Myers v. State (2025)

Case details
Full caption
JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEW HAVEN. AT NEW HAVEN. Ricardo MYERS v. STATE of Connecticut
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Connecticut (CT)
Court
Connecticut Supreme Court
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Myers v. State, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2048567Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.UNPUBLISHED OPINION. CHECK COURT RULES BEFORE CITING.Superior Court of Connecticut,JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF NEW HAVEN.AT NEW HAVEN.Ricardo MYERSv.STATE of Connecticut, et alNNH CV24-5061174 S|JULY 18, 2025Editor's Note: This document contains discussion of unverified citations, likely generated by AI tools used by a party orcounsel. These citations are not attributable to the Court. The unverified citations have been preserved as part of the officialrecord, but links are unavailable.MEMORANDUM OF DECISION RE: MOTIONS TO STRIKE (# 105) AND TO DISMISS (# 106)#435707 Cesar A. Noble Judge, Superior Court*1 Before the court, in this petition for a new trial following a criminal conviction, are the State's motion to dismiss for lackof subject matter jurisdiction due to untimeliness, and Attorney Paul Spinella's motion to strike the claims asserted againsthim on the grounds that he is misjoined in a petition for new trial and, to the extent that the claim against him sounds in legalmalpractice, the petitioner fails to allege appellate post-conviction relief. Because the court agrees with both defendants, themotions are granted.The petitioner, Ricardo Myers, commenced the present petition for new trial on April 12, 2024. In his petition, Myers allegesthat on June 3, 2015 he was found guilty of murder and two counts of assault in the first degree in the matter of State v. RicardoMyers, NNH-CR13-0139954-T. In his petition, Myers alleges that he is entitled to a new trial because his trial counsel, thedefendant Attorney Spinella, and Assistant State's Attorney Gary Nicholson intentionally and mistakenly misrepresented thata marshal attempted service of a capias on a witness vital to Myer's third-party culpability defense when they knew or shouldhave known that the capias was never given to a marshal for service. Following his conviction, Myers was sentenced by thecourt on August 4, 2015 to serve a forty-seven year period of incarceration.Thereafter, Myers filed a direct appeal, a writ of habeas corpus, and a first petition for new trial. The direct appeal was deniedas was the writ of habeas corpus. The Appellate Court affirmed the denial of habeas relief and affirmed the dismissal of thepetition for new trial on the ground that the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because it was outside of the three-yearstatute of limitations established for same by General Statutes § 52-582.1
Myers v. State, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Attorney Spinella's Motion to StrikeAttorney Spinella argues in his motion to strike that the petition fails to state any cause of action against him upon which reliefcan be granted. As a petition for a new trial is not an action independent from the original criminal case, Attorney Spinella cannotgrant the relief requested and, accordingly, he has been misjoined in this action. Alternatively, in the event the court construesthe claim against Attorney Spinella as one for legal malpractice, he argues that the petitioner has failed to obtain appellate orpost-conviction relief, which is an essential element of a legal malpractice claim arising out of an attorney's representation of aplaintiff in criminal proceedings. See Cooke v. Williams, 349 Conn. 451, 476-77, 316 A.3d 278 (2024) (when proof of criminalmalpractice claim requires plaintiff to prove attorney's negligence was proximate cause of underlying criminal conviction, claimis insufficient as matter of law unless plaintiff obtained appellate or postconviction relief for underlying conviction).*2 The court applies the well-known standard applicable to motions to strike in which it construes the allegations of a complaintin the manner most favorable to sustaining its legal sufficiency; HSBC Bank USA, National Assn. v. Nathan, 195 Conn. App.179, 193, 224 A.3d 1173 (2020); in determining whether they are legally sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can begranted; Fort Trumbull Conservancy, LLC v. Alves, 262 Conn. 480, 498, 815 A.2d 1188 (2003). “[T]he exclusive remedy formisjoinder of parties ... is by motion to strike.” Bender v. Bender, 292 Conn. 696, 722 n.23, 975 A.2d 636 (2009); see alsoPractice Book § 11-3. “Naming an improper person as a party in a legal action constitutes misjoinder.” (Internal quotation marksomitted.) Bloom v. Milkovich, 111 Conn. App. 323, 329, 958 A.2d 1283 (2008). “Joinder is proper when each defendant isso related to the group of facts constituting the primary basis of liability that upon proper proof recovery may be had againsthim.” (Citation omitted, internal quotation marks omitted, emphasis added.) Id., 329.As Attorney Spinella correctly observes, he has no authority to provide the relief requested: a new trial. The petitioner's objectionis based on inconsistent theories. He first argues that the assertion of improper joinder mischaracterizes the nature of the petition“which challenges [Attorney Spinella's] professional conduct during the trial.” (Entry No. 113.00, p. 1.) He later asserts thathis “claim is not an independent tort action for malpractice but a petition for a new trial based on procedural irregularities andmisrepresentations during the trial.” (Entry No. 113.00, p. 3.) If Attorney Spinella is joined in the petition for a new trial, heis misjoined. If the claim against him is one for legal malpractice, the petitioner has failed to allege exoneration, a necessarypredicate for such a claim. See Cooke v. Williams, supra, 349 Conn. 476-77. In either case, the petitioner's claim fails to state acause of action legally sufficient to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. The motion to strike is granted.The State's Motion to DismissThe State moves to dismiss on the ground that this court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the petition for a new trial becausethe statutory scheme upon which it is predicated requires compliance with the relevant limitations period in order to vest thecourt with jurisdiction.“[A] motion to dismiss ... properly attacks the jurisdiction of the court, essentially asserting that the plaintiff cannot as a matterof law and fact state a cause of action that should be heard by the court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Santorso v. BristolHospital, 308 Conn. 338, 350, 63 A.3d 940 (2013). “A motion to dismiss shall be used to assert: (1) lack of jurisdiction over thesubject matter ....” Practice Book § 10-30(a). “[T]he three year limitation period pursuant to § 52-582 is a jurisdictional bar and,in the absence of any applicable exception or tolling doctrine, a trial court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over an untimelypetition for a new trial.” Reyes v. State, 222 Conn. App. 538, 550, 306 A.3d 515 (2023). The petitioner acknowledges that hisright to petition for a new trial is governed by General Statutes § 52-270.2*3 General Statutes § 52-5823 imposes on a petition for a new trial a three year limitations period which runs from the renditionof judgment. Judgment in the present case was rendered when the petitioner was sentenced on August 4, 2015. “The three year
Myers v. State, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3period [of § 52-582] begins to run from the date of rendition of judgment by the trial court ... which, in a criminal case, is thedate of imposition of the sentence by the trial court.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Reyes v. State, supra, 222 Conn. App.550. Thus, for the present petition to have been timely commenced, this action should have been brought on or before August4, 2018. The present petition was not timely commenced as it was brought on April 12, 2024.Thus, unless saved by any applicable exception or tolling doctrine, the court lacks subject matter jurisdiction and the mattermust be dismissed. Our Appellate Court recognized in Turner v. State, 172 Conn. App. 352, 360, 160 A.3d 398 (2017), that“a court lacks the authority to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling or otherwise exercise discretionary authority to extend alimitations period if the applicable statute of limitations constitutes a limit on the court's subject matter jurisdiction.” It has,however, recognized that the “three year limitation period of § 52-582 may be tolled by a showing of fraudulent concealmentpursuant to § 52-595.” Randolph v. Mambrino, 216 Conn. App. 126, 132, 284 A.3d 645 (2022). “Under our case law, to provefraudulent concealment, the [petitioner] [was] required to show: (1) [the respondents’] actual awareness, rather than imputedknowledge, of the facts necessary to establish the [petitioner's] cause of action; (2) the [respondents’] intentional concealmentof these facts from the [petitioner]; and (3) the [respondents’] concealment of the facts for the purpose of obtaining delay onthe [petitioner's] part in filing a complaint on [his] cause of action.” Id., 136-37. The authority for such tolling arises by statutein General Statutes § 52-592 rather than by any equitable considerations. (See Id., 140.) Myers has not alleged or presentedevidence proving the existence of fraudulent concealment.The petitioner, however, relies solely on equitable tolling principles. He first argues that the statute of limitations is subject toequitable tolling in the present case and cites “ R.G. v. State, 180 Conn. App. 387, 393 (2018),” a case this court was unableto find under either its case name or the citation.4 Regardless, the controlling authority of the Appellate Court in Turner issimply to the contrary. The petitioner also raises the “continuing violations doctrine5,” fraud, misrepresentation or violations ofconstitutional rights6, and the general argument that subject matter exists. This court has already addressed the unavailabilityof equitable grounds for tolling in § 52-582 and discussed the precedent that concludes that subject matter is implicated by theuntimely filing of a petition for new trial. The court, therefore, grants the motion to dismiss.*4 For the foregoing reasons, Attorney Spinella's motion to strike and the State's motion to dismiss are granted.All CitationsNot Reported in Atl. Rptr., 2025 WL 2048567Footnotes1General Statutes § 52-582 provides in pertinent part that “(a) No petition for a new trial in any civil or criminal proceeding shallbe brought but within three years next after the rendition of the judgment or decree complained of, except that a petition for a newtrial in a criminal proceeding based on DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) evidence or other newly discovered evidence, as described insubsection (b) of this section, that was not discoverable or available at the time of the original trial or at the time of any previouspetition under this section, may be brought at any time after the discovery or availability of such new evidence, and the court maygrant the petition if the court finds that had such evidence been presented at trial, there is a reasonable likelihood there would havebeen a different outcome at the trial.”2General Statutes § 52-270 provides in relevant part that “(a) The Superior Court may grant a new trial of any action that may comebefore it, for mispleading, the discovery of new evidence or want of actual notice of the action to any defendant or of a reasonableopportunity to appear and defend, when a just defense in whole or part existed, or the want of actual notice to any plaintiff of theentry of a nonsuit for failure to appear at trial or dismissal for failure to prosecute with reasonable diligence, or for other reasonablecause, according to the usual rules in such cases. The judges of the Superior Court may in addition provide by rule for the grantingof new trials upon prompt request in cases where the parties or their counsel have not adequately protected their rights during theoriginal trial of an action.”
Myers v. State, Not Reported in Atl. Rptr. (2025) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.43General Statutes § 52-582(a) is provided in footnote 1. Section 52-582(b) defines “other newly discovered evidence,” as including“newly discovered forensic scientific evidence that was not discoverable or available at the time of the original trial.” Neither DNAevidence nor newly discovered forensic scientific evidence are applicable to the present case.4This suggests the case is a “hallucination” of an AI program.5The court interprets this argument as one pursuant to the continuing course of conduct.” See Our Supreme Court has recognized ...that the statute of limitations and period of repose contained in ... § 52-584 may be tolled, in the proper circumstances, under ... thecontinu[ing] course of conduct doctrine ... thereby allowing a plaintiff to bring an action more than three years after the commissionof the negligent act .... [T]he continuing course of conduct doctrine reflects the policy that, during an ongoing relationship, lawsuitsare premature because specific tortious acts or omissions may be difficult to identify and may yet be remedied.... For example, thedoctrine is generally applicable under circumstances where [i]t may be impossible to pinpoint the exact date of a particular negligentact or omission that caused injury or where the negligence consists of a series of acts or omissions and it is appropriate to allow thecourse of [action] to terminate before allowing the repose section of the statute of limitations to run.” (Citation omitted.) Bucci v.Bridgeport, 227 Conn. App. 593, 613, 323 A.3d 346, cert. denied, 350 Conn. 916, 324 A.3d 791 (2024).6The petitioner cites to Varley v. Varley, 181 Conn. 58, 434 A.2d 312 (1980) for the proposition that fraud and other equitableconsiderations constitute exceptions to the statute of limitations. His reliance on this case is misplaced because it does not supporthis assertion.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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