Advani v. Term, No. 25-CV-1627 (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Advani v. Appellate Term
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Advani v. Appellate Term, 2nd Judicial Department, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2201065Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D. New York.Aruna ADVANI, Plaintiff,v.APPELLATE TERM, 2ND JUDICIALDEPARTMENT et al., Defendants.25-CV-1627 (JMF)|Signed August 1, 2025Attorneys and Law FirmsAruna Advani, Astoria, NY, Pro Se.Bronwyn Mary James, NYS Office of the Attorney General,New York, NY, for Defendants.MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERJESSE M. FURMAN, United States District Judge:*1 In 2022, Windsor Terrace at Jamaica Estates Owners Inc.(“Windsor Terrace”), which owns an apartment building inQueens, New York, commenced a holdover proceeding inthe Housing Part of Queens County Civil Court (“HousingPart”) seeking possession of the apartment in which PlaintiffAruna Advani was residing. See ECF No. 23-1, at 1. OnJuly 31, 2023, the Housing Part awarded Windsor Terracepossession of the apartment and ordered Advani's eviction.Id. at 6. Advani appealed the judgment to the AppellateTerm of the Supreme Court of the State of New York(“Appellate Term”), which denied three requests to stayher eviction, denied her appeal of the Housing Part's order,denied her requests to vacate the denial of her appeal, anddenied her motion for leave to reargue her appeal. See ECFNo. 1 (“Pet.”), at 25-41.1 Thereafter, proceeding withoutcounsel, Advani filed a pleading in this Court, initially styledas an “Article 78 Proceeding Verified Petition,” id. at 2,which (as amended) seeks “judicial review of the unlawfulactions” of the Appellate Term and others “in connectionwith the eviction proceedings initiated against her by WindsorTerrace,” ECF No. 19 (“Am. Pet.”) 1, and seeks to “[a]nnuland vacate the decisions and orders issued by” the AppellateTerm, id. 154. Advani names the Appellate Term, the NewYork State Attorney General, and the Governor of New Yorkas Defendants.2 Two Defendants, the Appellate Term andthe New York State Attorney General, now move, pursuant toRule 12(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, to dismissAdvani's lawsuit. See ECF No. 22.Upon review of the parties’ submissions, the Court concludesthat Advani's lawsuit must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,which “bars federal district courts from hearing cases thatin effect are appeals from state court judgments, becausethe Supreme Court is the only federal court with jurisdictionover such cases.” Dorce v. City of New York, 2 F.4th 82,101 (2d Cir. 2021); accord Hoblock v. Albany Cnty. Bd. ofElections, 422 F.3d 77, 84 (2d Cir. 2005).3 Specifically,the Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprives federal district courtsof subject-matter jurisdiction when four requirements aremet: “(1) the federal-court plaintiff lost in state court; (2)the plaintiff complains of injuries caused by a state courtjudgment; (3) the plaintiff invites [district court] review andrejection of that judgment; and (4) the state judgment wasrendered before the district court proceedings commenced.”Vossbrinck v. Accredited Home Lenders, Inc., 773 F.3d 423(2d Cir. 2014) (cleaned up) (quoting Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 85);accord Worley v. Simon Meyrowitz & Meyrowitz, P.C., No. 21-CV-8385 (JMF), 2022 WL 14760633, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Oct.25, 2022).*2 Here, Advani does not (and cannot) dispute that threeof the four requirements — the first, second, and fourth— are met. Advani repeatedly lost in state court, see Pet.25-41; she explicitly complains of injuries caused by theAppellate Term's rulings, see, e.g., Am. Pet. 97 (claiming“significant harm” “[a]s a result of the invalidity of [theAppellate Term's] orders”); ECF No. 27 (“Pl.’s Opp'n”),at 20 (asserting discrimination via “the enforcement of anunsigned eviction order and the denial of [her] motions to stayeviction”); and the Appellate Term's judgments were renderedbefore Advani filed her lawsuit here, see Pet. 1, 25-41. Theonly question, therefore, is whether the third requirement —that the plaintiff invites district court review and rejection ofthat judgment — is met as well.It is. Despite Advani's insistence that she “does not seekappellate review of the Appellate Term's decision,” seePl.’s Opp'n 10, Advani's Amended Petition repeatedly andexplicitly invites review and rejection of the Appellate Term'sjudgments, see, e.g., Am. Pet. 1 (“This is a proceeding ...seeking judicial review of the unlawful actions of theAppellate Term ....”); id. 2 (“The Plaintiff seeks to annul
Advani v. Appellate Term, 2nd Judicial Department, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2the decisions of the Appellate Term and its orders related tothe eviction process[.]”); id. 2 (“Plaintiff asserts that thedecisions and orders denying stays of eviction were issued incontravention of law, violated Plaintiff's right to due process,and were based on unjust and retaliatory motives ....”); id. 16 (“[I]t is imperative that the court acknowledges thenullity of all Decisions signed by the Clerk [of the AppellateTerm] and vacates it [sic] on this ground alone”); id. 17(“This procedural defect is sufficient grounds for vacatingthe decisions [of the Appellate Term].”). In the face of theseinvitations, Advani's sporadic and conclusory assertions inher filings opposing the motion to dismiss that she “does notseek federal appellate review of a state court judgment” fallflat. See, e.g., Pl.’s Opp'n 8. What is more, even in thosefilings, she continues to ask for review and rejection of theAppellate Term's decisions. See id. at 7 (“[F]ederal courtsare not barred from reviewing unconstitutional acts by statecourts.” (emphasis added)); see also ECF No. 29 (“Pl.’s Sur-Reply”), at 4 (requesting that the Court “ ‘annul and vacate’certain orders” as “part of the relief necessary to remedyongoing violations”).The fact that Advani brings claims against Defendantsother than the Appellate Term does not affect the Court'sconclusion. At bottom, all of her claims against all Defendantsare premised on the invalidity of the Appellate Term'sjudgments and, thus, seek review of those judgments “insubstance.” Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 84 (emphasis added). Forexample, Advani argues that “Defendants ... intentionallyinitiated legal proceedings without legal justification andwith a malicious intent to harass, coerce, and injure” her,Am. Pet. 120, and that the “orders denying stays ofeviction” were unlawful and “orchestrated by the Board ofDirectors of Windsor Terrace in scheming with the AppellateTerm,” id. 2. To evaluate such claims, the Court mustevaluate the Appellate Term's judgments, rendering theclaims “inextricably intertwined” with those judgments andthus equally barred by Rooker-Feldman. Hoblock, 422 F.3dat 86; see also Burris v. Hous. & Servs. Inc., No. 17-CV-9289(JGK), 2019 WL 1244494, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 18, 2019)(noting that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine bars claims when“a review of the complaint would necessitate an inquiry intothe propriety of the eviction warrant issued by the housingcourt, and the affirmance of that decision by the AppellateTerm and the denial of leave to appeal to the AppellateDivision”) (quoting Babalola v. B.Y. Equities, Inc., 63 F.App'x 534, 536 (2d Cir. 2003) (summary order)).*3 Advani's arguments to the contrary lack merit. AlthoughAdvani asserts that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does notapply because she brings “independent” claims, Pl.’s Opp'n8; see Hoblock, 422 F.3d at 86, there is no basis to thatassertion. Advani states in passing that her claims arise from“extrinsic actions and omissions by judicial officers andstate actors,” Pl.’s Opp'n 9, and “unconstitutional processesand policies,” id. at 10, but she fails to identify anyparticular extrinsic actions, omissions, processes, or policies.Cf. Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 532 (2011) (findingthat the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not apply where theplaintiff did “not challenge the adverse [state court] decisionsthemselves” but instead “targeted as unconstitutional theTexas statute [the state court had] authoritatively construed”);Kachalsky v. Cacace, 817 F. Supp. 2d 235, 256 (S.D.N.Y.2011) (finding that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did notapply where the plaintiff did not challenge the state court'sdecision but rather targeted the constitutionality of a NewYork Penal Law provision). Thus, the purported “independentfederal constitutional violations,” Pl.’s Opp'n 8, are not soindependent; they are merely alternative characterizationsof the Appellate Term's judgments as unconstitutional, seeid. at 6 (contending that Advani's First Amendment rightswere violated by the enforcement of her eviction order andthat her Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated bythe Appellate Term's “unsigned decisions” and “fail[ure] toaddress key constitutional issues”). The Rooker-Feldman barcannot be overcome by the mere characterization of thestate court's judgment as unconstitutional. See D.C. Ct. ofAppeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 486 (1983) (holdingthat district courts lack jurisdiction “over challenges to statecourt decisions ... arising out of judicial proceedings evenif those challenges allege that the state court's actions wereunconstitutional.” (emphasis added)).In short, all four Rooker-Feldman requirements are plainlymet and this Court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction overAdvani's claims against all Defendants. Accordingly,Defendants’ motion to dismiss must be and is granted on thatbasis. The Court does not (and, indeed, may not) reach anyof Defendants’ arguments as to the merits. Further, the Courtdeclines to grant Advani leave to amend. Although leave toamend a pleading should be freely given “when justice sorequires,” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2), and courts should generallygrant plaintiffs proceeding without counsel leave to amend “atleast once when a liberal reading of the complaint gives anyindication that a valid claim might be stated,” Gomez v. USAAFed. Sav. Bank, 171 F.3d 794, 795 (2d Cir. 1999) (per curiam),“it is within the sound discretion of the district court to grant
Advani v. Appellate Term, 2nd Judicial Department, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3or deny leave to amend,” McCarthy v. Dun & BradstreetCorp., 482 F.3d 184, 200 (2d Cir. 2007). Here, the defectsin Advani's claims are substantive, so amendment would befutile. See, e.g., Cuoco v. Moritsugu, 222 F.3d 99, 112 (2dCir. 2000). Additionally, the Court already granted Advanileave to amend and explicitly cautioned her that she “w[ould]not be given any further opportunity to amend” to addressissues raised by Defendants’ motion. ECF No. 16; see, e.g.,Overby v. Fabian, No. 17-CV-3377 (CS), 2018 WL 3364392,at *14 (S.D.N.Y. July 10, 2018) (“Plaintiff's failure to fixdeficiencies in his previous pleading, after being providedample notice of them, is alone sufficient ground to deny leaveto amend ....”). Finally, Advani has not suggested that shepossesses any additional facts that could cure the defects inher claims. See, e.g., Maione v. Med. Answering Servs., LLC,No. 17-CV-8106 (JMF), 2018 WL 4682018, at *4 (S.D.N.Y.Sept. 28, 2018).One additional matter warrants brief mention. Advani's filingscontain several troubling features: They include at least fourcitations to nonexistent judicial opinions, Pl.’s Opp'n 12,28; Pl.’s Sur-Reply 4;4 at least three quotations that donot appear in the cases cited, Pl.’s Opp'n 9, 12, 28; andcitations to cases that plainly do not support the propositionfor which they are cited, see, e.g., Pl.’s Opp'n 14, 16-18,23, 28. The Court surmises that these problems are due toAdvani's use of generative artificial intelligence tools. See,e.g., Romero v. Goldman Sachs Bank USA, No. 25-CV-2857(GHW), 2025 WL 1916119, at *1-2 (S.D.N.Y. June 25, 2025)(cautioning that “citations, quotations, and holdings thathave been generated by generative artificial intelligence maybe hallucinations”). Regardless, the “presentation of falsecitations, quotations, and holdings by a party ... to the Courtis sanctionable conduct.” Id. at *2; see, e.g., Park v. Kim, 91F.4th 610, 615 (2d Cir. 2024) (per curiam) (observing thatthe “attempt to persuade a court or oppose an adversary” byrelying on “non-existent precedent generated by ChatGPT” isan “abuse of the adversary system”). Were Advani a lawyer,the Court would consider imposing sanctions on her. But inview of the fact that she is not a lawyer and of the dismissalof this case, the Court declines to pursue the matter furtherand merely warns Advani that presentation of false citations,quotations, and holdings in the future may indeed result inthe imposition of sanctions. See, e.g., Zeng v. Chell, No. 19-CV-3218 (JGK), 2024 WL 3360570, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. July 9,2024) (“Were it not for the plaintiff's pro se status and theproper judgment dismissing this case, a further inquiry” intothe plaintiff's potential use of artificial intelligence “would beappropriate.”); see also Reilly v. Conn. Interlocal Risk Mgmt.Agency, No. 25-CV-640 (VDO), 2025 WL 1726366, at *2-3(D. Conn. June 20, 2025) (“Whether the issues with [the prose plaintiff's] filings are the result of artificial intelligenceor some other mistake, the Court cautions [the plaintiff] toensure that future submissions to any court contain onlyaccurate representations.”).*4 The Clerk of Court is directed to terminate ECF No. 22,to enter judgment in favor of Defendants, to close this case,and to mail a copy of this Memorandum Opinion and Order toAdvani. Further, the Court certifies, pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3), that any appeal from this Memorandum Opinionand Order would not be taken in good faith and in formapauperis status is thus denied. See Coppedge v. United States,369 U.S. 438, 444-45 (1962).SO ORDERED.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2201065Footnotes1References to page numbers in Advani's Petition, Opposition, and Sur-Reply are to the page numbersautomatically generated by the Court's Electronic Case Filing (“ECF”) system.2In addition, the Court liberally construes Advani's Amended Petition to also bring a claim against WindsorTerrace. See, e.g., Am. Pet. ¶¶ 119-122.3Defendants argue that the Court also lacks subject-matter jurisdiction because Advani invokes only statestatutes, which “cannot create federal jurisdiction.” ECF No. 24 (“Defs.’ Mem.”), at 6-7. True enough. Butbecause Advani is proceeding without counsel, the Court must construe her pleadings “liberally to raise the
Advani v. Appellate Term, 2nd Judicial Department, Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4strongest arguments” they suggest. Nielsen v. Rabin, 746 F.3d 58, 63 (2d Cir. 2014). In light of that, andAdvani's own characterization of this case as a “federal civil rights lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,” ECF No.27 (“Pl.’s Opp'n”), at 3, the Court will construe her to be raising constitutional claims pursuant to Section 1983.4The citations to nonexistent judicial opinions are as follows: “Doe v. Jindal, No. 11-388, 2011 WL 3664490,at *3 (E.D. La. Aug. 19, 2011),” Pl.’s Opp'n 12; “Matter of Medical Transport v NY State Dept of Health 294A.D.2d 574 (2d Dept 2002),” Pl.’s Opp'n 28; “Parker v. Blauvelt Volunteer Fire Co., 93 F.3d 65, 69 (2d Cir.1996),” Pl.’s Sur-Reply 4; and “Guggenheimer v. Ginzburg, 43 F.3d 807, 812 (3d Cir. 1994),” Pl.’s Sur-Reply 4.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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