Judicial District of New Haven. Erica P. Kyne v. Owen Ehima and In re: Change of Name Petition Evelyn Ehima Kyne Docket No. NNH-FA-24-5061240-S (2026)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (CT)
Court
Connecticut Supreme Court
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
Kyne v. Ehima, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1330009Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.Superior Court of Connecticut,JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEW HAVEN.Erica P. KYNEv.Owen EHIMAandIn re: Change of Name Petition Evelyn Ehima KyneDOCKET NO. NNH-FA-24-5061240-S, DOCKET NO. NNH-FA-26-5066382-S|MAY 8, 2026Editor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generated by AI tools used by a party orcounsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. The unverified citations have been preserved as part of the officialrecord, but links are unavailable.MEMORANDUM OF DECISIONS Petition for Child's Name Change and Motion for Contempt (#159) in DissolutionCaseWalter M. Spader, Jr., JudgeAS TO THE PETITION FOR THE CHILD'S NAME CHANGE*1 The applicant, OWEN EHIMA, is the father of the one-year-old minor child, EVELYN EHIMA KYNE (dob:02/28/2025). The child was born during a contentious dissolution proceeding under docket number NNH-FA-24-5061240-S(Kyne v. Ehima). That action began as a Complaint for legal separation and was converted to a dissolution proceeding. Theparenting dispute was resolved in a Memorandum of Decision issued December 31, 2025 (#149.00). Pursuant to that Decision,the parties share joint legal custody of the child and primary residence is with the mother.The Court in that proceeding found that the mother did not include the father on the birth certificate at the hospital. He sought anorder adding his name to the birth certificate and changing the child's last name from Kyne to Ehima. The Court made a findingof the father's paternity and ordered the birth certificate amended to include him as the father. As to the surname, the Courtfound it lacked jurisdiction to change the name of a minor child incident to a dissolution of marriage action and directed himto Connecticut General Statute § 52-11. To the extent the Court may have had jurisdiction under Connecticut General Statute §46b-467, it denied the request, finding no good cause. Although this present petition was dated one week later, it was formallyfiled with the Court on April 7, 2026.DISCUSSION OF LAW AND FACTS
Kyne v. Ehima, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Connecticut General Statute § 52-n(a) provides that the Superior Court shall have jurisdiction of complaints praying for a changeof name, brought by any person residing in the subject judicial district. Connecticut Practice Book § 9-24 provides that in allsuch proceedings brought by a minor child through his or her next friend, the parents of the child shall be cited in.Whether an application for a change of name should be granted is a matter within the sound discretion of the Court. When aminor child is involved, the Court must consider whether the change of name will promote the child's best welfare. The movingparty bears the burden of proof by a fair preponderance of the evidence.DISCUSSIONProcedural DeficiencyThe parents share joint legal custody of their child. This application was filed by one parent, who represented that he wouldprovide notice to the mother. There is no proof of service in the file. The mother appeared at the hearing and orally objected. Thechild is not a party to this proceeding and no guardian ad litem has been appointed on her behalf. The applicant is requesting,on behalf of himself, that a non-party have her name changed.Since the child was not made a party to this proceeding, this Court has no authority to change the name of this child. On thisbasis alone, the applicant father's request for relief must be denied.Best Interest AnalysisAssuming, arguendo, that the applicant could surmount that procedural obstacle, he still bears the burden of proving by a fairpreponderance of the evidence that the name change would be in the child's best interest. He has not met that burden.*2 The applicant contends that the child's best interests are served by a name reflecting her paternal lineage and identity,promoting a consistent familial identity, preserving her relationship with her father, avoiding confusion caused by inconsistentsurnames, and supporting her long-term stability and sense of belonging. These are well-intentioned claims. They are also notclaims about this particular child in her particular circumstances — they are generic assertions that could appear in any namechange petition, by any father, drafted by ChatGPT1. They do not constitute proof by a preponderance of evidence that thechange would serve Evelyn's best interests.The child is happy, bubbly one year old. The mother brought her to Court for this proceeding, and she raised her hand whenmom raised her hand when the Clerk swore the parties in. As expected with a one-year-old, she had moments of crying. Whatwas most interesting to the Court was that only the mother attempted comforting of the child during the proceeding. The fatherdid hold the door open for mother and child at the end of the proceeding.Evelyn resides primarily with her mother. Her day-to-day life — school, doctor's appointments, extracurricular activities,community, church — will unfold in the orbit of her mother and her half-siblings.2 Having the child share her mother's surnamewill lessen confusion as the mother carries out her day-today parenting responsibilities and will alleviate the need to repeatedlyexplain her role to teachers, medical providers, and others.3The applicant's argument is framed entirely around the child's paternal lineage, with no acknowledgment of the equal claimthe child's maternal side of the family and identity has on her sense of self and belonging. The mother's present surname —Kyne — is the operative family surname in the household in which Evelyn will primarily be raised. To prioritize one parent'ssurname over the other's, when the child primarily resides with that other parent, is not a neutral act in the service of the child'sidentity. It is the imposition of the applicant's own interest in paternal recognition.
Kyne v. Ehima, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3The applicant further argues that Kyne is not truly the mother's name — it is the surname of her former husband — and that thename therefore carries no legitimate claim on the child's identity. The Court wholeheartedly rejects that framing. The motherretained the name Kyne as a deliberate choice, in part to maintain a cohesive household surname shared with her children fromher prior marriage. It is telling that she chose not to take the applicant's name upon their own marriage, seemingly for thatreason. That is her right. The child's household is a Kyne household. The claim that the name is an embarrassment becausethe former husband has left the country and owes child support is an argument about the mother's personal history, not aboutEvelyn's identity or welfare.*3 The applicant further contends that the child's surname should have automatically matched his upon her birth, given that theparties were still legally married, and that the mother's deliberate choice to name the child Kyne was an act of societal deceptionreflecting on her integrity. The Court also declines to engage with that framing. There is no requirement in Connecticut that achild must bear the father's surname prior to the finalization of a dissolution. What matters is what name best serves this child'sinterests going forward — not what the father believes he was entitled to at her birth.Critically, the father's connection to this child is already preserved in her name.His surname, Ehima, is the child's middle name.4 The mother did not erase the father when naming the child — she incorporatedhim. The applicant dismisses this, arguing that a middle name is not significant and does not provide adequate recognition. TheCourt disagrees. What the middle name reflects is that this mother, in the midst of contentious litigation, nonetheless chose tohonor the father's place in the child's identity. That is not nothing. It is, in fact, precisely the kind of co-parenting orientationthe December 31 decision was designed to encourage, and that the mother was already engaged in.The mother testified that everyone in her nuclear family shares the surname Kyne and that continuity matters to her and to thechildren. She offered a family Christmas card and referenced the Disney World welcome screen both identifying the family as“the Kynes.” That is the family in which Evelyn lives and will be raised. The Court finds this persuasive.The Court also observes the context in which this petition was brought. It was drafted on January 8, 2026 — one week afterJudge Egan declined to find good cause to change the child's name. The applicant filed a motion to reconsider in that matter andwithdrew it. He then filed this petition in April 2026, alongside a motion for contempt arising from the Kyne family vacation.The chronology does not suggest a parent focused on his daughter's welfare. It suggests a parent using the legal process as aninstrument of ongoing conflict. That is not a purpose this Court will serve.A surname does not make a parent. What builds a child's relationship with her father is consistency, presence and love. Theparenting plan set forth in the dissolution case provides a structured growing path to exactly that relationship. The Courtencourages the father to spend his efforts there. As to this specific issue, however, the applicant has not demonstrated, by a fairpreponderance of the evidence, that changing the child's surname from Kyne to Ehima would promote her best welfare.ORDER ON APPLICATIONThe application for change of surname of the minor child Evelyn Ehima Kyne is DENIED.AS TO THE MOTION FOR CONTEMPTThe defendant father, OWEN EHIMA, moves for an order of contempt against the plaintiff mother, ERICA KYNE, allegingtwo violations of the December 31, 2025 Memorandum of Decision: first, that she took the minor child on an out-of-state familyvacation without his consent, causing him to miss one scheduled Saturday parenting visit; and second, that she unilaterallyselected a childcare provider without consulting him and has submitted fraudulent or unverifiable expense reimbursementrequests in connection with that provider.
Kyne v. Ehima, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4DISCUSSION OF LAW AND FACTS*4 A finding of contempt requires proof by clear and convincing evidence of three elements: (1) a clear court order; (2) aviolation of that specific order; and (3) willful noncompliance — that is, that the party had the ability to comply but failed to doso without excuse. Even a party who disagrees with a court order must comply with it until it has been modified or successfullychallenged. The Court must look at the circumstances surrounding the alleged contempt and, even if it does not make a findingof contempt, the Court can fashion remedial orders to effectuate its judgment.The Disney VacationThe December 31, 2025 parenting plan provides that neither party shall relocate the child's residence from the State ofConnecticut without written agreement of the parties or further order of the court, and that either party intending to changeresidence to a location greater than twenty-five miles from the other party must give ninety days written notice. The plan alsoprovides that trips away from home without a parent involving overnight stays or leaving the state require joint legal custodyconsultation as doing so is a significant, non-routine matter. The defendant cites this portion of the Decision as the basis forhis contempt claim. However, the decision to take the child to Disney World did not involve a relocation nor travel out of thestate, overnight without a parent.On March 25, 2026 — the morning of the trip — the mother notified the father via AppClose that she was traveling with thechild to Disney World from that day through Sunday. The father missed his scheduled Saturday library visit as a result. Hesubsequently contacted law enforcement and reported the child missing, despite having been clearly told the child was notmissing but was in Disney World.The Court does not find the mother in willful contempt on this issue.The existing Orders do not consider decisions relating to family trips with a parent present as a decision requiring joint custodialinvolvement. To be clear, however, parents SHOULD communicate vacations with the other parent in a timely basis and consentshould not be unreasonably withheld. She acknowledges she should have provided notice earlier and understands that obligationnow. The trip was a family vacation, the destination was disclosed, and the father had actual knowledge that the child wasin Florida at a family theme park — not missing. His decision to contact law enforcement under those circumstances was anescalation inconsistent with good faith co-parenting. The mother has offered make-up parenting time for the missed Saturdayvisit, which the Court finds an appropriate offer, although it is not ordering it.The motion for contempt on this ground is denied. The Court directs that, in the future, out-of-state travel notice shall be providedat least seven days in advance absent an emergency, and that any such travel shall not unreasonably interfere with the otherparent's scheduled parenting time. Where a conflict is unavoidable, make-up time shall be provided.The Childcare ProviderThe father alleges that the mother unilaterally selected a childcare provider — a neighbor named Anayeli Texis — withoutconsulting him, and that her Venmo payments to this individual constitute fraudulent or unverifiable requests for expensereimbursement.5*5 The Court reviewed the December 31, 2025 Memorandum of Decision carefully. The nanny arrangement was not new atthe time of trial — it was in place and was specifically addressed. The Decision ordered the father to reimburse the motherfor childcare expenses incurred to the nanny as of the time of trial, and expressly listed “day care providers, including afterschool and summer camp programs” as matters subject to joint legal custody consultation for, as implied in the Decision, newselections. The mother did not make a new selection. She continued the arrangement that was before the Court and that theCourt incorporated into its financial orders.
Kyne v. Ehima, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5The father brought no evidence that the care Evelyn is receiving is in any way inadequate, neglectful, or harmful. The Venmorecords submitted as exhibits by the mother (nothing was presented by the father) show payments identified as “Care for EvelynWeek of [date]” — clear, contemporaneous documentation of childcare expenses. The assertion that these payments constitutefraud is not supported by any evidence. The father's implication in his AppClose messages that the mother should simply behappy with the child support she receives because she is “evil” does not bolster his credibility on this issue.The motion for contempt on this ground is denied. The mother is working, has arranged for qualified childcare assistance duringher working hours, and has acted in accordance with the Court's December 31 orders. The father is responsible for 38% ofwork-related childcare expenses and shall reimburse the mother within thirty days of each submission.The Father's CancellationsThe mother presented testimony reflecting that since December 31, 2025, the father has cancelled five Saturday in-personvisits: January 16, February 6, February 20, March 6, and April 18. He attributes these cancellations to weather and medicalappointments but offered no documentation (the mother provided his AppClose cancellation of the April 18 visit). The Courtnotes this pattern. The father is before the Court alleging that a one-week family vacation interfered with his parentingrelationship with Evelyn (especially since he only had one day notice of the vacation and only a few day notice that his Saturdayvisitation would not occur) while simultaneously having missed five of his own scheduled Saturday visits in approximately fourmonths, with less notice to the mother of his cancellations than she gave him.The Court declines to find the mother in contempt for the one Saturday visit affected by the Disney trip in light of the father'sown pattern of cancellations and the absence of any showing of willfulness. Both parties are reminded that consistent, reliableparenting time — not litigation — is what builds a child's relationship with her parents.ORDERThe motion for contempt is DENIED on both grounds. The parties are ordered to comply with the following additional Orders:1. Out-of-state travel shall be preceded by at least seven days written notice via AppClose absent emergency circumstances.Any travel that conflicts with the other parent's scheduled parenting time shall result in make-up time to be scheduled withinthirty days.2. The existing childcare arrangement with Anayeli Texis is approved. The father shall reimburse 38% of work-related childcareexpenses within thirty days of monthly submission by the mother.3. Both parties are reminded of their obligation to complete co-parenting counseling as ordered December 31, 2025 (Page19, ¶II.I.). The Court expects compliance and the Clerk's office is instructed to not schedule any non-emergency motions foradjudication unless the filer has submitted said Certification.*6 4. Both parties are reminded that the Court may consider a party's pattern of litigation conduct, including the filing ofmotions in bad faith or as instruments of conflict, when evaluating future requests for relief.All CitationsNot Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2026 WL 1330009Footnotes
Kyne v. Ehima, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.61In an attempt to further understand the father's arguments, the Court attempted to review his pleadings from the dissolution case. Thecases he cites for some of his propositions, such as “In re David W., 58 Conn.App. 237 (2000)” and “In re Marriage of Doyle, 190Conn. 748 (1983)”, do not exist and are likely artificial intelligence hallucinations.2The child resides with two half-siblings, ages ten and eleven, who also bear the surname Kyne. Kyne v. Ehima, Memorandum ofDecision at 2 (Dec. 31, 2025, Egan, J.). The mother's surname is therefore the operative family surname in the household in whichEvelyn will be raised.3See Androvic v. Allen, Superior Court, J.D. of Stamford-Norwalk, Docket No. FST-CV-22-6055658-S (Aug. 7, 2023, Golger, J.)(primary custodian having her name match the child's will lessen confusion as she carries out her parenting responsibilities); Gillette v.Schroeder, Superior Court, J.D. of New London, Docket No. FA-10-4112725 (Feb. 24, 2010, Shluger, J.)., (same, on nearly identicalfacts).4The December 31, 2025 Memorandum of Decision expressly noted that the father's surname is the child's middle name. Kyne v.Ehima.supra, at 12. That Decision also denied the father's then-pending request to change the child's surname on the merits, findingno good cause.5The nanny, Anayeli Texis, is identified by name in the Venmo payment records submitted as a plaintiff's exhibit. The payments aredenominated ‘Care for Evelyn Week of [date]’ and are consistent in amount and timing with the childcare expenses the mother hasbeen seeking reimbursement for under the father's 38% obligation.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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