Ammann v. Markel Ins. Co., No. 1:25-cv-1465 (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Ammann v. Markel Insurance Company
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
MICHAEL AMMANN, Plaintiff, v. MARKEL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 2122928Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, N.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.MICHAEL AMMANN, Plaintiff,v.MARKEL INSURANCECOMPANY, Defendant.Case No. 1:25-cv-1465|07/16/2026Editor's Note: This document contains discussion ofunverified citations, likely generated by AI tools used by aparty or counsel. These citations are not attributable to theCourt. The unverified citations have been preserved as part ofthe official record, but links are unavailable.Attorneys and Law FirmsMichael Ammann, Leander, TX, Pro Se.Brian Douglas Sullivan, Julie M. G. VanVliet, Reminger Co.,Cleveland, OH, for Defendant Markel Insurance Company.J. Philip Calabrese, United States District JudgeOPINION AND ORDER*1 Plaintiff Michael Ammann, proceeding without a lawyer,brings this action to enforce an arbitration award and finalState court judgment in favor of non-party Prop4 LLC, ofwhich he is a member. Mr. Ammann does so followingProp4's assignment of its interest in the judgment to himself.Defendant moves for judgment on the pleadings. For thefollowing reasons, the Court GRANTS that motion.FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDTaking the facts alleged in the complaint as true andconstruing them in Plaintiffs’ favor, as the Court must inthe current procedural posture, the complaint alleges thefollowing facts.Defendant Markel Insurance Company issued a commercialgeneral liability insurance policy to non-party Step AboveConstruction LLC, which was effective from March 15, 2024to March 15, 2025. (ECF No. 1, 5, PageID #2; see ECFNo. 1-2; ECF No. 14, PageID #80–142.) During the coverageterm, Step Above Construction performed negligent andincomplete construction work for non-party Prop4, LLC. (Id., 7.) The issue of the negligent and incomplete constructionwent to arbitration. (Id., 8.) On January 21, 2025, thearbitrator found in favor of Prop4 and awarded damagessolely for negligence. (Id.) On June 11, 2025, the CuyahogaCounty Court of Common Pleas entered final judgment infavor of Prop4 and against Step Above Construction andAnthony Layton. (Id., 9, PageID #2; ECF No. 1-1, PageID#5–7.)Following the entry of final judgment, Prop4 assigned itsinterest in the judgement to Plaintiff Michael Ammann.(Id., PageID #1, ECF No. 16-1.) The assignment bearsa single signature, that of Mr. Ammann as a member ofProp4, and recites that Prop4 received unspecified “good andvaluable consideration” in exchange. (ECF No. 16-1, PageID#165.) Following the assignment, Mr. Ammann submittedthe judgment and related material to Markel Insurance andrequested payment three separate times. (Id., 11.) MarkelInsurance denied payment each time. (Id., 12.) Instead,Markel Insurance requested post-judgment discovery andrelated litigation documents. (Id.)Now, Plaintiff brings this action asserting three causesof action against Defendant Markel Insurance Company:(1) bad faith denial of coverage; (2) declaratory relief;and (3) breach of contract. (Id. ¶¶ 13–24, PageID #2–3.)Specifically, Plaintiff alleges that Markel Insurance failed toconduct a good faith investigation into coverage and refusedto indemnify Step Above Construction and pay the finaljudgment. (Id., 13, PageID #2.)In response, Defendant Markel Insurance moves to amendits answer (ECF No. 14) and for judgment on the pleadings.(ECF No. 15.) In doing so, Defendant argues that Plaintiffdoes not have standing to assert his claims. (ECF No.15, PageID #148–51.) Specifically, Defendant argues thatPlaintiff cannot bring a direct action against it because Prop4,not Plaintiff, was involved in the underlying dispute andarbitration giving rise to this case. (ECF No. 15, PageID#148–49.) Also, Defendant argues that Plaintiff cannotproceed pro se in attempting to pursue a claim on behalf of alimited liability company, namely Prop4. (Id., PageID #149–
MICHAEL AMMANN, Plaintiff, v. MARKEL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.251.) Defendant argues that Plaintiff's inability to representProp4 pro se suffices to dismiss this case in its entirety. (ECFNo. 18, PageID #170.) Plaintiff claims standing based on theassignment to him of the rights in the judgment. (ECF No. 16,PageID #159.)JURISDICTION*2 Because federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction,the Court has an independent obligation to ensure that itpossesses jurisdiction before proceeding. See, e.g., Nikolaov. Lyon, 875 F.3d 310, 315 (6th Cir. 2017) (citations andquotations omitted). Accordingly, the Court begins withthe jurisdictional question whether Plaintiff has standing topursue his claims.I. Ability to Proceed Pro SeSection 1654 governs appearances before a federal court,which allows an individual to “plead and conduct their owncases personally.” 28 U.S.C. § 1654. While the statute allowsindividuals to represent themselves in federal court, it doesnot allow an individual to proceed on behalf of a corporation.Doherty v. American Motors Corp., 728 F.3d 334, 340 (6thCir. 1984). Indeed, it is well established that a corporationmay appear in federal court only through licensed counsel andmay not proceed pro se through an officer, director, member,or other nonlawyer representative, because a corporationis a distinct legal entity that lacks the capacity for self-representation. United States v. 9.19 Acres of Land, More orLess, in Marquette Cnty., Mich., 416 F.2d 1244, 1245 (6thCir. 1969) (holding that licensed counsel must represent acorporation under 28 U.S.C. § 1654.)Additionally, the Sixth Circuit has consistently interpretedfederal procedures as prohibiting a pro se litigant fromasserting the rights of others. Olagues v. Timken, 908 F.3d200, 203 (6th Cir. 2018). Courts recognize that a failureto comply with this requirement creates a lack of standing.Prakash v. Altadis U.S.A. Inc., No. 5:10-cv-0033, 2012 WL1109918, at *7 (N.D. Ohio Mar. 30, 2012) (dismissing claimsbelonging to a corporation because the pro se plaintiff couldnot assert them on behalf of the entity); Mercu-Ray Indus.,Inc. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 392 F. Supp. 16, 18 (S.D.N.Y.1974), aff'd 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir. 1974).As a pro se litigant, Mr. Ammann cannot proceed on behalf ofProp4. To circumvent this requirement, Plaintiff argues thathe has standing because Prop4 assigned to him the rights inthe judgment. (ECF No. 16, PageID #159.) In other words,Plaintiff argues that he represents himself, not Prop4, becausethe assignment made the claims his personal property andvests the claims in him individually. (Id., PageID #160.)Therefore, the Court analyzes whether the assignment ofrights embodied in the judgment cures the jurisdictional barfor Plaintiff to bring the complaint without counsel.II. Assignment of the JudgmentAn assignment cannot be used to circumvent federalprocedural requirements, including that a corporation mustbe represented by counsel. Bischoff v. Waldorf, 660 F. Supp.2d 815, 820 (E.D. Mich. 2009) (collecting cases that restrictthe use of an assignment to evade the restriction on pro serepresentation of a corporation); Palazzo v. Gulf Oil Corp.,764 F.2d 1381, 1385–386 (11th Cir. 1985); Jones v. NiagaraFrontier Transp. Auth., 722 F.2d 20, 23 (2d Cir. 1983); Mercu-Ray Indus., 392 F. Supp. at 18, aff'd 508 F.2d 837 (2d Cir.1974).Plaintiff attempts to do just that. He asserts that he canbring the claims solely on his own behalf because Prop4assigned its interest in the State court judgment to him.But this assignment, even if valid, cannot obviate the well-established rule that a corporation must be represented bycounsel. See Bischoff, 660 F. Supp. 2d at 821 (holding that avalid assignment cannot allow an assignee of a corporationto appear pro se). But the Court has grave doubts about thevalidity of the assignment. After all, on its face, it bears asingle signature—that of Mr. Ammann purportedly on behalfof Prop4—and lacks any indicia of consideration for theassignment (other than a self-serving, conclusory recital).(ECF No. 16-1.) Allowing Plaintiff to appear pro se in anattempt to collect a judgment in favor of Prop4—not him—would authorize him to evade the prohibition against allowinga corporation (or a limited liability company in this case) torepresent itself in federal court.*3 A corporation must pursue its own interests throughcounsel. See Ginger v. Cohn, 426 F.2d 1385, 1386 (6th Cir.1970). Accordingly, the Court finds that the assignment doesnot cure the jurisdictional bar for Plaintiff to pursue this actionwithout a lawyer.III. Use of Artificial IntelligenceThe Court addresses one last issue: Mr. Ammann's use ofartificial intelligence in briefing submitted to the Court. In
MICHAEL AMMANN, Plaintiff, v. MARKEL INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant., Slip Copy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3opposing Defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings,Plaintiff included the following sentence and citation: “Badfaith claims are assignable under Ohio law. Pilch v. Dept.of Human Servs., 66 Ohio St.3d 201, 204, 611 N.E.2d 298(1993) (tort claims assignable if they survive under R.C.2305.21).” (ECF No. 16, PageID #160.) That citation to theOhio State Reports is for Jamison v. Society National Bank,66 Ohio St. 3d 201, 611 N.E.2d 307 (1993). Nor does itappear at page 298 of the North Eastern Reporter. Jamisondoes not involve the assignment of tort claims. Instead, itholds that a bank may satisfy a loan from a certificate ofdeposit used as collateral where the borrower dies. 66 OhioSt. 3d at paragraphs one, two, and three of the syllabus.It does cite the definition of a negotiable instrument in theOhio Revised Code, which includes “any other writing whichevidences a right to the payment of money and is not itselfa security agreement or lease and is of a type which is inordinary course of business transferred by delivery with anynecessary indorsement or assignment.” Id. at 206. Otherwise,Jamison does not mention assignments. And the Court hasnot located any case— from the Ohio Supreme Court orotherwise—with the caption Pilch v. Department of HumanServices. Defendant did not either. (ECF No. 18, PageID #170& n.3.) Based on its review, it appears that Plaintiff usedartificial intelligence in drafting his opposition because it citesa nonexistent, hallucinated case.Artificial intelligence has the potential to serve as animportant tool to provide access to the courts for thosewho cannot afford counsel. Like all technology tools, itcomes with limitations, risks, and tradeoffs. By now, theproblem of hallucinations in legal filings is well knownand a common occurrence. Anyone who appears in Court,whether represented by counsel or not, is subject to Rule11. Under Rule 11, “by presenting to the court a pleading,written motion, or other paper,” the signatory to that filingmakes certain representations to the Court. Fed. R. Civ. P.11(b)(2). Specifically, an “unrepresented party certifies that tothe best of the person's knowledge, information, and belief,”formed after a reasonable inquiry, his “legal contentions arewarranted by existing law.” Id.It does not appear that Plaintiff has complied with Rule 11.Ordinarily, this behavior would subject him to sanctions.Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(c). Indeed, the Court has not hesitated toimpose sanctions for Rule 11 violations in the past. See, e.g.,Metron Nutraceuticals, LLC v. Cook, 550 F. Supp. 3d 484(N.D. Ohio 2021). And the Court previously warned that itwould sanction any pro se litigant whose reliance on artificialintelligence resulted in the submission of hallucinatedauthorities. See Nixon v. Ken Ganley Ford West, 798 F.Supp. 3d 770, 778 (N.D. Ohio 2025). Ironically, artificialintelligence appears not to have identified this important priorruling even as it created non-existent authority.*4 Before taking the serious step of imposing sanctions,due process generally requires notice and an opportunityto be heard. Because the Court determines that it lacksjurisdiction, the Court exercises its discretion to defer anysuch proceedings and declines to take them up for nowbecause the case is at an end and Mr. Ammann residesin Texas. In doing so, the Court again provides notice toPlaintiff—and to others, lawyer or not, who might make thissame mistake. Relying on artificial intelligence, generativeor otherwise, or citing authorities that do not, in fact, existsubjects a person to sanctions under Rule 11.CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, the Court GRANTS Defendant'smotion for judgment on the pleadings (ECF No. 15). Becausethe Court dismisses the action, the Court DENIES ASMOOT Defendant's motion for leave to amend its answer(ECF No. 14).SO ORDERED.Dated: July 16, 2026J. Philip Calabrese United States District Judge NorthernDistrict of OhioAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 2122928End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S.Government Works.
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