. Motion to declare T-Alexander a vexatious litigantOn September 7, 2023, respondents filed a motion to declareT-Alexander a vexatious litigant pursuant to section 391,and later an amended motion on November 16, 2023. Theyargued first that T-Alexander is a vexatious litigant pursuantto section 391, subdivision (b)(1), which defines a vexatiouslitigant as any person who, “[i]n the immediately precedingseven-year period has commenced, prosecuted, or maintainedin propria persona at least five litigations other than in a smallclaims court that have been (i) finally determined adverselyto the person or (ii) unjustifiably permitted to remain pendingat least two years without having been brought to trial orhearing.” (§ 391, subd. (b)(1).)*2 Respondents requested that the trial court take judicialnotice of five judgments and orders of dismissal in casesthat had been determined adversely to T-Alexander in the
MICHAEL T-ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v...., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2previous seven years: (1) Alexander v. Cal. Dept. of MotorVehicles (N.D. Cal., No. 19-cv-03996), in which a civilcomplaint was dismissed with prejudice; (2) Alexander v. Cal.Dept. of Motor Vehicles (9th Cir., No. 20-15252), in which theappeal was dismissed as frivolous; (3) Alexander v. Countyof San Mateo et al. (N.D. Cal., No. 20-cv-05179), in whichthe court denied T-Alexander injunctive relief and dismissedthe matter with prejudice; (4) Michael Alexander v. Countyof San Mateo et al. (9th Cir., No. 20-16861), in which T-Alexander's appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction;and (5) Michael Alexander v. County of San Mateo et al.,(9th Cir., No. 20-17189), in which T-Alexander's claims weredismissed on the basis his appeal was frivolous, and judgmentwas entered against him.Respondents also argued that T-Alexander is a vexatiouslitigant pursuant to section 391, subdivision (b)(3), whichdefines it as any person who, “[i]n any litigation whileacting in propria persona, repeatedly files unmeritoriousmotions, pleadings, or other papers, conducts unnecessarydiscovery, or engages in other tactics that are frivolous orsolely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” (§ 391, subd. (b)(3).) Respondents then listed nine distinct motions, pleadings,or papers that T-Alexander had filed in the 2023 lawsuit, andin a related lawsuit already pending in the same court—T.Alexander v. Michelle Baass, et. al., Case No. 22cv00899(2022 lawsuit).As respondents noted in their motion, T-Alexander had fileda notice of related case when he filed the petition in the2023 lawsuit, which asserted that the pending 2022 lawsuitinvolved the same parties, was based on the same or similarclaims, and arose from the same or substantially identicaltransactions, incidents, or events requiring the determinationof the same or substantially identical questions of law or fact.Accordingly, respondents requested an order requiring T-Alexander to seek leave of court before proceeding in propriapersona with a lawsuit in any California court, pursuant tosection 391.7, subdivision (a). That section provides: “Inaddition to any other relief provided in this title, the courtmay, on its own motion or the motion of any party, entera prefiling order which prohibits a vexatious litigant fromfiling any new litigation in the courts of this state in propriapersona without first obtaining leave of the presiding justiceor presiding judge of the court where the litigation is proposedto be filed. Disobedience of the order by a vexatious litigantmay be punished as a contempt of court.” (§ 391.7, subd. (a).)In addition, respondents requested an order requiring T-Alexander to post security sufficient to cover respondents'anticipated attorney fees and costs before T-Alexander mayproceed further in the 2023 lawsuit, pursuant to section 391.1subdivision (a), which provides: “In any litigation pendingin any court of this state, at any time until final judgmentis entered, a defendant may move the court, upon noticeand hearing, for an order requiring the plaintiff to furnishsecurity or for an order dismissing the litigation pursuant tosubdivision (b) of Section 391.3. The motion for an orderrequiring the plaintiff to furnish security shall be based uponthe ground, and supported by a showing, that the plaintiff is avexatious litigant and that there is not a reasonable probabilitythat they will prevail in the litigation against the movingdefendant.” (§ 391.1, subd. (a).)*3 In support of that request, respondents argued that therewas no reasonable probability that T-Alexander could prevailin the 2023 lawsuit because the claims are duplicative of thoseraised in the 2022 lawsuit. As a result, respondents argued, the2023 lawsuit is subject to special demurrer pursuant to section430.10, subdivision (c), because another action is pendingwhich involves the same parties and the same cause of action.After respondents filed their motion, T-Alexander initiallyfiled a pleading labeled “dismissal of case” on January 22,2024, in which he asked the court to “[p]lease dismiss thiscase.” However, he then filed an opposition to respondents'amended motion on January 29, 2024. T-Alexander arguedthat the prior lawsuits did not satisfy application of section391, subdivision (b)(1), because they were not final adversedeterminations on the merits, but rather were dismissed onprocedural grounds, were appeals of the underlying cases thatdid not count as separate proceedings, or were still pending.He also argued that the definition in section 391, subdivision(b)(3), was not satisfied because the cited motions andpleadings he had filed were legitimate and raised validarguments.Finally, he argued that, because “identical claims” remainedpending in the 2022 lawsuit, there was a reasonableprobability he could succeed on the merits, and an orderrequiring the posting of security was not warranted pursuantto section 391.1.C. Hearing and order
MICHAEL T-ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v...., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3A hearing was held on March 14, 2024.4 T-Alexander failedto properly contest the trial court's tentative ruling as requiredby the local rules, but nevertheless appeared remotely at thehearing and sought to argue against the ruling. The trial courtinitially allowed T-Alexander to present oral argument, butthen stopped him when he began addressing the merits of theunderlying petition, rather than the subject motion.The trial court issued its order granting respondents' motionon March 25, 2024 (order). The court first stated that T-Alexander's “proposed dismissal”—which it described as anapparent attempt to avoid respondents' motion—had beenrejected for failing to use the appropriate form.Next, the court determined T-Alexander to be a vexatiouslitigant pursuant to section 391, subdivision (b)(1). The courtbased that ruling on eight distinct actions T-Alexander hadfiled in propria persona in the previous seven years which hadbeen adversely decided against him.The court then held that there was not a reasonable probabilityT-Alexander would succeed in the 2023 lawsuit because itwas “duplicative and based upon the same facts and incidentas in [the 2022 lawsuit], which is pending.” The trial courttherefore required T-Alexander to post a $20,000 securitywithin 30 days to prevent dismissal of the 2023 lawsuit,pursuant to sections 391.1 and 391.3.Finally, the order stated that the court would issue a prefilingorder pursuant to section 391.7, thereby preventing T-Alexander from filing new litigation in any California courtwithout first obtaining leave from the presiding judge wherethe proposed litigation would be filed, unless represented byan attorney.The following month, on April 18, 2024, the trial court filedthe prefiling order declaring T-Alexander a vexatious litigantpursuant to section 391.7 (prefiling order). Pursuant to section391.7, subdivision (f), the prefiling order also directed theclerk of the court to provide a copy of the order to the JudicialCouncil, which maintains a record of vexatious litigantssubject to prefiling orders and annually disseminates a list ofthose persons to the clerks of California courts. (§ 391.7, subd.(f).)D. Appeal*4 T-Alexander timely appealed. This court subsequentlygranted T-Alexander's motion for permission to file thisappeal pursuant to section 391.7, subdivision (c).II. DISCUSSIONT-Alexander presents numerous arguments on appeal, chieflycontending that section 391 violates the supremacy clause ofthe United States Constitution, and is preempted by federallaw regarding disability rights, such as the RehabilitationAct of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act) and the Americans withDisabilities Act (ADA). As we explain below, many ofhis contentions are unsupported by reasoned argument andcitations to authority, or they otherwise challenge non-appealable aspects of the trial court's order.A. AppealabilityRespondents first argue that the appeal should be dismissedfor lack of jurisdiction because T-Alexander appeals from aninterlocutory vexatious litigant order, which is not directlyappealable, and the trial court proceedings remain pending.~(RB 16-17)~Respondents cite Golin v. Allenby (2010) 190 Cal.App.4th616 (Golin) which held that an “order determining a party tobe a vexatious litigant and requiring the posting of securityunder [Code of Civil Procedure] section 391.3 is not directlyappealable.” (Id. at p. 635.) Only after a plaintiff fails tofurnish the security and the matter is subsequently dismissedpursuant to section 391.4 will an appeal lie. (Ibid.)There is no evidence in the record here that any subsequentorder or judgment of dismissal was entered. For that reason,the trial court's order requiring the posting of security is notdirectly appealable by itself. (Golin, supra, 190 Cal.App.4that p. 636.)However, the court's order was not limited to the securityrequirement pursuant to section 391.3—instead, the court alsostated that it would enter a prefiling order pursuant to section391.7, which it then did on April 18, 2024.A prefiling order pursuant to section 391.7 is essentially aninjunction—“it is, literally, an order requiring [the litigant] torefrain from doing a particular act—filing any new litigation[in propria persona] without certain permission.” (Luckettv. Panos (2008) 161 Cal.App.4th 77, 90 [“there is no
MICHAEL T-ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v...., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4question that the prefiling order contemplated by section391.7, subdivision (a) is an injunction”].) Because an ordergranting an injunction is appealable pursuant to Code of CivilProcedure section 904.1, subdivision (a)(6), the prefilingorder here is appealable. (In re Marriage of Rifkin & Carty(2015) 234 Cal.App.4th 1339, 1347 (Rifkin).)T-Alexander filed his initial notice of appeal on April 17,2024, the day before the trial court entered the prefiling order.In addition, neither that notice of appeal, nor his subsequentamended notice of appeal filed on May 16, 2024, identifiedthe prefiling order as the order being appealed from—instead,the amended notice of appeal identified the trial court's March25, 2024, order. Nevertheless, we will construe T-Alexander'sinitial notice of appeal as a premature notice of appeal ofthe prefiling order, which we will treat as filed immediatelyafter entry of the prefiling order. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule8.104(d)(1), (e) [“notice of appeal filed after judgment [ororder] is rendered but before it is entered is valid and is treatedas filed immediately after entry of judgment [or order]”];Bosetti v. United States Life Insurance Company in City ofNew York (2009) 175 Cal.App.4th 1208, 1223, fn. 11; seealso rule 8.100(a)(2) [“The notice of appeal must be liberallyconstrued.”]; Verceles v. Los Angeles Unified School District(2021) 63 Cal.App.5th 776, 783 [“ ‘[N]otices of appeal areto be liberally construed so as to protect the right of appealif it is reasonably clear what appellant was trying to appealfrom, and where the respondent could not possibly have beenmisled or prejudiced.’ ”]B. Applicable law1. Vexatious litigant statutes*5 California's vexatious litigant statutes (§§ 391–391.7)“are designed to curb misuse of the court system bythose persistent and obsessive litigants who, repeatedlylitigating the same issues through groundless actions, wastethe time and resources of the court system and otherlitigants.” (Shalant v. Girardi (2011) 51 Cal.4th 1164, 1169(Shalant).)These statutes provide two distinct, but complementary,sets of remedies. (Shalant, supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1171.)First, sections 391.1 through 391.6 provide that, in pendinglitigation, “a defendant may have the plaintiff declared avexatious litigant and, if the plaintiff has no reasonableprobability of prevailing, ordered to furnish security.” (Ibid.;§§ 391.1–391.6.) Then, “if the plaintiff fails to furnish thesecurity, the action will be dismissed.” (Shalant, supra, at p.1171.)Second, a defendant may prevent a vexatious litigant “fromfiling any new litigation in propria persona by obtaining aprefiling order and, if any new litigation is inadvertentlypermitted to be filed in propria persona without the presidingjudge's permission, may then obtain its dismissal.” (Shalant,supra, 51 Cal.4th at p. 1171; § 391.7.) Section 391.7, addedby the Legislature in 1990 to provide an additional meansto counter misuse of the system by vexatious litigants, “‘operates beyond the pending case’ and authorizes a courtto enter a ‘prefiling order’ that prohibits a vexatious litigantfrom filing any new litigation in propria persona without firstobtaining permission from the presiding judge.” (Shalant,supra, at p. 1171, citation omitted.)The prefiling requirement in section 391.7 does not deny avexatious litigant access to the courts, but rather “ ‘operatessolely to preclude the initiation of meritless lawsuits and theirattendant expenditures of time and costs.’ ” (In re Marriageof Deal (2022) 80 Cal.App.5th 71, 77.)2. Rehabilitation Act and ADAThe Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (29 U.S.C. § 701 et seq.),was the “ ‘first major federal statute designed to protectthe rights of ... the [disabled] people of this country.’” (Fleming v. Yuma Regional Medical Center (9th Cir.2009) 587 F.3d 938, 940 (Fleming), quoting Smith v. Barton(9th Cir. 1990) 914 F.2d 1330, 1338.) Section 504 of theRehabilitation Act (section 504) “creates a private right ofaction for individuals subjected to disability discriminationby any program or activity receiving federal financialassistance [citation] including employment discrimination insuch programs [citations].” (Fleming, supra, at p. 940 [“[n]ootherwise qualified individual with a disability ... shall, solelyby reason of her or his disability, be excluded from theparticipation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjectedto discrimination under any program or activity receivingFederal financial assistance”].)The ADA, enacted in 1990, “aims ‘to provide a clearand comprehensive national mandate for the eliminationof discrimination against individuals with disabilities.’” (Daubert v. Lindsay Unified School District (9th Cir. 2014)760 F.3d 982, 985, quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1).) “The
MICHAEL T-ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v...., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5ADA contains five titles separately addressing employment,public entities, public accommodations, telecommunications,and miscellaneous matters.” (Stanley v. City of Sanford,Florida (2025) 606 U.S. 46, 51.)C. Principles of appellate review and standard of review*6 A fundamental principle of appellate review is that wepresume a trial court's judgment is correct and the burden ison the appellant to demonstrate that the court committed anerror that justifies reversal of the judgment. (L.O. v. Kilrain(2023) 96 Cal.App.5th 616, 620 (Kilrain).) The appellantmust support each claim of error with meaningful analysisand citation to legal authority. (Ewald v. Nationstar Mortgage,LLC (2017) 13 Cal.App.5th 947, 948.) An appellant's failureeither to raise a point or support it with reasoned argumentand citations to authority allows the reviewing court to deemthe unsupported contentions forfeited. (Ibid.; Kilrain, supra,at p. 620.)We review a trial court's determination that an individual isa vexatious litigant for substantial evidence. (Rifkin, supra,234 Cal.App.4th at p. 1346, citing Holcomb v. U.S. BankNational Association (2005) 129 Cal.App.4th 1494, 1498–1499.) “Review of the order is accordingly limited and theCourt of Appeal will uphold the ruling if it is supported bysubstantial evidence. Because the trial court is best suitedto receive evidence and hold hearings on the question ofa party's vexatiousness, we presume the order declaring alitigant vexatious is correct and imply findings necessary tosupport the judgment.” (Golin, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p.636.)By contrast, we exercise de novo review of theconstitutionality of statutes and whether they are preemptedby federal law. (Persky v. Bushey (2018) 21 Cal.App.5th810, 817–818; People ex rel. Renne v. Servantes (2001)86 Cal.App.4th 1081, 1087.) “ ‘ “[A]ll presumptions andintendments favor the validity of a statute and meredoubt does not afford sufficient reason for a judicialdeclaration of invalidity. Statutes must be upheld unlesstheir unconstitutionality clearly, positively, and unmistakablyappears.” ’ ” (Voters for Responsible Retirement v. Board ofSupervisors (1994) 8 Cal.4th 765, 780, citations omitted.)D. Analysis1. Supremacy clause and preemptionT-Alexander first argues that the supremacy clause of theUnited States Constitution precludes using section 391 to“convert federally protected ADA disability complaints under42 USC § 12101 and Section 504 complaints into groundsfor restricting state court access.” According to T-Alexander,penalizing an individual for exercising his federal rights inthat manner “creates precisely the type of procedural obstaclethat ‘burdens, frustrates and defeats’ federal rights….”We begin with a brief overview of the supremacy clause andthe law regarding preemption. As a general matter, “ ‘in oursystem of federalism, federal law and state law ordinarilycoexist.” (Ranger v. Alamitos Bay Yacht Club (2025) 17Cal.5th 532, 547, citing Ward v. United Airlines, Inc. (2020) 9Cal.5th 732, 757 (Ward).) When state and federal law overlap,“tensions between them are resolved not by interstate comityand choice of law principles but by the supremacy clause andpreemption principles.” (Ward, supra, at p. 757.)The supremacy clause of the United States Constitutionprovides: “This Constitution, and the Laws of the UnitedStates which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and allTreaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authorityof the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land;and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, anyThing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrarynotwithstanding.” (U.S. Const. Art. VI, cl. 2.) As a result,“Congress may consequently pre-empt, i.e., invalidate, a statelaw through federal legislation. It may do so through expresslanguage in a statute. But even where ... a statute does notrefer expressly to pre-emption, Congress may implicitly pre-empt a state law, rule, or other state action.” (Oneok, Inc. v.Learjet, Inc. (2015) 575 U.S. 373, 376–377.)*7 There are “ ‘three different types of preemption—“conflict,” “express,” and “field,” [citation]—but all ofthem work in the same way: Congress enacts a law thatimposes restrictions or confers rights on private actors; astate law confers rights or imposes restrictions that conflictwith the federal law; and therefore the federal law takesprecedence and the state law is preempted.’ ” (County of Buttev. Department of Water Resources (2022) 13 Cal.5th 612, 628,quoting Murphy v. National Collegiate Athletic Assn. (2018)584 U.S. 453.)Here, T-Alexander broadly argues that section 391 violatesthe supremacy clause by penalizing “the filing of federalADA disability complaints under 42 USC § 12101 andSection 504 complaints.” As support, he cites numerous
MICHAEL T-ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v...., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6United States Supreme Court cases for the generalpropositions described above.However, T-Alexander has failed to analogize any of the casesto the facts at issue here, or otherwise describe how section391—or any of the vexatious litigant statutes—conflicts withfederal disability laws or rights. Nor do his case referencesinclude any pin citations to specific portions of the opinionsthat purportedly support his assertions.5 We consider thearguments forfeited. (Handyman Connection of Sacramento,Inc. v. Sands (2004) 123 Cal.App.4th 867, 880, fn. 14(Handyman) [declining to consider points supported only bycase citations with no pin cites].) “ ‘It is not our place toconstruct theories or arguments to undermine the judgmentand defeat the presumption of correctness.’ ” (Kilrain, supra,96 Cal.App.5th at p. 620; see also, In re S.C. (2006) 138Cal.App.4th 396, 412 [not court's role to carry out appellateburden to explain how authorities support claim of error];Nwosu v. Uba (2004) 122 Cal.App.4th 1229, 1246– 1247[rules apply equally to self-represented parties].)Similarly, with respect to preemption, T-Alexander merelyrecites the various types of preemption—conflict, express,and field—but fails to provide any analysis or discussionof how the doctrines might apply here. And he again citesnumerous United States Supreme Court cases but providesno discussion or application to the facts here.6 To theextent T-Alexander has asserted any arguments regardingpreemption, we consider them forfeited. (Handyman, supra,123 Cal.App.4th at p. 880, fn. 14.)*8 T-Alexander also argues that “[t]he imposition of [§391] bond requirements on individuals exercising their rightsunder the ADA (42 USC § 12101) and Section 504 createsan impermissible financial barrier that directly conflicts withfederal disability law's guarantee of meaningful access tolegal remedies.” However, as explained above, the trialcourt's order requiring the posting of security is not directlyappealable here. (Golin, supra, 190 Cal.App.4th at p. 636.)T-Alexander next argues that the use of section 391 topenalize the federally protected act of filing disabilitycomplaints constitutes prohibited state interference withfederal law, pursuant to Nash v. Florida IndustrialCommission (1967) 389 U.S. 235 (Nash). In Nash, the UnitedStates Supreme Court considered whether a Florida statelaw that denied unemployment insurance to those who hadfiled an unfair labor practice charge violated the supremacyclause because it conflicted with the federal National LaborRelations Act (NLRA), “a comprehensive code passed byCongress to regulate labor relations in activities affectinginterstate and foreign commerce.” (Nash, supra, at pp. 235–237.) Implementation of the NLRA, the Court explained,“is dependent upon the initiative of individual persons whomust, as petitioner has done here, invoke its sanctions throughfiling an unfair labor practice charge,” and “Congress hasmade it clear that it wishes all persons with information aboutsuch practices to be completely free from coercion againstreporting them to the Board,” as shown by section 8(a)(4) ofthe NLRA, “which makes it an unfair labor practice for anemployer to discriminate against an employee because he hasfiled charges.” (Nash, supra, at p. 238.)The Court held that the state law, “like the coercive actionswhich employers and unions are forbidden to engage in, hasa direct tendency to frustrate the purpose of Congress toleave people free to make charges of unfair labor practices tothe Board.” (Nash, supra, 389 U.S. at p. 239.) Specifically,because Florida had applied its law so that an employeewho believes he has been wrongly discharged must either“keep quiet and receive unemployment compensation until hefinds a new job,” or file an unfair labor practice charge andthereby surrender his right to unemployment compensation,the financial burden imposed by the state law impedes resortto the federal law and “thwart[s] congressional reliance onindividual action.” (Ibid.)T-Alexander argues the case is directly analogous herebecause: (1) filing ADA and section 504 disability complaintsare similarly protected federal acts; (2) California usessection 391 to penalize disability rights filings; (3) Californiasimilarly forces a choice between exercising federal disabilityrights through complaints or avoiding state penalties undersection 391; (4) section 391's financial burdens and its bar onaccess to state courts to enforce state and federal disabilitycomplaints impede access to ADA and section 504 remedies;and (5) using section 391 to burden federal disability rights“retards, impedes, burdens” federal rights and creates “anobstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the fullpurposes and objectives of Congress.”We find the analogy unpersuasive. As a threshold matter,T-Alexander has not identified any specific sections of theRehabilitation Act or ADA which he claims are impeded here.Instead, he refers only to “section 504” or the “ADA” as awhole. For that reason, we are unable to conduct the kindof analysis the United States Supreme Court undertook inNash, when it determined that Florida's state law thwarted
MICHAEL T-ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v...., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7the specific cited sections of the NLRA which made it anunfair labor practice to discriminate against an employeebecause he had filed charges. (Nash, supra, 389 U.S. at p.238.) Although T-Alexander refers generally to a right to file afederal disability complaint, he does not identify any specificstatutory authority immunizing his federal litigation activityfrom the operation of section 391 et seq.7*9 In any event, California's vexatious litigant statutesdo not preclude the filing of federal disability, or other,complaints. Instead, where applicable, they merely require avexatious litigant plaintiff to (1) furnish security to maintainan action where the plaintiff has no reasonable probabilityof prevailing, or (2) obtain permission from the presidingjudge before filing any new litigation in propria persona.(§§ 391.1–391.7.) T-Alexander has failed to articulate howthose statutes thwart congressional intent of any part of theRehabilitation Act or ADA.Relatedly, T-Alexander argues that the ADA and section 504create a protected class of litigants for qualified individualswith disabilities, thereby creating a “ ‘fundamentaldistinction’ between disability rights litigation and the generalcivil cases [section 391] was designed to regulate.” It follows,he contends, that section 391's inclusion of “any civilaction or proceeding” within its scope “impermissibly failsto recognize the special status of federal disability rightsclaims.”However, T-Alexander has again failed to support hiscontentions with reasoned argument or citations to authority.For instance, he cites generally to Tennessee v. Lane (2004)541 U.S. 509, for its purported statements that “Title II ofthe ADA unambiguously confers fundamental rights,” andthat Congress enacted the ADA “to provide clear, strong,consistent, enforceable standards addressing discriminationagainst individuals with disabilities.” Yet the cited quotationsdo not appear in the opinion at all.8 We consider thearguments forfeited.Lastly, T-Alexander argues that section 391 isunconstitutional, both facially and as applied, because itdoes not exempt federally protected claims from thosethat can be considered to determine a vexatious litigant.According to T-Alexander, “the statute's failure to distinguishbetween ordinary civil litigation (overly-broad language)and congressionally created rights of action for a protectedclass (not narrowly tailored) raises serious constitutionalconcerns under both the Supremacy Clause and fundamentalprinciples of federal preemption.” Yet T-Alexander againmerely asserts general propositions without any reasonedargument or authority. As we have explained, California'svexatious litigant statutes do not preclude the filing of federaldisability complaints, and T-Alexander has failed to articulatehow the statutes thwart or impede the Rehabilitation Act orADA.92. Trial court conduct and due processT-Alexander argues that “improper judicial conduct” violatedhis due process and invalidates the trial court's order.Specifically, he contends that the trial court improperlyconsidered and relied on the 2022 lawsuit as a basis for itsruling, even though the complaint from the 2022 lawsuit wasnever entered into evidence. He asserts that the trial court'sreliance on the 2022 lawsuit constitutes improper use of extra-record evidence; constitutional violations through extra-judicial knowledge; improper independent investigation;improper ex parte communication between trial court judges;and violation of due process.*10 First, we note that T-Alexander himself identified the2022 lawsuit as a related case, and asserted that it involvedthe same parties, was based on the same or similar claims, andarose from the same or substantially identical transactions,incidents, or events requiring the determination of the sameor substantially identical questions of law or fact as the 2023lawsuit.More importantly, though, it is immaterial whether thecomplaint from the 2022 lawsuit was entered into evidenceor whether the trial court relied on it. Only the trial court'sprefiling order pursuant to section 391.7 is properly beforethis court on appeal. And the trial court based its prefilingorder on its determination that T-Alexander is a vexatiouslitigant pursuant to section 391, subdivision (b)(1), for havingfiled at least five pro per lawsuits in the preceding seven yearsthat were finally determined adversely to him, which did notinclude the 2022 lawsuit.103. No federal court vexatious litigant designationT-Alexander argues that the federal courts' decision not todeclare him a vexatious litigant “carries significant legalweight that cannot be disregarded.” He contends that the
MICHAEL T-ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v...., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8federal courts' “choice not to impose such restrictions,particularly given their special expertise in federal disabilityrights law, should inform any state court's consideration of thesame conduct under [section 391.]”However, T-Alexander has cited no evidence of whether anyof the federal courts that presided over his prior litigationactually considered declaring him a vexatious litigant anddecided not to. Nor has he cited any authority for theproposition that such a determination would be relevant orlegally preclude a California court from declaring him avexatious litigant pursuant to section 391.4. Procedural versus substantive determinationsT-Alexander argues that because the prior federal litigationwas resolved on procedural grounds, rather than on the meritsof his disability claims, it cannot serve as the basis for avexatious litigant determination pursuant to section 391.Contrary to T-Alexander's assertion, though, it is wellestablished that “litigation is finally determined adverselyto a plaintiff if he does not win the action or proceedinghe began, including cases that are voluntarily dismissedby a plaintiff.” (Garcia v. Lacey (2014) 231 Cal.App.4th402, 406–407, citing Tokerud v. Capitolbank Sacramento(1995) 38 Cal.App.4th 775, 779; In re Whitaker (1992) 6Cal.App.4th 54, 56.) In short, there is no requirement thatprior litigation be resolved on the merits for purposes ofsection 391, subdivision (a)(1). Nor has T-Alexander hascited any authority for that proposition.III. DISPOSITION*11 The order is affirmed. In the interests of justice, theparties shall bear their own costs on appeal. (Cal. Rules ofCourt, rule 8.278(a)(5).)WE CONCUR:Grover, Acting P. J.Lie, J.All CitationsNot Reported in Cal.Rptr., 2026 WL 1004593Footnotes1Subsequent undesignated statutory references are to the Code of Civil Procedure.2Appellant alternately refers to himself as “T-Alexander,” “T. Alexander,” or “Alexander.” We will refer to himas “T-Alexander,” which matches the name listed on the operative petition and complaint and the notice ofappeal in this action.3We refer to this lawsuit as the “2023 lawsuit” because, as explained below, T-Alexander had previously fileda related lawsuit in 2022 against the same respondents in the same court, which remained pending at thetime he filed the 2023 lawsuit.4The hearing was not transcribed by a court reporter. T-Alexander elected to designate a settled statementon appeal, which the trial court ultimately prepared and certified on December 10, 2024.5See, e.g., McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 17 U.S. 316; Felder v. Casey (1988) 487 U.S. 131; Howlett v. Rose(1990) 496 U.S. 356; Wisconsin Public Intervenor v. Mortier (1991) 501 U.S. 597; Sperry v. Florida ex rel.Florida Bar (1963) 373 U.S. 379; Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation &Development Commission (1983) 461 U.S. 190; Arizona v. United States (2012) 567 U.S. 387; Leslie Miller,Inc. v. Arkansas (1956) 352 U.S. 187.
MICHAEL T-ALEXANDER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v...., Not Reported in... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.96See, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corporation (1947) 331 U.S. 218; Fidelity Federal Savings and LoanAssociation v. de la Cuesta (1982) 458 U.S. 141; Lawrence County v. Lead-Deadwood School District No.40-1 (1985) 469 U.S. 256; Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Taylor (1987) 481 U.S. 58; Brown v. Hoteland Restaurant Employees and Bartenders International Union Local 54 (1984) 468 U.S. 491; HillsboroughCounty, Florida v. Automated Medical Laboratories, Inc. (1985) 471 U.S. 707; Boyle v. United TechnologiesCorporation (1988) 487 U.S. 500; Geier v. American Honda Motor Company, Inc. (2000) 529 U.S. 861.7Elsewhere in his opening brief, T-Alexander claims that section 391 “impermissibly converts protected federalacts (filing disability complaints) (39 CFR 255.6) into grounds for state penalties.” The cited regulationappears to be part of the United States Postal Service regulations implementing section 504, which includesadministrative procedures for filing section 504 complaints “alleging disability discrimination in any programor activity of the Postal Service and brought by members of the public.” (39 C.F.R. § 255.6(b); Muhammadv. United States (D.D.C. 2018) 300 F.Supp.3d 257, 263.) T-Alexander has not articulated how the regulationis applicable or relevant here.8This is not the only instance of T-Alexander including quotations in his opening brief that do not appear inthe cited source. We note another such incident below.9T-Alexander also contends that respondents' request for judicial notice in the trial court had “merely listedfederal case dispositions without providing the underlying complaints,” so the trial court failed to recognizethat the cases involved statutorily protected ADA and section 504 claims. However, T-Alexander has notestablished that the nature of the underlying complaints makes any difference in the analysis of a vexatiouslitigant determination pursuant to section 391.10T-Alexander cites People v. Superior Court (Humberto S.) (2008) 43 Cal.4th 737, 750, for the followingquotation: “a judge may not act on personal knowledge of facts not presented in evidence or conduct anindependent investigation of facts not in evidence.” However, no such quotation appears in that case, orin any other case this court was able to locate. In addition to the other such instance in his opening briefidentified above, T-Alexander's reply brief contains numerous similar fabricated quotations. The record alsoshows that T-Alexander acknowledged having included inaccurate citations in briefing in the trial court. Wecaution appellant that such conduct violates the California Rules of Court and Code of Civil Procedure,notwithstanding the fact that he is unrepresented. (See, e.g., Cal. Rules of Court, rule 8.204(a)(1)(B) [requiringall assertions of law in brief be supported by citation to legal authority]; § 128.7, subd. (b)(2) [requiring “legalcontentions” in a brief to be “warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new law”].)End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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