Akins v. Ratliff (M.D.N.C. 2026)

Case details
Full caption
Brandon Rulund Akins v. Tashi Latwon Ratliff, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Middle District of North Carolina (M.D. N.C)
Decided
2026
Majority
Of United States (J.) (unanimous Court)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINABRANDON RULUND AKINS, ) )Plaintiff, ) )v. )1:25cv712 )TASHI LATWON RATLIFF, et al., ) )Defendants. )MEMORANDUM OPINION, ORDER, AND RECOMMENDATIONOF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGEThis matter comes before the undersigned United StatesMagistrate Judge on an Application to Proceed in District CourtWithout Prepaying Fees or Costs (Docket Entry 1) (the“Application”) filed by Brandon Rulund Akins (the “Plaintiff”) inconjunction with Plaintiff’s pro se complaint (Docket Entry 2) (the“Complaint”) against, as relevant here, GEICO Indemnity Company(the “Defendant”) (see id. at 1).1 For the reasons that follow,the undersigned will (i) grant the Application for the limitedpurpose of recommending dismissal of Plaintiff’s lone federalclaim, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B), for failure to state aclaim, as well as dismissal without prejudice of any state claim(s)under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and (ii) resolve ancillary motionsrelevant to the Application and Complaint (see Docket Entries 7,13, 21, 23, 26).1 Docket Entry page citations utilize the CM/ECF footer’spagination.Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 1 of 23
LEGAL STANDARD“The federal in forma pauperis statute, enacted in 1892 andpresently codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1915, is designed to ensure thatindigent litigants have meaningful access to the federal courts.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989). To balance thispublic interest with the potential administrative burden on thecourts, the statute provides, in relevant part, that “the courtshall dismiss the case at any time if the court determines that theaction . . . fails to state a claim on which relief may begranted,” 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). A complaint falls short of that requirement when it does not“contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state aclaim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (internal citations omitted)(quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “Aclaim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factualcontent that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference thatthe defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. Further,“the tenet that a court must accept as true all of the allegationscontained in a complaint is inapplicable to legal conclusions. Threadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supportedby mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id.22 Although “[a] document filed pro se is to be liberallyconstrued, and a pro se complaint, however inartfully pleaded, must(continued...)2Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 2 of 23
BACKGROUNDThe Complaint seeks relief against Defendant (see Docket Entry2 at 14-15) for its alleged “failure to comply with its obligationsunder the Medicare Secondary Payer Act (‘MSPA’)” (id. at 2), see 42U.S.C. § 1395y, its “breach of [the] common law duty of good faithand fair dealing” (Docket Entry 2 at 2), and its “repeatedviolations of the North Carolina Unfair Claims Settlement PracticesAct, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 58-63-15(11), and the Unfair and DeceptiveTrade Practices Act, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 75-1.1” (Docket Entry 2 at2).32(...continued)be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadings draftedby lawyers,” Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (internalcitation and quotation marks omitted), the United States Court ofAppeals for the Fourth Circuit has “not read Erickson to undermineTwombly’s requirement that a pleading contain more than labels andconclusions,” Giarratano v. Johnson, 521 F.3d 298, 304 n.5 (4thCir. 2008) (internal quotation marks omitted) (dismissing pro secomplaint); accord Atherton v. District of Columbia Off. of Mayor,567 F.3d 672, 681-82 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (“A pro se complaint . . .‘must be held to less stringent standards than formal pleadingsdrafted by lawyers.’ But even a pro se complainant must plead‘factual matter’ that permits the court to infer ‘more than themere possibility of misconduct.’” (first quoting Erickson, 551 U.S.at 94; then quoting Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679)).3 In addition to Defendant and its insured, the Complaintnamed “Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO)” and “GeicoInsurance Company, LLC” as defendants upon its filing. (DocketEntry 2 at 1.) Plaintiff thereafter moved twice to amend thecaption and clarify his claims against Defendant, rather than theother entities named in the Complaint. (See Docket Entries 13,26.) Defendant “consent[ed] to Plaintiff’s [first] request”(Docket Entry 17 at 1) to “remov[e ] other named entities [asidefrom Defendant]” (Docket Entry 13 at 2) and did not respond to thesecond, substantially similar motion (see Docket Entry 26; Docket(continued...)3Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 3 of 23
According to the Complaint:On or about the evening of July 25, 2024, atapproximately 9:00 p.m., Plaintiff [ ] operated hisvehicle lawfully and responsibly when he was violentlyrear-ended by a vehicle operated by Defendant[’s insured]. . . [who] was at the time insured by Defendant [ ]. The force of the collision caused immediate and seriousphysical injuries to [ ] Plaintiff, necessitatingemergency medical attention and transport via ambulanceto Hoke Hospital. Plaintiff was diagnosed and treated for multipleinjuries, including:•Acute cervical and lumbar strains•Paraspinal tenderness•Persistent migraines•Concussion-like symptoms includingdizziness, lethargy, confusion, and visiondisturbances•Psychological traumaThese injuries required, and continue to require, ongoingtreatment including physical therapy and psychologicalcounseling. On or about date [sic], [Defendant] offered Plaintiff asettlement of $3,000 without requiring any Medicare orTRICARE lien documentation. However, this directlycontradicts [Defendant’s] current position anddemonstrates an inconsistent and unreasonable delaytactic.3(...continued)Entries dated Nov. 17, 2025, to present). The undersigned willtherefore grant the first of those motions (Docket Entry 13) as tothe termination of “Government Employees Insurance Company (GEICO)”and “Geico Insurance Company, LLC” (id. at 1-2) as defendants andwill terminate the second motion (Docket Entry 26) as moot. SeeFed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). Additionally, Plaintiff pursued anegligence claim against Defendant’s insured (see Docket Entry 2 at4) before settling with that individual (see Docket Entry 25 at 1-2(noticing voluntary dismissal of Defendant’s insured); id. at 4-5(providing copy of written release)).4Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 4 of 23
(Id. at 3-4 (paragraph numbering, parenthetical, internal brackets,and stray quotation mark omitted); see also Docket Entry 2-1 at 1;Docket Entry 2 at 10 (alleging that “Plaintiff declined to accept[Defendant’s] inadequate offer”).)The Complaint further alleges that “Defendant . . . hasacknowledged liability and issued partial [p]ayments to [ ]Plaintiff in the amount of: $18,846.37 for the total loss of[ P]laintiff’s vehicle [and] $788.72 for rental car reimbursement”(id. at 4 (bullet points omitted)) and that “the remaining disputepertains solely to damages, not liability” (id. at 5).Continuing, the Complaint alleges:Plaintiff provided [Defendant] with clear, undeniable,and thoroughly documented evidence of medical expenses,physical injuries, and legal liability stemming from theJuly 25, 2024 collision caused by Defendant[’s insured]. These irrefutable facts were supported by hospitalrecords, diagnostic imaging, therapy notes, and incidentreports which left no reasonable doubt regarding theextent of the damages or [ ] Defendant’s responsibility.[Defendant’s] refusal to engage fairly, despite thisoverwhelming documentation, constitutes a severe anddeliberate breach of its duty to act in good faith.Over the course of several months, Plaintiff consistentlycommunicated with [Defendant], submitting multiplerequests for resolution via phone calls, emails, portalmessages, and formal written notices for a settlementinstead of litigation. At each turn, [Defendant] eitherignored or misrepresented the law about legalrequirements, intentionally delaying a response, [and]refusing to enter into good-faith negotiations.(Id.; see also id. at 5-6 (alleging that Defendant’s“representative made false and obstructive statements approximately20 times” and listing allegedly false and obstructive statements).)5Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 5 of 23
Additionally, the Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff isenrolled in both Medicare and TRICARE and, as a result of injuriessustained in the [ ] collision, incurred substantial medicalexpenses related to treatment, therapy, and diagnostic care.” (Id.at 8; see also id. at 11 (alleging that “Plaintiff is a Medicarerecipient with TRICARE as secondary insurance”).) According to theComplaint, Defendant “[f]alse[ly s]tate[d]” that it “is legallyrequired to obtain a summary of verification of Medicare andTRICARE lien payments prior to making a settlement offer ordiscussing settlement numbers with [ ] Plaintiff.” (Id. at 6(internal quotation marks omitted).) That statement, the Complaintalleges, “is entirely inaccurate and serves as a delay tactic” (id.at 10). Moreover, the Complaint alleges that “Plaintiff provid[edDefendant with] all medical notes, bills and billing statementsfrom Tricare” (id. at 6; see also id. at 11 (alleging that“Plaintiff submitted all required documentation to Defendant [ ],including proof of significant injuries and medical expensesexceeding $25,000”)). The Complaint further alleges thatDefendant’s “continued refusal to make an offer [of settlement]under the pretext of needing lien information” (id. at 12) caused“Plaintiff [to] suffer[] financial losses, worsening physicalconditions due to delayed treatment, prolonged emotional distress,and interference with his federally protected rights” (id.), all of6Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 6 of 23
which “should be compensated accordingly” (id. at 8; see also id.at 14-15 (requesting, among other forms of relief, “compensatorydamages in the amount of $500,000” and “punitive damages in theamount of $500,000”)).DISCUSSIONI. Failure to State a ClaimPlaintiff seeks relief against Defendant for its alleged“failure to comply with its obligations under the MedicareSecondary Payer Act” (id. at 2).“During the initial years of the Medicare program after itsenactment in 1965, Medicare acted as the first payer for manymedical services . . . . In 1980 and 1981, in part due to risingMedicare costs, Congress enacted and amended the Medicare SecondaryPayer statute.” Marietta Mem’l Hosp. Emp. Health Benefit Plan v.DaVita Inc., 596 U.S. 880, 882 (2022). “That statute as amendedmakes Medicare a ‘secondary’ payer,” id. at 882-83, “in certaincircumstances when both Medicare and a non-Medicare entity haveindependent duties to pay for a covered person’s healthcare costs,”DaVita Inc. v. Virginia Mason Mem’l Hosp., 981 F.3d 679, 684 (9thCir. 2020). The MSPA “creates a federal coordination of benefitsbetween primary and secondary payers. Worker’s compensation plans,liability insurance plans, and no fault insurance plans act asprimary payers, and Medicare benefits act as secondary payers.” Humana Ins. Co. v. Paris Blank LLP, 187 F. Supp. 3d 676, 677–787Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 7 of 23
(E.D. Va. 2016) (internal citations omitted). “When a primary planis responsible for payment for medical services, a secondary payermay make a conditional payment on behalf of the beneficiary andthen seek recovery for such conditional payment from the primaryplan.” Id. at 678.“The MSP[A ] provides two mechanisms for enforcing a primaryplan’s recoupment obligation. First, the United States may sue torecover the amount from the primary plan or from the individual orentity to whom the primary plan has paid the funds.” Penegar v.Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 115 F.4th 294, 297 (4th Cir. 2024) (citing42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(iii)). “Second, and pertinent to [this]case, private parties may sue to recover double damages from aprimary plan that has failed to provide for primary payment inaccordance with the MSP[A ].” Id. (citing 42 U.S.C.§ 1395y(b)(3)(A)). “The ostensible purpose of [the private causeof action] . . . is ‘to help the government recover conditionalpayments from insurers or other primary payers.’” Id. at 298(quoting Netro v. Greater Balt. Med. Ctr., Inc., 891 F.3d 522, 524(4th Cir. 2018)).Turning to the text of the statute, the MSPA “establishe[s] aprivate cause of action for damages (which shall be in an amountdouble the amount otherwise provided) in the case of a primary planwhich fails to provide for primary payment (or appropriatereimbursement) in accordance with paragraphs (1) and (2)(A)” of8Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 8 of 23
subsection (b) of the statute. 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(3)(A).4 “Paragraph (2)(A) . . . forbids Medicare from paying for serviceswhen a primary plan is responsible, ‘except as provided insubparagraph (B).’” MSPA Claims 1, LLC v. Kingsway Amigo Ins. Co.,950 F.3d 764, 771 (11th Cir. 2020) (quoting 42 U.S.C.§ 1395y(b)(2)(A)). In turn, “subparagraph (B) states that aprimary plan must reimburse Medicare ‘if it is demonstrated thatsuch primary plan has or had a responsibility to make payment withrespect to such item or service.’” Id. (quoting§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii)). “A primary plan’s responsibility for suchpayment,” according to the MSPA, “may be demonstrated by ajudgment, a payment conditioned upon the recipient’s compromise,waiver, or release (whether or not there is a determination oradmission of liability) of payment for items or services includedin a claim against the primary plan or the primary plan’s insured,or by other means.” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii).54 Paragraph (1) sets forth “[r]equirements of group healthplans,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(1), not implicated here.5 “Other means” of demonstrating responsibility to pay “mustinvolve an enforceable obligation such as a judgment orsettlement,” Caldera v. Ins. Co. of the State of Pa., Civ. ActionNo. 11-321, 2012 WL 360183, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Feb. 2, 2012), aff’don other grounds, 716 F.3d 861 (5th Cir. 2013); see also Sullivanv. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. of Mich., No. 1:10cv909, 2011 WL1231264, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 1, 2011) (requiring a showing of“something akin to judicial determination or settlement”).9Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 9 of 23
Accordingly, “[t]he private cause of action under the MSPArequires three elements: (1) a primary plan, (2) that isresponsible to pay for an item or service, and (3) that failed tomake the appropriate payment to Medicare for the item or service.” Sims v. PMA Ins. Co., No. 1:20cv249, 2021 WL 369675, at *7 n.8(M.D.N.C. Feb. 3, 2021). As to the first element, the term “primary plan” includes, asrelevant here, “an automobile or liability insurance policy orplan,” 42 U.S.C. § 1395y(b)(2)(A)(ii). The second and thirdelements of an MSPA claim represent “two important conditionsprecedent that must be satisfied prior to invoking this cause ofaction. First, Medicare must have actually made payments onPlaintiff’s behalf.” Sullivan v. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co. ofMich., No. 1:10cv909, 2011 WL 1231264, at *3 (W.D. Mich. Apr. 1,2011) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). See also,e.g., Leggette v. B.V. Hedrick Gravel & Sand Co., No. 3:04cv530,2006 WL 6809606, at *11 (W.D.N.C. May 24, 2006) (“[An] MSP[A]‘double damages’ claim may be maintained only where Medicare has,in fact, paid claims that a primary insurer should have, butrefused, to pay.”). “The second condition precedent is that theinsurer must be ‘responsible’ for making the payments.” Sullivan,2011 WL 1231264, at *3. “Until [a d]efendant[’s] responsibility topay for a Medicare beneficiary’s expenses has been demonstrated(for example, by a judgment), [a d]efendant[’s] obligation to10Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 10 of 23
reimburse Medicare does not exist under the relevant provisions.” Glover v. Liggett Grp., Inc., 459 F.3d 1304, 1309 (11th Cir. 2006).Here, the Complaint fails to allege the existence of anypayments made on Plaintiff’s behalf by Medicare; instead, it merelyalleges that “Plaintiff is a Medicare recipient” (Docket Entry 2 at11) who “incurred substantial medical expenses” (id. at 8), andthat the “total cost of [those] medical expenses exceeds $25,000”(id. at 4). Even liberally construed, these allegations fall shortof “[t]he requirement of actual payment by Medicare as aprerequisite to maintaining a[n MSPA] action,” Leggette, 2006 WL6809606, at *11, as nothing in the Complaint indicates thatMedicare or its affiliates “incurred costs covering [Plaintiff’s]medical expenses,” MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v. Grange Ins.Co., No. 5:19cv219, 2019 WL 6770729, at *17 (N.D. Ohio Dec. 12,2019), which a primary payer (such as Defendant) should have born,or for which Plaintiff may properly seek “reimbursement,” 42 U.S.C.§ 1395y(b)(3)(A), under the MSPA.6 “Moreover, absent [allegations6 The Complaint’s allegations that “Plaintiff provid[edDefendant with] all medical notes, bills and billing statementsfrom Tricare” (Docket Entry 2 at 6 (emphasis added)) — “a federalhealth insurance program administered by [the Department ofDefense] to provide medical care to current and retired servicemembers and their families,” County Bd. of Arlington Cnty. v.Express Scripts Pharmacy, Inc., 996 F.3d 243, 248-49 (4th Cir.2021) (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted) — also proveinsufficient, because only “the United States [or its authorizedrepresentative] may institute and prosecute legal proceedingsagainst a third party payer to enforce a right of the United Statesunder [TRICARE],” 32 C.F.R. § 220.7(a)-(b); see also 10 U.S.C.(continued...)11Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 11 of 23
concerning Plaintiff’s] submission of [his medical] claims to andpayment of at least some portion of them by Medicare, it [would be]impossible to calculate the amount of damages subject to doubling,”Leggette, 2006 WL 6809606, at *11, further rendering theComplaint’s allegations insufficient. See id. (explaining that“the baseline for double damages is not the amount billed by theprovider, but the damages Medicare actually incurred as a result ofthe primary plan’s failure to pay” (citing 42 U.S.C.§ 1395y(b)(3)(A))).The Complaint also fails to allege facts “demonstrat[ing] that[a] primary plan has or had a responsibility to make a payment withrespect to” Plaintiff’s medical expenses. 42 U.S.C.§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii). As noted above, “[o]ne way to demonstratesuch a responsibility is by showing that the primary plan had acontractual obligation to pay.” MSP Recovery Claims, Series LLC v.American Fam. Connect Prop. & Cas. Ins. Co., No. 23cv20105, 2023 WL2536444, at *3 (S.D. Fla. Mar. 16, 2023) (brackets and internal6(...continued)§ 1095(e)(1) (“The United States may institute and prosecute legalproceedings against a third-party payer to enforce a right of theUnited States under this section.”). However, even if theComplaint’s allegations that (A) “Plaintiff is a Medicare recipientwith TRICARE as secondary insurance” (Docket Entry 2 at 11) and (B)TRICARE produced “bills and billing statements” to Plaintiff (id.at 6) combined to support the inference that (C) Medicare incurredexpenses, too, given TRICARE’s status “as secondary” to Medicare(id. at 11 (emphasis added)), the Complaint nonetheless fails toallege Defendant’s demonstrated responsibility to reimburseMedicare’s expenses, as explained in the discussion that followsabove.12Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 12 of 23
quotation marks omitted). Despite alleging that Defendant“acknowledged liability and issued partial [p]ayments . . . for thetotal loss of [ P]laintiff’s vehicle . . . [and his] rental car[expenses]” (Docket Entry 2 at 4), the Complaint does not allegethe existence of a settlement agreement that could “demonstrate[]. . . [Defendant’s] responsibility,” 42 U.S.C.§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii), to reimburse Medicare for Plaintiff’s medicalexpenses.7 On the contrary, the Complaint attempts to holdDefendant liable for its “refusal to make a settlement offer”(Docket Entry 2 at 12 (emphasis added); see also id. at 2 (alleging“delay and obstruction of settlement”), 5 (alleging that Plaintiff“submitt[ed]” and Defendant “ignored” multiple “written notices fora settlement instead of litigation”), 6 (alleging existence of7 The Complaint’s contention that, because Defendant“acknowledged liability and issued partial payments” forPlaintiff’s vehicle and rental car expenses (Docket Entry 2 at 4),“the [instant] dispute pertains solely to damages, not liability”(id. at 5) represents a legal conclusion which the Court need notaccept at this stage of the proceedings, see Iqbal, 556 U.S. at678. Moreover, as a general matter, “[Defendant’s] payment ofproperty damages cannot create an acknowledg[]ment of its liabilityfor [Plaintiff’s] personal injuries,” Denis v. Liberty Mut. Ins.Co., 791 F.2d 846, 849 (11th Cir. 1986), nor can it“demonstrate[ Defendant’s] . . . responsibility,” 42 U.S.C.§ 1395y(b)(2)(B)(ii), to reimburse Medicare for the cost of thoseinjuries. Likewise, Defendant’s “offer[ of] a settlement of$3,000” (Docket Entry 2 at 4) cannot suffice “to prove the validityof the claim [against Defendant] that the [ ] offer was meant tosettle,” Macsherry v. Sparrows Point, LLC, 973 F.3d 212, 224 (4thCir. 2020); see also Sharp v. City of Elizabeth City, No. 2:23cv52,2023 WL 9051270, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Dec. 29, 2023) (refusing to“consider [a] settlement demand for purposes of determining whether[the] plaintiff has stated a valid claim”).13Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 13 of 23
promises to “provide a settlement offer” which “[Defendant] failedto honor” (internal quotation marks omitted)), 14 (alleging thatDefendant “withh[eld] settlement”)). That attempt falls short,however, as “[t]he MSP[A] itself does not impose a duty to pay on[Defendant but] . . . [i]nstead[ ] presupposes an existingobligation,” Virginia Mason Mem’l Hosp., 981 F.3d at 684 (internalquotation marks omitted), which the Complaint does not plead. Seealso Fresenius Med. Care Holdings, Inc. v. Brooks Food Grp., Inc.,Civ. Action No. 3:07cv14, 2007 WL 2480251, at *7-8 (W.D.N.C. Aug.28, 2007) (explaining that “[t]he MSPA makes it a conditionprecedent to reimbursement that there be a ‘demonstratedresponsibility’ to pay for items or services” and that “[t]o holdotherwise would open a primary insurer to double damages each timeit contests a claim, rather than only when it fails to pay afterresponsibility has been established”). In sum, the Complaint fails to allege payments made byMedicare and “Defendant[’s demonstrated] responsibility for th[ose]payments. If and when such a [settlement or] determination is made. . . [and] Defendant[] fail[s] to reimburse [Medicare for] theappropriate funds, then the MSPA allows for a private cause ofaction for double damages.” Fresenius, 2007 WL 2480251, at *8. Absent such facts, the Complaint fails to state a claim.88 Alternatively, because “[Plaintiff’s] suit remainscontingent upon Defendant[’s] failing to [reimburse Medicare] after(continued...)14Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 14 of 23
II. State-Law ClaimsThe Complaint pursues claims against Defendant for breach ofthe “duty of good faith and fair dealing” (Docket Entry 2 at 5;accord id. at 12) and “violat[ions of] North Carolina’s UnfairClaims Settlement Practices Act . . . and the Unfair and DeceptiveTrade Practices Act” (id. at 12; accord id. at 9, 13, 14-15).Facts supporting jurisdiction must appear in the complaint,see Pinkley, Inc. v. City of Frederick, 191 F.3d 394, 399 (4th Cir.1999), and the party asserting federal jurisdiction bears theburden of “show[ing] that jurisdiction does, in fact, exist,” Davisv. Pak, 856 F.2d 648, 650 (4th Cir. 1988) (internal quotation marksomitted). Here, the Complaint invokes (A) the Court’s “originaljurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331” (Docket Entry 2 at 3), alleging that “Plaintiff’s [MPSA] claims arise under the laws theUnited States” (id.), and (B) the Court’s “supplementaljurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state law claims” (id.).8(...continued)[a demonstration of its responsibility to pay] occurs . . .[Plaintiff’s] claim is not currently fit for judicial decision. . . [and] should be dismissed as premature.” Sims, 2021 WL369675, at *7; see also id. at *5-7, *7 n.8 (dismissing MSPA forfailure to plead both responsibility to pay and failure topay/reimburse and noting that a “merits analysis would turn on thesame factors affecting the jurisdictional analysis”); Sullivan,2011 WL 1231264, at *3 (“[The p]laintiff’s original [c]omplaintattempts to simultaneously litigate his MSP[A] claim with theunderlying claim. The MSP[A] claim is accordingly premature. . . .”); Mason v. American Tobacco Co., 346 F.3d 36, 43 (2d Cir.2003) (“[T]he trigger for bringing a[n] MSP[A] claim is not thependency of a disputed tort claim, but the established obligationto pay medical costs . . . .” (internal quotation marks omitted)).15Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 15 of 23
Federal courts possess “original jurisdiction of all civilactions arising under the Constitution[ and] laws . . . of theUnited States,” 28 U.S.C. § 1331. When a court possesses federalquestion jurisdiction over a federal claim, “[a] claim that neitherarises from a federal question nor satisfies the requirements fordiversity jurisdiction may nevertheless be entertained in federalcourt [via] supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1367.” Mebane v. GKN Driveline N. Am., Inc., 499 F. Supp. 3d 220, 231(M.D.N.C. 2020). “Under supplemental jurisdiction, ‘[t]he stateand federal claims must derive from a common nucleus of operativefact’ where a plaintiff ‘would ordinarily be expected to try themall in one judicial proceeding.’” Id. (quoting United Mine Workersof Am. v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715, 725 (1966)). Importantly, supplemental jurisdiction constitutes “a doctrineof discretion,” United Mine Workers, 383 U.S. at 726, in regards towhich “[n]eedless decisions of state law should be avoided,” id. As such, if “federal claims are dismissed before trial, . . . thestate claims should be dismissed as well.” Id.; see also 28 U.S.C.§ 1367(c)(3) (“The district courts may decline to exercisesupplemental jurisdiction over a claim . . . [if] the districtcourt has dismissed all claims over which it has originaljurisdiction[.]”).Although Plaintiff’s MSPA claim raises a federal question, theComplaint pursues state-law claims which arise under North Carolina16Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 16 of 23
law9 and thus do not satisfy federal question jurisdiction. Therefore, given the foregoing recommendation of dismissal ofPlaintiff’s federal claim, the Court should decline to exercisesupplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. SeeCarnegie-Mellon Univ. v. Cohill, 484 U.S. 343, 350 n.7 (1988)(“[I]n the usual case in which all federal-law claims areeliminated before trial, the balance of factors to be considered. . . — judicial economy, convenience, fairness, and comity — willpoint toward declining to exercise jurisdiction over the remainingstate-law claims.”).10III. Ancillary MotionsIn addition to the Application, Complaint, and the motions toamend resolved in footnote 3 above, this case comes before theundersigned on Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss (Docket Entry 7)(“Dismissal Motion”), Defendant’s Motion to Strike Plaintiff’s9 “North Carolina [law, rather than federal law,] recognizesa cause of action for a breach of the implied covenant of goodfaith and fair dealing,” Nadendla v. WakeMed, 24 F.4th 299, 307(4th Cir. 2022) (emphasis added), and Plaintiff’s claims for“[s]tatutory violations under North Carolina law” (Docket Entry 2at 14) plainly arise under state law.10 Additionally, diversity of citizenship jurisdiction —which the Complaint does not invoke (see Docket Entry 2 at 3) —does not exist for Plaintiff’s state-law claims because theComplaint fails to allege Defendant’s citizenship (see id. at 2(alleging only Plaintiff’s status as a “resident of . . . NorthCarolina”)). See also MicroPicture Int’l, Inc. v. Kickartz, No.3:05cv34, 2005 WL 8174556, at *1 (W.D. Va. July 25, 2005) (“[A]party alleging jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenshipclearly must state the citizenship of all parties involved in theaction.”).17Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 17 of 23
Surreply to the Dismissal Motion (Docket Entry 23) (“Motion toStrike”), and Plaintiff’s Motion for “In Camera Inspection ofExhibit A” (Docket Entry 21) (“Inspection Motion”), which Plaintiffattached to his response in opposition the Dismissal Motion (seeDocket Entry 15-1). (See also Docket Entry dated Dec. 10, 2025(referring Inspection Motion); Docket Entry dated Feb. 19, 2026(referring Dismissal Motion and Motion to Strike).)In light of the foregoing recommendation that the Courtdismiss this action, the undersigned (A) will terminate the Motionto Strike as moot and (B) will recommend that the Court terminatethe Dismissal Motion as moot. Likewise, the Inspection Motion asksthe “Court to conduct an in-camera inspection of [ ] transcribedaudio recordings” (Docket Entry 21 at 1 (emphasis omitted))submitted with Plaintiff’s response to the Dismissal Motion (seeDocket Entry 15; Docket Entry 15-1). The undersigned has reviewed,and thus “inspected,” those materials (which appear on the publicdocket and generally amount to verified pleadings (see, e.g.,Docket Entry 15-1 at 2)) in the course of addressing the DismissalMotion, Application, and Complaint, and will therefore terminatethe Inspection Motion as moot.IV. Plaintiff’s Inaccurate PleadingsLastly, in recommending dismissal of the instant action, theundersigned also admonishes Plaintiff for failing to confirm theaccuracy of his pleadings, as required under Federal Rule of Civil18Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 18 of 23
Procedure (the “Rules”) 11, and warns Plaintiff that any futurefilings containing errant or fabricated citations may result insanctions, including orders to pay an opposing party’s reasonableattorney’s fees. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c).Rule 11(b) provides, in relevant part, that:By representing to the court a pleading, written motion,or other paper . . . [an] unrepresented party certifiesthat to the best of the persons’s knowledge, information,and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under thecircumstances . . . the claims, defenses, and other legalcontentions are warranted by existing law or by anonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, orreversing existing law or for establishing new law.Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) (emphasis added).“Rule 11 applies to pro se parties as well as partiesrepresented by counsel.” Walker v. Tillerson, No. 1:17cv732, 2018WL 1187599, at *9 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 7, 2018), aff’d sub nom. Walker v.Pompeo, 735 F. App’x 69 (4th Cir. 2018). “All litigants, pro seand practitioners [alike], must ensure that the legal authoritythey cite actually exists and is properly characterized in allfilings.” United States v. Boice, No. 1:20cr167, 2025 WL 2076452,at *4 n.4 (E.D. Va. June 23, 2025). Here, the Complaint alone contains at least 11 citations tocases that either do not exist or do not stand for the legalpropositions that Plaintiff invoked. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 2 at7, 9, 10, 11, 13 (citing Alford v. Motors Ins. Corp., 104 N.C. App.537 (1991), Barber v. Perry, 61 N.C. App. 134, 300 S.E.2d 387(1983), Estate of Harvey v. Kore-Kut, Inc., 364 N.C. 394, 70019Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 19 of 23
S.E.2d 231 (2010), Estate of McCall v. United States, 206 F. Supp.3d 1304 (N.D. Fla. 2016), and Calderon v. GEICO Gen. Ins. Co., No.1:19cv362 (M.D.N.C. Jan. 26, 2021) — none of which exist at thosecitations); id. at 14 (citing “Kusulas v. GEICO” without furtheridentifying information), 15 (citing “In re. COVIDrelated coverage,[as a] 2024 NC Supreme Court decision affirming insurer liabilityfor wrongful denial,” despite a cursory search revealing that theonly potentially relevant North Carolina Supreme Court decisionfrom that year affirmed dismissal of a plaintiff’s insurance-related claims, see Cato Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 386 N.C.667, 676, 909 S.E.2d 144, 151 (2024)). Similarly, Plaintiff’s subsequent filings contain over a dozendubious citations. (See, e.g., Docket Entry 4 at 1, 5, 6, 8(citing Calderon three times and Estate of McCall five times atnon-existent citations); Docket Entry 5 at 3 (citing United Statesv. Harris, No. 1:19cr44, 2021 WL 1089411, at *2 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 22,2021), and Robinson v. Bowser, No. 1:15cv596, 2015 WL 11571094, at*1 (M.D.N.C. Mar. 22, 2021), neither of which exists as cited);Docket Entry 8 at 3 (again citing Harris and Bowser at non-existentcitations); Docket Entry 13 at 2 (citing R.S. v. Board of Dirs. ofWoods Charter Sch. Co., No. 1:16cv119 (M.D.N.C. Apr. 19, 2016), andstating that “[t]his Court granted a pro se plaintiff’s motion toamend to add and correct parties early in litigation” in that case,despite (A) the absence of any docket entry or decision rendered in20Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 20 of 23
R.S. v. Board on the date cited, compare id., Docket Entry 5 (Mar.11, 2016), with id., Docket Entry 6 (May 9, 2016), and (B) theplaintiff in that case proceeding exclusively with counsel, not prose, see id., Docket Entry 2 at 1 (noticing appearance of counsel onaction’s commencement); Docket Entry 26 at 3 (again citing R.S. v.Board for same unfounded proposition).)“The [undersigned] understands that Plaintiff is proceedingpro se, but that does not allow [him] to flaunt the [ R]ules andhaphazardly file pleadings without completing any due diligence.” Lucas v. Scharf, No. 3:25cv1015, 2026 WL 642917, at *2 (W.D.N.C.Feb. 25, 2026); see also id. (“Even a cursory Google search would[have] reveal[ed] that these cases do not exist [as cited].”). More pointedly, Plaintiff’s submissions foreground an issue that“[c]ourts across the country are grappling with,” In re Nwaubani,No. 25-9517, 2026 WL 687194, at *3 (4th Cir. Mar. 11, 2026), inthat citations such as Plaintiff’s to “nonexistent cases . . . arethe frequent posterchild” for “the use of generative [artificialintelligence] in materials submitted to the court,” id.; see alsoKruglyak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 774 F. Supp. 3d 767, 770 (W.D.Va. 2025) (“It has become widely known that [artificialintelligence] platforms sometimes ‘hallucinate,’ meaning theyprovide inaccurate responses. In the legal research context, thesehallucinations can include the generation of fictitious case citesand misrepresentations of case summaries or holdings[.]”). 21Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 21 of 23
At this juncture, the undersigned need not determine “whether[Plaintiff] drafted [the foregoing pleadings] with the assistanceof artificial intelligence or not,” Kideckel v. Foreign Nation ofCan., No. 1:24cv2907, 2026 WL 125208, at *3 (D.D.C. Jan. 16, 2026)(internal quotation marks omitted), appeal filed, 2026 WL 125208(Jan. 23, 2026), and need only advise that Plaintiff’s citations tonon-existent or wholly inapplicable authorities almost certainlycontravene his obligations under Rule 11. See, e.g., Suiter v. Gm- Gen. Motors, LLC, No. 5:24cv54, 2026 WL 701683, at *8 (W.D. Va.Mar. 12, 2026) (“Regardless of whether [the plaintiff] used thesetools, submitting a filing containing fabricated authority . . . isunacceptable and . . . could also constitute a violation of [Rule]11, for which the court may impose sanctions.” (internal quotationmarks omitted)). The undersigned therefore warns Plaintiff thatsubsequent filings containing such blatant fabrications may resultin sanctions.CONCLUSIONThe Complaint fails to state a claim on which relief may begranted, and the Court should decline to exercise supplementaljurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state-law claims. Consistent withthat recommendation, the undersigned has resolved or recommendedresolution of ancillary motions and has warned Plaintiff thatfilings containing citations to inaccurate or non-existentauthorities may subject him to sanctions under Rule 11.22Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 22 of 23
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED (A) that the Application (Docket Entry1) is GRANTED for the sole purpose of entering this Recommendationand (B) that Plaintiff is WARNED that the Court may imposesanctions for future failures to confirm the accuracy of hispleadings and other filings.IT IS FURTHER ORDERED (A) that Plaintiff’s first Motion toAmend Caption and Clarify Defendants (Docket Entry 13) is GRANTEDas to the termination of “Government Employees Insurance Company(GEICO)” and “Geico Insurance Company, LLC” as defendants and (B)that the Inspection Motion (Docket Entry 21), the Motion to Strike(Docket Entry 23), and Plaintiff’s second Motion to Amend Captionand Clarify Defendants (Docket Entry 26) are TERMINATED AS MOOT.IT IS RECOMMENDED (A) that Plaintiff’s lone federal claim bedismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) for failure tostate a claim, as well as that the Court decline to exercisesupplemental jurisdiction over Plaintiff’s state claim(s) under 28U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3), and (B) that the Dismissal Motion (DocketEntry 7) be TERMINATED AS MOOT. This 28th day of April, 2026. /s/ L. Patrick Auld L. Patrick AuldUnited States Magistrate Judge23Case 1:25-cv-00712-DAB-LPA Document 32 Filed 04/28/26 Page 23 of 23
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access