such a point as to transcend it, for we have not such a casé before us. The acts must be judged by their contents not by the allegations as to their purpose in the complaint. We know of no objection to exacting a discouraging rate as the alternative to giving up a business, when the legislature has the full power of taxation. The case is different from those where the power to tax is limited to inspection fees and the like, as in
Postal Telegraph-Cable Co. v. Taylor, 192 U. S. 64, 72.
. But it is said that however it may be with regard to the Constitution taken by itself, the statutes brought into question are contrary to the act of Congress' from which the local legislature derives its power. In the first place they are said to be an attempt to modify or repeal the fish laws of the United States. The Act of Congress of June 6, 1900, c. 785, § 29, 31 Stat. 321, 331, Alaska Compiled Laws, § 2569; imposes a tax on fish oil works of ten cents per barrel and on fertilizer works of twenty cents per ton, repeated in slightly different words by the Act of June 26, 1906, c. 3547, 34 Stat. 478; Alaska Compiled Laws, § 259. But these are not fish laws as we understand the phrase. It is argued, however, that at least they import a license, License Tax Cases, 5 Wall. 462, 470, and that a tax alleged to be prohibitory flies in their teeth. It would be going far to say that a tax on fish oil works in general terms imported a license to a specific kind of works deemed undesirable by the local powers, and when we take into account the express and unlimited authority to impose additional taxes and licenses we are satisfied that the objection should not prevail. We confine our decision to the statutes before us, repeating in this connection that they must be judged by' their contents not by the characterization of them in the complaint.
The requirement of uniformity in § 9 is disposed of by what we have said of the classification when considered with reference to the Constitution. The legislature was