BFG Corp. v. Pierce Re Holdings, No. 1:25-cv-02142 (June 30, 2026)

Case details
Full caption
BFG Corporation v. Pierce RE Holdings et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
June 30, 2026
Disposition
Motion Denied
BFG CORPORATION d/b/a BYLINE FINANCIAL GROUP as assignee of STAR CAPITAL GROUP, L.P.,..., SlipCopy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 1878426Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, N.D. Illinois, Eastern Division,EASTERN DIVISION.BFG CORPORATION d/b/a BYLINEFINANCIAL GROUP as assignee ofSTAR CAPITAL GROUP, L.P., Plaintiff,v.PIERCE RE HOLDINGS, LLC,FREDERICK T. BREWSTER, III, andJENNIFER BREWSTER, Defendants.Case No. 1:25-cv-02142|Filed: 06/30/2026Attorneys and Law FirmsBrian Gipson, Pro Hac Vice, Ashen Law Group, Chicago, IL,for Plaintiff BFG Corporation.Pierce RE Holdings, LLC, Mobile, AL, Pro Se.Jennifer Brewster, Mobile, AL, Pro Se.Frederick T. Brewster III, Mobile, AL, Pro Se.MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDERSHARON JOHNSON COLEMAN United States DistrictJudge*1 BFG Corporation d/b/a Byline Financial Group(“Plaintiff”), as assignee of Star Capital Group, L.P. (“StarCapital”), brought this case against Pierce RE Holdings,LLC (“Pierce RE”), Frederick T. Brewster, III, and JenniferBrewster (“Guarantors” and, together with Pierce RE,“Defendants”) alleging one count of breach of contractagainst Pierce RE and two separate counts for breachof personal guaranties of equipment financing agreementagainst Guarantors. Before the Court is Defendants’ motion toreconsider the denial of their motion to dismiss. Additionally,Plaintiff has filed motion for summary judgment. For thereasons set forth below, Defendants’ motion to reconsideris denied, and Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment isgranted.BACKGROUNDThe following facts are undisputed. Pierce RE enteredinto Equipment Finance Agreement No. 190985 (the“Agreement”) with Star Capital, which provides for thefinancing of Pierce RE's acquisition of certain equipment. StarCapital confirmed acceptance of the equipment and fundedthe supplier of the equipment, and Pierce RE accepted theequipment. Star Capital assigned its rights, title, and interestin the Agreement to Plaintiff. The Agreement required aninitial payment of $4,377.48 to Star Capital and forty-sixconsecutive monthly installment payments of $2,013.74, withthe first monthly payment due August 1, 2023 (the “MonthlyPayments”). In May 2024, Plaintiff and Pierce RE enteredinto an Amendment to the Agreement providing for $0.00Monthly Payments due March 1, 2024 and April 1, 2024, andthirty-nine consecutive Monthly Payments thereafter in theamount of $2,038.15.Guarantors executed Guaranties whereby they separately,unconditionally, and irrevocably guaranteed Star Capital, itssuccessors and assigns, the prompt payment and performanceof all obligations under the Agreement (collectively, the“Guaranties”). Both Pierce RE and Guarantors failed tomake the July 1, 2024 Monthly Payment and all subsequentMonthly Payments. Under the Agreement, upon theoccurrence of a default, Plaintiff has the right to accelerate allunpaid amounts due on the date of default, including MonthlyPayments, plus all future Monthly Payments. Plaintiff also hasthe right under the Agreement to institute legal proceedingsagainst Defendants. As of October 23, 2025, the acceleratedbalance due and owing under the Agreement and Guarantiesis $75,411.55, including $30,572.25 in past due MonthlyPayments and $44,839.30 in future Monthly Payments. TheAgreement and Guaranties also provide that Plaintiff isentitled to attorney's fees and costs incurred in enforcing itsrights thereunder.DISCUSSIONI. Defendants’ Motion to ReconsiderWhile Defendants filed their motion pursuant to FederalRule of Civil Procedure 59(e), a motion to reconsider aninterlocutory order such as the denial of a motion to dismiss isgoverned by Rule 54(b). See Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). Althoughthe standard for reconsideration is high, Rule 54(b) preservesthe Court's broad, inherent authority to revise its interlocutoryorders at any time before it enters final judgment. See MosesH. Cone Mem. Hosp. v. Mercury Const. Corp., 460 U.S. 1,
BFG CORPORATION d/b/a BYLINE FINANCIAL GROUP as assignee of STAR CAPITAL GROUP, L.P.,..., SlipCopy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.212 (1983) (“every order short of a final decree is subject toreopening at the discretion of the district judge”); see alsoGalvan v. Norberg, 678 F.3d 581, 587 & n.3 (7th Cir. 2012)(noting district courts’ “sweeping authority” under Rule 54(b)to revise interlocutory orders). Motions for reconsiderationare disfavored and rarely granted. See Bank of Waunakee v.Rochester Cheese Sales, Inc., 906 F.2d 1185, 1191 (7th Cir.1990) (citation omitted). A motion for reconsideration “isnot an appropriate forum for rehashing previously rejectedarguments.” Caisse Nationale de Credit Agricole v. CBIIndus., Inc., 90 F.3d 1264, 1270 (7th Cir. 1996)). They servea “limited function,” either “to correct manifest errors of lawor fact or to present newly discovered evidence.” Id. at 1269.*2 Defendants’ motion fails to establish any error oflaw or fact the Court made in denying their motion todismiss. Defendants accuse the Court of “misapprehending”50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(2), a provision of the Trading withthe Enemy Act, a statute related to presidential wartimepowers. Defendants maintain that “Congress did not limit[the statute's] scope to the President.” To briefly address thisunfounded argument, the “actual statutory text” provides that§ 4305(b)(2) applies to payments “made to or for the accountof the United States, or as otherwise directed, pursuant to thissubdivision or any rule, regulation, instruction, or directionissued hereunder ....” 50 U.S.C. § 4305(b)(2). Defendants’“Demand Draft” baldly states that it is “ACCEPTED on theaccount of the United States pursuant to U.S. Code § 4305(b)(2)” and that “LAWFUL MONEY DEMANDED per 12 U.S.Code § 411,” but Defendants have not established that theDemand Draft in any way constituted a valid payment madepursuant to the Trading with the Enemy Act “to or for theaccount of the United States.”Defendants have also not established that their Demand Draftconstituted valid tender, which “must be without conditionsto which the creditor can have a valid objection or whichwill be prejudicial to his rights.” Frankel v. Bedstone Co.,2024 IL App (1st) 221404-U, 35 (citing MXL Industries,Inc. v. Mulder, 252 Ill. App. 3d 18, 29-30 (1993)). Plaintiffmay well have “a valid objection” to the uncertain paymentinstrument created by Defendants. Accordingly, Defendantshave also not shown that the Court “misapplied” the UniversalCommercial Code (“UCC”) principle that “refusal of tenderdischarges the obligation,” because they have not establishedthat the tender was valid.Amazingly, Defendants accuse the Court of erring by notingthat cases cited in their motion to dismiss could not be foundand were very likely “hallucinated.” They brazenly offer“to provide detailed reports of each case upon stipulation ohourly compensation or their time and labor, unless the Courtintends to compel involuntary servitude.” Notwithstandingthat it was incumbent upon Defendants to locate real casesand to demonstrate their relevance in their own motion, itwould be an exercise in futility. The cases cited in Defendants’motion to dismiss either do not exist or do not support theproposition for which they cite them. Many case citationseven deal with subject matter completely unrelated to thecase at hand. See, e.g., Chames w DeMayo, 972 So.2d850, 855 (Fla. 2007) (addressing issues of waiving certainrights under the Florida Constitution, rather than UCC tenderprinciples as Defendants claimed). These are hallmarks ofgenerative artificial intelligence. While the Court appreciatesDefendants’ pro se status, they are held to the same standardas practicing attorneys in this District: submitting briefs tothe Court including “hallucinations” generated using artificialintelligence is “inimical to the administration of justice.”Perez-Castillo v. Blanche, 177 F.4th 837 (7th Cir. 2026)(recognizing “the seriousness of submitting briefs containing[artificial intelligence] hallucinations” to federal courts)(internal citation and quotation marks omitted). The Courtkindly reminds Defendants that there is no pro se exception toRule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, see Jonesv. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, 164 F.4th 967, 970 (7th Cir.2026), and courts have sanctioned licensed attorneys and self-represented litigants alike for the use of artificial intelligencein submitting court filings. See Glass v. Foley & Lardner LLP,2025 WL 3079280, at *1 (W.D. Wis. Nov. 4, 2025).Because Defendants have not established a basis forreconsideration, denial of Defendants’ motion is proper.II. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary JudgmentSummary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows thatthere is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and themovant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R.Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S.317, 322–23, 106 S. Ct. 2548, 91 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1986). Agenuine dispute as to any material fact exists if “the evidenceis such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for thenonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.242, 248 (1986). The Court “consider[s] all of the evidence inthe record in the light most favorable to the non-moving party,and ... draw[s] all reasonable inferences from that evidencein favor of the party opposing summary judgment.” Logan v.City of Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021) (quotationomitted). After “a properly supported motion for summary
BFG CORPORATION d/b/a BYLINE FINANCIAL GROUP as assignee of STAR CAPITAL GROUP, L.P.,..., SlipCopy (2026) WESTLAW   © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3judgment is made, the adverse party must set forth specificfacts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson,477 U.S. at 250 (quotation omitted).*3 Plaintiff maintains the undisputed evidence conclusivelyestablishes breach of nonpayment of the Agreement andGuaranties. Defendants’ first argument in opposition isthat “[n]o affidavit or declaration from a competent factwitness with personal knowledge has been submitted” andthat “[u]nauthenticated documents cannot support summaryjudgment.” However, Plaintiff submitted the affidavit ofits Vice President and in-house counsel Robert Condon,which establishes the authenticity of the attached Agreement,Delivery and Acceptance Certification, and Assignmentserving as evidence for Plaintiff's motion.Nevertheless, Defendants further argue that “summaryjudgment would still be improper because material factualdisputes exist.” When addressing party's motion for summaryjudgment, the Court derives the background facts from theparties’ Local Rule 56.1 Statements, which assist the Courtby “organizing the evidence, identifying undisputed facts, anddemonstrating precisely how each side propose[s] to prove adisputed fact with admissible evidence.” Bordelon v. ChicagoSch. Reform Bd. of Trs., 233 F.3d 524, 527 (7th Cir. 2000).On January 5, 2026, Defendants filed a response to Plaintiff'ssummary judgment motion, but did not respond to its LR56.1 statements of fact.1 A litigant's failure to respond toa statement of fact in a LR 56.1 statement results in thestatement being considered admitted. Raymond v. AmeritechCorp., 442 F.3d 600, 608 (7th Cir. 2006).Because Plaintiff's facts are deemed admitted, there is nogenuine dispute that Plaintiff and Pierce RE entered into validand enforceable contracts, nor that Star Capital and Plaintiffperformed under the Agreement, nor that Pierce RE acceptedthe Equipment. There is no dispute that Pierce RE failedto make payments when they were due and that Plaintiff ispermitted to accelerate all sums due upon an event of default.And there is no material dispute that Plaintiff was damaged.See Elson v. State Farm Fire and Cas. Co., 691 N.E.2d 807,811 (Ill. App. 1st Dist. 1998). Finally, the affidavit of RobertCondon sets forth that as of October 23, 2025, the acceleratedbalance due and owing under the Agreement and Guarantiesis $75,411.55.Similarly, under the terms of the Guaranties, Guarantorsare indebted to Plaintiff for all Pierce RE's obligations andagreed that Plaintiff “can proceed directly against any andall Guarantors without disposing of any such security orseeking to collect from the [Pierce RE] under the Agreement.”As there is no material dispute that Pierce RE breachedthe Agreement and that Guarantors failed to perform itsobligations under the Agreement, Plaintiff “is entitled to thepayments set forth therein.” FirstMerit Bank, NA v. Grasso,2012 WL 5200111, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Oct. 22, 2012).CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing reasons, the Court denies Defendants’motion to reconsider [42] and grants Plaintiff's motion forsummary judgment [54].IT IS SO ORDEREDEntered:All CitationsSlip Copy, 2026 WL 1878426Footnotes1The Court notes that this matter has remained under advisement for five months as of the date of this Order,without further filings nor contact from Defendants.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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