Starski v. Holderness (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Edward Starski v. Chandler Holderness
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Colorado (CO)
Court
Colorado Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Affirmed
© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.Edward Starski, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chandler Holderness,Defendant-Appellee.Colorado Court of Appeals, Division III. | December 18, 2025 | Not Reported in Pac. Rptr. | 2025WL 3678910Document Detailsstandard Citation:Edward Starski, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chandler Holderness, Defendant-Appellee., No. 24CA2009, 2025 WL 3678910 (Colo. App. Dec. 18,2025)All Citations:Not Reported in Pac. Rptr., 2025 WL 3678910Search DetailsJurisdiction:ColoradoDelivery DetailsDate:December 19, 2025 at 12:31 PMDelivered By: Client ID:NOCLIENTIDOutlineAttorneys and LawFirms (p.1)JUDGMENTAFFIRMED (p.1)All Citations (p.5)
Edward Starski, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chandler Holderness,..., Not Reported in Pac.... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3678910Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e)Colorado Court of Appeals, Division III.Edward Starski, Plaintiff-Appellant,v.Chandler Holderness,Defendant-Appellee.Court of Appeals No. 24CA2009|Announced December 18, 2025Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion ofcitation references that are incorrect or do not actuallyexist. These invalid citations appeared in the originalcourt opinion and have been preserved as written sincethey are part of the official record. Any links to theseinvalid citations have been removed.Douglas County District Court No. 23CV42Honorable Andrew C. Baum, JudgeAttorneys and Law FirmsEdward Starski, Pro SeThe Ray Law Firm LLC, Keith P. Ray, Centennial,Colorado, for Defendant-AppelleeLipinsky and Taubman*, JJ., concurJUDGMENT AFFIRMEDOpinion by JUDGE BERGER**1 1 Plaintiff, Edward Starski, appeals thejudgment in favor of defendant, Chandler Holderness.Starski contends that the trial court erred in thefollowing respects: (1) denying his motion todismiss for failure to join indispensable parties; (2)concluding that Holderness had a valid easement onStarski's property; (3) determining that Holderness’underground “invisible” dog fence was not astructure prohibited by the declarations of covenantsaffecting Starski's property; and (4) failing to awardStarski nominal damages for Holderness’ trespass byinstalling a chicken coop on Starski's property. Weconsider and reject each of Starski's contentions andaffirm the judgment.I. Relevant Facts and Procedural History 2 In 2023, Starski and his wife purchased alot (Tract B) in the Sequoia Ridge Subdivision inDouglas County. Shortly after the purchase, Starskibrought trespass claims against Holderness, whoowned property bordering Tract B. Starski alleged,among other things, that Holderness trespassed byburying an invisible dog fence and installing a chickencoop on Tract B. 3 Holderness counterclaimed, seeking, in part,a declaratory judgment that the subdivision'sdeclarations granted him an easement and a right toaccess Tract B. 4 During the second day of the resulting benchtrial, Starski moved to dismiss Holderness’ declaratoryjudgment counterclaim for failure to join indispensableparties.1 5 After the trial, the court issued a detailed orderdenying Starski's motion to dismiss. The court alsoissued a comprehensive written judgment makingfindings of fact and conclusions of law. The courtconcluded that Holderness had a valid easement thatgave him the right to bury the invisible fence on TractB, and that, while the installation of the chicken coopwas a trespass, Starski failed to prove any damagesresulting from that trespass.II. Failure to Join Indispensable Parties 6 Starski argues that the trial court erred bydenying his motion to dismiss Holderness’ declaratoryjudgment counterclaim for failure to join indispensableparties. We conclude that the trial court did not abuseits discretion.
Edward Starski, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chandler Holderness,..., Not Reported in Pac.... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law 7 Under C.R.C.P. 12(b)(6), a party may move todismiss a claim because the claim's proponent failedto join an indispensable party. Usually, such objectionscan be raised at any stage of the proceedings.Karakehian v. Boyer, 900 P.2d 1273, 1280 (Colo.App. 1994), aff'd in part and rev'd in part on othergrounds, 915 P.2d 1295 (Colo. 1996). However, thereis an exception to that general rule. “[A] party withknowledge of a person whose joinder may be requiredmay not wait until late in the proceedings and then raisethe issue for his own protection rather than that of theallegedly indispensable person.” Id.*2 8 We review a trial court's denial of a motion todismiss for failure to join indispensable parties for anabuse of discretion. Hygiene Fire Prot. Dist. v. Bd. ofCnty. Comm'rs, 205 P.3d 487, 489 (Colo. App. 2008),aff'd, 221 P.3d 1063 (Colo. 2009).B. The Trial Court Didn't Abuse Its Discretion byDenying Starski's Motion to Dismiss 9 In its order denying Starski's motion to dismiss, thetrial court found that Starski waited to raise the issue ofindispensable parties solely to protect himself, and notthe interests of the absent parties. Starski had knownof Holderness’ declaratory judgment counterclaim fornearly a year before trial. More damning is thatStarski called some of the parties he claimed wereindispensable as trial witnesses, demonstrating hisawareness of those parties and their interests. Waitinguntil trial had already begun to raise the motion — afterStarski could see how his and Holderness’ claims werefaring — provides ample support for the trial court'sconclusion regarding Starski's motivation. 10 On appeal, Starski only makes conclusoryarguments regarding his failure to raise the motionto dismiss earlier. Without citing the record, Starskimerely asserts that “the district court's finding ofuntimeliness lacks support” because there was noshowing of undue delay. However, the record does notsupport this contention. See Fisher v. State Farm Mut.Auto. Ins. Co., 2015 COA 57, 18 (declining to addressarguments “presented to us in a conclusory mannerthat are lacking citations to any supporting authority”),aff'd, 2018 CO 39. 11 Starski's only citation to case law is City andCounty of Denver, By and Through Its Board ofWater Commissioners v. City of Arvada, 556 P.2d 76(Colo. 1976). But in that case, the trial court raisedthe indispensable parties issue, not the plaintiff ordefendant. Id. at 79. Accordingly, unlike here, therewere no allegations that a party improperly delayedin bringing the motion to dismiss. See id. (“[W]e donot lay down a general rule as to when the joinderof additional parties is mandatory and when it isdiscretionary with the trial court.”). 12 Because the record supports the trial court'sconclusion that Starski raised his motion to dismisssolely to protect himself — and Starski does notprovide an alternative explanation for his delay — thecourt did not abuse its discretion in denying Starski'smotion to dismiss.III. Holderness’ Easement 13 Starski next argues that the trial court erred byfinding that Holderness had a valid easement givinghim a right to access Tract B. We disagree.A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law 14 An easement is a type of servitude that authorizessomeone to do or maintain something on the land ofanother. Allen v. Nickerson, 155 P.3d 595, 598 (Colo.App. 2006). Servitudes are created in common-interestcommunities when a developer “conveys a lot ... [inthe] community subject to a recorded declaration ofservitudes” for the community. Id. (citation omitted). 15 We review de novo a trial court's interpretation ofa conveyance instrument for the existence and extentof an expressly created easement. Gold Hill Dev. Co.v. TSG Ski & Golf, LLC, 2015 COA 177, 43.B. Holderness Had a Valid Easement
Edward Starski, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chandler Holderness,..., Not Reported in Pac.... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3*3 16 Starski first claims that because ahomeowners association (HOA) was never formallycreated under the terms of the subdivision'sdeclarations, any servitudes created by thosedocuments are invalid. 17 True, the HOA referenced in the declarations wasnever formally incorporated. But whether an HOA isformally created is not determinative of the validity ofcommon-plan servitudes. See generally Allen, 155 P.3dat 600 (“[A] property owner who subdivides propertywith a common plan may create servitudes, includingeasements, burdening or benefiting the subdivisionthat arise upon the conveyance of individual parcels,and those servitudes are binding upon the subdividerowner and inure to purchasers with notice.”). 18 As the trial court found — and Starskidoes not dispute — through the declarations, thedevelopers of the subdivision created a common-interest community and stated that all the propertieswithin the subdivision would be sold and conveyed“subject to” various servitudes. Because the dulyrecorded declarations created the easements, thoseservitudes became enforceable upon the developers’conveyance of the land. See Bolinger v. Neal, 259 P.3d1259, 1264 (Colo. App. 2010) (“[W]here ‘a developersells lots according to a recorded plat, the granteesacquire an easement in any areas set apart for their use.’” (citation omitted)). 19 The declarations expressly granted every lotowner in the subdivision “a nonexclusive right andeasement of enjoyment in and to the CommonProperty.” In the final plat for the subdivision, Tract Bis labeled “Open Space” and is dedicated to the ownersof three other lots — including the one Holderness nowowns — as “perpetual open space.” The declarationsalso stated that the easement “shall be appurtenant toand shall pass with the title to every [l]ot.” Because itis undisputed that Starski had notice of the servitudesencumbering Tract B, Holderness has a valid easementas defined in the declarations. 20 Starski argues that section 38-33.3-301, C.R.S.2025, required the incorporation of the HOA beforethe date the first unit in the subdivision was conveyed.But the statute explicitly states, “[T]he failure of theassociation to incorporate ... will not adversely affecteither the existence of the common interest communityfor purposes of this article or the rights of personsacting in reliance upon such existence.” § 38-33.3-301. 21 Without citation to authority, Starski asserts thatthe words “for purposes of this article” mean thatthe HOA incorporation requirement was a conditionprecedent to the enforceability of any easements.Id. But this ignores the rest of the statute, whichspecifically excuses the failure to incorporate an HOAwhen it comes to “the rights of persons acting inreliance” upon the existence of the common-interestcommunity, including the enforcement of easementscreated by its common plan. Id.; see DeJean v. Grosz,2015 COA 74, 30 (finding that the right to form anHOA runs with the land even after initial developerfailed to do so, “especially where the declaration statesthat the covenants are to run with the land”). 22 Similarly, Starski claims that proper HOAformation is required for the HOA to hold titleand “impose” the easement, but this argument alsomisunderstands the law. Title to Tract B was nevertransferred to the HOA, nor is the HOA the entitythat enjoys the easement. Holderness — a propertyowner to whom the subdivision developers granted theeasement in the declarations — has the right to accessTract B for the purposes specified in the easement.*4 23 Starski also contends that Tract B's previoussales by treasurer's deeds extinguished prior interests inthe land, including the easement. But as the trial courtsaid, the very statute Starski cites in support of thisargument states that executing a treasurer's deed “shallnot affect the existence of ... easements[ ] or equitableservitudes that run with land and have both benefits andburdens, ... as claimed or existing prior to the executionof such deed.” § 39-11-136(3), C.R.S. 2025. 24 Next, Starski asserts that the treasurer's deedsand failure to form the HOA “evidence abandonment”of the easement. But despite Starski's certification inhis opening brief that he provided a discussion ofpreservation for each issue, he doesn't discuss wherethis abandonment argument was preserved, as theappellate rules require. C.A.R. 28(a)(7)(A). Indeed,Starski fails to discuss issue preservation for any of hisappellate arguments — though Holderness concedesthat all of the other issues Starski argues on appeal were
Edward Starski, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chandler Holderness,..., Not Reported in Pac.... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4preserved. Because, even after an independent reviewof the record, we find no evidence of the preservationof this abandonment issue, we decline to considerit.2 See Rinker v. Colina- Lee, 2019 COA 45, 22(declining to consider insufficiently preserved issues). 25 Starski additionally argues that various policy andequitable concerns require us to reverse the trial court'sruling on Holderness’ easement. Yet, when interpretingunambiguous statutes, we are not to make or weighpublic policy considerations. Kaiser v. Aurora Urb.Renewal Auth., 2024 CO 4, 37. Because the lawand the facts here are clear, we uphold the trial court'sconclusion that Holderness has a valid easement.IV. The Invisible Fence 26 Starski next contends that the trial court erred byfinding that Holderness’ invisible dog fence wasn't a“structure” under the declarations. We again disagree. 27 Interpretations of declarations of covenants arequestions of law that we review de novo. Vista RidgeMaster Homeowners Ass'n v. Arcadia Holdings at VistaRidge, LLC, 2013 COA 26, ¶¶ 8, 18. 28 Holderness’ easement prohibits the placementof “any structure whatsoever upon the CommonProperty.” Examples of structures are given elsewherein the declarations, including “a Residence, anybuilding, a tennis court, a swimming pool,fences, walls, canopies, awnings, roofs, exteriorlighting facilities, athletic facility or other similarimprovements or attachments.”*5 29 The trial court found that Holderness’invisible fence consisted of an entirely undergroundwire that “[did] not change the use or nature of thesurface land” and that “if one did not know it had beeninstalled, one would not know it was there.” Thus, theinvisible fence is fundamentally not like a traditional“fence” or any of the other structures enumerated inthe declarations. 30 Looking at the rest of the prohibited uses ofthe common property is illustrative. The declarations’other limitations on the easement focus on denying freeaccess to other homeowners, something the invisibledog fence did not do. Starski's claim that the invisiblefence “restrict[ed] movement across Tract B” wasmade without any citation and contrary to the trialcourt's finding. 31 Furthermore, as the trial court concluded, theword “upon” in the declarations suggests a prohibitionagainst the placement of a structure “on the surface”of the common property, not buried underneath itas was the invisible fence's wire. Merriam-WebsterDictionary, https://perma.cc/R4GP-P35K. 32 The “absurd outcomes” that Starski sayswill follow from this interpretation are inapposite.Unlike the invisible dog fence, complex undergroundinstallations are not entirely underground, and theywould “change the use or nature of the surface land.”Such subterranean constructions would also likely runafoul of other provisions of the declarations by denyingfree access to the land and violating other governmentrules. 33 Accordingly, the court did not err when it foundthat the installed invisible dog fence did not violate theeasement.3V. Nominal Damages 34 Starski finally contends that, after the courtfound that the chicken coop installation constituteda trespass, the trial court erred by failing to awardhim nominal damages. But we need not determinewhether the trial court erred, because “[i]n the absenceof special circumstances the [failure to award nominaldamages is] of no consequence ... and courts will notreverse a judgment simply because nominal damageswere not awarded.” City of Westminster v. Centric-Jones Constructors, 100 P.3d 472, 481-82 (Colo. App.2003) (alterations in original) (citation omitted). 35 Because Starski has not identified any suchspecial circumstances — and we are aware of none— we conclude that any error in failing to awardnominal damages for trespass from the chicken coopinstallation was harmless. See id. at 482.
Edward Starski, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. Chandler Holderness,..., Not Reported in Pac.... © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5VI. Disposition 36 The judgment is affirmed.JUDGE LIPINSKY and JUDGE TAUBMAN concur.All CitationsNot Reported in Pac. Rptr., 2025 WL 3678910Footnotes*Sitting by assignment of the Chief Justice under provisions of Colo. Const. art. VI, § 5(3), and § 24-51-1105,C.R.S. 2025.1Starski disputes precisely when he moved to dismiss for failure to join indispensable parties. That disputeis not material to our disposition of this appeal. Moreover, Starski did not supply us with a transcript of thetrial. Absent this record, “we must presume the evidence fully supports the trial court's ruling.” Clements v.Davies, 217 P.3d 912, 916 (Colo. App. 2009).2Starski's abandonment argument is also troublesome for other reasons. He cites “In re Application of Kieta,573 N.W.2d 787 (Neb. 1998),” to support his claim. However, so far as our independent research confirms,no such case exists. In addition, throughout his briefs, Starski cites legal propositions and provides directquotations that don't appear in the authorities he cites. These improper citations and illusory authorities areindicative of artificial intelligence (AI) “hallucinations” that risk wasting resources of the other party and thecourt. See Al-Hamim v. Star Hearthstone, LLC, 2024 COA 128, ¶¶ 2, 31. We caution Starski that this courthas previously warned self-represented litigants that court filings containing AI-generated hallucinations mayresult in sanctions. Id. at 41. We decline to impose sanctions against Starski, particularly as Holderness didnot bring these problematic citations to our attention and did not request a sanctions award. See id. at 40.3Starski also claims that the trial court erred by relying on Holderness’ subjective intent. But the courtspecifically rejected this reasoning and concluded that the intent element had been met for the invisiblefence trespass. Furthermore, because Starski did not request injunctive relief or damages resulting fromthe limited excavation work required to install the underground fence, we express no views as to whetherthat act was a trespass.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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