Keirton Inc. v. Rahmanovic, No. 25-12622 (Mar. 19, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Keirton Inc. v. Mersad Rahmanovic
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Colorado (CO)
Court
Colorado Supreme Court
Decided
Mar. 19, 2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
In re: Mersad Rahmanovic Debtor. Keirton Inc. Plaintiff, v. Mersad..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 787397Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States Bankruptcy Court, D. Colorado.In re: Mersad Rahmanovic Debtor.Keirton Inc. Plaintiff,v.Mersad Rahmanovic Defendant.Case No. 25-12622 MER|Adversary No. 25-01338 MER|Filed:03/19/2026Chapter 7ORDER GRANTING MOTION TO DISMISS WITHLEAVE TO AMENDMichael E. Romero, Judge United States Bankruptcy CourtTHIS MATTER comes before the Court on the Motionto Dismiss Defendant's Counterclaims (“Motion”) filed byKeirton, Inc. (“Keirton”) and Debtor/Defendant MersadRahmanovic's (“Rahmanovic”) response thereto.1BACKGROUNDKeirton commenced the instant adversary proceeding onNovember 14, 2025. In its complaint, Keirton assertsone claim for relief against Rahmanovic pursuant to 11U.S.C. § 727(a)(4). In support of its claim, Keirton allegesthat Rahmanovic stated under the penalty of perjury thathe lives at the property known as 1607 South OaklandStreet, Aurora, Colorado 80012 (“Oakland Property”).Rahmanovic claimed a homestead exemption in the OaklandProperty. However, Keirton contends Rahmanovic's priortestimony, responses to post-judgment interrogatories in astate court case, emails, and a private investigation prove thathe does not reside at the Oakland Property. As such, Keirtonasserts Rahmanovic knowingly and fraudulently made falsestatements on his schedules and at the Meeting of Creditors.Rahmanovic filed his answer to Keirton's complaint, aswell as counterclaims for abuse of process and declaratoryjudgment, on December 10, 2025.2 Keirton filed the instantMotion on December 31, 2025, asserting that both ofRahmanovic's counterclaims should be dismissed becausethey are not properly pled and because his counterclaimfor declaratory judgment is duplicative of his defenses toKeirton's § 727(a)(4) claim.3 Keirton also asserts that severalof Rahmanovic's case citations do not exist and are the resultof A.I. hallucinations. In response, Rahmanovic asserts thathe sufficiently pled both claims and that even if his citationsare incorrect or nonexistent, his counterclaims should not bedismissed or stricken. Additionally, Rahmanovic asserts heshould be permitted to amend his counterclaims.ANALYSISA. Dismissal Is Warranted Under Rule 12(b)(6)Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) (incorporated by Fed. R.Bankr. P. 7012), a complaint may be dismissed for failureto state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Whenconsidering a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), theCourt accepts as true all well-pled factual allegations inthe complaint and views them in the light most favorableto the plaintiff.4 A complaint will be dismissed unless it“contains sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to statea claim to relief that is plausible on its face.”5 “A claim hasfacial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual contentthat allows the court to draw the reasonable inference thatthe defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”6 “Theplausibility standard is not akin to a probability requirement,but it asks for more than a sheer possibility that a defendanthas acted unlawfully.”7 A court is not required to accept mereconclusory allegations.81. Declaratory JudgmentRahmanovic's first counterclaim is for declaratory judgment.This counterclaim is supported by a single sentence, whichstates that, “[Rahmanovic] lived at [the Oakland Property]on the petition date; truthfully stated residency; exemptionwas in good faith.”9 Keirton argues this claim should bedismissed because it serves no useful purpose in clarifying orsettling the issues at hand. Instead, the claim is duplicativeof Rahmanovic's defenses to Keirton's § 727(a)(4) claim. Inparticular, Keirton asserts that if its claim fails, it will do
In re: Mersad Rahmanovic Debtor. Keirton Inc. Plaintiff, v. Mersad..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2so because the Court will have found that Rahmanovic didlive at the Oakland Property on the petition date, truthfullystated his residency, and claimed a homestead exemption inthe property in good faith. Rahmanovic disagrees, assertingthat the counterclaim is not duplicative and that claims fordeclaratory relief should not be dismissed at the pleadingstage simply because the Court may resolve the issue later.To prevail on a claim for declaratory judgment, the partyseeking relief must show there is an actual controversy atissue.10 The question to be asked in each case is, “whetherthe facts alleged, under all circumstances, show that there isa substantial controversy, between the parties having adverselegal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrantthe issuance of a declaratory judgment.”11 “Courts in thiscircuit have dismissed declaratory judgment claims where aplaintiff seeks declaratory relief that would resolve the sameissues raised by other claims brought in the same action.”12 Adeclaratory judgment claim serves no useful purpose whereit raises issues that will be resolved in the context of otherclaims asserted in the same action.13 Rahmanovic, as theparty seeking declaratory judgment, bears the burden ofestablishing an actual controversy.14Here, there is a controversy between Keirton and Rahmanovicregarding whether he resided at the Oakland Property as of thepetition date. However, Rahmanovic has not alleged any factsto support his claim that he resided at the Oakland Propertyon the petition date and thus is entitled to the homesteadexemption in the Property. Further, the Court agrees that theissues raised in Rahmanovic's claim, as it is currently pled,are duplicative of the issues to be addressed by Keirton's §727(a)(4) claim. Indeed, when determining Keirton's claim,the Court will have to address whether Rahmanovic resided atthe Oakland Property on the petition date and, therefore, madeaccurate statements on his schedules. As such, Rahmanovic'sdeclaratory judgment claim is duplicative of his defenses toKeirton's § 727(a)(4) claim and will therefore be dismissed.2. Abuse of ProcessRahmanovic's second counterclaim is for abuse of process.This claim is also supported by a single conclusory sentencewherein Rahmanovic alleges that “Keirton misuses § 727to punish [Rahmanovic] for litigating and to create leverageon unrelated judgments.”15 Keirton asserts this claim shouldbe dismissed because Rahmanovic failed to allege all theelements required for an abuse of process claim. Keirtonalso contends that even taking the facts Rahmanovic didallege are true and viewed in the light most favorable tohim, there is an obvious alternative explanation as to whyKeirton initiated this proceeding that disproves Rahmanovic'sclaim that it is only being used to punish him. Rahmanovicdisagrees. Instead, Rahmanovic argues that he plausiblypled his abuse of process counterclaim because the onlyelements required to prove such a claim are: (1) an ulteriorpurpose and (2) willful use of process in a manner notproper in the regular course of proceedings. Rahmanoviccontends his counterclaim alleges both of these elements, andthat Keirton's alternate explanation of why it initiated thisproceeding is not a basis for dismissal, but an issue to beresolved at a later time.A claim for abuse of process under Colorado law requiresa showing of three elements: (1) an ulterior purpose in theuse of judicial proceedings; (2) willful actions in the useof the process which are not proper in the regular courseof proceedings; and (3) resulting damages.16 “The essentialelement of an abuse of process claim is the use of a legalproceeding in an improper manner; therefore, an improper useof process must be established.”17 Here, Rahmanovic has notpled all the required elements of an abuse of process claim.Even construing his pleading liberally, Rahmanovic has notmade any allegations regarding damages suffered as a resultof Keirton's alleged abuse of process, nor has he provided anyfactual allegations to support his conclusion that Keirton isimproperly using this proceeding. Therefore, Rahmanovic'scounterclaim for abuse of process will be dismissed.B. Warning to Rahmanovic Regarding Use of ArtificialIntelligenceRahmanovic directly quotes several cases in his answer andcounterclaims. While the cases Rahmanovic cites are real,the quotes he cites do not exist. For example, one caseRahmanovic cites is Gullickson v. Brown (“Gullickson”).18Rahmanovic directly quotes Gullickson for the propositionsthat, “[d]enial of discharge is a harsh remedy reserved for atruly pernicious debtor and must be construed strictly againstthe objecting creditor and liberally in favor of the debtor,”and that “[s]ection 727 should not be used as a litigationweapon.”19 Neither of these quotes exists in the Gullicksoncase. As such, the Court cautions Rahmanovic that, regardlessof whether he chooses to proceed pro se, he is subject to therequirements of Rule 11 (incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P.9011). If Rahmanovic is using artificial intelligence, he iscautioned that such use is subject to Rule 11 compliance and
In re: Mersad Rahmanovic Debtor. Keirton Inc. Plaintiff, v. Mersad..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3that failure to ensure the existence and accuracy of a citationmay be sanctionable.20C. Leave to AmendPursuant to Rule 15 (incorporated by Fed. R. Bankr. P. 7015),a party may amend its pleading only with the opposingparty's consent or with the Court's leave.21 “The court shouldfreely give leave when justice so requires.”22 Courts withinthis circuit have generally held that a pro se party shouldbe granted leave to amend, “where the deficiencies in acomplaint are attributable to oversights likely the result ofan untutored pro se litigant's ignorance of special pleadingrequirements.”23 As such, the Court will grant Rahmanovicleave to amend his counterclaims.CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, the CourtORDERS, the Motion is GRANTED. The CourtFURTHER ORDERS Rahmanovic shall file his amendedcounterclaims on or before April 2, 2026.BY THE COURT:All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 787397Footnotes1ECF Nos. 11 & 15.2ECF No. 7. Rahmanovic asserts the same counterclaims in his Motion to Dismiss.3Any use of the term “Section” or “§” hereafter means Title 11 of the United States Code.4In re Matt Garton & Assoc., Adv. Pro. No. 21-1215-TBM, 2022 WL 711518, at *3 (Bankr. D. Colo. Feb. 14, 2022) (citingBurnett v. Mortgage Elec. Registration Sys., Inc., 706 F.3d 1231, 1235 (10th Cir. 2013)). Any use of the term “Rule”hereafter means the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.5Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).6Id.7Id. (Internal quotations omitted).8Mira Holdings, Inc. v. ZoomerMedia, Ltd., 676 F.Supp.3d 909, 913 (D. Colo. 2023).9ECF No. 7 at 5.10Mira Holdings, Inc., 676 F.Supp.3d at 917; Surefoot LC v. Sure Foot Corp., 531 F.3d 1236, 1240 (10th Cir. 2008).11Mira Holdings, Inc., 676 F.Supp. at 917 (citing MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007)).12Id; see TBL Collectibles, Inc. v. Owners Insurance Co., 285 F.Supp.3d 1170, 1195-96 (D. Colo. 2018).13Mira Holdings, Inc., 676 F.Supp at 917.14Id.15ECF No. 7 at 5.16Inst. for Professional Development v. Regis College, 536 F.Supp. 632, 634 (D. Colo. 1982); Active Release Techniques,LLC v. Xtomic, LLC, 413 P.3d 210, 212 (Colo. App. 2017).
In re: Mersad Rahmanovic Debtor. Keirton Inc. Plaintiff, v. Mersad..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.417Xtomic, LLC, 413 P.3d at 212 (quoting Sterenbuch v. Goss, 266 P.3d 428, 439 (Colo. App. 2011)).18Gullickson v. Brown (In re Brown), 108 F.3d 1290 (10th Cir. 1997).19ECF No. 15 at pgs. 2 & 4.20Graham v. Mascio, Adv. Pro. No. 25-1157-TBM, 2025 WL 2434832, at *15 (Bankr. D. Colo. Aug. 22, 2025); see Coomerv. Lindell, Case No. 22-CV-01129-NYW-SBP, 2025 WL 1865282, at *3 and *8 (D. Colo. Jul. 7, 2025).21Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a)(2).22Id.23Garcia v. Brown, 429 F.Supp.3d 924, 931 (D.N.M. 2019) (quoting Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10thCir. 1990)).End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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