Bey v. Glass, No. 8:25-cv-01977-WFJ-CPT (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Ali Taj Bey v. Mark Glass
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Jung (Justice)
ALI TAJ BEY, Plaintiff, v. MARK GLASS, in his official capacity..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3442739Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, M.D. Florida.ALI TAJ BEY, Plaintiff,v.MARK GLASS, in his official capacity asCommissioner of the Florida Department ofLaw Enforcement; VICTOR D. CRIST, in hisofficial capacity as Clerk and Comptroller ofHillsborough County, Florida, Defendants.Case No. 8:25-cv-01977-WFJ-CPT|12/01/2025Editor's Note: This decision contains discussion of citationreferences that are incorrect or do not actually exist. Theseinvalid citations appeared in the original court opinion andhave been preserved as written since they are part of theofficial record. Any links to these invalid citations have beenremoved.Attorneys and Law FirmsAli Taj Bey, St. Petersburg, FL, Pro Se.Caitlin E. Wilcox, Office of the Attorney General, Tampa, FL,for Defendant Mark Glass.Jason L. Margolin, Akerman LLP, Tampa, FL, for DefendantVictor D. Crist.ORDER*1 Before the Court are Defendants Mark Glass,Commissioner of the Florida Department of LawEnforcement (“Commissioner Glass”) and Victor D. Crist's,in his official capacity as Clerk of Circuit Court &Comptroller, Hillsborough County, Florida (“Clerk Crist”),Motions to Dismiss the Amended Complaint under FederalRule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (6). Dkts. 92, 94.Plaintiff Ali Bey, proceeding pro se, has responded inopposition. Dkts. 100, 101. For the reasons explained below,the Court grants the motions to dismiss without prejudice.BACKGROUNDThis dispute centers around Plaintiff Bey suing severalDefendants,1 including Commissioner Glass and Clerk Crist,because he disputes his state felony conviction. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 74,75.In the Complaint, Plaintiff alleges he “applied to multiple app-based platforms” seeking employment, and that Checkr Inc.furnished consumer reports containing “a criminal convictionfrom Hillsborough County Circuit Court in Case No. 21-CF-014072-A” for “Felon in Possession of a Firearm.” Id.¶¶ 83, 85. Plaintiff argues that “[t]he conviction arose froma prosecution that Plaintiff alleges was void, constitutionallydefective, and grounded on an expunged prior predicateoffense.” Id. 86.Concerning Commissioner Glass and Clerk Crist, Plaintiff'sallegations against them are only two sentences: “DefendantVictor D. Crist, in his capacity as Clerk and Comptroller,continues to maintain and disseminate the void judgment viapublic and commercial access channels[,] [and] DefendantMark Glass, in his capacity as FDLE Commissioner,continues to publish and make available Plaintiff'scriminal history through law enforcement and third-partyintegrations.” Id. ¶¶ 101, 102.On July 28, 2025, Plaintiff filed suit against nine defendants,asserting various claims against each defendant. Seegenerally id. As relevant to Commissioner Glass andClerk Crist, only Count V in the Complaint is directed atDefendants, which “seeks a declaratory judgment that theconviction in Case No. 21-CF-014072-A is void due toconstitutional and jurisdictional defects[,]...[and] injunctiverelief prohibiting...FDLE and Clerk Crist from publishing,transmitting, or certifying the void record[.]” Id. ¶¶ 69, 70.LEGAL STANDARDAs an initial matter, pro se litigants’ filings are liberallyconstrued. Tannenbaum v. United States, 148 F.3d 1262,1263 (11th Cir. 1998). This liberal reading, however, doesnot exempt pro se plaintiffs from the pleading standardsoutlined in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure or theLocal Rules of the Middle District of Florida. Beckwith v.Bellsouth Telecomms., Inc., 146 F. App'x 368, 371 (11th Cir.2005); Caton v. Louis, No. 2:07-CV-32-FtM-99SPC, 2007
ALI TAJ BEY, Plaintiff, v. MARK GLASS, in his official capacity..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2WL 9718731, at *1 (M.D. Fla. Feb. 21, 2007). Moreover, adistrict court may not serve as a pro se plaintiff's “de factocounsel” or “rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading....” SeeGJR Invs., Inc. v. Cnty. of Escambia, Fla., 132 F.3d 1359,1369 (11th Cir. 1998).*2 When considering a motion to dismiss under FederalRule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), the Court must accept allthe complaint's allegations as true, construing them in a lightmost favorable to the plaintiff. Pielage v. McConnell, 516 F.3d1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2008). The pleading must contain “ashort and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleaderis entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). “To survivedismissal, the complaint's allegations must plausibly suggestthat the [plaintiff] has a right to relief, raising that possibilityabove a speculative level.” James River Ins. Co. v. GroundDown Eng'g, Inc., 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008)(citation modified) (citing Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550U.S. 544, 555–56 (2007)). The Court does not need to acceptas true any bare legal conclusions offered in a complaint.Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).Subject matter jurisdiction must be established before acase can proceed on the merits. See Steel Co. v. Citizensfor a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 94–95 (1998). This isbecause “[f]ederal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.”Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. of Am., 511 U.S. 375, 377(1994). “[B]ecause a federal court is powerless to act beyondits statutory grant of subject matter jurisdiction, a courtmust zealously [e]nsure that jurisdiction exists over a case.”Smith v. GTE Corp., 236 F.3d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 2001)(citation modified). A defendant may challenge subject matterjurisdiction facially or factually. See Douglas v. United States,814 F.3d 1268, 1274–75 (11th Cir. 2016). “A facial attackon the complaint requires the court merely to look and seeif the plaintiff has sufficiently alleged a basis of subjectmatter jurisdiction, and the allegations in his complaint aretaken as true for the purposes of the motion.” Stalley ex rel.U.S. v. Orlando Reg'l Healthcare Sys., Inc., 524 F.3d 1229,1232–33 (11th Cir. 2008) (citation modified). “By contrast,a factual attack on a complaint challenges the existence ofsubject matter jurisdiction using material extrinsic from thepleadings, such as affidavits or testimony.” Id.DISCUSSIONFor the reasons discussed below, the Court grants Defendants’motions to dismiss. As pled, the Court finds thatYounger abstention requires dismissal of Count V againstCommissioner Glass and Clerk Crist.As an initial matter, the Court cannot determine the causeof action being brought by Plaintiff against CommissionerGlass and Clerk Crist in Count V. The heading for Count Vis titled “DECLARATORY AND INJUNCTIVE RELIEF.”Dkt. 1 at 7. Declaratory judgments and injunctions, however,are not causes of action. Instead, they are remedies tied tosome other cause of action. See Alabama v. U.S. Army Corpsof Eng'rs, 424 F.3d 1117, 1127 (11th Cir. 2005) (citationmodified) (“There is no such thing as a suit for a traditionalinjunction in the abstract. For a traditional injunction tobe even theoretically available, a plaintiff must be able toarticulate a basis for relief that would withstand scrutinyunder Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6) (failure to state a claim).”);Goodin v. Fid. Nat. Title Ins. Co., 491 F. App'x 139(11th Cir. 2012) (citing Borden v. Katzman, 881 F.2d 1035,1037 (11th Cir. 1989)) (“The Declaratory Judgment Act, 28U.S.C. § 2201, does not confer jurisdiction upon a federalcourt....Thus, a suit brought under the Declaratory JudgmentAct must have an independent source of jurisdiction, suchas diversity jurisdiction.”); Kornegay v. Beretta USA Corp.,614 F. Supp. 3d 1029, 1037 (N.D. Ala. 2022) (“Declaratoryjudgments and injunctions are not causes of action but, rather,are remedies tied to some other cause of action.”). Plaintiff'sfailure to adequately plead a substantive provision of stateor federal law for which he seeks declaratory and injunctiverelief is already grounds for dismissal.2 Regardless, asdiscussed below, the Court also finds that there are otherindependent grounds warranting dismissal.I. Article III Standing*3 In his motion to dismiss, Commissioner Glass arguesthat Plaintiff has failed to sufficiently plead the elementsnecessary to show Article III standing. Dkt. 92 at 5. Todemonstrate Article III standing, a plaintiff must have “(1)suffered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to thechallenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely tobe redressed by a favorable judicial decision.” Spokeo, Inc.v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 338 (2016) (citation omitted). Thesethree elements “constitute[ ] the core of Article III's case-or-controversy requirement.” Steel Co. v. Citizens for a BetterEnv't, 523 U.S. 83, 103–04 (1998). The plaintiffs bear theburden of establishing each of the three standing elements.Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 167–68 (1997). How muchevidence is necessary to satisfy that burden depends on thestage of litigation at which the standing challenge is made.
ALI TAJ BEY, Plaintiff, v. MARK GLASS, in his official capacity..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Id. At the pleading stage, “general factual allegations ofinjury resulting from the defendant's conduct may suffice, foron a motion to dismiss [the Court] presume[s] that generalallegations embrace those specific facts that are necessary tosupport the claim.” Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S.555, 561 (1992) (citation modified).Here, for the purposes of resolving the motion to dismiss, theCourt finds Plaintiff has sufficiently pled all three elements.First, Plaintiff claims to have suffered an injury in factdue to “adverse employment outcomes, economic injury,reputation damages, and emotional distress.” Dkt. 1 103;see TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 417 (2021)(listing types of “concrete harm[s]” including “physicalharm, monetary harm, or various intangible harms [like]reputational harm”). Second, accepting the factual allegationsas true and liberally construing Plaintiff's pro se Complaint,the alleged injuries are fairly traceable to Commissioner Glassas the head of “the state agency charged with maintainingand publishing criminal history records.” Dkt. 100 at 4;see Dkt. 1 102. Finally, as to redressability, such harmscould be remedied by a favorable judicial decision prohibitingCommission Glass from engaging in such conduct. However,for the reasons discussed below, the Court dismisses theComplaint and abstains from hearing this case under Youngerabstention.II. Younger AbstentionCommissioner Glass also contends that this Court shouldabstain from hearing this case under Younger v. Harris, 401U.S. 37 (1971). Dkt. 92 at 6. “Younger established that,based on principles of comity and federalism, a federalcourt should not interfere with ongoing state criminalproceedings where the state court conviction and/or sentenceis not yet final.” Johnson v. Florida, 32 F.4th 1092, 1099(11th Cir. 2022) (citing Younger, 401 U.S. at 43–45);see Tokyo Gwinnett, LLC v. Gwinnett Cnty., Georgia, 940F.3d 1254, 1261 (11th Cir. 2019) (“[F]ederal courts shouldabstain from hearing suits aimed at restraining pending statecriminal prosecutions.”). “Younger abstention applies only inthree exceptional circumstances: (1) ongoing state criminalprosecutions, (2) certain civil enforcement proceedings, and(3) civil proceedings involving certain orders uniquely infurtherance of the state courts’ ability to perform theirjudicial functions.” Tokyo Gwinnett, 940 F.3d at 1267 (citationmodified). When one of those circumstances exists, a courtmust determine whether abstention was warranted basedon the following factors: “(1) there is an ongoing state-court proceeding at the time of the federal action; (2)the state proceeding implicates an important state interest;and (3) the state proceeding affords the federal plaintiffan adequate opportunity for judicial review of his or herfederal constitutional claims.” Id. at 1268 (citation modified)(quoting Middlesex Cnty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State BarAss'n, 457 U.S. 423, 432 (1982)). If these factors are satisfied,a federal court can abstain under Younger. See New GeorgiaProject, Inc. v. Att'y Gen., State of Georgia, 106 F.4th 1237,1242– 43 (11th Cir. 2024).*4 As to the first Middlesex factor, “a state proceedingis considered ‘ongoing’ for Younger purposes in twocircumstances[:] First, a state proceeding is ‘ongoing’ if it waspending at the time the federal suit was filed....Second, evenif a state proceeding began after the filing of a federal suit,the state proceeding is still ‘ongoing’ if the state proceedingcommenced before any proceedings of substance on themerits have taken place in the federal court.” Id. (citationmodified).Here, the Court should abstain under Younger as all threeMiddlesex factors are satisfied. First, the relief Plaintiff seeksin this case would interfere with the criminal proceedingpending in state court. As admitted in the Complaint, thecriminal case against Plaintiff is “ongoing” as it was reopenedand pending at the time Plaintiff filed the instant federal caseon July 28, 2025. See Dkt. 1 81 (“No court to date has ruledon the constitutional validity of the judgment in Case No.21-CF-014072-A. The state courts have refused to docket orhear Plaintiff's pending [Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure]3.850 motion filed on June 2, 2025, and have failed to respondto the July 3, 2025, Motion to Hear and Rule.”); see also NewGa. Project, Inc. v. Att'y Gen., State of Ga., 106 F.4th 1237,1243 (11th Cir. 2024) (“[A] state action is ‘ongoing’ if it'sactually pending on the day the federal suit is filed.”).Furthermore, this federal proceeding would interfere withPlaintiff's pending criminal case. “In order to decide whetherthe federal proceeding would interfere with the stateproceeding, [the Court] look[s] to the relief requested andthe effect it would have on the state proceedings.” 31 FosterChild. v. Bush, 329 F.3d 1255, 1276 (11th Cir. 2003) (citationomitted). “The relief sought need not directly interfere withan ongoing proceeding or terminate an ongoing proceeding inorder for Younger abstention to be required.” Id.Here, Plaintiff “seeks a declaratory judgment that theconviction in Case No. 21-CF-014072-A is void due toconstitutional and jurisdictional defects” and “injunctive
ALI TAJ BEY, Plaintiff, v. MARK GLASS, in his official capacity..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4relief prohibiting . . . FDLE and Clerk Crist from publishing,transmitting, or certifying the void record[.]” Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 69,70. Both forms of relief would directly usurp the very role thestate court is presently tasked with—i.e., determining whetherto “void” Plaintiff's state felon in possession conviction. Inother words, the declaratory and injunctive relief Plaintiffrequests “would interfere with the ongoing state [criminal]proceedings by placing decisions that are now in the hands ofthe state court[ ] under the direction of” this federal districtCourt. 31 Foster Child., 329 F.3d at 1278. Such a request isimproper under Younger.Second, Plaintiff's pending state criminal proceedingundoubtedly implicates an important state interest, as“criminal proceedings involve important state interests.”Turner v. Broward Sheriff's Off., 542 F. App'x 764, 767 (11thCir. 2013) (citing Middlesex, 457 U.S. at 432); Middlebrooksv. Dist. Att'y of Floyd Cnty., Georgia, No. 24-11498, 2025 WL227587, at *2 (11th Cir. Jan. 17, 2025).Third, the Court finds the underlying state criminalproceeding will afford Plaintiff an adequate opportunity forjudicial review of his federal constitutional claims. Plaintiffhas “the burden of establishing that the state proceedings donot provide an adequate remedy for [his] federal claims.”31 Foster Child., 329 F.3d at 1279 (citation omitted).“Minimal respect for the state processes, of course, precludesany presumption that the state courts will not safeguardfederal constitutional rights.” Id. (quoting Middlesex, 457U.S. at 431). “A federal court ‘should assume that stateprocedures will afford an adequate remedy, in the absenceof unambiguous authority to the contrary.’ ” Id. (quotingPennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 15 (1987)). As such,“[a]dequacy in this context is not about the quality of thestate proceedings, but rather about ‘whether the challengecan be raised in the pending state proceedings at all.’ ”Leonard v. Alabama State Bd. of Pharmacy, 61 F.4th 902, 908(11th Cir. 2023) (citation modified) (quoting Moore v. Sims,442 U.S. 415, 425 (1979)). “[G]eneralized arguments aboutthe inadequacy, inconvenience, or complexity of proceedingsbefore a state tribunal will not do.” Id. at 909.*5 Here, Plaintiff summarily alleges, without any factualsupport, that he “has no adequate remedy at law and hasexhausted all available state...procedures.” Dkt. 1 72. ButPlaintiff then alleges he has a pending Florida Rule ofCriminal Procedure 3.850 motion before the state court judge.Id. 81. Accepting the factual allegations as true, Plaintiffhas an opportunity—and is currently using said opportunityby filing a post-conviction relief motion—to raise challengesto his felony conviction in the pending state proceeding.Moreover, Plaintiff will also have an opportunity to appealthe state court's rulings on any motion to Florida's SecondDistrict Court of Appeal. As for allegations that the statecourt judge is “refusing to docket or hear” Plaintiff's pendingpost-conviction relief motion, id. 81, these are “generalizedarguments” about inadequacy in the state proceeding, which“will not do.”3 Leonard, 61 F.4th at 909. Therefore, the Courtfinds Plaintiff has failed to carry his burden of establishingthat the state proceedings do not provide an adequate remedyfor his federal claims.Because all three Middlesex factors are satisfied, this Courtshould abstain under Younger unless Plaintiff shows that oneof the “three narrow exceptions to the abstention doctrine”applies: “(1) there is evidence of state proceedings motivatedby bad faith; (2) irreparable injury would occur; or (3) there isno adequate alternative state forum where the constitutionalissues can be raised.” Johnson, 32 F.4th at 1099 (citationsomitted). The Court need not spend much time discussingthese exceptions. Nothing in Plaintiff's Complaint or briefresponse to the motion to dismiss establishes that any of thesenarrow exceptions are present or satisfied. See generally Dkts.1, 100.Finally, Younger abstention generally justifies the dismissalof claims seeking injunctive and declaratory relief, notmonetary damages. See Pompey v. Broward Cnty., 95 F.3d1543, 1552 n.12 (11th Cir. 1996) (citing Quackenbush v.Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706 (1996)) (“It is doubtfulthat federal district courts may dismiss claims for damagesunder abstention principles.”); Deakins v. Monaghan, 484U.S. 193, 202 (1988) (“Even if the Younger doctrine requiresabstention here, the District Court has no discretion todismiss rather than to stay claims for monetary relief thatcannot be redressed in the state proceeding.”); see alsoTribble v. Tew, 653 F. App'x 666, 667 (11th Cir. 2016)(“Although abstention was appropriate, the district court erredin dismissing [the plaintiff's] claims rather than staying thisaction....[The plaintiff's] seeks money damages, which areunavailable in his state criminal proceeding[.]”); Watson v.Fla. Jud. Qualifications Comm'n, 618 F. App'x 487, 491 (11thCir. 2015) (finding that “[t]he district court did not abuse itsdiscretion by dismissing [the plaintiff's] claims for injunctiveand declaratory relief” but that “the district court lackeddiscretion to dismiss [the plaintiff's] claims for monetarydamages under the Younger doctrine”).
ALI TAJ BEY, Plaintiff, v. MARK GLASS, in his official capacity..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Here, the Complaint is clear that Plaintiff is only seekingdeclaratory and injunctive relief against Commissioner Glassand Clerk Crist, not monetary damages. Dkt. 1 ¶¶ 69, 70.Moreover, Plaintiff's response to one of the motions to dismisshelpfully clarifies that he “does not seek monetary damagesagainst Commissioner Glass.” Dkt. 100 at 6. Thus, the Courtdismisses Count V without prejudice4 on Younger abstentiongrounds.5CONCLUSION*6 Accordingly, it is hereby ORDERED and ADJUDGEDthat:1. Defendants Commissioner Glass and Clerk Crist'sMotions to Dismiss, Dkts. 92, 94, are GRANTED. CountV in the Complaint, Dkt. 1 at 7, is DISMISSED withoutprejudice.2. The Clerk is directed to TERMINATE all pendingmotions and deadlines, and to CLOSE this case.DONE AND ORDERED in Tampa, Florida, on December1, 2025./s/ William F. JungWILLIAM F. JUNGUNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGECOPIES FURNISHED TO:Counsel of RecordPlaintiff, pro seAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3442739Footnotes1Every other Defendant has been terminated from the case following voluntary dismissals and settlements.2The Complaint argues that “[u]nder Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), and Ford v. Browning, 568 F.3d1175 (11th Cir. 2009), state officials may be sued in their official capacity for prospective equitable relief.”Dkt. 1 71. To the extent Plaintiff is arguing that Ex parte Young is a cause of action, he is mistaken. TheEx parte Young doctrine “is a long and well-recognized exception to [the Eleventh Amendment immunity]rule for suits against state officers seeking prospective equitable relief to end continuing violations of federallaw[,]” not an independent cause of action. Summit Med. Assocs., P.C. v. Pryor, 180 F.3d 1326, 1336 (11thCir. 1999). As for “Ford v. Browning,” the Court cannot find this alleged Eleventh Circuit case based onindependent research. The Court believes the citation is a hallucination, possibly caused by the use of ArtificialIntelligence during the drafting of the Complaint. The Court warns Plaintiff that it has the inherent authorityunder Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 to sanction Plaintiff for such conduct, including the completedismissal and termination of the case. See ByoPlanet Int'l, LLC v. Johansson, 792 F. Supp. 3d 1341, 1357(S.D. Fla. 2025); O'Brien v. Flick, No. 24-61529-CIV, 2025 WL 242924, at *8 (S.D. Fla. Jan. 10, 2025).3To the contrary, a brief review of the pending state criminal case docket—STATE OF FLORIDA v. BEY, ALITAJ, Case No. 21-CF-014072-A—shows that State Circuit Judge Michelle Sisco recently issued an Orderon November 4, 2025, that set an evidentiary hearing on January 6, 2026, at 10:00 a.m. for Plaintiff's Rule3.850 post-conviction relief motion. See State of Florida v. Bey, Ali Taj, 21-CF-014072-A, Dkt. 369 at 11.4See Hale v. Pate, 694 F. App'x 682, 684 (11th Cir. 2017) (“Dismissals pursuant to the Younger abstentiondoctrine are without prejudice.”).
ALI TAJ BEY, Plaintiff, v. MARK GLASS, in his official capacity..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.65Pursuant to the clear application of the Younger abstention doctrine, the Court need not reach Defendants’additional arguments concerning the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994),sovereign immunity, or failure to state a claim because this case should be dismissed on the above analysiswithout regard to those additional arguments. See Dkt. 92 at 8–16; Dkt. 94 at 3–9.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access