Bailey v. Ritchie, No. 5:25-cv-00141 (Jan. 27, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
BRIAN BAILEY v. HON. CLARK A. RITCHIE
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Jan. 27, 2026
Disposition
Dismissed
BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. HON. CLARK A. RITCHIE, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 210416Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, W.D. Virginia.BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff,v.HON. CLARK A. RITCHIE, et al., Defendants.Civil Action No. 5:25-cv-00141|Filed 01/27/2026By: Hon. Thomas T. Cullen United States District JudgeAttorneys and Law FirmsBrian Bailey, Front Royal, VA, Pro Se.MEMORANDUM OPINIONHON. THOMAS T. CULLEN UNITED STATES DISTRICTJUDGE*1 Plaintiff Brian Bailey, proceeding pro se, filed this actionagainst the following parties: the Honorable Clark A. Ritchie,a Virginia circuit court judge; Jennifer Brown, the guardian adlitem in child-custody proceedings involving Bailey's child;Alana Brown, the Director of the Division of Child SupportEnforcement of the Virginia Department of Social Services(“DCSE”); Rockingham County, Virginia; and Ann PatriceBailey, the mother of Bailey's child (“Mother”). Bailey assertsvarious claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that eachDefendant has, in some way, violated his constitutionalrights during child-custody and enforcement proceedings inVirginia state court.This matter is before the court on Bailey's motion for leaveto proceed in forma pauperis. Because the court finds thatBailey's application satisfies the necessary standard, the courtwill grant his motion. But after undertaking its independentduty to screen initial filings under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), thecourt will dismiss Bailey's action in its entirety.I. STATEMENT OF FACTS ANDPROCEDURAL BACKGROUNDThe following facts are taken from Bailey's Complaint1 and,at this stage, the court accepts these facts as true. Ashcroft v.Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).This action arises from child custody proceedings concerningBailey's minor son in the Juvenile & Domestic RelationsCourt (“J&DR Court”) and Circuit Court of RockinghamCounty, Virginia. (See generally Compl.; ECF No. 3, Attach.1.) Though the child-custody determination was resolved byfinal order of the Circuit Court in 2023, state-level visitation,child-support, and contempt proceedings are ongoing. (See id.¶¶ 21–23; ECF No. 3, Attach. 1 at 1209–2524.)Bailey, who is Black (see Compl. 21), allegesthat, during the state-court proceedings, he has beensubjected to “systematic misconduct by judicial and quasi-judicial officers, child-support enforcement officials, andcollaborating private actors.” (Id. 2.) Specifically, Baileyalleges that Mother lodged approximately 15 false criminalcomplaints against him. (Id. ¶¶ 3, 25–28.) While many of thecharges have been “dismissed, nolle prossed, or otherwiseterminated in his favor,” Bailey alleges that Mother andJennifer Brown “rely on the existence of the charges ... tojustify restrictions on [Bailey's] contact with his child and tocast doubt upon his credibility.” (Id. 27.)Further, Bailey alleges that Jennifer Brown has “adoptedMother's narrative without meaningful investigation, showedopen hostility to [Bailey], and treated [Bailey's] efforts todocument his involvement and the falsity of his charges asunimportant or manipulative.” (Id. 30.) Additionally, heavers that Jennifer Brown has(a) ignored or minimized evidence that criminal chargeswere dismissed;*2 (b) disregarded [Bailey's] documentation of Mother'salcohol use, instability, and ignoring of court-orderedboundaries; and(c) advocated restrictions on Plaintiff's visitation that bearno proportionate relationship to any proven risk, but thatconveniently reinforce Mother's attempt to marginalizehim.(Id. 31.) Alleging that Jennifer Brown has “entanglementswith local offices and practitioners aligned with Mother” whoharbor “racialized presumptions in this ‘small town,’ ” Baileybelieves that she has continued to act with prejudice againsthim. (Id. ¶¶ 32–33.)
BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. HON. CLARK A. RITCHIE, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Similarly, Bailey alleges that Judge Ritchie has displayed“overt and implicit bias” against him, including(a) accepting Mother's uncorroborated claims at face valuewhile scrutinizing [Bailey's] assertions with suspicion;(b) making comments suggesting [Bailey] is inherentlyproblematic or dangerous, including repeating Mother'sclaims that [Bailey] “beat her until she had to play dead,”despite the absence of credible evidence and despite[Bailey's] denial;(c) reacting negatively to [Bailey's] use of technologyand legal research (including assistance from artificialintelligence) in preparing his filings, treating theseefforts as improper rather than as evidence of diligence;and(d) advising [Bailey] that “he needs an attorney to put [his]stuff in,” effectively signaling that pro se filing will notbe considered, in direct tension with his constitutionalright to self-representation.(Id. 34.)Bailey alleges that the DCSE, “under the direction andpolicy leadership of [Alana Brown]” and acting in concertwith other Defendants, has pursued “enforcement actionsand the threat of contempt ... to punish him for challengingMother's narratives and for insisting upon more robustparenting time.” (Id. ¶¶ 37, 39.) Specifically, Bailey allegesthat the DCSE has undertaken enforcement efforts againsthim without considering “the retaliatory context in whichthe support orders arose,” his ability to pay child supportand attorney's fees, and “the fact that Mother has benefitedmaterially from [Bailey's] past support and from retainingcontrol of the child[.]” (Id. 38.)Finally, Bailey alleges that “his race has been a motivatingfactor” in the actions described above, adding that he“has repeatedly observed that white litigants in the samecourthouse are treated with more patience, more presumptionof good faith, and more willingness to credit their testimony,while Black fathers are presumed to be ‘deadbeats’ orabusers.” (Id. ¶¶ 40, 41.) Bailey alleges that, because ofDefendants' actions, he has suffered a damaged relationshipwith his son, less time with his son, a tarnished reputation,emotional distress, stigma, and “economic strain.” (Id. ¶¶ 43,44.)II. STANDARD OF REVIEWUnder 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e), which governs in forma pauperisproceedings, the court has a duty to screen initial filings. SeeEriline Co. S.A. v. Johnson, 440 F.3d 648, 656–57 (4th Cir.2006). When screening, the court should liberally construe thefilings of pro se litigants, using a “less stringent standard[ ]than formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Haines v. Kerner,404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972). But even a pro se complainant muststill state a plausible claim for relief, see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556U.S. 662, 679 (2009), and the court must dismiss a case “atany time” if the court determines that the complaint “fails tostate a claim on which relief may be granted.” 28 U.S.C. §1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).*3 The standards for reviewing a complaint for dismissalunder § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) are the same as those that applywhen a defendant moves for dismissal under Federal Rule ofCivil Procedure 12(b)(6)—failure to state a claim on whichrelief may be granted.2 See De'Lonta v. Angelone, 330 F.3d630, 633 (4th Cir. 2003). Thus, in reviewing a complaintunder this statute, the court must accept all well-pleadedfactual allegations as true and view the complaint in thelight most favorable to the plaintiff. See Philips v. Pitt Cnty.Mem. Hosp., 572 F.3d 176, 180 (4th Cir. 2009). To survivedismissal for failure to state a claim, “a complaint mustcontain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘statea claim for relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroftv. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp.v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is faciallyplausible when the plaintiff's allegations “allow[ ] the courtto draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liablefor the misconduct alleged.” Id. While a complaint doesnot need “detailed factual allegations,” complaints merelyoffering “labels and conclusions,” “naked assertion[s] devoidof ‘further factual enhancement,” or “a formulaic recitationof the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Id.(alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted)(quoting Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555, 557).Federal courts also “have an independent obligation todetermine whether subject-matter jurisdiction exists, evenwhen no party challenges it.” Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S.77, 94 (2010). “If the court determines at any time that itlacks subject-matter jurisdiction, the court must dismiss theaction.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(3); see also Melton v. Naumann,No. 25-3343-BAH, 2025 WL 2938362, at *2 (D. Md. Oct.16, 2025) (granting motion for leave to proceed in forma
BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. HON. CLARK A. RITCHIE, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3pauperis but dismissing complaint due to lack of subject-matter jurisdiction).III. DISCUSSIONBecause the court finds that Bailey's application to proceedin forma pauperis satisfies the necessary standard, see 28U.S.C. § 1915(a), the court will grant his motion. But §1915(e) requires a court to screen a plaintiff's initial filingfor plausibility and subject-matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. §1915(e). Therefore, the court will evaluate Bailey's claimsin the following order: (1) the § 1983 claims against JudgeRitchie, Jennifer Brown, and Mother; (2) the § 1983 claimagainst Alana Brown; (3) the § 1985 claim against allDefendants; and (4) the Monell claim against RockinghamCounty.A. Counts I–III: Judge Ritchie, Jennifer Brown, andMother Under § 1983Each of Bailey's § 1983 claims fail against Judge Ritchie,Jennifer Brown, and Mother. At the threshold, Bailey fails tostate a valid § 1983 claim against Judge Ritchie because heis protected by absolute judicial immunity. Clay v. Osteen,No. 1:10cv399, 2010 WL 4116882, at *3 (M.D.N.C. Oct. 19,2020) (“[C]laims of judicial immunity are generally reviewedunder Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6)[.]”).The doctrine of judicial immunity protects judges—stateand federal—from § 1983 suits seeking both damages andinjunctive relief. See DeBelardino v. Miyares, No. 2:23-cv-225, 2024 WL 1466811, at *5 (E.D. Va. Mar. 4, 2024)(listing cases); Rhoe v. Kunz, No. GJH-17-3757, 2018 WL6423897, at *5 (D. Md. Dec. 4, 2018) (“Additionally, thisCourt lacks jurisdiction over the Defendant Circuit Court andthe Defendant judges because of absolute judicial immunity.‘[I]t is a general principle of the highest importance tothe proper administration of justice that a judicial officer,in exercising authority vested in him, shall be free toact upon his own convictions, without apprehension ofpersonal consequences to himself.’ ” (quoting Bradley v.Fisher, 80 U.S. 335, 347 (1971)) (brackets in original)). Theprotection of this doctrine lapses only when a judge performsa nonjudicial action (or “actions not taken in the judge'sjudicial capacity”3), or when she acts within her judicialrole but lacks the jurisdiction to do so. Mireles v. Waco,502 U.S. 9, 11 (1991). In all other circumstances, judges areentitled to judicial immunity so they may “exercise discretionvigorously and effectively, without apprehension that theywill be subjected to burdensome and vexatious litigation.”Lesane v. Spencer, No. 3:09-cv-012, 2009 WL 4730716, at *2(E.D. Va. Dec. 8, 2009).*4 In a ng absolute immunity to guardian ad litem).Therefore, where plaintiffs' allegationsimilar vein, guardiansad litem in custody cases are afforded quasi-judicial immunityfrom § 1983 actions while acting as an agent of the judiciary,even if they engage in “misfeasance of their duties.” Flemingv. Asbill, 42 F.3d 886, 889 (4th Cir. 1994) (“A guardianad litem must ... be able to function without the worry ofpossible later harassment and intimidation from dissatisfiedparents. Consequently, a grant of absolute immunity wouldbe appropriate. A failure to grant immunity would hamperthe duties of a guardian ad litem in his role as advocate forthe child in judicial proceedings.” (citing Kurzawa v. Mueller,732 F.2d 1456, 1458 (6th Cir. 1984)) (emphasis added)); seealso Braun v. Braun, No. 3:22-cv-00357-RJC-DCK, 2023WL 3236906, at *11 (W.D.N.C. May 3, 2023) (citing Flemingwith approval and grantis fail to overcome the barrier ofjudicial immunity or quasi-judicial immunity, courts mustdismiss the claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); Murphyv. Ross, No. 3:14cv870, 2015 WL 1787351, at *4 (E.D. Va.Apr. 15, 2015).Here, Judge Ritchie and the court-appointed guardian adlitem, Jennifer Brown,4 are entitled to judicial and quasi-judicial immunity from Bailey's § 1983 suit. (See Compl.¶¶ 14, 16.) First, Bailey has alleged that Judge Ritchie'salleged misconduct occurred while he was presiding over thechild-custody proceedings. (See id. ¶¶ 34–35.) From theseallegations, there is no doubt that Judge Ritchie was actingin his judicial capacity in “a function normally performedby a judge,” or that he had subject-matter jurisdiction overthe case. See Stump, 435 U.S. at 362 (discussing “judicialacts”); Va. Code Ann. § 16.1-241 (granting exclusive originaljurisdiction over matters involving “custody, visitation,support, control, or disposition of a child” to the juvenile anddomestic relations district courts). Judge Ritchie, therefore,is shielded from Bailey's claims by judicial immunity. As forJennifer Brown, her alleged wrongdoing took place solelyin her role as guardian ad litem—an actor in the judicialprocess.5 (See Compl. ¶¶ 29–33.) Jennifer Brown is alsoimmune from this § 1983 action, and the court will dismissall § 1983 claims against her. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii); Fleming, 42 F.3d at 889.
BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. HON. CLARK A. RITCHIE, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4*5 Bailey's claims also fail against Mother, because aplaintiff “may only lodge due process claims under § 1983against state actors.”6 Braun, 2023 WL 3236906, at *5. Aprivate party may be considered a state actor for the purposesof § 1983 in limited scenarios, but plaintiffs face a strictpleading standard to allege that the defendant “may fairly besaid to be a state actor .... [and] has acted together with orhas obtained significant aid from state officials” Id. (quotingGregg v. Ham, 678 F.3d 333, 340 (4th Cir. 2012) (citationsomitted)). The key inquiry is whether “there is such a closenexus between the State and the challenged action,” such aswhen the private actor has exercised a traditionally publicfunction or when “the state's engagement or encouragementis so significant that ‘the choice must in law be deemed tobe that of the State.’ ” Braun, 2023 WL 3236906, at *5–6(first quoting Mentavlos v. Anderson, 249 F.3d 301, 310 (4thCir. 2001), then quoting Peltier v. Charter Day Sch., Inc., 37F.4th 104, 115 (4th Cir. 2022) (citation omitted)). But a privateparty's mere dissemination of information to state actors—even if demonstrably false—does not elevate them to the levelof quasi-state actors for the purposes of § 1983 liability. SeeCruey v. Huff, No. 7:09-cv-000516, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS118374, at *11 (W.D. Va. Nov. 8, 2010) (“[C]ourts have heldthat providing information to the state and pressing for stateaction against an individual, without more, cannot suffice tomake a private entity liable under section 1983 as a stateactor.” (quoting Manax v. McNamara, 842 F.2d 808, 813 (5thCir. 1988)) (internal quotations omitted)).None of Bailey's allegations regarding Mother, taken as true,would establish that she is a state actor subject to § 1983liability. Bailey admits as much, stating that Mother “is suedin her individual capacity as a private actor[.]” (Compl. 20.) At most, Bailey alleges that Mother “deliberatelyinvoked state power through false reports and strategicmisuse of the criminal and family-court systems, therebysubjecting her to § 1983 liability as a willful participantin joint action with the State.” (Id. 50; see also 24(“Mother began to manufacture incidents and accusationsdesigned to portray him as dangerous, violent, or unstable,despite the lack of objective evidence ... [or a] history ofsubstantiated abuse.”); 25 (alleging that Mother instigated15 criminal charges “directly or indirectly” against Bailey).)This allegation sounds only in unilateral action on Mother'spart. The Complaint also lacks any allegations that shewas delegated a role from the Commonwealth, that shereceived aid or encouragement from this government entity,or that her alleged wrongdoing is “fairly attributable” to theCommonwealth. Braun, 2023 WL 3236906, at *5–6. At best,the allegations establish that Mother provided information tothe state actors, which they found persuasive. But even ifMother's reports were false, this action does not subject her to§ 1983 liability. See Cruey, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 118374,at *11; see also Collins v. Womancare, 878 F.2d 1145, 1155(9th Cir. 1989) (“[M]erely complaining to the police does notconvert a private actor into a state actor.”). In the absence ofthe required nexus between Mother and the state actors, thecourt will dismiss all § 1983 claims against Mother.B. Counts I–III: Alana Brown Under § 1983In Counts I–III of the Complaint, Bailey asserts thatAlana Brown, as the Director of the DCSE, has violatedhis constitutional rights to substantive and procedural dueprocess and equal protection. (See Compl. ¶¶ 45–70.) Bailey'sallegations are insufficient to state a claim against her.“A plaintiff asserting a § 1983 substantive due process claimmust allege both the deprivation of his life, liberty[,] orproperty interest by a state actor, and the deprivation of thisinterest was ‘arbitrary in the constitutional sense.’ ” Callahanv. N. Carolina Dep't Pub. Safety, 18 F.4th 142, 145 (4thCir. 2021) (citation omitted). “To establish a procedural dueprocess violation under [§] 1983, a plaintiff must show (1) thathe has been deprived of a cognizable liberty interest and (2)that such deprivation occurred without adequate proceduralprotections.... At a minimum, procedural due process requires‘fair notice’ of impending governmental action and ‘anopportunity to be heard.’ ”7 Norris v. City of Asheville, 721F. Supp. 3d 404, 413 (W.D.N.C. 2024) (first citing Swarthoutv. Cooke, 562 U.S. 216, 219 (2011), then quoting Snider Int'lCorp. v. Town of Forest Heights, 739 F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir.2014)). And finally,*6 [t]o succeed on an equalprotection claim, a plaintiff must ...demonstrate that he has beentreated differently from others withwhom he is similarly situated andthat the unequal treatment wasthe result of intentional purposefuldiscrimination.... While a similarlysituated comparator is not an absoluterequirement to succeed on an EqualProtection claim, ... [p]roof of ...discriminatory intent or purpose isrequired to show a violation of
BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. HON. CLARK A. RITCHIE, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5the Equal Protection Clause of theFourteenth Amendment.Borkowski v. Baltimore County, 492 F. Supp. 3d 454, 471 (D.Md. 2020) (cleaned up).Despite his various allegations in support of each of hisclaims, Bailey fails to put forward any specific, non-conclusory allegations against Alana Brown to sufficientlyallege violations of his right to substantive due process,procedural due process, or equal protection. In fact, thescant allegations8 against Alana Brown take issue notwith her direct actions, but with her alleged supervisoryshortcomings. (See Compl. 36 (alleging that “[t]he Divisionof Child Support Enforcement, under the direction andpolicy leadership of Defendant Brown, has proceeded againstPlaintiff in a manner that is disproportionate, punitive, andcoordinated with the adverse custody rulings”); ¶¶ 37, 38,39 41 (alleging that under Defendant Brown's leadership,the Division's enforcement actions are threatening, coercive,and improper and have “transform[ed] a family-law disputeinto a civil-rights problem”).) Government officials may beliable under § 1983 “only for their personal wrongdoingor supervisory actions that violated constitutional norms.”Timpson ex rel. Timpson v. Anderson Cnty. Disabilities &Special Needs Bd., 31 F.4th 238, 257 (4th Cir. 2022); seealso Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 676 (“Government officials maynot be held liable for the unconstitutional conduct of theirsubordinates under a theory of respondeat superior.”). Toestablish supervisory liability under § 1983, a plaintiff mustallege facts that, if true, would establish(1) that the supervisor had actualor constructive knowledge thathis subordinate was engaged inconduct that posed a pervasive andunreasonable risk of constitutionalinjury to citizens like the plaintiff; (2)that the supervisor's response to thatknowledge was so inadequate as toshow deliberate indifference to or tacitauthorization of the alleged offensivepractices; and (3) that there was anaffirmative causal link between thesupervisor's inaction and the particularconstitutional injury suffered by theplaintiff.*7 Shaw v. Stroud, 13 F.3d 791, 799 (4th Cir. 1994).Plaintiffs face a high bar under Shaw. As to the firstfactor, a supervisor's “mere knowledge” of a supervisee'swrongdoing is not sufficient to open them to liability, Iqbal,556 U.S. at 677; rather, to establish a “pervasive andunreasonable risk of constitutional injury,” the plaintiff mustallege that the supervisor knew of “widespread” examplesof unconstitutional behavior, Shaw, 13 F.3d at 799. Underthe second factor, a plaintiff must establish the supervisor's“continued inaction in the face of documented widespreadabuses”; isolated incidents of supervisees' wrongdoing willnot suffice. Slakan v. Porter, 737 F.2d 368, 373 (4th Cir.1984). Third, a plaintiff must establish proximate causebetween the defendant-supervisor's actions and the plaintiff'seventual harm. See id. at 376.Here, Bailey does not clear the first bar of the Shaw test.At most, he states that Alana Brown was the head of theDCSE during the relevant period. (See, e.g., Compl. 36.)He has not alleged, however, that as the leader of theDCSE, Alana Brown was aware of “widespread” violationsof Bailey's rights—or the rights of African-American fathersgenerally—or that she exhibited “continued inaction in theface of documented widespread abuses.” See Slakan, 737F.2d at 373. Even if he were able to overcome these hurdlesand successfully state a claim against Alana Brown, hisunderlying claims are directed towards the enforcementactions of the DCSE and ongoing state-level proceedings,which this court must refrain from policing. See Cristia v.Newell, No. 6:09-cv-01311, 2011 WL 830112, at *8 (S.D.W.Va. Feb. 9, 2011) (“It is inappropriate for federal courts tointerfere in state and local law enforcement actions, absentextraordinary circumstances.” (citing Younger v. Harris, 401U.S. 37, 43–45 (1971))), R.&R. adopted by, 2011 WL 833353(S.D.W. Va. Mar. 3, 2011). Therefore, the court will dismissBailey's § 1983 claims against Alana Brown.C. Count V: Jennifer Brown, Alana Brown, RockinghamCounty, and Mother Under § 1985Bailey also fails to state a claim of civil conspiracy under 42U.S.C. § 1985. To state a claim under § 1985(3), a plaintiffmust plausibly allege:
BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. HON. CLARK A. RITCHIE, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6(1) a conspiracy of two or morepersons, (2) who are motivated bya specific class-based, invidiouslydiscriminatory animus to (3) deprivethe plaintiff of the equal enjoymentof rights secured by the law to all,(4) and which results in injury to theplaintiff as (5) a consequence of anovert act committed by the defendantsin connection with the conspiracy.*8 Simmons v. Poe, 47 F.3d 1370, 1376 (4th Cir. 1995). “Inorder to prove a section 1985 conspiracy, a claimant mustshow an agreement or a meeting of the minds by defendantsto violate the claimant's constitutional rights.” Facey v. DaeSung Corp., 992 F. Supp. 3d 536, 541 (D. Md. 2014). “Thisis a ‘relatively stringent standard,’ and the Fourth Circuit ‘hasrarely, if ever, found that a plaintiff has set forth sufficientfacts to establish a section 1985 conspiracy.’ ” Borkowski,492 F. Supp. 3d at 483–84 (rejecting § 1985(2) claimbecause plaintiffs' complaint alleging that the defendants“employed facially discriminatory customs and policy ... andtreated one class of victims differently from others” based ondiscriminatory motives was a “shotgun[-]style pleading” anddid not “rise to the level of concreteness required to meet the“ ‘relatively stringent’ standard set by the Fourth Circuit inPoe for alleging a conspiracy” (quoting Simmons, 47 F.3d at1377)).Bailey's allegations do not meet the “relatively stringentstandard” to state a claim of civil conspiracy under §1985(3). Id. at 484. For one, Bailey's allegations are directedprimarily towards Jennifer Brown and Mother, with only avague reference to Rockingham County officials and AlanaBrown involved in a “meeting of the minds.” Facey, 992 F.Supp. 3d at 541. The remaining allegations against JenniferBrown and Mother are similarly conclusory and speculative.That Jennifer Brown “adopt[ed] ... Mother's narrative” incustody and enforcement actions falls woefully short ofestablishing that Jennifer Brown and Mother harbored adiscriminatory motive or communicated to deprive Baileyof his parental rights. (See Compl. ¶¶ 80–82.) See also ASoc'y Without a Name v. Virginia, 655 F.3d 342, 347 (4thCir. 2011) (dismissing § 1985(3) conspiracy claim becauseplaintiff failed to establish any communications between thedefendants and merely stated that there was generally ameeting of the minds). For this reason, the court will dismissthe § 1985 claim.D. Count VI: Rockingham CountyIn support of his Monell claim against Rockingham County,Bailey alleges that Rockingham County implemented policiesthat treat Black fathers differently from white fathers andcondoned racially discriminatory customs in its J&DRproceedings. (See Compl. ¶¶ 40, 41, 85–88.) The Complaintonly formulaically recites the elements of a Monell claimand provides scant factual support for the required elements.Bailey has therefore failed to state a claim.In Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of NewYork, the United States Supreme Court held that while localgovernmental units cannot be held liable under a theory ofrespondeat superior in § 1983 claims, they nevertheless maybe held responsible when the unit's policy or custom inflicts aconstitutional deprivation upon a plaintiff. 436 U.S. 658, 694(1978). In other words, a municipality is “liable only for itsown illegal acts,” rather than those of their employees. Owensv. Balt. City State's Att'y's Off., 767 F.3d 379, 402 (4th Cir.2014).To state a claim for Monell liability, a plaintiff must “plausiblyallege that his constitutional harm stems from the acts of amunicipal employee taken in furtherance of some municipalpolicy or custom.” Johnson v. Balt. Police Dep't, 452 F. Supp.3d 283, 308 (D. Md. 2020) (internal quotations omitted)(quoting Milligan v. City of Newport News, 743 F.2d 227, 229(4th Cir. 1984)). A plaintiff may establish the existence of a“policy or custom,” with the requisite particularity, in one offour ways:(1) through an express policy, such as a written ordinanceor regulation; (2) through the decisions of a person withfinal policymaking authority; (3) through an omission, suchas a failure to properly train officers, that “manifest[s]deliberate indifference to the rights of citizens”; or (4)through a practice that is so “persistent and widespread” asto constitute a “custom or usage with the force of law.”*9 Johnson, 452 F. Supp. 3d at 308 (quoting Lytle v. Doyle,326 F.3d 463, 471 (4th Cir. 2003)); see also Owens, 767F.3d at 402–03 (holding that plaintiff sufficiently allegeda widespread practice of officers knowingly suppressingexculpatory evidence in criminal prosecutions on multipleoccasions, and his allegations, though brief, made out aplausible claim of an “impermissible custom”); Washington
BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. HON. CLARK A. RITCHIE, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.7v. Balt. Police Dep't, 457 F. Supp. 3d 520, 535 (D. Md.2020) (determining that complaint survived the 12(b)(6) stagebecause it identified three instances when police department'sfailure to train officers to disclose Brady evidence andfailure to modify Brady training program led to wrongfulconvictions); Harris v. Piedmont Reg'l Jail Auth., No.3:24cv799, 2025 WL 2581839, at *10 (E.D. Va. Sep. 5,2025) (holding that merely stating that “it was the custom,practice or policy of defendant-jail to inadequately traintheir employees ... [or] failing to adequately discourageconstitutional violations on the part of their employees” wasa conclusory, formulaic recitation of the elements of a Monellclaim and could not survive a motion to dismiss).At the threshold, Bailey has failed to identify an officialRockingham County policy causing his injuries and hasonly formulaically recited that the County's failure to traincontributed to them. (See Compl. ¶¶ 85, 87.) See alsoTwombly, 550 U.S. at 555; Owens, 767 F.3d at 402–03. Hetherefore fails to state a Monell claim on these grounds.Moreover, most of Bailey's allegations describe RockinghamCounty's “tolera[nce] and perpetuat[ion]” of customs thatresult in allegedly discriminatory decisions in child-custodydisputes. (Compl. 86.) From these allegations, the courtregards Bailey's Monell claim as one premised on a theoryof “condonation,” or the “failure by municipal policymakersto put a stop to or correct a widespread pattern ofunconstitutional conduct.” Spell v. McDaniel, 824 F.2d 1380,1389 (4th Cir. 1987). To bring a viable Monell claim under thecondonation theory, a plaintiff must establish “a persistent andwidespread practice of municipal officials, the duration andfrequency of which indicate that policymakers (1) had actualor constructive knowledge of the conduct, and (2) failedto correct it due to their deliberate indifference.” Owens,767 F.3d at 402; see Newhard v. Borders, 649 F. Supp. 2d440, 446 (W.D. Va. 2009) (dismissing complaint for lack offacts that would “support[ed] a conclusion that the Town'sgoverning officials were actually or constructively awareof persistent and widespread constitutional deprivations byTown officers.”). Plaintiffs face a high bar in establishingdeliberate indifference and, generally, must allege patternsof a municipality condoning constitutional violations, savefor obvious and extreme examples of deliberate indifference.See Lane v. Fayette Cnty. Comm'n, No. 2:18-cv-01223, 2019WL4780815, at *3 (S.D.W. Va. Sep. 30, 2019).Bailey's allegations fall well short of this exacting standard.His allegations against the County, with respect to its“tolera[nce] and perpetua[tion]” of unjust customs, areconclusory, speculative,9 and fail to paint a plausiblepicture that Rockingham County knew of and condonedunconstitutional practices.10 (Compl. ¶¶ 41, 86 (alleging thatRockingham County tolerates “racially based assumptionsabout Black fathers ... in decision-making,” relies on“dismissed criminal charges ... as valid indicators of danger orunfitness,” and does not afford “equal procedural respect” to“Black pro se fathers”). At bottom, Bailey does not “point[ ] toany instances of such misconduct other than the instant case,”and therefore cannot establish that Rockingham County “wasaware of such conduct or if it made a deliberate choice”to condone it. Lane, 2019 WL4780815, at *3. Therefore,Bailey's final claim will be dismissed.IV. CONCLUSION*10 For the reasons discussed above, the court will grantBailey's application to proceed in forma pauperis, but it willdismiss his Complaint.The Clerk is directed to forward a copy of this MemorandumOpinion and accompanying Order to the parties.ENTERED this 27th day of January, 2026.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 210416Footnotes1The court also notes that voluminous state court records accompany Bailey's filings. (See ECF No. 3.) Forbrevity, the court only includes those facts from the state-court proceedings that are relevant to resolvingBailey's instant claims.
BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. HON. CLARK A. RITCHIE, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.82A complaint is also subject to summary dismissal if it is determined to be “frivolous or malicious,” 28 U.S.C §1915(e)(2)(B)(i), or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief,” id. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii). As noted below, some of the named defendants are protected by absolute immunity, and thus theclaims against them are subject to dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii).3“A judicial function” is determined by “whether it is a function normally performed by a judge, and to theexpectations of the parties, i.e., whether they dealt with the judge in his judicial capacity.” Stump v. Sparkman,435 U.S. 349, 362 (1978). There is no doubt that, in ruling on the matters before the court, Judge Ritchiewas exercising judicial functions.4Bailey also asserts a § 1983 claim against Jennifer Brown in her individual capacity. “Personal participationof a defendant is a necessary element of a § 1983 claim against a government official in his or her individualcapacity[,]” and without allegations establishing a defendant's personal actions contributing to a plaintiff'sinjury, the claim will fail. Herrera v. Finan, 176 F. Supp. 3d 549, 568 (D.S.C. 2016) (citing Trulock v. Freeh,275 F.3d 391, 402 (4th Cir. 2001)). Here, Bailey's allegations concern only Jennifer Brown's actions taken inher role as the guardian ad litem. (See generally Compl.) Similarly, Bailey sues Alana Brown in her individualcapacity as well, though his allegations concern her alleged wrongdoing in her professional capacity. (Id.)Bailey, therefore, has not stated a claim against these Defendants in their individual capacities.5Further, the bulk of Bailey's allegations against Jennifer Brown concern her failure to be “a neutral advocatefor the child's best interests,” her “open hostility” towards Bailey, and her potential “divided loyalt[ies].” (Compl.¶¶ 30, 32, 33.) While these allegations, if true, may raise ethical considerations, they do not form the basisfor a § 1983 action. See Laws v. Priority Tr. Servs. N. Carolina, LLC, 375 F. App'x 345, 348 (4th Cir. 2010)(affirming district court's conclusion that “the complaint did not plead ... a violation of anything other thanthe North Carolina Rules of Professional Conduct, which ... cannot serve as a basis for civil liability in NorthCarolina”).6Bailey also alleges a § 1983 claim for malicious prosecution against “Joint State Actors.” (See Compl., CountIV.) Because Bailey has not specifically identified these individuals, the court cannot assess the validity ofthe claims against them, and they will be dismissed as well.7Bailey cannot state a procedural due process claim because he has not alleged any violations of his right tonotice and an opportunity to be heard. “At bottom, procedural due process requires fair notice of impendingstate action and an opportunity to be heard[.]” Snider Int'l Corp. v. Town of Forest Heights, Maryland, 739F.3d 140, 146 (4th Cir. 2014) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333 (1976)); see also ClevelandBd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985). In fact, the Complaint makes it apparent that he receivednotice of and was present at the child custody, enforcement, and contempt proceedings. That the state courtcast doubt on the veracity of Bailey's court filings—that is, the court suspected the use of generative artificialintelligence (“AI”) based on citations to nonexistent authorities (see ECF No. 3, Attach. 1 at 922–25)—doesnot constitute a procedural due process violation, but rather reflects a serious concern that AI jeopardizesthe integrity of the judicial system. See Iovino v. Michael Stapleton Assocs., No. 5:21-cv-00064, 2024 WL3520170, at *7 (W.D. Va. July 24, 2024).8Bailey also alleges that “Brown has ongoing professional relationships and entanglements with local officesand practitioners.” (Compl. 32.) While Bailey fails to specify whether he refers to Jennifer Brown or AlanaBrown, the court construes this as an allegation against the former, given that the allegation is bookendedby other allegations against Jennifer Brown and is lodged in a section entitled “Guardian ad Litem Bias andConflicts.” (See id. ¶¶ 29–33.)9Insofar as Bailey alleges that other Black fathers are treated similarly in child-custody proceedings, the courtis at a loss to see how he can make such a statement, given that matters involving minor children are not open
BRIAN BAILEY, Plaintiff, v. HON. CLARK A. RITCHIE, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.9to the public. See, e.g., Va. Code Ann. §§ 16.1-302(C) (“The general public shall be excluded from all juvenilecourt hearings and only such persons admitted as the judge shall deem proper.”); 19.2-266 (prohibiting mediacoverage in “child custody proceedings”). Nevertheless, as part of its screening obligation under 28 U.S.C.§ 1915, the court accepts Bailey's allegations as true.10Bailey's only semi-specific allegation is that he “has repeatedly observed that white litigants in the samecourthouse are treated with more patience, more presumption of good faith, and more willingness to credittheir testimony, while Black fathers are presumed to be ‘deadbeats’ or abusers unless they can overcomethat starting point.” (Compl. 40.) This allegation is troublesome, if true, but it is not specifically directedtowards the County.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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