from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, the district court entered a judgment on the pleadings as to it. Finding Barrett’s allegations insufficient to satisfy an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, judgment was also entered in favor of the individual board members. The judge concluded Barrett’s attempt to amend her complaint would be futile and denied as moot her challenge to a magistrate judge’s order denying a stipulated confidential discovery motion. In this appeal she challenges all of those decisions.
II. DISCUSSION
We review the district court’s Rule 12(c) dismissal under the same standard applicable to Rule 12(b)(6). Corder v. Lewis Palmer Sch. Dist. No. 38, 566 F.3d 1219, 1223 (10th Cir.2009). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’ ” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007)). “[M]ere labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not suffice; a plaintiff must offer specific factual allegations to support each claim.” Kan. Penn Gaming, LLC v. Collins, 656 F.3d 1210, 1214 (10th Cir.2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). We also review de novo the application of Eleventh Amendment immunity. See Chamber of Commerce of U.S. v. Edmondson, 594 F.3d 742, 760 (10th Cir.2010).
A. Eleventh Amendment Immunity
The Board is an arm of the State of New Mexico. See N.M. Const. Art. 12, § § 3 & 11 (providing UNM, as a state university, is under the exclusive control of the State); N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-7-3 (1978) (stating the Board has control over “[t]he management and control of [UNM]”). Accordingly, it is immune from Barrett’s suit under the Eleventh Amendment, as are its members sued in their official capacities. See Buchwald v. Univ. of N.M. Sch. of Med., 159 F.3d 487, 494 n. 3 (10th Cir.1998) (UNM and its Regents “are arms of the state, entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity” (internal quotation marks omitted) (collecting cases)).
Barrett claims to be entitled to the prospective equitable relief of reinstatement, leaving her claim viable against the individual Board members pursuant to Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 28 S.Ct. 441, 52 L.Ed. 714 (1908). That case recognizes an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity for suits brought “against a state officer in his official capacity seeking only prospective relief.” See Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 760. The exception is very narrow, however, applying only to prospective relief and requiring an ongoing violation of federal law. Buchwald, 159 F.3d at 495. A plaintiff must adequately allege the individual official’s duty to enforce the statute in question and a demonstrated willingness to do so. Edmondson, 594 F.3d at 760. Barrett’s general allegations of responsibility to enforce the ADA are insufficient because individual Board members are not empowered to act individually, but must act as “a body corporate.” N.M. Stat. Ann. § 21-7-4 (1978). Barrett cannot demonstrate an exception to Eleventh Amendment immunity, even assuming she can show violation of the ADA.
B. Amendment of Complaint
Barrett faults the district judge for not allowing her to plead additional facts or name additional defendants, even though he mentioned, at a pre-trial conference, the possibility of former supervisors being appropriate defendants. “[Barrett]