Wade v. Traincareconsult, Inc (2025)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
California (CA)
Court
California Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Wade v. Traincareconsult, Inc, 2025 WL 4670779 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 4670779 (Cal.Super.) (Trial Order)Superior Court of California,Civil Division,Northeast District, Alhambra Courthouse, Department T.Los Angeles CountyLevisa WADE, et al.,v.TRAINCARECONSULT, INC.No. 24NNCV06599.November 7, 2025.*1 Editor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generatedby AI tools used by a party or counsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. Theunverified citations have been preserved as part of the official record, but links are unavailable.8:30 AMJudicial Assistant: I. YinCourtroom Assistant: V. GarciaCSR: NoneERM: NoneDeputy Sheriff: NoneOrderRiasat Azmi for Anthony Willoughby via LACC, for plaintiff(s).Garrett Parsons via LACC, for defendant(s).Honorable Ian C. Fusselman, Judge.NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Hearing on Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10) (8387); Status Conference re:2nd Amended ComplaintMatter is not called for hearing.Court's tentative ruling on the motions were posted prior to the hearing.Counsel for plaintiff and counsel for defendant submit on the Court's tentative ruling.Court's tentative ruling shall issue as order of the court.After reading and considering all moving documents, the court rules as follows: The Demurrer -with Motion to Strike (CCP430.10) (8387) filed by TRAINCARECONSULT, INC on 09/12/2025 and Demurrer - with Motion to Strike (CCP 430.10)(8387) filed by TRAINCARECONSULT, INC on 09/12/2025 are Sustained.
Wade v. Traincareconsult, Inc, 2025 WL 4670779 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2BACKGROUNDOn December 13, 2024, Plaintiffs Levisa Wade and Darnell Wade (“Plaintiffs”) filed a complaint alleging abuse of DarnellWade.On October 23, 2025, at the hearing for Plaintiffs' ex parte application, the Court deemed the opposition and demurrer to therejected second amended complaint filed, and Plaintiff was to prepare and submit a new second amended complaint. (Min.Order, 10/23/25.)On October 23, 2024, Plaintiffs filed the operative second amended complaint (“SAC”) alleging that Darnell Wade(“Darnell”), who is a dependent adult suffering from developmental disabilities, received caregiving support from DefendantTrainCareConsult, Inc. (“Defendant”) at his home. (SAC 1, 8.) From 2022 to September 2024, Defendant assigned variousemployees to provide in-home services to Darnell, who then inflicted abusive and excessive force on Darnell, resulting in abroken arm and fractured rib. (Id. 11.)Defendant now demurs to the following causes of action in the SAC: fifth cause of action for negligent infliction of emotionaldistress (“NIED”). Defendant concurrently moves to strike portions of the SAC as improperly pled under the sham pleadingdoctrine, as well as Plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages.Plaintiffs oppose and Defendant replies.MOVING PARTY POSITIONIn demurring to the fifth cause of action, Defendant first argues that the newly pled NIED claim is duplicative of Plaintiffs'negligence claim as NIED is not an independent tort. Even if NIED could be alleged against Defendant by Plaintiff Levisa Wade(“Levisa”), there is complete absence of factual allegations establishing Levisa's presence at the scene of any injury-producingevent or her contemporaneous awareness that any such event was causing harm to Darnell.In moving to strike new allegations under the sham pleading doctrine, Defendant argues that the new allegations found inParagraphs 15, 25, and 33 contradict prior pleadings found in Plaintiffs' first amended complaint (“FAC”).In moving to strike the punitive damages allegations, Defendant argues that Plaintiffs fail to plead sufficient facts to support therecovery of punitive damages and, consequently, failed to plead facts sufficient to see any enhanced remedies under Welfareand Institutions Code section 15657.OPPOSITION*2 In opposing the demurrer, Plaintiffs contend that the SAC contains sufficient allegations to support Levisa's NIED claimunder a bystander theory, as the alleged facts are sufficient to establish her contemporaneous awareness of the alleged injury-producing events.In opposing the motion to strike, Plaintiffs first contend that Defendant's application of the sham pleading doctrine is misplacedas the SAC permissibly clarifies and amplifies the facts that the Court previously identified as deficient. Plaintiffs next contendthat SAC pleads punitive damages against a corporate employer through sufficient facts establishing ratification, as well assufficient facts to support the enhanced remedies sought under Section 15657.
Wade v. Traincareconsult, Inc, 2025 WL 4670779 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3REPLYAs Plaintiffs initially filed an erroneous opposition to the demurrer that was duplicative of their opposition to the motion tostrike, Defendant did not address the opposition arguments in their briefing.In responding to the opposition to its motion to strike, Defendant initially argues that the cited authority for Plaintiff's assertionthat the Court must accept contradictory pleadings is not only mischaracterized but reliant on non-existent, quoted verbiagefrom the cited cases. There is a clear contradiction between Plaintiffs' prior allegation in the FAC that Defendant removed theallegedly abusive employees and the new allegations that these employees were not removed but instead sent back to Plaintiffs'home.Defendant finally requests sanctions based on apparent signs that the opposition contains artificial intelligence “hallucinations”based on these non-existent quotes and mischaracterization of Defendant's demurrer and motion to strike as containing a citationthat was never referenced.ANALYSISI. Demurrer Legal StandardThe primary function of a pleading is to give the other party notice so that it may prepare its case [citation], and a defect in apleading that otherwise properly notifies a party cannot be said to affect substantial rights.” (Harris v. City of Santa Monica(2013) 56 Cal.4th 203, 240.) “A demurrer tests the legal sufficiency of the factual allegations in a complaint.” (Ivanoff v. Bankof America, N.A. (2017) 9 Cal.App.5th 719, 725.) It raises issues of law, not fact, regarding the form or content of the opposingparty's pleading (complaint, answer or cross-complaint). (Code Civ. Proc. §§ 422.10, 589; see, also, Donabedian v. MercuryIns. Co. (2004) 116 Cal.App.4th 968, 994.) It is not the function of the demurrer to challenge the truthfulness of the complaint;and for purposes of the ruling on the demurrer, all facts pleaded in the complaint are assumed to be true. (Donabedian, 116Cal.App.4th at 994.)The general rule is that the plaintiff need only allege ultimate facts, not evidentiary facts. (Doe v. City of Los Angeles (2007)42 Cal.4th 531, 550.) “All that is required of a plaintiff, as a matter of pleading, even as against a special demurrer, is thathis complaint set forth the essential facts of the case with reasonable precision and with sufficient particularity to acquaint thedefendant with the nature, source and extent of his cause of action.” (Rannard v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. (1945) 26 Cal.2d149, 156-157.)Where a demurrer is sustained, leave to amend must be allowed where there is a reasonable possibility of successful amendment.(Goodman v. Kennedy (1976) 18 Cal.3d 335, 348.) The burden is on the plaintiff to show the court that a pleading can beamended successfully. (Id.; Lewis v. YouTube, LLC (2015) 244 Cal.App.4th 118, 226.) However, “[i]f there is any reasonablepossibility that the plaintiff can state a good cause of action, it is error to sustain a demurrer without leave to amend.” (Youngmanv. Nevada Irrigation Dist. (1969) 70 Cal.2d 240, 245.)II. Meet and Confer*3 The declaration of Defendant's counsel, Garrett S. Parsons, establishes that the parties met and conferred via telephone onSeptember 4, 2025, and were unable to reach a resolution regarding the instant demurrer and motion to strike.III. Request for Judicial Notice
Wade v. Traincareconsult, Inc, 2025 WL 4670779 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Defendant request that the Court take judicial notice of the Court's minute order dated July 18, 2025, and Plaintiff's FirstAmended Complaint filed May 6, 2025, from the records of the instant case. The Court grants Defendant's request and takesnotice of these records. (Evid. Code § 452, subd. (d)(1).)IV. DiscussionA. NIED (Fifth Cause of Action)California law recognizes negligent infliction of emotional distress (“NIED”) not as an independent tort but as a form ofnegligence, and recovery is typically available under either a bystander or direct victim theory. (Spates v. Dameron Hosp. Assn.(2003) 114 Cal.App.4th 208, 213.) “In the absence of physical injury or impact to the plaintiff himself, damages for emotionaldistress should be recoverable only if the plaintiff: (1) is closely related to the injury victim; (2) is present at the scene of theinjury-producing event at the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim and, (3) as a result suffersemotional distress beyond that which would be anticipated in a disinterested witness.” (Thing v. La Chusa (1989) 48 Cal.3d644, 647.)To recover for NIED on a bystander theory, a bystander plaintiff must be “present at the scene of the injury producing eventat the time it occurs and is then aware that it is causing injury to the victim[.]” (Thing, supra, 48 Cal.3d at p. 668.) The keyis that, at the time of perception, the bystander knows the event is injuring the relative. (Ibid.; see, also, Wright v. City of LosAngeles (1990) 219 Cal.App.3d 318, 350 [finding no NIED claim in circumstances where the plaintiff saw paramedics treatinga family member but did not know he was being maltreated].)Here, Levisa appears to bring her NIED claim under a bystander theory, based on alleged abuse suffered by her son Darnell.(SAC ¶¶ 57-65.) Defendant argues that “there is a complete absence of a factual allegation supporting the claim that PlaintiffLevisa was physically present at the scene of any such event, much less that she was aware, in real-time, that these supposedevents were inflicting harm upon Plaintiff Darnell.” (Demurrer, p. 60.)In reviewing the SAC, the Court finds that Plaintiffs fail to sufficiently establish Levisa's contemporaneous awareness of thealleged injury-producing events, as Plaintiffs only allege that Levisa personally witnessed the “results” of the purported abuseand not the abuse itself. (SAC ¶¶ 60.) This factual distinction is further established by Plaintiff's allegations setting forth themeans by which she was made contemporaneously aware as receiving and viewing “video footage and photographs documentingthe abuse”, observing “fresh injuries on her son's body”, witnessing firsthand “her son's distress, fear, and emotional traumaresulting from continued exposure to abusive caregivers”, and repeatedly notifying the defendants “of the abuse via text message,phone calls, and verbal reports.” (Ibid.) Common to all of these allegations is Levisa's apparent temporal or spatial distance froman injury-producing event, as she is alleged to have viewed digital documentation the abuse, or to have observed the effects ofthe abuse after an incident occurred or cumulatively over time. There is no indication in the SAC that she was physically presentfor the occurrent of any injury-producing event. Nor do Plaintiffs allege any well-pleaded facts to establish her contemporaneousawareness. Thus, the Court finds that this element of Levisa's NIED claim is insufficiently pled.*4 The Court also notes that Plaintiffs frequently misrepresent the substance of their factual allegations, as made evidentby their repeated reliance on non-existent allegations in support of their argument that their NIED claim is sufficiently pledunder a bystander theory. (See Opp., p. 8 [citing and relying on non-existent paragraphs 94 through 96 in support of Plaintiffs'argument that “[t]he SAC pleads serious emotional distress—mental anguish, loss of peace of mind, and distress of a nature noreasonable person should be expected to endure—arising from Plaintiff's contemporaneous perception and immediate-aftermathobservations.”]; see, also, ibid. [citing and relying on non-existent paragraphs 88 through 92 and 94 through 96 as a factual basisfor the argument the “Thing demands contemporaneous awareness of the injury-producing event, not necessarily eye-on-impactin the same physical space; later authorities focus on whether the plaintiff perceived and understood the causal connection asit occurred, which the SAC alleges in detail.”] [emphasis added].)
Wade v. Traincareconsult, Inc, 2025 WL 4670779 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5These misrepresentations are repeated in support of Plaintiffs' alternative argument that the SAC sufficiently alleged NIEDunder a direct victim theory. Here, Plaintiffs assert that the SAC contains allegations supporting this theory, including factualallegations that “[Defendant] entered the home to provide daily caregiving/supervision for Plaintiff's dependent adult son; that[Defendant] and its staff communicated directly with Plaintiff regarding staffing, incidents, and injuries; that [Defendant] failedto supervise, warn, and truthfully report what was occurring; and that it concealed or minimized incidents despite Plaintiff'srepeated reports and submissions of videos.” (Opp., pp. 9-10.) Plaintiffs provide the following citations to allegations that areeither mischaracterized or non-existent in the SAC as support for these alleged facts: “(SAC ¶¶ 31–32 [videos in the home],88–92 [contemporaneous notice and management communications], 94–96 [serious distress].).” (Ibid.) However, in examiningparagraphs 31 and 32 of the SAC, neither of these paragraphs address the presence of videos in Plaintiffs' home and insteadseek to establish the alleged misconduct of Defendant's agents and employees. (See SAC ¶¶ 31–32.)The boldest misrepresentations appear later in Plaintiffs' argument that Levisa's severe emotional distress is sufficiently pled,where Plaintiffs set forth the following analysis: “Here, the SAC expressly alleges serious emotional distress—includingongoing mental anguish and loss of peace of mind— flowing from Plaintiff's contemporaneous perception of [Defendant's]injury-producing conduct and the immediate aftermath (SAC ¶¶ 94–96). Those allegations, accepted as true and construedliberally, are enough to state the element of severe distress at the pleading stage; granular medical particulars (diagnoses,treatment records, duration) are not required now.” (Opp., p. 11 [emphasis added].) The overt and egregious nature of Plaintiffs'misrepresentations becomes fully evident in Plaintiffs' final argument that Levisa's NIED claim is intelligible on its face because“it identifies who (Plaintiff mother; Darnell), what (injury-producing abusive handling/negligent supervision and concealment),when/where (inside Plaintiff's home during [Defendant's] in-home shifts), how Plaintiff perceived it (live/near live home videoand immediate aftermath), and the resulting harm (serious emotional distress). (SAC ¶¶ 31–32, 86, 88–92, 94–96.)” (Opp., p. 11.)Nevertheless, in reviewing the allegations in the SAC, the Court finds that Plaintiff insufficiently pled NIED under a directvictim theory as the California Supreme Court has restricted direct victim NIED to three specific scenarios: (1) the negligentmishandling of a corpse, (2) the negligent misdiagnosis of a disease that could harm another, and (3) the negligent breach ofa duty arising out of a preexisting relationship. (Christensen v. Superior Court (1991) 54 Cal.3d 868, 879; Molien v. KaiserFoundation Hospitals (1980) 27 Cal.3d 916, 923; Burgess v. Superior Court (1992) 2 Cal.4th 1064, 1072–1076.) None of thesespecific factual scenarios find support from Plaintiffs' allegations. Nor is it reasonably apparent that any amendment to theSAC could cure these factual deficiencies as Plaintiffs allege no mishandling of remains, no misdiagnosis of a disease, and nopreexisting relationship imposing a duty beyond that owed to the general public.*5 Moreover, the Court finds that the SAC contains insufficient facts to establish Levisa's severe emotional distress, asPlaintiffs rely solely on conclusory allegations of severe distress instead of well-pleaded facts. (See SAC ¶¶ 12, 21, 57–65.) Nordo Plaintiffs sufficiently allege that Levisa's severe emotional distress resulted from her presence at an injury-producing eventand her contemporaneous awareness that this event was harming Darnell.Therefore, the demurrer to the fifth cause of action is sustained with leave to amend the NIED claim under only a bystandertheory of liability.IV. Motion to StrikeCalifornia law authorizes a party's motion to strike matter from an opposing party's pleading if it is irrelevant, false, or improper.(Code Civ. Proc. §§ 435; 436(a).) Motions may also target pleadings or parts of pleadings which are not filed or drawn inconformity with applicable laws, rules or orders. (Code Civ. Proc. § 436(b).) A motion to strike is used to address defectsthat appear on the face of a pleading or from judicially noticed matter but that are not grounds for a demurrer. (Pierson vSharp Memorial Hospital (1989) 216 Cal.App.3d 340, 342; see also City & County of San Francisco v Strahlendorf (1992) 7Cal.App.4th 1911, 1913 [motion may not be based on a party's declaration or factual representations made by counsel in themotion papers].)
Wade v. Traincareconsult, Inc, 2025 WL 4670779 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6A. Striking Punitive DamagesPunitive damages may be imposed where it is proven by clear and convincing evidence that the defendant has been guilty ofoppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (a).) “Malice” is conduct intended by the defendant to cause injury to theplaintiff or despicable conduct which is carried on with a willful and conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others. (Civ.Code § 3294, subd. (c)(1).) “‘Punitive damages are proper only when the tortious conduct rises to levels of extreme indifferenceto the plaintiff's rights, a level which decent citizens should not have to tolerate.’ [Citation.]” (Lackner v. North (2006) 135Cal.App.4th 1188, 1210.)“As amended to include [despicable], the [Civil Code section 3294] plainly indicates that absent an intent to injure theplaintiff, ‘malice’ requires more than a ‘willful and conscious' disregard of the plaintiffs' interests. The additional componentof ‘despicable conduct’ must be found.” (College Hospital Inc. v. Superior Court (1994) 8 Cal.4th 704, 725.) The statute'sreference to despicable conduct represents a “new substantive limitation on punitive damage awards.” (Ibid.) Despicable conductis “conduct which is so vile, base, contemptible, miserable, wretched or loathsome that it would be looked down upon anddespised by ordinary decent people. Such conduct has been described as ‘having the character of outrage frequently associatedwith crime.”’ (Tomaselli v. Transamerica Ins. Co. (1994) 25 Cal.App.4th 1269, 1287.) Further, “[t]here must be evidence thatdefendant acted with knowledge of the probable dangerous consequences to plaintiff's interests and deliberately failed to avoidthese consequences.” (Flyer's Body Shop Profit Sharing Plan v. Ticor Title Ins. Co. (1986) 185 Cal.App.3d 1149, 1155.)A motion to strike punitive damages is properly granted where a plaintiff does not state a prima facie claim for punitive damages,including allegations that defendant is guilty of oppression, fraud or malice. (Turman v. Turning Point of Cent. California, Inc.(2010) 191 Cal.App.4th 53, 63.) “Mere negligence, even gross negligence, is not sufficient to justify such an award” for punitivedamages. (Kendall Yacht Corp. v. United California Bank (1975) 50 Cal.App.3d 949, 958.) Moreover, conclusory allegationsare not sufficient to support a claim for punitive damages. (Brousseau v. Jarrett (1977) 73 Cal.App.3d 864, 872.) Lastly, “[t]hemere allegation an intentional tort was committed is not sufficient to warrant an award of punitive damages. Not only must therebe circumstances of oppression, fraud, or malice, but facts must be alleged in the pleading to support such a claim.” (Grievesv. Superior Court (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 159, 166.)B. Punitive Damages towards a Corporation*6 For an Elder/Dependent Adult Abuse claim, “[t]he standards set forth in subdivision (b) of Section 3294 of the Civil Coderegarding the imposition of punitive damages on an employer based upon the acts of an employee shall be satisfied before anydamages or attorney's fees permitted under this section may be imposed against an employer.” (Welf. & Inst. Code § 15657,subd. (c).)When seeking damages from an employer, an employer is not liable for punitive damages arising from an employee's actionspursuant to Civil Code section 3294(a) unless the employer had advance knowledge of the unfitness of the employee andemployed him or her with a conscious disregard of the rights or safety of others or authorized or ratified the wrongful conductfor which the damages are awarded or was personally guilty of oppression, fraud, or malice. (Civ. Code § 3294, subd. (b).) Withrespect to a corporate employer, the advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or act of oppression,fraud, or malice must be on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation. (Ibid.)C. Analysisi. Sham Pleading Doctrine“A trial court has authority to strike sham pleadings, or those not filed in conformity with its prior ruling.” (Ricard v. Grobstein,Goldman, Stevenson, Siegel, LeVine & Mangel (1992) 6 Cal.App.4th 157, 162 [citing Code Civ. Proc. § 436].) “Generally, after
Wade v. Traincareconsult, Inc, 2025 WL 4670779 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7an amended pleading has been filed, courts will disregard the original pleading. However, an exception to this rule is found …where an amended complaint attempts to avoid defects set forth in a prior complaint by ignoring them. The court may examinethe prior complaint to ascertain whether the amended complaint is merely a sham.... Moreover, any inconsistencies with priorpleadings must be explained; if the pleader fails to do so, the court may disregard the inconsistent allegations. Accordingly, acourt is not bound to accept as true allegations contrary to factual allegations in former pleading in the same case.” (VallejoDevelopment Co. v. Beck Development Co. (1994) 24 Cal.App.4th 929, 946 [cleaned up] [internal citations and quotationsomitted].)Here, Defendant argues that the newly alleged facts set forth in paragraphs 15, 25, and 33 of the SAC are sham pleadingsbecause these allegations contradict facts previously established in Plaintiffs' FAC.In Paragraph 15, Plaintiffs allege the following: “Prior to November 30, 2023, Plaintiff Levisa Wade personally notifiedTrainCare management by phone that Darnell Wade had been subjected to abusive treatment by staff. Levisa Wade also sentsurveillance footage via text message to TrainCare's management clearly depicting the mistreatment. Despite being placed onactual notice, TrainCare failed to remove the staff involved and continued to send the same individuals to Darnell Wade's homeuntil explicitly directed not to by Plaintiff.” (SAC 15.)In Paragraph 25, Plaintiffs also set forth the following allegations: “Plaintiffs are informed and believe, and thereon allege, thatprior to the final instances of abuse suffered by Darnell, Defendants, including but not limited to Traincare and its owners ormanaging agents, were personally notified by telephone of abusive conduct by Traincare staff toward Darnell. Plaintiffs furtherallege that video recordings depicting this abuse were sent via text message to Traincare's ownership and/or management,particularly to Jay Smith and Sergio Merida . Despite this clear notice, Traincare continued to assign the same abusive staffto Darnell's care, thereby knowingly subjecting him to further harm. Plaintiffs allege that Defendants ratified this conduct byfailing to investigate, failing to terminate the abusive personnel, and continuing to expose Darnell to risk.” (SAC 25.)*7 In Paragraph 33, Plaintiffs further allege as follows: “[t]he abuse, neglect, and dangerous conduct occurred over anextended period from 2022 to 2024, during which Defendants repeatedly failed to protect Darnell Wade. Despite Plaintiff LevisaWade's multiple complaints and requests for staff changes, TrainCare failed to conduct meaningful investigations or removeunfit employees from its caregiving rotation. The continuation of this pattern demonstrates willful disregard and systemicfailure.” (SAC 33.)Defendant argues that these allegations are sham pleadings because Plaintiffs “now allege that TrainCare did not removenegligent employees from Plaintiffs' care but rather ‘failed to remove the staff involved and continued to send the sameindividuals to Darnell Wade's home until explicitly directed not to by Plaintiff.”’ (Mot., p. 7.)In Paragraph 14 of the SAC, Plaintiffs alleged as follows: “Throughout this period, Levisa Wade repeatedly raised concernsabout injuries observed on Darnell's body, and in each instance, requested that TrainCare remove the staff member responsible.In response, TrainCare routinely substituted one employee for another but failed to address the root cause: inadequate training,lack of supervision, and a failure to screen personnel for violent tendencies or substance abuse.” (FAC 14.)In opposition, Plaintiffs contend that because these newly pled allegations only “clarify and amplify the FAC in direct responseto the Court's guidance—and do not contradict a prior judicial admission— the sham pleading doctrine is inapplicable.” (Opp.,p. 6.)As an initial matter, the Court again notes apparent misrepresentations made by Plaintiffs in support of their oppositionarguments. Specifically, as Defendant highlighted in its reply, the characterizations of the applicable sham doctrine rulesestablished in Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740, Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408, and Colapintov. County of Riverside (1991) 230 Cal.App.3d 147, as well as quoted language from these cases, are plainly baseless.
Wade v. Traincareconsult, Inc, 2025 WL 4670779 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.8Nevertheless, under the applicable standard, the Court finds these newly pled allegations to be sham pleadings. Specifically,Plaintiffs alleged that Defendant “routinely substituted one employee for another” in response to Levisa's requests after eachinstance where observed any injuries on Darnell's body. (FAC 14.) Inconsistent with this prior allegation, Plaintiffs now allegethat after receiving notice from Levisa of an incident, Defendant failed to remove the staff involved in these incidents andcontinued to send the same individuals to their home despite her requests for staff changes. (SAC ¶¶ 15, 25, 33.)As Plaintiffs fail to explain this inconsistency in their opposition, the motion to strike is granted with prejudice, with respectto the following portions of each allegation:Paragraph 15: “Despite being placed on actual notice, TrainCare failed to remove the staff involved and continued to sendthe same individuals to Darnell Wade's home until explicitly directed not to by Plaintiff.” (SAC 15.)Paragraph 25: “Despite this clear notice, Traincare continued to assign the same abusive staff to Darnell's care, therebyknowingly subjecting him to further harm.” (SAC 25.)Paragraph 33: “Despite Plaintiffs Levisa Wade's multiple complaints and requests for staff changes, TrainCare failed toconduct meaningful investigations or remove unfit employees from its caregiving rotation. The continuation of this patterndemonstrates willful disregard and systemic failure.” (SAC 33.)ii. Punitive Damages & Enhanced Remedies*8 Because Defendant is corporate entity, Plaintiffs must comply with section 3294(c) in seeking to recover punitive damages.Punitive damages require sufficient allegations of advance knowledge and conscious disregard, authorization, ratification or anact of oppression, fraud, or malice on the part of an officer, director, or managing agent of the corporation.“‘Managing agents' are employees who ‘exercise[ ] substantial discretionary authority over decisions that ultimately determinecorporate policy.’ [Citation.] [The California Supreme Court in White v. Ultramar, Inc. (1999) 21 Cal.4th 563] concluded:‘[T]he Legislature intended the term ‘managing agent’ to include only those corporate employees who exercise substantialindependent authority and judgment in their corporate decisionmaking so that their decisions ultimately determine corporatepolicy.' [Citation.] ‘[T]o demonstrate that an employee is a true managing agent under [Civil Code] section 3294, subdivision(b), a plaintiff seeking punitive damages would have to show that the employee exercised substantial discretionary authorityover significant aspects of a corporation's business.’ [Citation.]” (Davis v. Kiewit Pacific Co. (2013) 220 Cal.App.4th 358, 366.)Here, Plaintiffs fail to allege sufficient facts establishing the person(s) who acted as the managing agent(s) on behalf ofDefendant, as well as any facts regarding whether said agent(s) acted with the requisite knowledge and in the requisite mannerto establish Defendant's liability for these claimed punitive damages as a corporate employer.Although Plaintiffs contends this liability is established because their factual allegations now establish that notice was sentup the chain to Defendant's management and owners, that Defendant continued assigning the same staff despite receiving thisnotice, and that Defendant's decisions after receiving notice ratified this abuse and showed conscious disregard of Plaintiffs'rights, the Court again notes that Plaintiffs rely in part on non-existent allegations to support this argument. (See Opp., p. 7.)To the extent that Plaintiff relies on allegations found in paragraphs 15, 25, and 33 to establishing a “knowing continuation ofa dangerous practice”, as the Court has determined the relevant portions of these allegations to be sham pleadings, no factualbasis for establishing these ratifying actions remains. Further, to the extent that Plaintiff relies on these allegations to establishnotice to an office, director, or managing agent, the Court finds that the allegations that “video recordings depicting this abusewere sent via text message to Traincare's ownership and/or management, particularly to Jay Smith and Sergio Merida” do nosuffice as it unclear from the pleadings what role these individuals serve for Defendant and whether this role is sufficient toestablish Defendant's liability for punitive damages under Section 3294(b). (SAC 25.) Thus, the Court finds that Plaintiffsfailed to plead sufficient factual allegation to support their request for punitive damages.
Wade v. Traincareconsult, Inc, 2025 WL 4670779 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9Therefore, the motion to strike is granted without prejudice.Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657 lists the heightened remedies given to a person who brings an Elder Abuse claim.Defendant argues that the statutory remedies are limited to only those explicitly listed. Section 15657 allows for recovery ofattorney's fees and costs, removes the damages limitations under Code of Civil Procedure section 377.34, and explicitly statesthat the standard for punitive damages for corporate employers in Civil Code section 3294(b) must be met before any damagesor attorney fees or costs are imposed against the employer. (See Welf. & Inst. Code, § 15657.)*9 Because the SAC does not comply with Civil Code section 3294(b) and is required to seek punitive damages and for theheightened remedies in Welfare and Institutions Code section 15657(c), the motion to strike these remedies is also grantedwithout prejudice.RULINGDefendant TrainCareConsult, Inc.'s Demurrer to the Second Amended Complaint is SUSTAINED with 20 days' leave to amendas to the fifth cause of action as to the bystander theory of liability only.The Motion to Strike is GRANTED with prejudice as to the specified portion of the Second Amended Complaint and otherwisewithout prejudice.ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE RE WHY SANCTIONS SHOULD NOT BE IMPOSED“An attorney is an officer of the court and owes the court a duty of candor.” (Levine v. Bershneider (2020) 56 Cal.App. 5th 916,921.) This duty imposes an obligation on counsel to not “knowingly make a false statement of fact or law” to the court. (RulesProf. Conduct, rule 3.3(a)(1); see also Bus. & Prof. Code § 6068(d) [“It is the duty of an attorney to do all of the following: …never to seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or false statement of fact or law.”].) As noted in Noland v.Land of the Free, L.P. (2025) 114 Cal.App.5th 426, 431, “[s]imply stated, no brief, pleading, motion, or any other paper filed inany court should contain any citations— whether provided by generative AI or any other source— that the attorney responsiblefor submitting the pleading has not personally read and verified.Violation of this duty may lead to sanctions. (See Levine, supra,56 Cal.App.5th at 921– 922.) In particular, the Court notes thatC.C.P. § 128.5(a) provides that “[a] trial court may order a party, the party's attorney, or both, to pay the reasonable expenses,including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a result of actions or tactics, made in bad faith, that are frivolous orsolely intended to cause unnecessary delay.” For purposes of this statute, “[a]ctions or tactics” includes opposing a motion and“frivolous” is defined as “totally and completely without merit or for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.”Plaintiff's oppositions contain what appear to be inaccurate and false statements of law and facts seemingly in violation ofcounsel's duty to act with candor before this court. Specifically, the Court notes the following offending quotes:1. Citing Hahn v. Mirda (2007) 147 Cal.App.4th 740 for the proposition that sham pleading rules “only applies to ‘clearand deliberate’ contradictions” when no such language or analysis appears in the case.2. Citing Deveny v. Entropin, Inc. (2006) 139 Cal.App.4th 408 for the proposition that the “sham doctrine [is] rarelyapplied” when no such language or analysis appears in the case.3. Citations to non-existent allegations in the SAC, including references to Paragraphs 86, 88-92 of the SAC when theSAC only has 65 paragraphs.
Wade v. Traincareconsult, Inc, 2025 WL 4670779 (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.10And being based as it is on such false matters, Plaintiff's oppositions appear to contain frivolous and misleading arguments thatis sanctionable. (Cf. Levine, supra, 56 Cal.App.5th at 922 [“A misrepresentation of material fact is subject to sanction undersection 128.5.”].) Accordingly, the Court sets the following:*10 Order to Show Cause Re: Sanctions Pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure Section 128.5 for payment of reasonable attorneyfees to defendant is scheduled for 12/05/2025 at 01:30 PM in Department T at Alhambra Courthouse. Attorney Riasat Azmiis to personally appear.Moving party is to give notice.This minute order is completed by Irene Yin, Judicial Assistant, using the notes of Judicial Assistant Ana Garzaro, dated11/07/2025.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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