Labonte v. Bokf (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Labonte v. Bokf, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Colorado (CO)
Court
Colorado Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Maritza Dominguez Braswell (J.) (unanimous Court)
JOSHUA WARREN LABONTE, Plaintiff, v. BOKF, N.A.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 369375Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Colorado.JOSHUA WARREN LABONTE, Plaintiff,v.BOKF, N.A., UNIVERSAL LENDINGCORPORATION, MORTGAGE ELECTRONICREGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC., and CHUCKBROERMAN, Public Trustee, Defendants.Civil Action No. 25–cv–02947–MDB|02/10/2026Maritza Dominguez Braswell, United States Magistrate JudgeORDER*1 This matter is before the Court on UniversalLending Corporation's (“ULC”) Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff'sAmended Complaint (Doc. No. 36), the Motion to DismissFirst Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)by Defendants Bokf, N.A. (“Bokf”) and Mortgage ElectronicRegistration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”) (Doc. No. 37), andDefendant Broerman's (“Mr. Broerman”) Motion to DismissAmended Complaint Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and(6) (Doc. No. 38) (collectively, the Motions). Plaintiff hasfiled responses in opposition to each Motion.1 (Doc. No. 39(response to Mr. Broerman); Doc. No. 40 (response to Bokfand MERS); Doc. No. 41 (response to ULC).) Defendantshave replied in support of their Motions. (Doc. Nos. 45; 46;47.) After reviewing the Motions, briefing, and relevant law,the Court GRANTS the Motions.SUMMARY FOR PRO SE PLAINTIFFThe Court is granting Defendants’ Motions to Dismissand closing this case. The TILA, CCPA, and fraudulentmisrepresentation claims are time-barred. Additionally, theallegations do not support a quite title claim, and the requestfor injunctive relief has no basis because all underlying claimsare being dismissed. This is only a high-level summary of theCourt's Order. The full decision is set forth below.BACKGROUNDThis case arises out of foreclosure proceedings related toPlaintiff's property at 7168 Spring Linden Ct., ColoradoSprings, CO 80927 (the “Property”). (See generally Doc. No.31.) Plaintiff alleges that on October 2, 2020, he secureda mortgage loan with ULC for the Property. (Id. at 11.)Plaintiff says his loan agreement did not include certaindisclosures required by the Truth in Lending Act (“TILA”):*2 • “Loan Estimate within three business days ofapplication”;• “Closing Disclosure three business days prior toconsummation”;• “Accurate APR and Finance Charge calculations due tothe [non-]disclosure of Yield Spread Premium”• “Itemization of Amount Financed or Good FaithEstimate”; and,• “HUD Loan Information Booklet.” (Id. at 13.)Plaintiff further alleges that the yield spread premium“increased the interest rate and total finance charge,” butthis fact was “concealed.” (Id. at 14.) He also alleges theannual percentage rate was “overstated by 0.259 percent,”and “beyond the tolerance of ± 0.125 percent.” (Id. at 15.) Finally, Plaintiff says the “closing documents alsofailed to disclose non-payment, default, and accelerationclauses.” (Id.)According to Plaintiff, on August 19, 2025, Bokf issueda “a Notice of Election and Demand for Sale,” “initiatingnonjudicial foreclosure” of the 7168 Spring Linden Ctproperty pursuant to Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 120.(Id. at 16.) Apparently, at some unspecified time during thefall of 2025, the state court granted Bokf's Rule 120 petitionand authorized the foreclosure of Plaintiff's property. (See id.at 35–38.)Plaintiff filed the instant action on September 19, 2025,seeking to enjoin the foreclosure proceedings (Claim 5). (Id.at ¶¶ 35–38.) In support of this request for relief, Plaintiffbrings claims under TILA (Claim 1) and the ColoradoConsumer Protection Act (“CCPA”) (Claim 2), (id. at ¶¶ 19–26), as well as for fraudulent misrepresentation (Claim 3) (id.at ¶¶ 27–32). Additionally, Plaintiff asks to quiet title (Claim
JOSHUA WARREN LABONTE, Plaintiff, v. BOKF, N.A.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.24). (Id. at 33–34.) Bokf is a Defendant to each claim, ULC isa Defendant to Claims 1 through 4, MERS is a Defendant toClaims 4 and 5, and Mr. Broerman is a Defendant to Claim5. (See id. at ¶¶ 19–38.)Defendants seek dismissal of all claims. ULC and Bokf arguePlaintiff's TILA, CCPA, and fraudulent misrepresentationclaims are time-barred and insufficiently pled. (See Doc. No.36 at 5–14; Doc. No. 37 at 6–13; see also Doc. No. 38 at 5–7.) Additionally, Bokf and Mr. Broerman argue that Plaintiffhas failed to state a quiet title or injunctive relief claim. (Doc.No. 37 at 13–15.) Mr. Broerman also argues the Court mustabstain from enjoining the foreclosure proceedings under theRooker-Feldman doctrine. (Doc. No. 38 at 4–5.) ULC andMERS have also filed a disclaimer of interest as to the subjectproperty. (Doc. Nos. 23, 50; see also Doc. No. 37 at 2 (“MERSwas the original beneficiary of the Deed of Trust....MERSassigned the Deed of Trust to BOKF. Thus, MERS no longerholds an interest in the Property and should be dismissed fromCounts IV and V of Amended Complaint.” (internal citationomitted))).LEGAL STANDARDI. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(1) allows a courtto dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1). Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) isnot a judgment on the merits of a plaintiff's case but adetermination that the court lacks authority to adjudicatethe matter, attacking the existence of jurisdiction rather thanthe complaint's allegations. Creek Red Nation, LLC v. JeffcoMidget Football Ass'n., Inc., 175 F. Supp. 3d 1290, 1293 (D.Colo. 2016). A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction maytake one of two forms: a facial attack or a factual attack. Whenreviewing a facial attack on a complaint pursuant to Rule12(b)(1), the Court accepts the allegations of the complaintas true. Holt v. United States, 46 F.3d 1000, 1002 (10thCir. 1995). When reviewing a factual attack on a complaintsupported by affidavits and other documents, the Court makesits own factual findings and need not convert the motion toone brought pursuant to Rule 56. Id. at 1003.II. Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)*3 Rule 12(b)(6) provides that a court may dismiss acomplaint for “failure to state a claim upon which relief canbe granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In ruling on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must accept all well-pleaded facts as trueand view these allegations in the light most favorable to theplaintiff. Casanova v. Ulibarri, 595 F.3d 1120, 1124 (10thCir. 2010). However, the “burden [remains] on the plaintiffto frame a ‘complaint with enough factual matter to suggest’that [they are] entitled to relief.” Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir. 2008) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v.Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 545 (2007)). Indeed, “[t]hreadbarerecitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mereconclusory statements, do not suffice.” Bixler v. Foster, 596F.3d 751, 756 (10th Cir. 2010) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556U.S. 662, 667 (2009)). Ultimately, the Court must “determinewhether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supportingall the elements necessary to establish an entitlement torelief under the legal theory proposed.” Forest Guardians v.Forsgren, 478 F.3d 1149, 1160 (10th Cir. 2007).III. Pro se PlaintiffIn applying the above principles, this Court is mindfulPlaintiff proceeds pro se and thus affords his papers andfilings a liberal construction. Smith v. Allbaugh, 921 F.3d1261, 1268 (10th Cir. 2019). But the Court cannot and doesnot act as his advocate, United States v. Griffith, 928 F.3d855, 864 n.1 (10th Cir. 2019), and applies the same proceduralrules and substantive law to Plaintiff as to a represented party.See Requena v. Roberts, 893 F.3d 1195, 1205 (10th Cir. 2018);Dodson v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs, 878 F. Supp. 2d 1227, 1236(D. Colo. 2012).ANALYSISI. Rooker-Feldman DoctrineBecause Defendant Broerman's Rooker-Feldman argumentimplicates the Court's subject matter jurisdiction, the Courtaddresses it first. See Campbell v. City of Spencer, 682 F.3d1278, 1281 (10th Cir. 2012) (stating that Rooker-Feldmanis jurisdictional); State v. Nat'l Indian Gaming Comm'n, 151F. Supp. 3d 1199, 1208 (D. Kan. 2015) (“When faced withmotions for dismissal relying on both [Rule 12(b)(1) and (6)],a court must first determine whether it has subject matterjurisdiction over the controversy before addressing the meritsof the case under a Rule 12(b)(6) analysis.” (citing Bell v.Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946)), aff'd sub nom. Kansas exrel. Schmidt v. Zinke, 861 F.3d 1024 (10th Cir. 2017).“The Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that only theSupreme Court has jurisdiction to hear appeals from final
JOSHUA WARREN LABONTE, Plaintiff, v. BOKF, N.A.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3state court judgments.” Mayotte v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 880F.3d 1169, 1173 (10th Cir. 2018) (quoting Bear v. Patton, 451F.3d 639, 641 (10th Cir. 2006)) (alteration omitted); see alsoRooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923). The doctrineprevents lower federal courts from exercising jurisdiction“over cases brought by ‘state-court losers’ challenging ‘state-court judgments rendered before the [federal] district courtproceedings commenced.’ ” Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459,460 (2006) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). The doctrine applies toclaims where “(1) the plaintiff lost in state court, (2) the statecourt judgment caused the plaintiff's injuries, (3) the statecourt rendered judgment before the plaintiff filed the federalclaim, and (4) the plaintiff is asking the district court to reviewand reject the state court judgment.” Bruce v. City & Cnty.of Denver, 57 F.4th 738, 746 (10th Cir. 2023) (citing ExxonMobil, 544 U.S. at 284). “Where these factors exist, [a federaldistrict court] lack[s] subject matter jurisdiction.” Id. (citingLance, 546 U.S. at 465).Plaintiff argues Rooker-Feldman is not implicated herebecause a Rule 120 foreclosure order is not a final judgment,and the foreclosure sale has yet to occur. (Doc. No. 39at 3–5.) Plaintiff is correct. Courts have repeatedly heldthat Rooker-Feldman bars federal claims attacking completedforeclosure proceedings—i.e., claims seeking to undo the saleof a foreclosed property, see, e.g., Viegas v. Partner ColoradoCredit Union, 2025 WL 365865, at *5 (D. Colo. Jan. 31,2025) (collecting cases), or claims challenging a state courtproceeding that affirmed a Rule 120 order, see Grigat v.Mortg. Lenders Network, USA, 2017 WL 4251943, at *3 (D.Colo. Sept. 26, 2017) (“[I]f a state court has approved the saleof a property and a plaintiff subsequently files suit in federalcourt asserting claims that are inextricably intertwined withthe foreclosure proceeding, federal courts lack jurisdictionover the claims.”), report and recommendation adopted subnom. Grigat v. Mortg. Lenders Network USA, Inc., 2017 WL6033686 (D. Colo. Oct. 31, 2017).*4 But here, the case is brought prior to a foreclosure saleand in the absence of any state court proceeding confirmingthe Rule 120 order. See Grigat, 2017 WL 4251943 at *3(“However, if the state court has only authorized the sale,the proceedings are not final, and federal district courts mayexercise jurisdiction.” (citing Miller, 666 F. 3d at 1261–62)).The Tenth Circuit has made clear that the Rooker–Feldmandoctrine does not operate to preclude federal consideration ofrequests to enjoin a pending foreclosure sale. See McDonaldv. J.P. Morgan Chase Bank, N.A., 2014 WL 334813, at *3(D. Colo. Jan. 30, 2014). As the Tenth Circuit has noted,Rule 120 proceedings are non-adversarial and “Rule 120 itselfprovides that ‘[t]he granting of [a Rule 120 motion] shallbe without prejudice to the right of any person aggrievedto seek injunctive or other relief in any court of competentjurisdiction[.]’ ” In re Miller, 666 F.3d 1255, 1262 (10thCir. 2012) (quoting Colo. R. Civ. P. 120(d)(4)); see Lanier v.Sylvester, 2008 WL 4830797, at *3 (D.Colo. Nov. 4, 2008)(“Rule 120 limits the scope of the hearing to issues regardingwhether a default has occurred[.]”).As such, the Court finds it has subject matter jurisdiction overPlaintiff's request for injunctive relief and turns to consider theRule 12(b)(6) challenge. See Brickert v. Deutsche Bank Nat'lTr. Co., 380 F. Supp. 3d 1127, 1137 (D. Colo. 2019) (“[T]heCourt finds that Rule 120 proceedings do not carry sufficientfinality for Rooker-Feldman to apply.”).II. Statute of LimitationsDefendants argue Plaintiff's TILA, CCPA, and fraudulentmisrepresentations claims are time-barred.2 The Courtagrees.A. TILAThe TILA's civil liability provision states: “any [TILA]action...may be brought...within one year from the date ofthe occurrence of the violation.” 15 U.S.C. § 1640(e). “Aviolation occurs, and the one year limitations period beginsto run, ‘when credit is extended through the consummationof the transaction between the creditor and its customerwithout the required disclosures being made.’ ” Betancourtv. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 344 F. Supp. 2d 1253,1258 (D. Colo. 2004) (quoting Dryden v. Lou Budke'sArrow Finance Co., 630 F.2d 641, 646 (8th Cir. 1980).Accordingly, Plaintiff's TILA claim is subject to a one-year statute of limitations, which began running when themortgage transaction was consummated in 2020. (See Doc.No. 31 at 11.) Because this case was initiated in September2025 (Doc. No. 1), Plaintiff's TILA claim is barred.Plaintiff relies on the “recoupment” or “set-off” provisionin § 1640(e), to argue the claim is not time-barred. Theargument is without merit. That section allows a borrowerto assert TILA violations as a “defense” in “an action tocollect [a] debt which was brought more than one year fromthe date of the occurrence of the violation.” 15 U.S.C. §1640(e). But Plaintiff is not using the alleged TILA violationsas a “defense.” He asserts them as affirmative claims. See
JOSHUA WARREN LABONTE, Plaintiff, v. BOKF, N.A.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Rosenfield v. HSBC Bank, USA, 2010 WL 3489926, at *3(D. Colo. Aug. 31, 2010) (rejecting plaintiff's argument thatsection 1640(e)’s statute of limitation did not apply because“the Plaintiff's damage claims are not asserted in a defensivecapacity as setoffs to a debt...but rather, are offensive innature”), aff'd, 681 F.3d 1172 (10th Cir. 2012). Additionally,and even assuming the Court construed the TILA claim asa “defense,” the underlying Rule 120 foreclosure proceedingis not an “action to collect [a] debt.” See Rosenfield, 2010WL 3489926, at *3 (“Because a Rule 120 proceeding is not ameans by which a creditor can ‘collect the debt,’ Colorado'scourts have made it clear that claims for damages by debtors,whether they be independent or cognizable as recoupment orsetoff, are not proper subjects for consideration within theRule 120 hearing.” (citing Plymouth Capital Co. v. DistrictCourt, 955 P.2d 1014, 1017 (Colo.1998)); see also Mortg.Invs. Corp. v. Battle Mountain Corp., 70 P.3d 1176, 1183(Colo. 2003), as modified on denial of reh'g (June 9, 2003)(distinguishing an action for “the enforcement of debts” froma “foreclosure on a deed of trust” in order to determine theproper statute of limitations in a different context). Thus, §1640(e)’s exception to the limitations period does not apply tothe TILA claim here. See Savard v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,N.A., 2010 WL 2802543, at *5 (D. Colo. July 14, 2010) (“Adebtor who brings a creditor into court may not revive a time-barred claim by characterizing the suit as a defense to anillegal [foreclosure action]”); Kraft v. JP Morgan Chase Bank,Nat. Ass'n, 2010 WL 4869099, at *5 (D. Colo. Nov. 23, 2010)(“Plaintiff's passing reference to offsets and recoupment,concepts which apply only in defense of a creditor's claim...isinsufficient to demonstrate a viable claim outside TILA's one-year statute of limitations.”).*5 Still, the Court considers whether the TILA claimshould be equitably tolled. “[U]nder certain circumstances,‘equity may require a tolling of the statutory period whereflexibility is required to accomplish the goals of justice.’ ”Shell Western E&P, Inc. v. Dolores Cnty. Bd. of Comm'rs, 948P.2d 1002, 1007 (Colo. 1997) (quoting Dean Witter, 911 P.2dat 1096). “Equitable exceptions, however, have been narrowlyconstrued” and require a plaintiff to show “(1) that he has beenpursuing his rights diligently, and (2) that some extraordinarycircumstance stood in his way.” Harms v. IRS, 321 F.3d 1001,1006 (10th Cir. 2003); Yang v. Archuleta, 525 F.3d 925, 928(10th Cir. 2008).Plaintiff does not provide any basis for equitable tolling.At most, Plaintiff appears to allege that he did notdiscover the alleged errors and missing documents until hehad a “professional audit” conducted five years after thetransaction. (See, e.g., Doc. No. 31 at 11–18; Doc. No. 40at 49–51.) But this insufficient to justify the extraordinaryremedy of equitable tolling. The documents at issue wereavailable to Plaintiff at the time of the transaction, andhis pro se status and inability to identify the issues orallegedly missing documents without a professional audit,does not justify the delay. Montoya v. Chao, 296 F.3d 952,958 (10th Cir. 2002) (holding that difficulties faced by alllitigants are insufficient to justify equitable tolling); see alsoCentennial Bankshares, Inc. v. Utah through Utah Dep't ofFin. Institutions, 834 F. App'x 448, 452 (10th Cir. 2020)(“[E]quitable tolling is not available for those who couldhave known of the relevant information but inexcusably andunreasonably slept on their rights.” (applying Utah law)).Additionally, there is no evidence that Defendants interferedor otherwise prevented Plaintiff from reasonable diligence.See Dalton v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 828 F. Supp.2d 1242, 1249 (D. Colo. 2011) (rejecting an equitable tollingargument where “Plaintiff has not alleged that Defendantsprevented her from determining that there were inadequaciesin their disclosures under TILA...and Plaintiff is unable toargue that she worked diligently to make this determinationwhen she admits that she did not read any of the loandocuments in detail at the time the loans closed”).B. CCPA and Fraudulent MisrepresentationPlaintiff's CCPA and fraudulent misrepresentation claims aresubject to three-year statutes of limitations. Col. Rev. Stat.§ 6–1–115 (“All actions brought under [the CCPA] must becommenced within three years after the date on which thefalse, misleading, or deceptive act or practice occurred[.]”);Ulm v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2019 WL 859708, at *4 (D.Colo. Feb. 22, 2019) (“Under Colorado law, the statute[ ] oflimitations for fraud...[is] three years after the cause of actionaccrues.” (citing Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-80-101(1)(c))). Theseclaims, filed nearly five years after the mortgage transactionat issue, are also time-barred. Moreover, for the same reasonsdiscussed above (see supra at 10–11), the allegations donot support equitable tolling. Accordingly, these claims aredismissed.III. Plaintiff's Request for Declaratory and InjunctiveReliefAll that remains is Plaintiff's request that the Court quiet titlein his name (Claim 4) and enjoin the pending foreclosure sale(Claim 5). These claims must also be dismissed.
JOSHUA WARREN LABONTE, Plaintiff, v. BOKF, N.A.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Quiet title actions are governed by Colo. R. Civ. P. 105, whichauthorizes “[a]n action...brought for the purpose of obtaininga complete adjudication of the rights of all parties thereto,with respect to any real property and for damages, if any,for the withholding of possession” Hinojos v. Lohmann, 182P.3d 692, 696-97 (Colo. App. 2008) (citing Colo. R. Civ.P. 105(a)). “A plaintiff in an action to quiet title ‘must relyon the strength of his own title thereto’ and cannot succeedby challenging defendant[’]s title.” Knowles v. Bank of Am.,N.A., 2012 WL 5882570, at *5 (D. Colo. Nov. 21, 2012)(quoting School Dist. No. 6 in Weld Cnty. v. Russell, 156 Colo.75, 396 P.2d 929, 932 (Colo.1964)).*6 Here, the Amended Complaint predicates the quiettitle theory on the alleged TILA, CCPA, and common lawviolations underlying the dismissed statutory claims. (SeeDoc. No. 31 at 33–34 (“Because of Defendants’ materialstatutory and fraudulent violations, the purported Deed ofTrust is void or voidable. Plaintiff is the lawful ownerof the property and seeks a declaration quieting title inhis name[.]”).) However, because such allegations do notexplain why Plaintiff's title is superior to Defendants’ interest,Plaintiff has failed to state a plausible quiet title claim.See Knowles, 2012 WL 5882570, at *5 (dismissing a quiettitle claim where “[t]he plaintiffs spent the majority of thecomplaint attacking defendants’ claims to title and saidlittle about the strength of their own title to the property”);McKinsey v. GMAC Mortg., LLC, 2013 WL 3448483, at *14(D. Colo. July 9, 2013), aff'd, 574 F. App'x 818 (10th Cir.2014) (dismissing a quiet title claim where “Plaintiffs havenot alleged any facts demonstrating that they have title to theproperty that is superior to that of any of the defendants”).3Finally, Plaintiff's request for a permanent injunctionpreventing foreclosure is not an independent cause of actionbut a form of relief contingent on merits success. SeeRomstad v. City of Colorado Springs, 650 F. App'x 576,585 n.7 (10th Cir. 2016) (unpublished) (“An injunctionis not an independent cause of action; it is a remedypotentially available only after a plaintiff can make a showingthat some independent legal right is being infringed....”).Because Plaintiff's TILA, CCPA, and common law claims aredismissed, there is no basis for equitable relief. Thus, Plaintiffcannot demonstrate entitlement to a permanent injunction,and the request is dismissed. See zvelo, Inc. v. Akamai Techs.,Inc., 2019 WL 4751809, at *6 (D. Colo. Sept. 30, 2019)(“Because the Court has dismissed plaintiff's substantiveclaims, there is no remaining claim for which plaintiff couldseek injunctive relief.”).CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, it is ORDERED that UniversalLending Corporation's Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff'sAmended Complaint (Doc. No. 36), the Motion to DismissFirst Amended Complaint Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) by Defendants Bokf, N.A. and Mortgage ElectronicRegistration Systems, Inc. (Doc. No. 37), and DefendantBroerman's (Motion to Dismiss Amended Complaint UnderFed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6) (Doc. No. 38) are GRANTED.Plaintiff's Claims 1 through 3 are dismissed with prejudice,and Claims 4 and 5 are dismissed without prejudice. TheClerk of Court is directed to close this case.Dated this 10th day of February, 2026.BY THE COURT:Maritza Dominguez BraswellUnited States Magistrate JudgeAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 369375Footnotes1Plaintiff's responses appear to contain multiple inaccuracies that may stem from the improper use ofgenerative artificial intelligence. Although the Court does not attempt to catalogue every such error, severalillustrative examples suffice. First, in Doc. No. 39 at page 10, Plaintiff attributes to Citizen Center v. Gessler,770 F.3d 900, 913 (10th Cir.), a quotation cautioning against dismissals that would “strip a court of its ability toafford complete relief.” That language does not appear in Gessler. Second, in Doc. No. 40 at page 14, Plaintiff
JOSHUA WARREN LABONTE, Plaintiff, v. BOKF, N.A.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6cites “Harris v. Sand Canyon Corp., 2011 WL 13176128.” Although Harris is a real case, its correct citation is274 F.R.D. 556, and it does not appear to stand for the proposition asserted by Plaintiff. Finally, in Doc. No. 41at page 10, Plaintiff cites “Sterling v. Velsicol Chem. Corp., 855 P.2d 1188,” calling it a decision by a “Coloradocourt.” Sterling is a real case, but its correct citation is 855 F.2d 1188. Moreover, Sterling was decided by theSixth Circuit, not a Colorado court, and appears to have no connection to the proposition for which Plaintiffcites it. On careful consideration of the errors and circumstances of this case, including its dismissal as setforth herein, the Court declines to impose any disciplinary sanctions. However, the Court strongly condemnsthe submission of inaccurate citations and mischaracterized authority. Such errors undermine the reliabilityof Plaintiff's filings and diminish Plaintiff's credibility.2“An affirmative defense based on the statute of limitations can be resolved in a Rule12(b)(6) motion to dismissif the relevant dates are clear from the face of the complaint.” Ulm v. Bank of Am., N.A., 2019 WL 859708, at*4 (D. Colo. Feb. 22, 2019) (citing Aldrich v. McCulloch Prop. Inc., 627 F.2d 1036, 1041 n.4 (10th Cir. 1980),report and recommendation adopted, 2019 WL 1236747 (D. Colo. Mar. 18, 2019).3Moreover, even if Plaintiff's TILA and CCPA-based allegations were deemed allegations explaining whyPlaintiff's title is superior to Defendants’ interest, Plaintiff has not cited, and the Court has not found, supportfor the proposition that the TILA or CCPA provides a mechanism by which alleged statutory violations, withoutmore, invalidate a deed of trust or establish a borrower's superior title. At most, such statutes provide remedialrelief sounding in damages or unwinding of the transaction, which is fundamentally distinct from a quiet-titledeterminationEnd of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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