belonged to the districts from which it was created, and required the new district to as¬ sume and pay the debts and obligations of the old districts. The new district did not include all of the lands of the old districts.
On the 7th of October, 1901, an informa¬ tion was filed in the nature of a quo warran¬ to by the attorney general of the state upon the relation of L. E. Kies, W. E. Alley, J. B. Strong, and Stephen McCleary, charging de¬ fendants in error with usurping, intruding into, and unlawfully claiming to exercise “a false, fictitious, and pretended public office,
169
238-241
Oct. Term,
Supreme Court of
to wit, trustees and officers of the pretended school district known as ‘the public schools of the village of Jerome,’ and ex officio ‘the board of school inspectors of the public schools of the village of Jerome,’ to wit, »at the county of Hillsdale aforesaid, in con¬ tempt of the people of the state of Michigan, and to their great damage and prejudice.”
The circuit court rendered a judgment of ouster against defendants in error. The sifpreme court entered the following judg¬ ment: “The judgment of ouster should be affirmed as to such officers as now hold un¬ der the legislative appointment, if there be any thus holding. As to others, if any, it will be reversed.”
The grounds of attack upon the validity of the act creating the new district in the supreme court of the state were as follows:
First. It deprives this school district or municipality of the right of local self-gov¬ ernment, guaranteed to all municipalities by the Constitution.
Second. The title to the’ act indicates, and the act itself embraces, more than one object.
Third. The act is broader than the title ; the body of the act embraces many objects not covered by the title.
Fourth. The act as passed impairs the obligation of contracts, within the meaning of the Constitution of the United States and the Constitution of the state of Michigan.
T239] With the first- three grounds we have no concern. They present strictly local ques¬ tions. We are concerned with the fourth ground only in so far as it invokes the Con¬ stitution of the United States. The supreme court disposed of this ground as follows: “We have already shown that the obligation of contracts is not impaired. The districts did not hold this property under any con¬ tract with the state, but as a public agency.” In other words, the nonexistence of a con¬ tract was rested on the construction of the Constitution and laws of the sta'-?, and hence defendant in error contends that the decision of the court did not involve a Fed¬ eral question. This, however, overlooks the power and duty of this court to determine for itself the existence or nonexistence of a contract. Other grounds in support of the motion to dismiss are urged which, we think, are also untenable. The motion is therefore denied.
Plaintiff in error broadened in this court his objections to the act, based on the Con¬ stitution of the United States. He urges, besides the contract clause of the Constitu¬ tion, that provision of the 14th Amendment which protects private property from dep¬ rivation without due process of law, and § 4, article 4, which provides: “The United States shall guarantee to every state in 170
the United States.
this Union a republican form of govern¬ ment.” But the grounds all depend ulti¬ mately upon the same arguments. If the legislature of the state has the power to create and alter school districts, and divide and apportion the property of such district, no contract can arise, no property of a dis¬ trict can be said to be taken, and the ac¬ tion of the legislature is compatible with a republican form of government even if it be admitted that § 4, article 4, of the Consti¬ tution, applies to the creation of, or the powers or rights of property of, the subor¬ dinate municipalities of the state. We may omit, therefore, that section and article from further consideration. The decision of the other grounds urged we may rest up¬ on the opinion of the supreme court of the state and the case of Lamarie County v. Albany County, 92 U. S. 307, 23 L. ed. 552.
It is there said in many ways, with citation of “many supporting cases, that the legisla-[2401 ture of the state has absblute power to make and change subordinate municipali¬ ties. The following quotation meets exactly the contentions of plaintiff in error:
“Institutions of the kind, whether called counties or towns, are the auxiliaries of the state in the important business of munici¬ pal rule, and cannot have the least preten¬ sion to sustain their privileges or their ex¬ istence upon anything like a contract be¬ tween them and the legislature of the state, because there is not, and cannot be, any reciprocity of stipulation, and their objects and duties are utterly incompatible with everything of the nature of compact. In¬ stead of that, the constant practice is to divide large counties and towns, and to con¬ solidate small ones, to meet the wishes of the residents, or to promote the public in¬ terests as understood by those who control the action of the legislature. Opposition is sometimes manifested, but it is every¬ where acknowledged that the legislature possesses the power to divide counties and towns at their pleasure, and to apportion the common property and the common bur¬ dens in such manner as to them may seem reasonable and equitable.” Many cases are cited. See also Worcester v. Worcester Consol, street It. Co. 19(3 U. S. 539, 49 L. ed.
591, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 327.
Judgment affirmed.
*TAMPA WATERWORKS COMPANY, [241] Plff. in Err.,
n.
CITY OF TAMPA.
(See S. C. Reporter’s ed. 241-247.)
1. Error to state court— questions re-
199 U. S.
1905.
Tampa Waterworks Co. v. Tampa.
viewable — statutory construction. —
The decision of a state court construing a state statute so as to remove any question of its repugnancy to the Federal Constitution cannot be reviewed by the Supreme Court of the United States on writ of error to the state court.
2. Constitutional law — self-executing^
provisions. — A provision of a state Consti¬ tution giving the legislature full power to cor¬ rect abuses, and prevent unjust discrimi¬ nation and excessive charges, is self-executing to the extent that contracts made after it went into effect are subject to the possibility of the exercise of such power.
3. Error to state court — following state
court decisions. — The decision of a state court that a municipality could not, by a con¬ tract with a water company, deprive itself of the right to establish reasonable maximum water rates, conformably to a state statute adopted to carry into effect a provision of the state Constitution in force when the contract was made, which invests the legislature with full power to pass laws to correct abuses and prevent excessive charges by “persons and cor¬ porations engaged as common carriers in transporting persons and property, or per¬ forming other services of a public nature,” and declares that the legislature “shall pro¬ vide for enforcing such laws by adequate penalties or forfeitures,” is not so clearly er¬ roneous as to require reversal on a writ of error from the Supreme Court of the United States.
[No. 29.]
Argued and submitted October 27, 1905.
Decided 'November 13, 1905.
T N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the -*- State of Florida to review a decree affirm¬ ing a decree of the Circuit Court for Hills¬ borough County, in that state, which dis¬ missed on demurrer a bill to enjoin the en¬ forcement of an ordinance fixing maximum water rates, on the ground that such ordi¬ nance impaired the obligation of a contract between the municipality and the water com¬ pany. Affirmed.
See same ease below (Fla.), 36 So. 174, on former appeal, 34 So. 631.
The fact's are stated in the opinion.
Mr. William A. Carter argued the cause, and, with Messrs. Stephen M. Spark¬ man, Edward L. Sparkman, and Peter 0. Knight, filed a brief for plaintiff in error:
The city of Tampa, at the time said con- j tract was entered into and the amendments ! thereto made, possessed ample power to con- •
Note. — On what questions the Federal Su¬ preme Court will consider in reviewing the judgments of state courts — see note to Mis¬ souri ex rel. Hill v. Dockery, 63 L.R.A. 571.
On self-executing constitutional provisions — ee note to Willis v. St. Paul Sanitation Co. 16 L.R.A. 281.
As to state decisions and laics as rules of decision in Federal courts — see notes to Wilson
199 U. S.
tract with the plaintiff in error for a pub¬ lic and private supply of water.
Los Angeles City Water Co. v. Los Ange¬ les, 88 Fed. 720; Santa Ana Water Co. v. San Buenaventura, .56 Fed. 339; Wells v. Atlanta, 43. Ga. 67 ; Atlantic City Water¬ works Co. v. Atlantic City, 48 N. J. L. 378, 6 Atl. 24; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas¬ light cC- Coke Co. 66 Ind. 396; 1 Dill. Mun. Corp. §§ 91, 443.
The city of Tampa likewise had the power, in such contract, to fix the rates for a pub¬ lic and private supply of water for said city and its inhabitants during the entire con¬ tract period, and so to bind any future coun¬ cil from altering or interfering in any way with the same.
McQuillin, Mun. Ord. § 584; Detroit v. Detroit Citizens’ Street R. Co. 184 U. S. 368, 46 L. ed. 592, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 410; New Orleans Gaslight Co. v. Louisiana Light & H. P. d Mfg. Co. 115 U. S. 650, 29 L. ed. 516, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 252; New Orleans TFa.- ter works Co. v. Rivers, 115 U. S. 683. 29 L. ed. 528, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 273; St. Tammany Waterworks Co. v. New Orleans Waterworks Co. 120 U. S. 64, 30 L. ed. 563, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 405; Los Angeles City Water Co. v. Los Angeles, 88 Fed. 720, 177 U. S. 558, 44 L. ed. 886, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 736; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co. 172 U. S. 1, 9, 43 L. ed. 341, 345, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 77; Pingree v. Michigan C. R. Co. 118 Mich. 314, 53 L.R.A. 274, 76 N. W. 635; Atlantic City Waterworks Co. v. Atlantic City, supra; Illinois Trust d Sav. Bank v. Ar¬ kansas City, 34 L.R.A. 518, 22 C. C. A. 171, 40 U. S. App. 257, 76 Fed. 271; Green¬ ville v. Greenville W aterworks Co. 125 Ala. 625, 27 So. 764; Vincennes v. Citizens’ Gas¬ light Co. 132 Ind. 114, 16 L.R.A. 485, 31 N. E. 573; Indianapolis v. Indianapolis Gas¬ light d Coke Co. supra; Newport v. New¬ port Light Co. 84 Ky. 168; Fergus Falls Water Co. v. Fergus Falls, 65 Fed. 591.
The constitutional provision relied upon by defendant in error conferred no power upon the legislature. This is manifest upon the face of the provision. It is only de¬ claratory of a power that already existed.
State ex rel. Lamar v. Jacksonville Termi¬ nal Co. 41 Fla. 377, 27 So. 225.
It is a power inherent in every American state legislature, and does not require to be expressed in order that the legislature may pass laws for the correction of abuses, or to
v. Perrin, 11 C. C. A. 71'; Hill v. Hite, 29 C. C. A. 553 ; and Griffin v. Overman Wheel Co. 9 C. C. A. 548 ; Elmendorf v. Taylor, 6 L. ed. U. S. 290; Jackson ex dem. St. John v. Chew, 6 L. ed. U. S. 583 ; United States ex rel. Butz v. Muscatine, 19 L. ed. U. S. 490 : Clark v. Graham, 5 L. ed. U. S. 334; and Forepaogh v. Delaware, L. & W. R. Co. 5 L. R.A. 508.
171
241, 242
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct. Te&m,
prevent excessive charges by persons or cor¬ porations performing services of a public nature where contract rights do not inter¬ vene.
McWhorter ▼. Pensacola d A. R. Go. 24 Fla. 417, 2 L.R.A. 504, 12 Am. St. Rep. 220, 5 So. 129; Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113, 24 L. ed. 77; Chicago, B. d Q. R. Go. v. Iowa (Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co. v. Cutts) 94 U. S. 155, 24 L. ed. 94; Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. 870.
The constitutional provision was not self¬ executing. It was dormant, requiring the action of the legislature to vitalize it, and, until this was done, could not form a part of, or be written by implication into, any contract.
Cooley, Const. Lim. 119-121; 6 Am. & Eng. Enc. Law, 2d ed. p. 919; Sharp v. Rational Biscuit Co. 179 Mo. 553, 78 S. W.
787.
The right to abolish, to alter and amend, does not give to a municipality the right to interfere with vested rights. These can¬ not be affected by legislative action, either directly or indirectly.
Beach, Pub. Corp. §§ 110-112.
The ordinance in question impairs the ob¬ ligation of the contract between the city of Tampa and plaintiff in error, constitutes a taking of its property without due process of law, and denies to it the equal protec¬ tion of the law.
Scott v. Toledo, 1 L.R.A. 688, 36 Fed. 395; Chicago, B. d Q. R. Co. v. Chicago, 166 U. S. 226, 41 L. ed. 979, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581;
Mt. Hope Cemetery v. Boston. 158 Mass. 509, 35 Am. St. Rep. 515, 33 N. E. 695; Gardner v. Newburgh, 2 Johns. Ch. 162, 7 Am. Dec. 526; Sinnickson v. John¬ son, 17 N. J. L. 129, 34 Am. Dec. 184; Har¬ ness v. Chesapeake d O. Canal Co. 1 Md. Ch. 249; Henderson v. Central Pass. R. Co. 21 Fed. 358; Baker v. Norwood, 74 Fed. 997 ; Davidson v. New Orleans, 96 U. S. 102, 24 L. ed. 618; Kentucky Railroad Tax Cases, 115 U. S. 331, 29 L. ed. 416, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 57; New Memphis Gas d Light Co. v. Memphis, 72 Fed. 952; Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. 70 Ill. 198, 22 Am. Rep. 71; Board of Education v. Balcewell, 122 Ill. 348, 10 N. E. 378; Rigney v. Chi¬ cago, 102 Ill. 77 ; Chicago d W. I. R. Co. v. Englewood Connecting R. Co. 115 Ill. 385, 56 Am. Rep. 173, 4 N. E. 246.
Messrs. Hugh C. Macfarlane and James F. Glen submitted the cause for defendant in error. Mr. John P. Wall was with them on the brief:
The provision of the Florida Constitu¬ tion in question is a self-executing limita¬ tion upon legislative power.
172
There can be no complaint that the ex¬ ercise of such reserved power impairs the obligation of a contract, or deprives a party of property without due process of law, sub¬ ject to the suggested qualification that there might be such an abuse o*f the power under the guise of its exercise as to call for interference.
Stanislaus County v. San Joaquin d K.
Sav. Bank v. Owensboro, 173 U. S. 636,
43 L. ed. 840, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 530; Louis¬ ville d N. R. Co. v. Kentucky. 183 U. 'S.
503, 46 L. ed. 298, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 95: Covington v. Kentucky, 173 U. S. 231, 43 L. ed. 679, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383; Sioux City Street R. Co. v. Sioux City, 138 U. S. 98.
34 L. ed. 898, 11 Sup. Ct. t?ep. 226; United States v. Union P. R, Co. 160 U. S. 1, 40 L. ed. 319, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 190; Louisville Water Co. v. Clark, 143 U. S. 1, 36 L. ed.
55, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 346; Gibbs v. Consoli¬ dated Gas Co. 130 U. S. 396, 32 L. ed. 979,
9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 553; Spring Valley Water¬ works v. Schottler, 110 LT. S. 347, 28 L. ed. 173, 4 Sup. Ct. Rep. 48; Greenwood v.
Union Freight R. Co. 105 U. S. 13, 26 L. ed. 961; Pennsylvania College Cases ( Jef¬ ferson College v. Washington d J. Col¬ lege) 13 Wall. 190, 20 L. ed. 550.
A Constitution is not a grant of power, but a limitation, and, in the nature of things, every such limitation, as a limita¬ tion, is self-executing or inherently effective.
The provisions of a state Constitution are designed, in and of themselves, to be restric¬ tions in so far as they either expressly or by implication prohibit legislation in dero¬ gation thereof. Legislation may be neces¬ sary, as it often is; to carry into effect the mandate of a constitutional provision, but none the less is the constitutional provision a presently operative limitation upon legis¬ lative power.
Cooley, Const. Lim. 7th ed. p. 120, note 5; pp. 127 et seq.
Mr. Justice Holmes delivered the opin¬ ion of the court:
This case comes here by writ of error to a decree dismissing the bill of the plaintiff in error upon demurrer. 45 Fla. 600, 34 So.
631, 36 So. 174. The bill alleges a contract between the plaintiff water company and the city of Tampa, bv wh Jr*1! VrD'or
was to erect waterworks and to ‘have the [242] right to charge certain rates for the u»e ,,i its water for thirty years, with various other terms, not necessary to mention. By a sub-
199 U. S.
1905.
Tampa Watebwobks (Do. v. Tampa.
242-24 l
sequent ordinance the city fixed lower rates as the highest to be charged by any person or corporation furnishing water to the city or its inhabitants, and imposed a penalty on violation of this ordinance or refusal to furnish water in compliance with its terms. The bill sets up that this ordinance impairs the obligation of the plaintiff’s contract, and takes its property without due process of law, contrary to the Constitution of the United States. The city justified under § 30, article 16, of the state Constitution in force when the contract was made, and un¬ der an act approved May 31, 1901, chap. 5070, after the date of the contract. The supreme court of the state held the justifica¬ tion sufficient, and dismissed the bill.
We assume for the purpose of decision that the contract made was within the pow¬ ers of the city, subject to whatever qualifica¬ tion or inherent weakness the Constitution created or imposed. We assume also that the case shows more than a mere breach of contract by the city if its justification fails, and pass at once to the merits of the justification.
The clause of the state Constitution is as follows: “The legislature is invested with full power to pass laws for the correction of abuses and to prevent unjust discrimination and excessive charges by persons and cor¬ porations engaged as common carriers in transporting persons and property, or per¬ forming other services of a public nature, and shall provide for enforcing such laws by adequate penalties or forfeitures.”
In pursuance of this clause in the Consti¬ tution the legislature passed the act referred to above. By this act the corporate authori¬ ties of cities, towns, and villages were em¬ powered to prescribe by ordinance maximum charges for water. “Such charges to be just and reasonable: Provided, that this act shall not be so construed as to impair the validity of any valid contract heretofore entered into between any city, town, or vil¬ lage and any person, firm, or corporation for [243] the supply of water to *such city, town, or village or its inhabitants. But this act. shall not be held to validate any contract heretofore made.” This act was construed by the supreme court of Florida, as we un¬ derstand it, to mean that cities might estab¬ lish reasonable maxima in any case where they could do so without impairing the obli¬ gation of contracts. Therefore the act was held to authorize the ordinance complained of unless the ordinance was open to consti¬ tutional objection. This construction of the statute is a very slight extension of the di¬ rect meaning of the words used, and seems to us reasonable even if a somewhat differ¬ ent one could be conceived. Of course it removes any question of constitutionality 199 U. S.
from the statute, and therefore there seems to be no ground for reviewing the decision upon that point. Central Land Co. v. Laid- ley, 159 U. S. 103, 40 L. ed. 91, 16 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 80; Weber v. Rogan, 188 U. S. 10, 47 L. ed. 363, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 263.
We turn to the construction of the Con¬ stitution of the state. There was some argu¬ ment that the clause was not self-executing.
But so far as it expressed a power of the legislature, of course, as soon as the Con¬ stitution went into effect, that power existed at once, and contracts afterwards were made subject to the possibility of its exercise, as it was exercised by the subsequent statute. Spring Valley Waterworks v. Schottler, 110 U. S. 347, 355, 28 L. ed. 173, 176, 4 Sup.
Ct. Hep. 48 ; Bienville Water Supply Co. v. Mobile, 186 U. S. 212, 46 L. ed. 1132, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 820. The only question then is, how far the clause of the Constitution goes. When the contract was made there had been no judicial construction of the clause which withdrew the contract from its operation, nor has there been since, so far as we are aware. There is no ground for the application of the doctrine of Muhllcer v. New York £ 11. R. Co. 197 U. S. 544,
49 L. ed. 872, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 522, or Gelpclce v. Dubuque, 1 Wall. 175, 17 L. ed.
520. In such circumstances, although we
construe the Constitution for ourselves, and determine the existence or nonexistence of the contract set up, and whether its obliga¬ tion has been impaired by the state enact¬ ment ( Douglas v. Kentucky, 168 U. S. 488,
502, 42 L. ed. 553, 557, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep.
199), “the Federal courts will lean towards an agreement of views with the state courts if the question seems to them balanced *with[244] doubt,” — a principle reinforced by the later cases. Burgess v. Seligman, 107 U. S. 20,
34, 27 L. ed. 359, 365, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 10; Wilson v. Standefer, 184 U. S. 399, 412, 46 L. ed. 612, 618, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 384; Bien¬ ville Water Supply Co. v. Mobile, 186 U. S.
212, 220, 46 L. ed. 1132, 1135, 22 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 820; Chicago Theological Seminary v. Illinois, 188 U. S. 662, 674, 675, 677, 47 L. ed. 641, 649, 650, 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 386.
It cannot be said that the interpretation adopted is not a possible one. Water com¬ panies are corporations performing services of a public nature quite as much as common carriers, and, therefore, are within the words of the clause which is not confined to common carriers. A natural method of preventing excessive charges is the passage by the cities or towns within which the services are per¬ formed, of ordinances establishing reasonable rates and punishing noncompliance. There¬ fore the power to prevent excessive charges, given to the legislature, properly was exer-
173
244-246
Supreme Court of the United States.
Oct. Term
cised by a law granting cities authority to pass ordinances of the kind supposed.
So much probably would be admitted; but it is said that the clause is merely declara¬ tory of powers which the legislature would have had without it, and which, with or without it, the legislature could cut down by contract. The argument is not without force, but it did not prevail in this case, and we are not prepared to overrule the Florida courts in their interpretation of their own laws. It is entirely possible to read the words as conferring a power which, by their very form, they were meant to make inalienable. No doubt some sort of a legislature would exist. Constitution or no Constitution; and presumably would have power to regulate rates charged by com¬ panies performing public services, or to re¬ strict that power by a constitutionally bind¬ ing contract. But the actual legislature derives its being, its form as a senate and house of representatives, and its powers, from the instrument in force. When the Constitution says that the legislature “is invested’’ with a certain power, it invests it with that power; and does so none the less that, in the absence of those words, a more or less similar power would be implied by more general expressions in the same in¬ strument. It says that the power shall be 1245] “full ‘power ;” and the adjective may be read as meaning a power which cannot be cut down. When it goes on to require that the legislature' “shall” provide for enfor¬ cing the laws which it is expected to pass for the correction of abuses and the preven¬ tion of excessive charges, the argument is strengthened that it means to impose a duty which the legislature is not at liberty to give up. Such was the opinion of the su preme court of Florida, and we have yielded to the judgment of the state court upon more doubtful questions than this.
The case stands on the single ground of contract. There is no allegation that the rates fixed by the new ordinances are unrea¬ sonable, or that their effect will be to de¬ stroy or considerably impair the value of the plaintiff’s property. Although the 14th Amendment is invoked, no case is made out under it on any other ground than that the obligation of a binding contract is impaired. The single question is whether the city of Tampa is bound for thirty years from the date of its agreement to permit certain speci¬ fied rates to be charged, even if they have ceased to be reasonable. We are not pre¬ pared to say that the supreme court of Florida was wrong in deciding that it is not bound, under the Florida Constitution and laws. The effect of a former decree dis¬ missing a bill brought by the city, which 174
is set up in this bill, cannot be reargued here.
Decree affirmed.
Mr. Justice Brown, with wl|om was Mr. Justice Peckham, dissenting:
In September, 18S7,. the waterworks com¬ pany made a contract with the city fur the establishment of waterworks, in which it was agreed that the contract should continue in force for thirty years from the time the works were completed and ready for duty, and that the owners might charge and collect quarterly, in advance, for water furnished to private consumers, prices not to exceed certain maximum rates fixed by the con¬ tract.
*At this time there was in force the fol- [246] lowing constitutional provision in Florida:
“The legislature is invested with full pow¬ er to pass laws for the correction of abuses and to prevent unjust discrimination and ex¬ cessive charges by persons 'and corporations engaged as common carriers in transport¬ ing persons and property, or performing other services of a public nature, and shall provide for enforcing such laws by ade¬ quate penalties or forfeitures.”
By an act of the legislature passed May 31, 1901 (chap. 5070), the corporate au¬ thorities of any city were empowered to prescribe by ordinance maximum rates and charges for the supply of water, such charges to be just and reasonable; provided, “that this act shall not be so construed as to im¬ pair the validity of any valid contract here¬ tofore entered into . . . for the supply
of water to such city,” “but this act shall not be held to validate any contract here¬ tofore made.”
On December 20, 1901, the city couneil of Tampa passed the ordinance complained of (No. 274), which provided that “it shall be unlawful for any individual, company, or corporation furnishing water to the city of lam pa or its inhabitants, to charge any higher rates for water than those herein¬ after specified.” The ordinance made a large deduction in the rates fixed by the original ordinance or contract, and thereby, as it is alleged, impaired its obligation.
The constitutional provision was evidently not self-executing, though it vested full pow¬ er in the legislature to prevent excessive charges for the performance of public serv¬ ices. The legislature did not see fit to exer¬ cise this power to its full extent. But in authorizing corporate authorities in any city, etc., to fix rates, provided that the act should not be so construed as to impair the validi¬ ty of any valid contract. This it had the right to do. It was not bound to exercise the whole power vested in it by the Con¬ stitution, but might grant so much of such
199 U. S.
1905.
Chesapeake Beach R. Co. v. Washington, P. & C. R. Co.
246, 247
power to the corporate authorities as it deemed best for the public interests. This we have repeatedly held with respect to par¬ celing out the power vested in Congress by 1247] the Constitution. *M’Intire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504, 3 L. ed. 420; Kendall v. United Slates, 12 Pet. 524-616, 9 L. ed. 1181-1217; Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. 236-245, 11 L. ed. 576-581.
It follows that if the ordinance of 1901 impaired the original contract between the waterworks and the city, it exceeded its pow¬ ers under the act of the legislature.
In its opinion the supreme court of Flor¬ ida assumed, without deciding, that “the powers granted to the city were sufficient to authorize it to contract with the water company for a public and private supply of water,” and were also sufficient to enable the city to insert clauses fixing the rates and obligating the city to pay these rates for water used by it during the entire con¬ tract period, and that the same powers existed of fixing the rates for wTater supply to individuals. ■
Now, as the Constitution only delegated to the legislature the power to authorize the corporate authorities to reduce rates, and the legislature delegated that power only in cases where it did not impair the validity of any contract, it seems to me clear that the city council of Tampa exceeded its au¬ thority in reducing rates protected by a con¬ tract, and must be held to have impaired its obligation.