In re Marriage of Cristina Anderson and Edward Allyn Volovlek (2026)

Case details
Full caption
In re the Marriage of Cristina Anderson and Edward Allyn Volovlek
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Colorado (CO)
Court
Colorado Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Affirmed
In re the Marriage of Cristina Anderson, Appellee, and Edward Allyn Volovlek, Appellant., Not Reported inPac. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1765638Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)Colorado Court of Appeals, Division VI.In re the Marriage ofCristina Anderson, Appellee,andEdward Allyn Volovlek, Appellant.Court of Appeals No. 25CA0522|Announced June 18, 2026Pitkin County District Court No. 08DR34 Honorable LauraC. Makar, JudgeAttorneys and Law FirmsR&B Law, P.C., Josie L. Burt, Carbondale, Colorado, forAppelleeEdward Allyn Volovlek, Pro SeGomez and Moultrie, JJ., concurORDER AFFIRMED AND CASE REMANDED WITHDIRECTIONSOpinion by JUDGE GROVE*1 1 Edward Allyn Volovlek (father) appeals the districtcourt's order finding him in remedial contempt and imposingremedial contempt sanctions against him for the failure topay child support to Cristina Anderson (mother). We affirmand remand the case so the district court may determine anappropriate award of reasonable appellate attorney fees andcosts in accordance with this opinion.I. Background 2 The parties divorced in 2007 in Michigan, where an orderfor child support was originally entered for the parties’ onlychild. The parties registered their Michigan divorce decree inColorado, and in 2010, via a joint stipulation that was adoptedas an order of the court, modified father's child supportobligation to $522 per month. In June 2024, mother moved tohave father held in both remedial and punitive contempt forthe failure to pay approximately $79,000 in child support andstatutory interest, plus approximately $8,000 in unreimbursedmedical expenses for the child. 3 After a hearing, the district court declined to hold father inpunitive contempt. However, the court found father to be inremedial contempt given his longstanding failure to pay bothchild support and his share of the child's medical expenses.In support, the court found that it was undisputed that fatherwas aware of the child support order and, except for threesmall payments, father had failed to pay child support sincelate 2015. 4 The district court also found that father had the abilityto pay mother the outstanding child support and medicalexpense arrearages. The court cited father's ability to earn atleast minimum wage in Michigan where he resided and thesubstantial home equity that was available to him from hisprimary residence. 5 Accordingly, as a remedial sanction, the court finedfather $100 per day until he paid mother $90,888.90, whichrepresented his child support arrearage with statutory interest,and $7,773.24 for the medical expenses. However, the courtgave father approximately two and a half months to complybefore the daily fine would begin accruing. 6 The district court also awarded mother attorney fees andcosts related to the contempt proceeding in the amount of$11,474.86.II. Remedial Contempt Finding and Sanctions 7 On multiple grounds, father challenges the districtcourt's finding of remedial contempt and resulting sanctionof a $100 per day fine. We conclude that many of father'scontentions are unpreserved for appeal, and we are otherwisenot persuaded that the district court erred.1. Standard of Review and Generally Applicable Law 8 A court has the discretion to find a party in contempt,and we will not reverse that decision unless the courtabuses its discretion reaching it. In re Marriage of Sheehan,2022 COA 29, 23. A court abuses its discretion if its
In re the Marriage of Cristina Anderson, Appellee, and Edward Allyn Volovlek, Appellant., Not Reported inPac. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2decision is manifestly arbitrary, unreasonable, or unfair, or ifit misapplies the law. In re Marriage of Bergeson-Flanders,2022 COA 18, 10. 9 One basis for a court's contempt finding is when a partyhas not complied with a lawful court order that the party knewabout. See Sheehan, 24 (citing In re Marriage of Cyr, 186P.3d 88, 91 (Colo. App. 2008)); C.R.C.P. 107(a)(1) (defining“contempt” as “disobedience or resistance by any person toor interference with any lawful ... order of the court”). Oncethose two factors have been established, the burden shifts tothe party to show that he or she was unable to comply withthe order. Sheehan, 24.*2 10 There are two types of contempt sanctions: punitiveand remedial. Cyr, 186 P.3d at 91. A court uses punitivesanctions, which are criminal in nature, to punish a party, andthey require a showing of willful disobedience on the part ofthe contemnor. Id. at 91-92. The district court in this case didnot impose a punitive sanction. 11 Rather, the district court imposed a remedial sanction.“[R]emedial sanctions are civil in nature and are intended‘to force compliance with a lawful order or to compelperformance of an act within the person's power or presentability to perform.’ ” Id. at 92 (citation omitted). The purposeof remedial sanctions is for the benefit of another. See id.When the court orders a remedial contempt sanction, it mustspecify the means by which the contemnor can purge thecontempt. See id. 12 To order a remedial sanction, the court must make“two findings of present duty and ability to pay: one whichsupports the contempt finding, and a second which justifiesthe imposition of a remedial order.” In re Marriage of Hartt,603 P.2d 970, 972 (Colo. App. 1979).2. Ability to Pay 13 As best as we can discern, father asserts that the districtcourt erred when it found that he had the ability to complywith the court's orders by paying the arrearages owed tomother. We are not persuaded. 14 Father first argues that the district court abused itsdiscretion by imputing income to him. But we conclude thatany error was harmless. It is true that, when assessing whethera party has the ability to comply for remedial contemptpurposes, the court is generally prohibited from imputingincome to the contemnor. Sheehan, ¶¶ 37-39. This is because“a finding of a present ability to comply based on the ability ...to secure a better job places the jailhouse keys in someoneelse's hand.” Id. at 37. 15 But here, although the district court imputed incometo father, it did so at a level that was less than theamount of money that father has conceded he actuallymakes. Specifically, the district court imputed father a full-time income using the minimum wage in Michigan, whichis $12.48 per hour or approximately $26,000 annually.Yet, father testified at the hearing that he was earningapproximately $36,000 per year from his self-employment,and consistent with that testimony, father's opening briefrepresents that he presently makes “less than $37,000” peryear. 16 Father has not explained how the court's reliance on alevel of imputed income that is less than his actual incomehas prejudiced him, and we therefore conclude that any erroron the part of the district court was harmless. See C.R.C.P.61 (instructing courts to disregard any error which “does notaffect the substantial rights of the parties”); People in Interestof A.C., 170 P.3d 844, 845 (Colo. App. 2007) (an allegederror, without a valid allegation of prejudice, is not groundsfor reversal). 17 Similarly, father claims that the district court overvaluedhis home and the equity available to him when assessing theresources that he had available to pay the amounts owed tomother. The district court found that it was uncontrovertedthat “whether the Court looks at that [$]500,000 or [$]700,000number [for the home's value], either way the amount ofequity that [father] has in his personal residence ... wouldallow him to pay the total amount that is currently owed” tomother.*3 18 The district court's findings as to father's homeequity were supported by the record. Father suggested atthe hearing that he could use his home equity to satisfy hisobligations to mother and “absolutely” agreed that he had “atleast $180,000 of equity in the home that [he could] pull.”3. Nature of Sanction Imposed 19 We next consider and reject father's contention that thedistrict court erred because the sanction that it imposed — a
In re the Marriage of Cristina Anderson, Appellee, and Edward Allyn Volovlek, Appellant., Not Reported inPac. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3$100 per day fine until he paid the outstanding child supportand medical expenses owed to mother — was punitive innature. 20 A remedial sanction “exists primarily to enforceobedience to a trial court's order,” In re Marriage of Nussbeck,974 P.2d 493, 499 (Colo. 1999), and the “contemnor maypurge [remedial contempt] by complying with the court orderin question,” id. at 498. Here, contrary to father's assertion,the daily fine imposed by the district court was in fact aremedial sanction given that it was connected to a specificact of compliance, namely his full payment of the amountsowed to mother. While father complains that the sanctionwas improper because it had “no termination date and nostated purge condition other than payment in full,” we are notaware of any legal authority placing such limits on remedialsanctions. And the cases cited by father, to the extent thatthey even exist, do not stand for such a proposition. Indeed,given that the district court found that father had the presentability to pay the total amount currently owed to mother,coercing father's full payment of the outstanding child supportand medical expenses arrearages was the primary purpose ofthe remedial contempt sanction. See Nussbeck, 974 P.2d at498-99; Hartt, 603 P.2d at 972.4. District Court's Award of Attorney Fees 21 Father also argues that the district court erred byawarding mother her attorney fees arising from the contemptproceeding on the sole ground that the court was required toequitably apportion those fees based on the parties’ respectivefinancial resources under section 14-10-119, C.R.S. 2025. Wedisagree. 22 As a preliminary matter, because “a party is not requiredto object to the trial court's findings in the trial court topreserve a challenge to those findings,” People in Interest ofD.B., 2017 COA 139, 30, we reject mother's assertion thatfather failed to preserve this issue for our review. 23 Nevertheless, we are unpersuaded by father's contentionbecause it is apparent that the district court awarded motherattorney fees under C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2), which provides for“[c]osts and reasonable attorney's fees in connection with the[remedial] contempt proceeding.” And an award of attorneyfees under C.R.C.P. 107(d) is distinct from other awards ofattorney fees in domestic relations proceedings. See Catronv. Catron, 577 P.2d 322, 324 (Colo. App. 1978) (recognizingthat section 14-10-119 “controls the award of attorneys’ feesin a domestic relations case except in contempt proceedings,”which fall under C.R.C.P. 107(d)). Accordingly, section14-10-119 did not apply, and the court did not err by failingto consider the parties’ respective financial resources.5. Father's Unpreserved Contentions 24 Lastly, we decline to consider three of father'scontentions, which he failed to preserve for our appellatereview.*4 25 “It is axiomatic that issues not raised in or decidedby a lower court will not be addressed for the first timeon appeal.” Melat, Pressman & Higbie, L.L.P. v. HannonLaw Firm, L.L.C., 2012 CO 61, 18; see also Valentinev. Mountain States Mut. Cas. Co., 252 P.3d 1182, 1188n.4 (Colo. App. 2011) (“A party's mere opposition to itsadversary's request ... does not preserve all potential avenuesfor relief on appeal. We review only the specific argumentsa party pursued before the district court.”). And here, fatherfailed to present at least three of his contentions for appeal. 26 To start, father did not preserve his allegation that thedistrict court violated his due process rights by admittingand considering evidence that he never had an opportunity toreview. Specifically, father now claims that he did not receivecopies of mother's exhibits in the mail until the day afterthe hearing. But even assuming that father is correct as towhen he received the exhibits, at no point did he raise theissue of not having previously been able to review mother'sexhibits at the hearing. Nor did he object to the admissionof any of mother's exhibits. Thus, we decline to consider hisunpreserved contention of error. See Am. Family Mut. Ins.Co. v. DeWitt, 218 P.3d 318, 325 (Colo. 2009) (“In order toproperly preserve an objection to evidence admitted at trial,a timely and specific objection must appear in the trial courtrecord.”). 27 Next, while father now claims that the parties’ 2010stipulation and resulting order concerning child supportare somehow invalid and unenforceable for lack of adefinite termination date, nowhere did father raise such anargument before the district court. Therefore, this issue is alsounpreserved. See Melat, 18. 28 Similarly, we conclude that father failed to preservehis assertion that mother's alleged noncompliance with the
In re the Marriage of Cristina Anderson, Appellee, and Edward Allyn Volovlek, Appellant., Not Reported inPac. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4financial information exchange provisions of the parties’2010 stipulation somehow constituted a defense to a findingof remedial contempt. While at the beginning of the hearing,father referenced a motion to compel mother to comply withcertain provisions of the parties’ stipulation, which he hadfiled a week before the hearing, he conceded that he “gotthat in probably too late for consideration,” and the courtthus declined to consider any issues raised by father in thatmotion. Moreover, father has not cited, nor have we beenable to locate, a place in the record where he argued thatmother's alleged noncompliance with other provisions of thestipulation somehow excused him from paying child support.See C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A) (requiring the appellant to identify“the precise location in the record where the issue was raised”in the record). Thus, this issue is also unpreserved.III. Mother's Request for Appellate Attorney Fees and Costs 29 Mother requests an award of her appellate attorney feesand costs on two separate grounds. 30 First, mother asserts that, because she was awardedattorney fees by the district court and prevailed in thecontempt proceeding, she is entitled to attorney fees and costsfor defending father's appeal. A party seeking attorney feesmust “explain the legal and factual basis” for their request.C.A.R. 39.1. And here, whether to award attorney fees andcosts to mother is a close call given that the legal authority shecited in support of her assertion is not directly applicable tothis proceeding. See Melssen v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 2012COA 102, 75 (awarding a successful appellant attorneyfees under the statutory scheme governing the unreasonabledelay or denial of insurance benefits, where the party was alsoawarded attorney fees in the district court).*5 31 Yet, it remains apparent to us that the district courtawarded mother attorney fees under C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2). Andbecause costs and attorney fees incurred in connection withan appeal of a contempt order are costs and fees incurred“in connection with the contempt proceedings,” mother isaccordingly entitled to an award of her appellate attorneyfees and costs arising from her successful defense of father'sappeal of the remedial contempt order. See Madison Cap. Co.v. Star Acquisition VIII, 214 P.3d 557, 562 (Colo. App. 2009)(citing C.R.C.P. 107(d)(2)); In re Marriage of Dean, 2017COA 51, 33. We therefore exercise our discretion underC.A.R. 39.1 and remand for the district court to determine anaward of mother's reasonable appellate attorney fees and costsincurred in defending against father's appeal. 32 Because we conclude that mother is entitled to anaward of her appellate attorney fees and costs under C.R.C.P.107(d)(2), we need not decide whether she is alternativelyentitled to an award of attorney fees for having to respondto father's opening brief, which she alleges was substantiallynoncompliant with the appellate rules. 33 We do, however, pause to note that father's brief largelyfailed to follow the appellate rules. See C.A.R. 32(a) (font andformatting requirements); C.A.R. 28(a)(5) (record citations);C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(B) (citations to legal authority). Moreover,three of the cases cited by father — In re Marriage ofStevenson, In re Marriage of Lambert, and In re Marriageof Rankin — do not appear to exist. This suggests to usthat portions of father's brief may have been drafted withthe use of generative artificial intelligence (GAI). “[U]singa GAI tool to draft a legal document can pose serious risksif the user does not thoroughly review the tool's output.”Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA 128, 32.Self-represented litigants must be particularly careful, as they“may not understand that a GAI tool may confidently respondto a query regarding a legal topic,” regardless of whetherthe answer contains errors and hallucinations, which are casenames and citations that a GAI tool makes up. Id. at ¶¶ 2, 32. 34 Accordingly, father is now on notice that (1) futurenoncompliance with C.A.R. 28 or other applicable appellaterules could lead to our striking the offending brief or imposingother appropriate sanctions, including dismissal, see C.A.R.38(a), Bruce v. City of Colo. Springs, 252 P.3d 30, 32 (Colo.App. 2010); and (2) errors caused by GAI in future filingsmay result in sanctions. See Al-Hamim, 41.IV. Disposition 35 The order is affirmed. We remand the case so the districtcourt may determine an appropriate award of reasonableappellate attorney fees and costs in accordance with thisopinion. 36 JUDGE GOMEZ and JUDGE MOULTRIE concur.
In re the Marriage of Cristina Anderson, Appellee, and Edward Allyn Volovlek, Appellant., Not Reported inPac. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5All CitationsNot Reported in Pac. Rptr., 2026 WL 1765638End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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