Bettis v. Gaston (Feb. 9, 2026)

Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Feb. 9, 2026
Disposition
Motion Granted
Majority
Manish S. Shah (J.) (unanimous Court)
Robert Bettis, Plaintiff, v. Sabrina Gaston, Evelyn Smith, Sarah..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 353214Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division,Eastern Division.Robert Bettis, Plaintiff,v.Sabrina Gaston, Evelyn Smith, Sarah Melgarejo,Cathy Ryan, Marikaw Carr, Lance Wells, and John/Jane Doe 1–5 Maryville Floor Staff, Defendants.No. 25 CV 892|Filed: 02/09/2026Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERManish S. Shah United States District Judge*1 Plaintiff Robert Bettis sues defendants Sabrina Gaston,Evelyn Smith, Sarah Melgarejo, Cathy Ryan, Marikaw Carr,Lance Wells, and unnamed staff from Maryville Academyfor violations of the First, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, Fourteenth,and Twenty-First Amendments to the U.S. Constitution, andfor violations of the Illinois Abused and Neglected ChildReporting Act. The named defendants all move to dismiss forfailure to state a claim. For the reasons discussed below, themotion is granted.I. Legal StandardsA complaint requires only “a short and plain statement”showing that the plaintiff is entitled to relief. Fed. R. Civ.P. 8(a)(2); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 677–78 (2009).To survive a motion to dismiss under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the plaintiff must allege facts that “allow[ ] the court todraw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable forthe misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. “Threadbarerecitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mereconclusory statements” are insufficient. Id.At this stage, I accept all factual allegations in the complaintas true and draw all reasonable inferences in the plaintiff'sfavor. Id.III. FactsPlaintiff Robert Bettis filed a complaint alleging that fromMarch 7, 2013, to July 21, 2014, he was physically andsexually assaulted and abused by staff at Maryville Academy,where he was placed by the Illinois Department of Childrenand Family Services. [19] ¶¶ 1–7.1 Despite repeated requestsfor intervention or relocation, he was ignored. [19] 7.Bettis alleges that defendants Marikaw Carr physicallyassaulted him following a suicide attempt, SabrinaGaston refused his request for transfer despite knowledgeof “ongoing risk,” Sarah Melgarejo failed to provideadequate mental health interventions or safeguards, EvelynSmith “neglected her operational responsibilities, therebyfacilitating an environment in which abuse could occur,”and Lance Wells, a supervisor, negligently ignored Bettis'sreports of abuse. [19] 8. Bettis also alleges that theunnamed defendants “directly participated in instances ofabuse (physical, sexual, or psychological) even after Plaintiffalerted them to his need for assistance.” [19] 8.Bettis alleges that as a result, he has suffered panic attacks,suicidal ideations, severe anxiety, sleep deprivation, and otherpsychological and physical harms. [19] 9.IV. AnalysisA. Two-Dismissal RuleDefendants say that Bettis has already brought two previousactions based on the same claim and voluntarily dismissedboth. They argue that this case is now barred by the two-dismissal rule.Rule 41 states that a plaintiff may dismiss an action without acourt order by filing a notice of dismissal before a defendantanswers or files a motion for summary judgment. Fed. R. Civ.P. 41(a)(1)(A). If a plaintiff voluntarily dismisses a case andthen voluntarily dismisses “any federal- or state-court actionbased on or including the same claim, a notice of dismissaloperates as an adjudication on the merits.” Fed. R. Civ. P.41(a)(1)(B). The effect is what is known as the “two dismissalrule”—a second voluntary dismissal bars further litigation.
Robert Bettis, Plaintiff, v. Sabrina Gaston, Evelyn Smith, Sarah..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2Sutton Place Dev. Co. v. Abacus Mortg. Inv. Co., 826 F.2d637, 639 (7th Cir. 1987).*2 “By its own clear terms, the ‘two dismissal’ rule appliesonly when the second dismissal is by notice under Rule 41(a)(1). It does not apply to a dismissal by stipulation nor toan involuntary dismissal nor to a dismissal by court orderunder Rule 41(a)(2).” Id. at 640 (quoting 9 C. Wright & A.Miller, Federal Practice & Procedure § 2368, at 188 (1971))(emphasis added); see also Garrett v. United States, 178F.3d 940, 942 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Here, the dismissal was bycourt order, and Rule 41(a)(1) expressly does not apply todismissals by court order.”).Defendants say that Bettis has voluntarily dismissed twocases based on the same claim, one in federal court and onein Illinois state court. They attach a court order from theLake County Circuit Court as evidence that Bettis voluntarilydismissed the state court action. The order reads, [33-4]:This Cause coming before the Court for Plaintiff's Motionto Voluntarily Dismiss, due notice having being [sic] given,and the Court being fully advised on the premises, IT ISHEREBY ORDERED:1. The claims and causes of action filed by Plaintiff RobertBettis are hereby voluntarily dismissed in their entiretywithout prejudice and with each party to bear its owncosts and attorneys’ fees.Because the dismissal in the Lake County Circuit Court wasby court order, Rule 41(a)(1) does not apply. Garrett, 178 F.3dat 942. Since Bettis has not voluntarily dismissed two casesunder Rule 41(a)(1), the two-dismissal rule does not apply.2B. Statute of LimitationsDefendants also argue that Bettis's suit is barred by the statuteof limitations for personal injury actions, which is two years.Bettis says that the limitations period for childhood sexualabuse claims are twenty years from discovery, and so hisclaims are timely. 735 ILCS 5/13-202.2(b). Bettis also arguesthat if the two-year limitation applies, that it should be tolledbecause he was a minor at the time of the violation, becausehe had a disability, because the violation was a continuingviolation, and because defendants fraudulently concealedinformation necessary to his suit.*3 Dismissal on statute of limitations grounds is proper on amotion to dismiss only when the plaintiff's allegations clearlyestablish that the claims are untimely. Cielak v. Nicolet UnionHigh Sch. Dist., 112 F.4th 472, 477 (7th Cir. 2024).1. The applicable statute of limitationsBettis brings his claims through 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Federallaw does not provide a limitations period for § 1983 claims,so I look to Illinois law to determine the applicable statuteof limitations. Id. There is a two-year statute of limitationsfor personal injury actions in Illinois. 735 ILCS 5/13-202.Although Bettis says that there is a twenty-year statute oflimitations on child sexual abuse claims, “the limitationsperiod applicable to all § 1983 claims brought in Illinoisis two years, as provided in 735 ILCS 5/13-202, and thisincludes § 1983 claims involving allegations of failure toprotect from childhood sexual abuse.” Woods v. Ill. Dep'tof Child. & Fam. Servs., 710 F.3d 762, 768 (7th Cir. 2013)(emphasis in original). The two-year statute of limitationsapplies to Bettis's claims.2. AccrualFederal law governs the accrual of § 1983 claims. Ghelf v.Town of Wheatland, 132 F.4th 456, 469 (7th Cir. 2025). Aplaintiff's claim accrues when a plaintiff “knows or shouldknow that his constitutional rights were violated.” Id.; see alsoAmin Ijbara Equity Corp. v. Village of Oak Lawn, 860 F.3d489, 493 (7th Cir. 2017) (“Accrual occurs when a plaintiffknows the fact and the cause of an injury.”).Defendants say that Bettis's claims accrued on or aroundJuly 21, 2014, and therefore he had until July 21, 2016, tofile his claims. Bettis says his claims did not accrue untilhe was “emancipated” in 2019. Bettis also contends that hisclaims did not accrue until he was released from Maryville,because the defendant's violations were “ongoing conditionsthat persisted daily until Plaintiff's removal.” [36] at 4.Bettis's claims are based on abuse he allegedly endured fromMarch 2013 to July 2014. Bettis's complaint also alleges thathe reported this abuse and requested intervention or relocationand was ignored, and that defendants failed to protect himfrom the abuse. [19] ¶¶ 7–8. Bettis's reports to staff andrequests for intervention or relocation show that he knew thefact and the cause of his injury when he made complaintswhile at Maryville. Amin Ijbara, 860 F.3d at 493. And hisallegations show that he knew that his requests were ignored
Robert Bettis, Plaintiff, v. Sabrina Gaston, Evelyn Smith, Sarah..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3and the defendants failed to protect him when no action wastaken to intervene or relocate him and he was further harmed.[19] 8. Because Bettis knew the fact of and cause of hisconstitutional violations by the time he left Maryville, hisclaims accrued in July 2014. The statute of limitations to bringhis constitutional claims expired in July 2016.Under the continuing-violation doctrine, a claim “accrues notjust once but repeatedly as a defendant continually wrongsa plaintiff.” Ghelf, 132 F.4th at 469 (quoting Milchtein v.Milwaukee Cnty., 42 F.4th 814, 823 (7th Cir. 2022)). Wherea tort “involves continuous or repeated injurious behavior ...the limitations period is held in abeyance and the plaintiff'scause of action does not accrue until the date the final injuryoccurs or the tortuous acts cease.” Logan v. City of Chicago, 4F.4th 529, 540 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting Taylor v. Bd. of Educ.of City of Chi., 2014 IL App (1st) 123744, 46). Assumingthe defendants continually wronged Bettis by ignoring hisreports and failing to protect him while he was in theircare, those wrongs ended in July 2014 when Bettis wasremoved from Maryville Academy. Bettis himself argues thatthe violations were “ongoing until Plaintiff's removal.” [36]at 4. The limitations period then began to run, and ended twoyears later, in July 2016. 735 ILCS 5/13-202.3. Tolling*4 Bettis argues that even if his claims accrued in July2014, his claims are timely because the statute of limitationswas tolled because he was a minor at the time his claimsaccrued, because he has a disability, because the violationsfall under the continuing-violation doctrine, and because theIllinois Department of Children and Family Services engagedin fraudulent concealment.If a person entitled to bring an action is under the age ofeighteen years old at the time the cause of action accrues,then the statute of limitations is tolled until two years after theperson turns eighteen. 735 ILCS 5/13-211(a). Bettis turnedeighteen on October 29, 2019. [33] at 7. He alleges that hewas abused in 2013 and 2014. Because he was a minor at thetime his cause of action accrued, the statute of limitations wastolled until October 29, 2021. He filed this case in January2025, over three years past that date. His claims are not timely.Bettis also contends that the statute of limitations shouldbe tolled because he has a “mild intellectual disability,PTSD, depression, and related disorders, conditions thatimpaired his ability to navigate the legal system withoutassistance.” [36] at 4. When a plaintiff has a legal disability,the statute of limitations is tolled until the plaintiff is nolonger disabled. 735 ILCS 5/13-211(a). Not all disabilitiesare legal disabilities. Sille v. McCann Constr. Specialties Co.,265 Ill.App.3d 1051, 1054 (1st Dist. 1994). To have a legaldisability, a person must be “incapable of managing [his]person or property and could not comprehend [his] rights orthe nature of the act giving rise to [his] cause of action.”Brucker v. Mercola, 227 Ill.2d 502, 543 (2007) (quotingBloom v. Braun, 317 Ill.App.3d 720, 730–31 (1st Dist. 2000)).The “record must contain sufficient allegations of fact fromwhich one could conclude that the person seeking to be foundlegally disabled was incompetent or suffered from seriousmental disorder which made that person entirely withoutunderstanding or capacity to make or communicate decisionsregarding his person and totally unable to manage his estateor financial affairs.” In re Doe, 301 Ill.App.3d 123, 127 (1stDist. 1998). “In a personal injury case, a person is not legallydisabled if he or she can comprehend the nature of the injuryand its implications.” Id.While Bettis says that his disabilities impaired his abilityto navigate the system, he has not made any allegationsthat he is without any understanding or capacity to makeor communicate decisions regarding his person. He arguesthat through the Illinois Division of Rehabilitation Services,he has received continuing assistance including personalassistant services, housing subsidies, transportation vouchers,vocational rehabilitation, educational support, and disabilitycounseling. Even if true, these services do not show that hehad no understanding or capacity to make or communicatedecisions regarding his person and that he is totally unable tomanage his financial affairs. Id. Bettis was making Freedomof Information Act requests of the Illinois Department ofChildren and Family Services as early as 2019. [33-1] at 21–22, 61. The requests continued into 2022. [33-1] at 26, 28,63. And as early as 2017, Bettis was emailing foster-care casemanagers, asking if there was any available money for him forfood, living arrangements, and clothing. [33-1] at 54. Despitehis impairments, he was able to advocate for himself and wasable to, at the very least, communicate decisions about hisperson.*5 Bettis has also not made any allegations that he couldnot comprehend the nature of his injury and its implications.Instead, his complaint shows that he did understand the natureof his injuries, even soon after he had experienced the abuse.He reported the abuse to the defendants and requested a
Robert Bettis, Plaintiff, v. Sabrina Gaston, Evelyn Smith, Sarah..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4transfer or some sort of intervention while he was still livingat Maryville. [19] 8.Bettis was required to allege facts that show he was legallydisabled. None of the allegations in the complaint do so.His arguments in his response brief, that he has a “mildintellectual disability, PTSD, depression, and related orders,”do not suggest a legal disability, especially in light ofhis active participation in investigating his case since heturned eighteen and his own allegations that he reported theabuse and requested a transfer or intervention—showing anunderstanding of the nature and implications of his injuries.[36] at 4. Because he has not alleged facts to support hiscontention that he suffered a legal disability, his conditionscannot toll the statute of limitations. Doe, 301 Ill.App.3d at127–28.Finally, Bettis contends that the Illinois Department ofChildren and Family Services engaged in fraudulentconcealment, tolling the statute of limitations. He says thatthe Illinois Department of Children and Family Services“withheld records and obstructed Plaintiff's FOIA requests,directly delaying discovery of the full extent of injuries andidentities of responsible actors.” [36] at 4.Under Illinois law, “[i]f a person liable to an action concealsthe cause of such action from the knowledge of the personentitled thereto, the action may be commenced at any timewithin 5 years after the person entitled to bring the samediscovers that he or she has such cause of action.” 735 ILCS5/13-215. Fraudulent concealment acts as an exception to astatute of limitations. Wisniewski v. Diocese of Belleville, 406Ill.App.3d 1119, 1154 (1st Dist. 2011). Generally, fraudulentconcealment must be affirmative acts or representations thatare “calculated to lull or induce a claimant into delaying filingof his claim or to prevent a claimant from discovering hisclaim.” Doe v. Boy Scouts of Am., 2016 IL App (1st) 152406, 81 (quoting Wisniewski, 406 Ill.App.3d at 1154). Silenceis usually not enough to establish fraudulent concealment,but where there is a “special relationship,” like a fiduciaryor someone in a position of trust and confidence, silencemay be the basis for fraudulent concealment. Wisniewski, 406Ill.App.3d at 1154–55; Duba ex rel. Crest Hill Land Dev., LLCv. Keepsafe Pub. Storage, LLC, 2025 IL App (3d) 230408, 54–55.Absent a special relationship, a plaintiff must plead andprove that “(1) the defendant engaged in affirmative actsor representations intended to ‘lull or induce’ the plaintiffto fail to discover his claim, (2) knowing them to befalse, (3) intending to deceive and (4) actually deceivingthe plaintiff, and (5) upon which the plaintiff detrimentallyrelied.” Duba, 2025 IL App (3d) 230408, at 54. Wherethere is a special relationship, there is a three-part inquiry:“(1) was there a special relationship between the parties; (2)did the defendant's acts or omissions amount to fraudulentconcealment; and (3) did this fraudulent concealment preventthe plaintiff from discovering his claim.” Id. 55 (quotingBoy Scouts of Am., 2016 IL App (1st) 152406, at 85).*6 Bettis claims that the Illinois Department of Childrenand Family Services and its “contractors” withheld recordsand obstructed plaintiff's information requests. But the IllinoisDepartment of Children and Family Services is not adefendant in this case, and Bettis makes no allegationsthat any defendant in the case was a “contractor” whowithheld records or obstructed his information requests orotherwise withheld information from Bettis. Shropshear v.Corp. Counsel of City of Chi., 275 F.3d 593, 597 (7th Cir.2001) (“Neither of the alleged concealers was ‘a person liableto an action’ ... and so their conduct cannot bring [the plaintiff]within the protection of the fraudulent-concealment statute.”).Because none of the alleged concealers was liable to theaction, fraudulent concealment does not apply.Even if the defendants here are included in “contractors,”fraudulent concealment does not apply. Assuming thatthere was a special relationship between Bettis and theIllinois Department of Children and Family Services and itscontractors, and that the silence in response to his requestsfor information amounted to fraudulent concealment, Bettishas not alleged any facts that the fraudulent concealmentprevented him from discovering his claim. A plaintiff cannotbenefit from the fraudulent concealment doctrine where he“possesses sufficient information that provides actual orconstructive notice to the cause of action, regardless of afiduciary's silence.” Duba, 2025 IL App (3d) 230408, at 57(citing Melko v. Dionisio, 219 Ill.App.3d 1048, 1062 (2d Dist.1991)). “[A]lthough the existence of a fiduciary relationshipmay excuse a plaintiff's failure to investigate diligently toascertain facts that would put her on notice of possible injury,there is plainly a difference between the failure to ascertainfacts through diligent inquiry and the failure to act upon factsof which the plaintiff already has knowledge.” GuaranteeTr. Life Ins. Co. v. Kribbs, 2016 IL App (1st) 160672, 41 (quoting Melko, 219 Ill.App.3d at 1062) (emphasis inoriginal). Bettis does not say that he did not know about theacts of abuse or that he did not know that he was injured by
Robert Bettis, Plaintiff, v. Sabrina Gaston, Evelyn Smith, Sarah..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5the acts of abuse. Instead, he only argues that the withholdingof information delayed the discovery of the full extent of hisinjuries. [36] at 4. But a “cause of action accrues even thoughthe full extent of the injury is not then known.” Cielak, 112F.4th at 478. Bettis's “allegations unambiguously show heknew both the fact ([the abuse and the failure to address it])and cause of his injury (defendants’ [abuse and decision tokeep Bettis at Maryville]) and thereby had a complete causeof action” by July 2014. Id.; Duba, 2025 IL App (3d) 230408,at 57.As for the alleged failure to identify who caused his injuries,“Illinois courts have unequivocally construed [the fraudulentconcealment statue] to reach only fraudulent concealmentof the cause of action—not fraudulent concealment of theidentity of the tortfeasor.” Smith v. City of Chi. Heights, 951F.2d 834, 935 (7th Cir. 1992) (collecting cases); see alsoGuarantee Tr., 2016 IL App (1st) 160672, at 35 (fraudulentconcealment applies only to “causes of action and not tothe identity of a defendant”). Any withholding of names ofpotential defendants does not show fraudulent concealment.Because the statute of limitations bars Bettis's claims, hisclaims for violations of the First, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth,Fourteenth, and Twenty-First Amendments to the U.S.Constitution are dismissed with prejudice. LJM Partners, Ltd.v. Barclays Cap., Inc., __ F.4th __, 2026 WL 114648, at *5,*12–13 (7th Cir. Jan. 15, 2026) (affirming dismissal withprejudice of claims barred by the statute of limitations becauseamendment would be futile).C. Collective Limitations Defense*7 Bettis claims that the defendants’ “collective limitationsdefense is procedurally defective and prejudicial.” [36] at 5.None of Bettis's cited cases support this argument. Brooksv. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 581 (7th Cir. 2009) discusses whata plaintiff must plead to give defendants notice of whatthe claim is. Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246 (7th Cir.1995) does not discuss whether certain defenses or doctrinesare defendant-specific. And Glasser v. United States, 315U.S. 60, 70–72 (1942) and Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S.475, 482 (1978) discuss conflicts of interest when the samelawyer represents two co-defendants in a criminal case—and whether it is prejudicial to the defendants. Hollowaymakes clear that even in criminal cases, joint representationis not a per se violation of the constitutional guarantees ofeffective assistance of counsel. Holloway, 435 U.S. at 482.It is only when the defendants have conflicting intereststhat joint representation violates a criminal defendant's rightto effective assistance of counsel. Id. at 483–84. But civillitigants have no constitutional right to effective assistanceof counsel. Black v. Wrigley, 997 F.3d 702, 712 (7th Cir.2021). And joint representation would be prejudicial to thedefendants, not to Bettis. There is no support for Bettis's claimthat collective defenses prejudice him and are proceduraldefective.D. Illinois Abused and Neglected Child Reporting ActDefendants argue that I should relinquish jurisdiction of thestate law claims. But I have discretion to retain jurisdictionwhen federal claims have dropped out: when “it is obvioushow the claims should be decided.” Williams Elecs. Games,Inc. v. Garrity, 479 F.3d 904, 907 (7th Cir. 2007). Here,it is obvious how the state-law claim should be decided.The Illinois Abused and Neglected Child Reporting Act doesnot give rise to a private cause of action. Doe-2 v. McLeanCnty. Unit Dist. No. 5 Bd. of Dirs., 593 F.3d 507, 514 (7thCir. 2010); Varela v. St. Elizabeth's Hosp. of Chi., Inc., 372Ill.App.3d 714, 719, 723, 728–29 (1st Dist. 2006) (“Illinoisstate and federal courts have soundly rejected previousattempts to imply a private cause of action from the statutorylanguage.”); Doe 1 ex rel. Tanya S. v. N. Cent. Behav. HealthSys., Inc., 352 Ill.App.3d 284, 288 (3d Dist. 2004). Becausethere is no private cause of action under the Illinois Abusedand Neglected Child Reporting Act, any amendment wouldbe futile, and Bettis's claims under the Act are dismissed withprejudice. Reilly v. Will Cnty. Sheriff's Off., 142 F.4th 924, 930(7th Cir. 2025).IV. ConclusionThe defendants’ motion to dismiss, [33], is granted. Thisaction is dismissed with prejudice. Enter judgment andterminate civil case.ENTER:All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 353214
Robert Bettis, Plaintiff, v. Sabrina Gaston, Evelyn Smith, Sarah..., Slip Copy (2026) © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6Footnotes1Bracketed numbers refer to entries on the district court docket. Referenced page numbers are taken from theCM/ECF header placed on the top of filings. The facts are taken from plaintiff's first amended complaint, [19].2In responding to defendants’ arguments regarding the two-dismissal rule, Bettis cited Dvorak v. MetropolitanPier & Exposition Authority, 941 F.3d 936 (7th Cir. 2019). As defendants point out, it appears that this casedoes not exist. Bettis also cited LeBeau v. Taco Bell, Inc., 892 F.2d 605 (7th Cir. 1989), which does notdiscuss the two-dismissal rule at all. Later in his brief, he cited to a quotation that does not exist in Brooksv. Ross, 578 F.3d 574 (7th Cir. 2009) (a real case), and to Williams v. Ramos, 71 F.3d 1246 (7th Cir. 1995),which does not provide any support for his contention. Citations to non-existent cases or to false support inexisting cases are hallmarks of generative artificial intelligence. Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, __F.4th __, 2026 WL 157661, at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026). “[A]ll litigants—represented and unrepresented—must read their filings and take reasonable care to avoid misrepresentations, factual and legal.” Id. at *3.While courts’ “understanding of honest mistakes and common presentational foot faults will remain,” a courtfiling will not be allowed “to include misrepresentations on legal or factual points that an unrepresented partyreasonably knows or should know exist.” Id. I warn Bettis that, in the future, if he submits filings in a courtwithout exercising reasonable care to check the accuracy of his filings, he may be sanctioned. Based on thecurrent available technology, relying on computer-generated language without verification is not reasonablecare.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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