Allen v. Action, No. 3:24-CV-2846-D (N.D. Tex. 2025)

Case details
Full caption
SAMUEL LOMBEH ALLEN v. Civil Action
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Northern District of Texas
Decided
2025
Disposition
Motion Granted in Part
Majority
Sidney A. Fitzwater (J.) (unanimous Court)
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURTFOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXASDALLAS DIVISIONSAMUEL LOMBEH ALLEN, § §Plaintiff, § § VS. § Civil Action No. 3:24-CV-2846-D §AMAZON, § §Defendant. §MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER In response to defendant Amazon’s subpoenas served on three non-parties, pro seplaintiff Samuel Lombeh Allen (“Allen”) has filed a “Motion to Compel DiscoveryResponses and to Require Defendant to Withdraw Boilerplate Objections” and a “Motion toModify Subpoenas and for Protective Order (Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 45(d)(3) and 26(c)).” Forthe reasons that follow, the court denies the motion to compel, and grants in part and deniesit part the motion to modify subpoenas and for a protective order.IThe relevant background facts of this case are largely set out in a prior memorandumopinion and order and need not be repeated at length for purposes of deciding these motions. See Allen v. Amazon, 2025 WL 3059629, at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 3, 2025) (Fitzwater, J.).Allen served discovery requests on Amazon. According to Allen, Amazon respondedto the requests with improper and unsupported objections. Allen then filed a motion tocompel discovery responses and to require Amazon to withdraw its boilerplate objections.Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 1 of 17 PageID 1078
In October 2025 Amazon notified Allen of its intention to serve three identicallyworded subpoenas on non-parties Medical City Dallas (“Medical City”), Parkland Health &Hospital System (“Parkland”), and Concentra Urgent Care (“Concentra”). The subpoenasrequired these three medical facilities to produce “any and all medical records” related toAllen from January 1, 2015 to the present. D. App. (ECF No. 65-3) 34, 38, 42. In response,Allen filed a motion to modify subpoenas and for protective order. Amazon opposes the motions, which the court is deciding on the briefs, without oralargument. IIThe court begins by addressing Amazon’s contention that Allen’s motions should bestricken because of their failure to comply with the court’s local civil rules.AAmazon maintains that, before Allen filed his motion to modify the subpoenas andfor a protective order, he failed to satisfy the conference requirements of N.D. Tex. Civ. R.7.1. In his motion, Allen represented that he “attempted in good faith to confer withDefendant’s counsel . . . on 25, OF October, 2025 but no agreement was reached.” P. Br.(ECF No. 58) 2. Amazon disputes Allen’s representation of what occurred. It contends that,on October 27, 2025, Allen sent a letter to Amazon’s counsel after business hours to “initiatea good-faith meet-and-confer regarding [Amazon]’s recently served subpoenas” and thenrequested a response within two days. D. Resp. (ECF No. 64) 3 (alteration in original). Before the two-day deadline expired, Allen filed the motion to modify the subpoenas and for- 2 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 2 of 17 PageID 1079
a protective order.Allen failed to comply both with a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure and with one ofthis court’s local civil rules: he did not confer in “good faith,” see Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(c)(1),and did not fully explain why it was not possible to confer, see N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7.1(b)(3)(“If a conference was not held, the certificate must explain why it was not possible toconfer[.]”). Nevertheless, “[a] failure to satisfy conference requirements does not . . .mandate summary denial of [a motion,] because the Court retains discretion to waive strictcompliance with the conference requirements and to consider the motion[] on [its] merits.” Brown v. Bridges, 2015 WL 11121361, at *5 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 30, 2015) (Solis, C.J.) (citationand internal quotation marks omitted), modified in part, 2015 WL 12532137 (N.D. Tex. June22, 2015). The court in its discretion can excuse a failure to confer when “it is clear that themotion is opposed and that a conference would neither have eliminated nor narrowed theparties’ dispute.” Obregon v. Melton, 2002 WL 1792086, at *1 n.3 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 2, 2002)(Fitzwater, J.).Here, although Allen’s certificate of conference violates both a Federal Rule of CivilProcedure and one of this court’s local civil rules, it is clear that the motion is opposed. Theissue in dispute—whether the information sought in three identically worded subpoenas isrelevant—is also already sufficiently narrow despite the absence of the required conference. Accordingly, the court will not deny Allen’s motion based solely on his failure to complywith Rule 26(c)(1) and local civil rule 7.1. See State Auto. Mut. Ins. Co. v. Freehold Mgmt.,Inc., 2018 WL 10391736, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Dec. 17, 2018) (Rutherford, J.) (declining to deny- 3 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 3 of 17 PageID 1080
motion to quash and for protective order based on failure to comply with Rule 26(c)(1) andlocal civil rule 7.1).Although the court has decided not to deny Allen’s motion to modify the subpoenasand for a protective order based on his failure to abide by these national and local rules, thecourt emphasizes that the “[f]ailure to comply with a local civil rule of this court is to becarefully avoided and should not be repeated.” Obregon, 2002 WL 1792086, at *1 n.3. Indeed, a magistrate judge of this court has cautioned that “future noncompliance with thecertificate of conference requirement may result in the Court striking the offending motionfrom the docket.” Monitronics Int’l, Inc. v. Skyline Sec. Mgmt., Inc., 2017 WL 7520612, at*1 n.1 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 30, 2017) (Toliver, J.). The same is true for a failure to comply witha Federal Rule of Civil Procedure.BAmazon also maintains that the court should strike Allen’s motion to compel becauseof his failure to disclose his use of artificial intelligence (“AI”). N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7.2(f)(1)requires that “[a] brief prepared using generative [AI] must disclose this fact on the firstpage[.]” Allen does not dispute that he used AI or that he failed to make the requireddisclosure. According to Amazon, Allen’s use of AI has resulted in his citing non-existentcases and procedures and providing hallucinated quotations. The court declines at this time to sanction Allen for his undisclosed use of AI. Allenis proceeding pro se, and the court has not previously warned him of the consequences offailing to comply with the court’s local civil rules. While such a warning is not necessarily- 4 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 4 of 17 PageID 1081
required in this or any other case involving a pro se party, the court deems it best toadmonish Allen before imposing sanctions that could be quite severe. Accordingly, the courtwarns Allen that, going forward, his failure to comply with N.D. Tex. Civ. R. 7.2(f) “mayresult in the imposition of sanctions, including the striking of filings, the imposition of filingrestrictions, monetary penalties, or dismissal of this action.” Jayroe v. Progressive Cas. Ins.,2025 WL 3144976, at *3 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 27, 2025) (Toliver, J.), rec. adopted, 2025 WL3143269 (N.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2025) (Fish, J.). IIIThe court now turns to Allen’s motion to modify the subpoenas that Amazon servedon Medical City, Parkland, and Concentra.AThe court must initially decide whether Allen has standing to challenge the subpoenas. “A party’s standing to quash subpoenas served on non-parties pursuant to Rule 45 is limited.” MC Trilogy Tex., LLC v. City of Heath, Tex., 2023 WL 5918925, at *9 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 11,2023) (Fitzwater, J.). To have standing, “[t]he movant must ‘be in possession or control ofthe requested material; be the person to whom the subpoena is issued; or have a personalright or privilege in the subject matter of the subpoena.’” Id. (quoting Brown v. Braddick,595 F.2d 961, 967 (5th Cir. 1979)). The movant may establish a “personal right” tosubpoenaed materials requested from a non-party in limited circumstances, such as when “thesubpoena seeks confidential or protected information sensitive to the movant.” KeybankNat’l Ass’n v. Perkins Rowe Assocs., LLC, 2011 WL 90108, at *2 (M.D. La. Jan. 11, 2011)- 5 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 5 of 17 PageID 1082
(collecting cases). “A party challenging a subpoena issued to a non-party may not object onthe grounds that it ‘violates another person’s privacy rights . . . that the subpoena is overlybroad, or that the subpoena seeks information that is irrelevant[,] because only the respondingthird party can object and seek to quash a Rule 45 subpoena on those grounds.’” Deitz v.Performance Food Grp., Inc., 2021 WL 2715974, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2021) (quotingRiver House Partners, LLC v. Grandbridge Real Est. Cap. LLC, 2016 WL 3747613, at *3(M.D. La. July 11, 2016)).The court holds that Allen has standing to challenge the subpoenas served on MedicalCity, Parkland, and Concentra. Allen’s contention that the subpoenas are overbroad anddisproportionate is, alone, insufficient to provide him standing. See, e.g., Donaldson v.Crisp, 2023 WL 6201372, at *5 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 21, 2023) (collecting cases) (“[A] partycannot challenge a subpoena issued to a non-party on the basis that it is overbroad, irrelevant,or unduly burdensome.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). But the subpoenasseek Allen’s medical records. The sensitive information contained in his medical recordsconfers Allen with standing. See Ruiz v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2024 WL 2982042, at *4(N.D. Tex. June 13, 2024) (Fitzwater, J.) (holding that plaintiff had standing to challengenon-party subpoena targeting her medical records); Giarratano v. Huntington Ingalls Inc.,2022 WL 16552816, at *4 (E.D. La. Oct. 31, 2022) (“Plaintiff has standing to seek the reliefrequested in this case under Rule 45 because she has a personal interest in her medicalrecords.”). - 6 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 6 of 17 PageID 1083
BHaving concluded that Allen has standing to challenge the subpoenas, the court nowaddresses the merits of his request to modify the subpoenas.11Rule 26(b)(1) provides that a party may obtain discovery of “any nonprivileged matterthat is relevant to any party’s claim or defense and proportional to the needs of the case.” Rule 26(b)(1). “Relevancy is broadly construed, and a request for discovery should beconsidered relevant if there is ‘any possibility’ that the information sought may be relevantto the claim or defense of any party.” Merrill v. Waffle House, Inc., 227 F.R.D. 467, 470(N.D. Tex. 2005) (Ramirez, J.) (quoting Sheldon v. Vermonty, 204 F.R.D. 679, 689 (D. Kan.2001)).Rule 45 governs subpoenas to obtain discovery from non-parties. The party issuingthe subpoena “must take reasonable steps to avoid imposing undue burden or expense on aperson subject to the subpoena.” Rule 45(d)(1). Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iv) requires that, on timelymotion, the court must quash or modify a subpoena if it “subjects a person to undue burden.” 1Allen’s motion is in part styled as a “Motion to Modify Subpoenas,” and the relevantsection of his brief is entitled “The Subpoenas Should Be Modified Under Rule 45(d)(3)(A).” P. Br. (ECF No. 58) 1. At times, however, he requests that the court modify or quash thesubpoenas. As discussed below, the court agrees with Allen that the wording of thesubpoenas is overbroad. But at least some of the subpoenaed information is likely relevant,and Allen, as the movant, has not demonstrated that production of that information willunduly burden him or the three medical facilities. The court therefore declines to quash thesubpoenas in toto. See Ruiz, 2024 WL 2982042, at *5 (applying similar reasoning to denymotion to quash); Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol. Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004)(“Generally, modification of a subpoena is preferable to quashing it outright.”)- 7 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 7 of 17 PageID 1084
Rule 45(d)(3)(A)(iv). The movant has the burden of proof, see Wiwa v. Royal Dutch Petrol.Co., 392 F.3d 812, 818 (5th Cir. 2004) (citing Williams v. City of Dallas, 178 F.R.D. 103,109 (N.D. Tex. 1998) (Fitzwater, J.)), and must meet “the heavy burden of establishing thatcompliance with the subpoena would be ‘unreasonable and oppressive.’” Williams, 178F.R.D. at 109 (citation omitted).“Whether a burdensome subpoena is reasonable must be determined according to thefacts of the case[.]” Linder v. Dep’t of Def., 133 F.3d 17, 24 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (citation andinternal quotation marks omitted). Among the factors that the court may consider indetermining whether there is an undue burden are “(1) relevance of the informationrequested; (2) the need of the party for the documents; (3) the breadth of the documentrequest; (4) the time period covered by the request; (5) the particularity with which the partydescribes the requested documents; and (6) the burden imposed.” Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818(citing Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 109). The status of a witness as a non-party entitles thewitness to consideration regarding expense and inconvenience. See Rule 45(d)(2)(B)(ii).Undue burden can be found when a subpoena duces tecum is facially overbroad. See, e.g.,Wiwa, 392 F.3d at 818.2The subpoenas request ANY AND ALL MEDICAL RECORDS (EXCLUDINGBILLING RECORDS), FROM 1/1/2015 TO PRESENT,INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO RECORDSREGARDING THE PATIENT’S CONDITIONS ANDTREATMENTS, DOCTOR’S NOTES, EVALUATIONS,- 8 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 8 of 17 PageID 1085
OFFICE NOTES, PROGRESS NOTES, CORRESPONDENCEWITH OTHER PHYSICIANS, THERAPISTS, HOSPITALSAND/OR HEALTHCARE PROVIDERS, PHYSICALTHERAPY RECORDS, LAB REPORTS, PATHOLOGYREPORTS, RADIOLOGY REPORTS, ALL OTHERDIAGNOSTIC REPORTS, PRESCRIPTIONS, REFERRALSTO OTHER HEALTH CARE PROVIDERS, CLAIMS,WORKER'S COMPENSATION RECORDS, HOSPITALRECORDS, THERAPISTS’ RECORDS, PATIENTINFORMATION FORMS, PATIENT INSURANCE FORMS,INTAKE FORMS, HANDWRITTEN NOTES, LETTERS OFPROTECTION, TELEPHONE MESSAGES, NURSES’NOTES, EVERY SUCH RECORD . . . PERTAINING TO;SAMUEL LOMBEH[.]D. App. (ECF No. 65-3) 34, 38, 42. Allen contends that the subpoenas are deficient in twoways. He maintains, first, that the subpoenas cover irrelevant subject matter.2 Allen posits,for example, that the subpoenas elicit information about his reproductive health and HIVtesting. He asserts, second, that the subpoenas’ ten-year scope is too broad because itextends beyond the period he was employed with Amazon. Amazon responds that, because Allen’s claims involve his visual disability, right leginjury, physical pain and suffering, and mental anguish and emotional distress, it is entitledto discover information about his history of physical impairments, mental or emotionalissues, disabilities, alternative stressors, and medical reasons restricting him from workbesides those alleged. And, Amazon explains, the subpoenas as phrased are reasonably2He also maintains that the subpoenas reach information protected by the HealthInsurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 and his privacy rights. But “theprivilege protecting medical records from discovery is waived when the party places [his]medical condition at issue.” Hardy v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys., 2025 WL 416106, at *5(E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2025) (collecting cases). - 9 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 9 of 17 PageID 1086
tailored to discover that information.3Amazon’s subpoenas are not limited in the information they seek about Allen’smedical history. Subpoenas that require production of documents that are not actually relatedto a claim or defense are looked upon with disfavor and, where feasible, are narrowed toexclude information that exceeds Rule 26(b)(1)’s scope. See, e.g., MC Trilogy Tex., 2023WL 5918925, at *8 (declining to enforce third-party subpoena requiring production of “all”communications during time-bound period); Williams, 178 F.R.D. at 110 (narrowingthird-party subpoena requiring production of “any and all” documents); Ruiz, 2024 WL2982042, at *1, 5 (narrowing third-party subpoena requiring production of “all medicalrecords” related to plaintiff). Given the nature of Allen’s claims, Amazon may subpoenainformation related to his visual disability, his right leg injury and any resultingcomplications and similar previous injuries, and his mental or emotional condition. SeeBarnett v. Stafford Transp. of La., 2020 WL 10314640, at *3 (E.D. Tex. Sept. 10, 2020)(“When a plaintiff places his medical condition at issue, a defendant may discover medicalinformation related to that condition”); Merrill, 227 F.R.D. at 473 (“[S]everal courts havefound that medical records are relevant to claims of mental anguish in discriminationcases.”); Parker v. Bill Melton Trucking, Inc., 2017 WL 6520779, at *4 (N.D. Tex. Feb. 2,2017) (Toliver, J.) (permitting subpoena to cover medical records concerning past, similarinjuries). But Amazon’s subpoenas require that the three medical facilities produce “any andall medical records.” D. App. (ECF No. 65-3) 34, 38, 42. Similar to the phrase “including- 10 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 10 of 17 PageID 1087
but not limited to,” id., this requirement, in the context of this case, is overbroad in itsexpansion of the scope of the subpoenas. See Moncevais v. Herrick, 2023 WL 4666612, at*2 (S.D. Tex. July 20, 2023) (subpoenas were facially overbroad where “including, but notlimited to” preceded list of particular documents). Consequently, these subpoenas—whichrequire the production of “any and all medical records”—“likely encompass many[documents] having absolutely nothing to do with” the issues in this case. See Crescent CityRemodeling, LLC v. CMR Constr. & Roofing, LLC, 643 F.Supp.3d 613, 620 (E.D. La. 2022). The ten-year scope of the subpoenas, however, is permissible. Allen requests that thecourt modify the subpoenas to cover only the period of his employment with Amazonthrough one-year after his termination. The court concludes, however, that medical recordsfrom before this period may be relevant to his disability and whether he suffered from anypre-existing physical or emotional conditions that may have been the cause of his allegedinjuries. See, e.g., Cummins v. Lollar, 2015 WL 12731746, at *2 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 5, 2015)(Cureton, J.) (explaining that access to plaintiff’s past medical records allows defendant to“sufficiently evaluate[] . . . [t]he issue of any preexisting causes to Plaintiff’s health issues”); EEOC v. Eastbox LLC, 2025 WL 41915, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Jan. 7, 2025) (similar). Moreover,courts in the Fifth Circuit have permitted subpoenas with similar ten-year scopes. See, e.g.,Barnett, 2020 WL 10314640, at *3 (allowing discovery of ten years of medical recordswhere plaintiff sought damages for “mental anguish, physical pain and suffering, disability,loss of enjoyment of life, and physical impairment”); Hardy v. Scandinavian Airlines Sys.,2025 WL 416106, at *10 (E.D. La. Feb. 6, 2025) (modifying scope of subpoena to- 11 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 11 of 17 PageID 1088
encompass ten years of medical records). Accordingly, the court denies Allen’s request tomodify the temporal scope of the subpoenas.34Accordingly, the court modifies the subpoenas to limit their subject matter scope. Medical City, Parkland, and Concentra may be subpoenaed to produce medical recordsrelated to Allen’s visual disability, his right leg injury and any resulting complications andsimilar previous injuries, and his mental or emotional condition. So modified, the subpoenaswill neither be overly broad nor intrusive. Amazon is ordered to serve new subpoenas on Medical City, Parkland, and Concentrathat are narrowed in compliance with this memorandum opinion and order, or to servenotices on Medical City, Parkland, and Concentra that, by court order, the subpoenas havebeen narrowed in accordance with this memorandum opinion and order. IVThe court next considers Allen’s request for a protective order. AThis court “has broad discretion in determining whether to grant a motion for aprotective order.” McKinney/Pearl Rest. Partners, L.P. v. Metro. Life Ins. Co., 322 F.R.D.235, 242 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (Horan, J.) (citing Harris v. Amoco Prod. Co., 768 F.2d 669, 6843In reply, Allen suggests that changing the start date of the subpoenas to 2019 wouldbe an appropriate modification. But Allen, as the movant, has not adequately “explained thesignificance of [this] cutoff date” that he proposes for the first time in his reply brief. SeeStogner v. Sturdivant, 2011 WL 4435254, at *6 (M.D. La. Sept. 22, 2011). - 12 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 12 of 17 PageID 1089
(5th Cir. 1985)). Under Rule 26(c)(1), the court “may, for good cause, issue an order toprotect a party or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden orexpense[.]” Rule 26(c)(1). The burden is on the moving party “to show the necessity of itsissuance, which contemplates a particular and specific demonstration of fact as distinguishedfrom stereotyped and conclusory statements.” In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d 302, 306 (5thCir. 1998) (per curiam) (quoting United States v. Garrett, 571 F.2d 1323, 1326 n.3 (5th Cir.1978)). “If a party maintains that a protective order is necessary to protect it from undueburden or expense, it ‘must show how the requested discovery is overly broad, undulyburdensome, or oppressive by submitting affidavits or offering evidence revealing the natureof the burden.’” Samurai Glob., LLC v. Landmark Am. Ins. Co., 2023 WL 2190190, at *3(N.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2023) (Fitzwater, J.) (quoting Samsung Elecs. Am. Inc. v. Yang Kun“Michael” Chung, 325 F.R.D. 578, 590 (N.D. Tex. 2017) (Horan, J.)).BAllen maintains that, because the records contain highly sensitive health information,the court should (1) limit the scope of the medical records that the three medical facilities arepermitted to produce to records related only to the medical conditions alleged in Allen’scomplaint, and (2) enter a protective order that requires that the produced records be keptconfidential and used solely for this litigation.CThe court need not address Allen’s motion for a protective order that limits the subjectmatter scope of the records that the medical facilities are permitted to produce to the extent- 13 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 13 of 17 PageID 1090
it is mooted by the court’s decision above to modify the scope of subpoenas. See, e.g., In reVenequip, S.A., 2022 WL 834780, at *1 n.1 (E.D. La. Mar. 21, 2022) (denying motion forprotective order as moot where court granted motion to quash subpoena); Alston v. PrarieFarms Dairy, Inc., 2017 WL 4274858, at *1 (N.D. Miss. Sept. 26, 2017) (same); EEOC v.New Hanover Reg’l Med. Ctr., 2010 WL 4668957, at *1 (E.D.N.C. Nov. 9, 2010) (“Becausethe same issue is presented in both the motion to quash and the motion for protective order,the Court will address the merits through the motion for protective order and deny the motionto quash as moot.”). The court also denies Allen’s request for a protective order designating his medicalrecords as confidential. As an initial matter, it is not evident that Allen’s concerns that therecords contain highly sensitive health information (e.g., HIV testing) remain given thecourt’s decision to narrow the subject matter scope of the subpoenas. And regardless,Allen’s thinly-supported assertion that, because the records contain highly sensitive healthinformation he is entitled to a protective order, is insufficient. See McCallum v. CampingWorld, Inc., 2020 WL 4558310, at *1 (W.D. Tex. Feb. 12, 2020) (“Although the Courtrecognizes that Plaintiff’s medical records may contain ‘private’ information, that alone doesnot necessarily mean the proposed protective order is appropriate[.]” (footnote omitted)). This assertion does not involve a “particular and specific demonstration of fact” necessaryto satisfy Allen’s burden under Rule 26(c). In re Terra Int’l, Inc., 134 F.3d at 306; seeRummans v. HSBC Bank USA, Nat’l Ass’n, 2024 WL 3635522, at *2 (N.D. Tex. May 28,2024) (Rutherford, J.) (“[C]onclusory statements fall far short of the specific demonstration- 14 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 14 of 17 PageID 1091
of fact required to obtain a protective order.”). Accordingly, the court denies Allen’s request for a protective order, in part on themerits and in part as moot.VThe court now considers Allen’s motion to compel discovery responses and requireAmazon to withdraw its boilerplate objections.A party’s motion to compel must meet certain threshold requirements under Rule37(a) in that it mustattach a copy of the discovery requests at issue . . . and of theresisting party’s responses and objections to those requests;must specifically and individually identify each discoveryrequest in dispute and specifically, as to each request, identifythe nature and basis of the dispute, including, for example,explaining . . . how a response or answer is deficient orincomplete, and ask the Court for specific relief as to eachrequest; and must include a concise discussion of the facts andauthority that support the motion as to each discovery request indispute.See Woolery v. Doty, 2023 WL 416556, at *1 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 25, 2023) (Fitzwater, J.)(quoting Yang Kun “Michael” Chung, 325 F.R.D. at 594). Allen maintains that Amazon has responded with improper and boilerplate objectionsto his discovery requests. By and large, however, he does not adequately identify thediscovery requests in dispute. See id. at *1 (denying motion to compel where plaintiff didnot identify discovery requests that were at issue). There are only two sets of discovery requests that Allen identifies with specificity. - 15 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 15 of 17 PageID 1092
He maintains that, in response to interrogatories 1, 3, and 5, Amazon referred him to aDisability and Leave Services (“DLS”) file.4 Allen maintains that Rule 33 requires thatAmazon “identify by Bates range or file name the documents containing each interrogatory’sresponsive information.” P. Br. (ECF No. 51) 6. Yet to support this assertion, Allen citesa case that does not discuss Rule 33. Moreover, he does not indicate that he is unable tolocate or identify the information he seeks in the DLS file that Amazon produced duringdiscovery. See Rule 33(d). Next, Allen identifies requests for production 7 through 17, inresponse to which Amazon allegedly produced an Owner’s Manual.5 He maintains that anOwner’s Manual that does not indicate “which sections correspond to which request fails[Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i)].” Id. at 7. This contention is also unavailing. Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i)requires that “[a] party must produce documents as they are kept in the usual course ofbusiness or must organize and label them to correspond to the categories in the request.” Rule 34(b)(2)(E)(i) (emphasis added). Allen does not explain how the Owner’s Manualqualifies as a document that must be organized and labeled. Because Allen has notdemonstrated how Amazon has responded insufficiently to his discovery requests, his motionto compel is denied. See Obinyan v. Prime Therapeutics LLC, 2021 WL 135983, at *2 (N.D.Tex. Jan. 14, 2021) (Fitzwater, J.) (denying motion to compel where plaintiff failed tocontend that responding party did not respond or insufficiently responded to discovery4It appears that Amazon only referred Allen to the DLS file in response tointerrogatory number 1.5Amazon maintains that only its responses to requests for production 7, 14, 15, and16 involve an Owner’s Manual.- 16 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 16 of 17 PageID 1093
requests).6 * * *For the reasons explained, the court denies Allen’s motion to compel, and grants inpart and denies in part Allen’s motion to modify subpoenas and for a protective order.SO ORDERED.December 23, 2025._________________________________SIDNEY A. FITZWATERSENIOR JUDGE6Allen’s remaining arguments are without merit. For example, he requests thatAmazon produce a privilege log, yet Amazon is not withholding documents on the basis ofprivilege. He also references a non-existent standing order about electronic discovery.- 17 -Case 3:24-cv-02846-D Document 76 Filed 12/23/25 Page 17 of 17 PageID 1094
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