In re Bittrex, No. 23-10598 (Oct. 22, 2025)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Delaware (DE)
Court
Delaware Supreme Court
Decided
Oct. 22, 2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
IN RE: BITTREX, INC., Wind Down Entity. ARABOUR, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2977719Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, D. Delaware.IN RE: BITTREX, INC., Wind Down Entity.ARABOUR, et al., Appellants,v.THE PLAN ADMINISTRATOR, Appellee.Case No. 23-10598 (BLS)|Civ. No. 24-714-JLH (lead), Civ. No.24-716-JLH, Civ. No. 24-719-JLH|Filed 10/22/2025Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.MEMORANDUM ORDERTHE HONORABLE JENNIFER L. HALL UNITEDSTATES DISTRICT JUDGEChapter 11Jointly AdministeredI. INTRODUCTION*1 The above-captioned appeals arise from the chapter11 cases of Bittrex, Inc. and certain of its affiliates(together, the “Debtors”). Pro se appellants Adel Abbasi,Shahriar Arabpour, and Amirali Momenzadeh (together,the “Appellants”), appealed the Bankruptcy Court'smemorandum orders (BUS Bankr. D.I. 148, 149, 150)1and accompanying orders (BUS Bankr. D.I. 210, 212, 213)(the “Bankruptcy Court Orders”) sustaining the Debtors’objections to Appellants’ claims, disallowing Appellants’claims for damages, and limiting Appellants’ claims tothe cryptocurrency associated with their accounts. On July22, 2024, at the request of the parties, the appeals wereconsolidated. (D.I. 5.) On September 19, 2025, this Courtissued an order (D.I. 35) (the “Order”) and accompanyingopinion (D.I. 34) (the “Opinion”) affirming the BankruptcyCourt Orders. On September 29, 2025, each of the Appellantsfiled a Notice of Appeal with respect to the Order. (D.I. 36,39, 40.) Pending before the Court is the Appellants’ jointMotion for Enlargement of Time to File Motion for RehearingPursuant to Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8022 (D.I.37) (the “Motion for Enlargement”). The Plan Administrator(“Appellee”) opposes the relief requested. (D.I. 38.)II. APPLICABLE STANDARDFederal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 8022 provides that,“[u]nless the time is shortened or extended by order or localrule, any motion for rehearing by the district court or BAPmust be filed within 14 days after a judgment on appeal isentered.” Fed. R. Bankr. P. 8022(a)(1).III. ANALYSISThe Court entered its Order on September 19, 2025. Pursuantto Bankruptcy Rule 8022, Appellants had 14 days—or untilOctober 3, 2025—to file either a motion for rehearing ora request to extend the time for rehearing. Ocwen LoanServicing, LLC for Deutsche Bank Nat'l Tr. Co. v. Randolph,2018 WL 2220843, at *2 (W.D. Pa. May 15, 2018). TheMotion for Enlargement was not filed until October 9, 2025.(D.I. 37.) “Once this deadline has passed, a motion to extendthe time for rehearing may only be granted if the ‘failureto act was the result of excusable neglect.’ ” Ocwen, 2018WL 2220843, at *1 (quoting Fed. R. Bankr. P. 9006(b)(1)which provides that the court may, for cause, “extend the timeto act if on motion made after the specified period expires,the failure to act within that period resulted from excusableneglect”). “Consequently, [Appellants] must demonstrate that[their] failure to seek rehearing in a timely manner was theresult of ‘excusable neglect.’ ” Id. at *2; see also Fed. R. Civ.P. 6(b)(1)(B) (“When an act may or must be done within aspecified time, the court may, for good cause, extend the time:on motion made after the time has expired if the party failedto act because of excusable neglect.”).*2 To determine excusable neglect in situations where, ashere, the need for an extension is “occasioned by somethingwithin the control of the movant,” the court must considerfour factors: (1) the danger of prejudice to the non-movant;(2) the length of the delay and its potential impact onjudicial proceedings; (3) the reason for the delay, includingwhether it was within the reasonable control of the movant;and (4) whether the movant acted in good faith.” Martinez
IN RE: BITTREX, INC., Wind Down Entity. ARABOUR, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2v. City of Reading Prop. Maint. Div., 2018 WL 1290087(E.D. Pa. Mar. 13, 2018) (quoting Pioneer Inv. Servs. Co. v.Brunswick Assocs. Ltd. P'ship, 507 U.S. 380, 395 (1993)).The determination is “an equitable one, taking account ofall relevant circumstances surrounding the party's omission.”Ragguette v. Premier Wine & Spirits, 691 F.3d 315, 324 (3dCir. 2017) (quoting Pioneer, 507 U.S. at 395). “Althoughinadvertence, ignorance of the rules, or mistakes construingthe rules do not usually constitute ‘excusable’ neglect, itis clear that ‘excusable neglect’ ... is a somewhat ‘elasticconcept,’ and is not limited strictly to omissions caused bycircumstances beyond the control of the movant.” Id. (quotingPioneer, 507 U.S. at 392). Finally, while parties appearing prose are afforded a greater degree of leniency and their pleadingsare held to “less stringent standards than formal pleadingsdrafted by lawyers,” pro se litigants must still “abide by thesame rules that apply to all other litigants.” Mala v. CrownBay Marina, Inc., 704 F.3d 239, 244–45 (3d Cir. 2013).Appellants argue that they have satisfied the Pioneer factorsfor excusable neglect and should be permitted to file a motion(or motions) for rehearing past the deadline. (See D.I. 37 at5.) According to Appellants, enlarging the deadline to permitthe filing of a motion for rehearing will result in minimalprejudice to Appellee or impact on judicial proceedingsbecause the delay has been (or will be) brief; there aregood reasons for the delay including “language barriers,international service, complex legal research, and pro sestatus;” and because Appellants have “consistently acted ingood faith, preserved all deadlines, and promptly sought reliefupon identifying barriers.” (See id.) Moreover, Appellantsargue that “[c]ourts in this District and the Third Circuithave granted similar relief,” and cite the following purported“cases” in support:• In re SemCrude, L.P., 405 B.R. 230, 232 (D. Del. 2009)(purportedly granting 14-day extension under Fed. R.Bankr. P. 8022 for pro se debtor with language andlogistical barriers);• In re PNB Holding Co., 2009 WL 5214150, at *2 (D. Del.Dec. 23, 2009) (purportedly granting an extension wherecomplex issues and pro se status warranted additionalbriefing time);• In re Roadhouse Holding Inc., 777 F. App'x 79, 81 (3d Cir.2019) (purportedly enlarging the deadline under Fed. R.Bankr. P. 8002(d)(1)(B) for excusable neglect);• In re Marie L. Chavannes, 641 F. App'x 243, 245 (3d Cir.2016) (purportedly finding excusable neglect where prose debtor missed deadline due to notice issues).2(Id.) As Appellee points out in his opposition (D.I. 38),none of these citations are accurate, nor has the Courtbeen able to locate any cases under similar names whichcontain the purported holdings or are otherwise relevant.Appellee further points out that the Motion for Enlargementdoes not state with particularity any point of law or factoverlooked or misapprehended for which Appellants intendto seek rehearing. Appellee further disagrees that there willbe minimal prejudice or impact by granting the Motionfor Enlargement. According to Appellee, since the filing ofthese appeals, Appellants have made little effort to adhere toapplicable rules, and the Motion for Enlargement representsyet another example of Appellants’ conduct:The filings submitted by Appellantsto this Court have beenlargely incomprehensible, andhave disregarded almost everyrelevant section of FederalRule of Bankruptcy Procedure8014(a) and (c). Their previoussubmissions to this Court failedto include required componentssuch as tables of contentsand authorities, jurisdictionalstatements, identification of theissues presented, the applicablestandard of review, proceduralhistory, and summaries of theirarguments. They did not specifywhich rulings they were askingthis Court to review, provided nocitations to the record, and the fewcase law citations they did includewere misleading, inaccurate, andlacked relevance and propercontextualization. Consequently,Appellees had to use the limitedremaining resources of the estates,which should be available fordistribution to stakeholders, torespond to briefing that wasincoherent, filled with senseless
IN RE: BITTREX, INC., Wind Down Entity. ARABOUR, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3and haphazard accusations, andadvanced arguments that found nosupport in the record.... In the eventthat the Court grants the Motion[for Enlargement], there can belittle doubt that [Appellants] willonce again regurgitate the samefacts, law, and arguments identicalto those the Court has alreadyconsidered.*3 (D.I. 38 at 3 (internal citations omitted).)Taking into account all relevant circumstances surroundingAppellants’ failure to timely seek rehearing, the Court agreesthat Appellants have failed to demonstrate excusable neglectunder the Pioneer factors. While the delay here is not lengthy,the Court finds that the reason for the delay was withinthe reasonable control of Appellants, who have participatedextensively in the Bankruptcy Court proceedings and theappellate proceedings despite their pro se status. Moreover,the Court disagrees that the relief requested will have littleimpact on judicial proceedings. A motion for rehearingunder Bankruptcy Rule 8022 “functions, essentially, likea traditional motion for reconsideration.” Lau v. Bank ofAmerica (In re Lau), 684 Fed. App'x 235, 239 (3d Cir.2017). “A motion for rehearing does not permit parties torecycle cases and arguments which the District Court alreadyrejected in rendering its original decision.” Id. The test iswhether “(1) the court has patently misunderstood a party,(2) the court has made a decision outside the adversarialissues presented ... by the parties; (3) the court has made anerror not of reasoning but of apprehension; or (4) there hasbeen a controlling or significant change in the law or factssince the submission of the issue to the Court.” Id. (quotingThomas v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 474 B.R. 450, 456-57(D.N.J. 2012)). The Motion for Enlargement demonstratesAppellants’ misunderstanding as to the very purpose servedby Bankruptcy Rule 8022. Rather than identifying any pointof law or fact overlooked or misapprehended by the Court, orasserting that there has been a change in the law or facts, theMotion for Enlargement promises that Appellants’ motion forrehearing will “address multiple overlapping areas—OFACsanctions, contract enforceability, damages, tort law, statutesof limitations, and Void ab inito [sic].” (D.I. 37 at 4.) It istherefore clear that Appellants, consistent with their priorfilings, intend to seek “rehearing” with respect to a litany ofissues including nearly every aspect of the Court's 36-pageOpinion. A motion for rehearing is not properly groundedin a request for a district court to rethink a decision it hasalready made, rightly or wrongly. Williams v. Pittsburgh, 32F.Supp.2d 236, 238 (W.D. Pa. 1998). Such arguments must bedirected to the Court of Appeals.*4 Far more important to the Court's determination as toexcusable neglect are Appellants’ misleading suggestions thatcourts in this jurisdiction have granted the relief they requestbased on cases which do not exist. Regardless of whether ornot these misrepresentations are attributable to the fallaciesof artificial intelligence, they are certainly not attributableto “language barriers, international service, complex legalresearch, [or Appellants’] pro se status” (D.I. 37 at 5), andthey weigh against any conclusion that Appellants have actedin good faith in requesting relief from the deadline.IV. CONCLUSIONAccordingly, for the reasons set forth herein, the Motion forEnlargement (D.I. 37) is DENIED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2977719Footnotes1“Des. Bankr. D.I.” refers to the docket of the chapter 11 case of Desolation Holdings LLC (Case No. Case23-10597), and “BUS Bankr. D.I.” refers to the docket of the chapter 11 case of Bittrex, Inc. (Case No.23-10598). Civ. No. 24-714-JLH is Mr. Arabpour's appeal of Bankr D.I. 148, 212; Civ. No. 23-716-JLH is Mr.
IN RE: BITTREX, INC., Wind Down Entity. ARABOUR, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4Abbasi's appeal of the Bankr. D.I. 149, 213; Civ. No. 24-719-JLH is Mr. Momenzadeh's appeal of Bankr. D.I.150, 210. The docket of the consolidated appeal, Civ. No. 24-714-JLH, is cited herein as “D.I. __.”2The Court managed to locate a decision under this name with a different citation, In re Chavannes, 658 F.App'x 65, 67 (3d Cir. 2016), which discusses excusable neglect but clearly does not stand for the propositionfor which it is cited; even if it did, that proposition would not advance Appellants’ cause as there is noassertion here that Appellants somehow lacked notice of entry of the Bankruptcy Court Orders or that thedelay was somehow attributable to third parties. See id. at 67 (rejecting appellant's argument that failure tofile a timely appeal was attributable to “excusable neglect” based on lack of notice or errors by the clerk'soffice or counsel).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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