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Billups v. Louisville Municipal School District
, No. 1:24-CV-74-SA-RP (N.D. Miss. 2025)
Case details
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Court
Northern District of Mississippi (N.D. MISS)
Decided
2025
Majority
United (Justice)
IN
THE
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
COURT
FOR
THE
NORTHERN
DIST
RICT
OF
MISSISSIPPI
ABERDEEN
DIVISION
THOMAS
BILLUPS
PLAINTIFF
v.
CIVIL
ACTION
NO.
1:24-CV-74-SA-RP
LOUISVILLE
MUNICIPAL
SCHOOL
DISTRICT
DEFENDANT
SANCTIONS
ORDER
This
matter
comes
before
the
Court
on
its
own
initiative.
On
September
11,
2025,
the
Court
entered
an
Order
to
Show
Cause
[69]
directin
g
Thomas
Billups’
counsel,
Jane
Watson,
Louis
Watson,
and
Nick
Norris,
to
show
cause
as
to
why
the
Court
should
not
impose
sanctions
against
them
pursuant
to
Rule
11
of
the
Federal
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure
and/or
the
Court’s
inherent
authority.
A
hearing
on
this
matter
was
held
on
October
24,
2025.
At
the
hearing,
counsel
admitted
to
submitting
a
memorandum
that
contained
fabricated
case
cita
tions
and
misrepresentations
of
case
holdings—all
resulting
from
unverified
artifici
al
intelligence
(“AI”)
usage.
The
Court
now
turns
to
the
issue
of
an
appropriate
sanction.
Relevant
Factual
and
Procedural
Background
On
April
19,
2024,
Thomas
Billups
initiated
this
lawsuit
by
filing
his
Complaint
[1]
against
Louisville
Municipal
School
Dist
rict
(“LMSD”).
Billups
brings
an
age
discrimination
claim
and
is
represented
by
Watson
&
Norris,
PLLC
(“the
Firm”).
Attorneys
Jane
Watson
(“Ms.
Watson”),
Louis
Watson
(“Mr.
Watson”),
and
Nick
Norris
all
entered
an
appearance
in
the
case
on
behalf
of
Billups.
1
1
Through
a
supplemental
letter
subm
itted
to
the
Court
(and
copying
counsel
of
record),
Norris
notified
the
Court
that
on
October
31,
2025,
he
provided
notice
to
Louis
Watson
that
he
intended
to
terminate
their
partnership
and
begin
practicing
as
a
sole
practitioner.
The
Court
cursorily
notes
this
development
and
will
address
it
in
more
detail
hereinafter.
Based
upon
info
rmation
provided
by
these
attorneys
at
the
hearing,
Norris,
Ms.
Watson,
and
Mr.
Watson
were
the
only
atto
rneys
practicing
at
the
Firm
when
the
conduct
at
issue
occurred.
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Billups
v.
Louisville
Municipal
School
District
Doc.
79
Dockets.Justia.com
2
On
May
22,
2025,
LMSD
filed
a
Motion
for
Summar
y
Judgment
[60]
seeking
dismissal
of
Billups’
claim.
Billups
filed
a
Response
in
O
pposition
[64]
and
supporting
Memorandum
[65]
on
June
12,
2025.
Ms.
Watson
and
Norris
were
signat
ories
on
the
Response
Memorandum
[65].
On
June
26,
2025,
LMSD
filed
a
Reply
[68].
In
reviewing
the
filings,
the
Court
immediately
identified
issues
with
multiple
case
citations
in
Billups’
Response
Me
morandum
[65].
Upon
further
review
and
extensive
research,
the
Court
found
within
the
Memorandum
[65]
one
case
citation
to
a
nonexistent
case
and
multiple
instances
where
case
holdings
were
misrepresented.
In
total,
there
were
four
problematic
citations
identified
in
the
Response
Memorandum
[65]:
1)
“
United
States
v.
Dr.
Pepper
Bottling
Co.
of
Tex.
,
130
F.
Supp.
2d
846,
851
(N.D.
Tex.
2001)”
(nonexistent
case);
2)
“
Jackson
v.
Gautreaux
,
3
F.
4th
182,
190
(5th
Cir.
2021)”
(existing
case
but
misrepresents
the
holding);
3)
“
Jackson
v.
Cal-W.
Packaging
Corp.
,
602
F.
3d
374,
380
(5th
Cir.
2010)”
(existing
case
but
misrepresents
the
holding);
and
4)
“
Etienne
v.
Spanish
Lake
Truck
&
Casino
Plaza,
L.L.C.
,
778
F.
3d
473,
476
(5th
Cir.
2015)”
(existing
case
but
misrepresents
the
holding).
As
noted
previously,
on
September
11,
2025,
th
e
Court
issued
an
Order
to
Show
Cause
[69]
directing
Ms.
Watson,
Mr.
Wat
son,
and
Norris
“to
show
cause
as
to
why
the
Court
should
not
impose
sanctions
pursuant
to
Federa
l
Rule
of
Civil
Procedure
11
and/
or
its
inherent
authority”
for
“[t]he
submission
of
fictitious
legal
authorities
and
making
misrepr
esentations
of
case
law[.]”
[69]
at
p.
1.
As
a
result
of
these
issues,
the
Court
wa
s
unable
to
rule
on
the
underlying
Motion
[60]
and
had
to
cancel
the
jury
trial
origin
ally
scheduled
for
October
20,
2025.
Notably,
on
September
3,
2025,
prior
to
the
entry
of
this
Court’s
Order
[69],
the
District
Court
for
the
Southern
District
of
Mississippi
issued
a
similar
order
identifying
discrepancies
found
in
legal
authorities
cited
in
a
brief
signed
and
submitted
by
Ms.
Watson.
See
Lewis
v.
Entergy
Case:
1:24-cv-00074-SA-DAS
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Mississippi,
LLC
,
3:25-CV-323-HTW-ASH,
Dkt.
[22].
That
order
directed
Ms.
Watson
to
file
a
written
response
(supported
by
a
de
claration
signed
under
penalty
of
perjury)
explaining
how
the
discrepancies
occurred.
See
id.
In
an
affidavit
ac
companying
her
respons
e,
Ms.
Watson
admitted
to
using
an
AI
tool
to
assist
her
in
drafting
the
brief
at
issue
in
that
case.
See
[23],
Ex.
1
at
p.
1-3.
Ms.
Watson
also
admitted
that
she
did
not
verify
the
accuracy
of
the
citations
generated
by
the
AI
tool
before
submitting
th
e
brief
to
the
court.
See
id
.
Reverting
to
this
case,
on
October
13,
2025,
Ms.
Watson,
along
with
Mr.
Watson
and
Norris,
filed
a
Motion
for
Leave
to
File
Corrected
Memorandum
[73].
The
Motion
[73]
stated
in
part:
Plaintiff's
counsel
used
AI
t
ools
to
assist
in
drafting
the
memorandum
response
filed
on
June
12,
2025.
Upon
review,
counsel
identified
inacc
uracies
in
certain
citations,
resulting
from
unverified
AI-generated
research.
[73]
at
p.
1.
That
Motion
[73]
remains
pending
at
this
t
ime.
On
October
24,
2025,
the
Court
held
the
show
cause
hearing.
From
the
outset,
Ms.
Watson
ad
mitted
to
using
AI
to
assist
in
research
and
drafting
without
verifying
the
ou
tput,
which
resulted
in
the
Memo
randum
[65]
bein
g
tainted
with
misrepresentations
of
law.
The
Court
pres
ented
Ms.
Watson
with
a
chart
of
all
the
misrepresentations
that
it
had
identified
in
the
filed
Response
Memorandum
[65].
2
After
being
provided
an
opportunity
to
review
the
chart,
Ms.
Watson
agreed
with
the
Court’s
findings
articulated
therein.
Following
this
admission,
further
explana
tion
from
counsel
revealed
a
concerning
sequence
of
events.
2
The
chart
is
attached
as
an
Appendix
to
this
Order.
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For
context,
at
all
times
pertinent
to
this
case,
Watson
&
Norris,
PLLC
was
a
plaintiff’s
firm
that
specialized
in
employment
law.
The
Firm
consisted
of
two
partners,
Mr.
Watson
and
Norris,
and
one
associate,
Ms.
Watson.
Counsel
explai
ned
at
the
hearing
that
Norris
acted
as
lead
counsel
on
all
litigation
while
Mr.
Watson
handled
administrativ
e
agency
work.
Mr.
Watson
was
typically
not
involved
in
litigat
ion
until
trial
was
imminent.
In
2023,
Ms.
Watson
joined
the
Firm
as
a
legal
assistant
and
then,
after
being
admi
tted
to
the
Mississippi
Bar
in
2024,
became
an
associate
attorney.
Ms.
Watson
worked
primarily
as
a
brief
write
r
under
Norris’
supervision.
Norris
reviewed
and
made
revisions
to
all
of
Ms.
Watson’s
draf
ted
documents.
At
the
he
aring,
Norris
explained
that
a
draft
would
typically
go
through
several
ite
rations
before
he
approved
a
final
version
for
Ms.
Watson
to
file.
According
to
counsel,
in
March
of
2025,
an
opposing
attorney
in
a
case
unrelated
to
the
case
sub
judice
contacted
Ms.
Watson
and
informed
her
that
the
attorney
noticed
certain
discrepancies
in
a
brief
that
Watson
had
filed.
This
same
attorney
then
called
Norris
and
informed
him
of
the
issue
and
that
it
appeared
to
the
attorney
that
Ms.
Watson
had
utilized
AI.
Norris
independently
confirmed
that
Ms.
Watson
used
unve
rified
AI
output.
Of
no
te,
also
in
March
2025,
the
Firm’s
three
attorneys
attended
a
continuing
legal
education
(“CLE”)
course
on
ethics
in
utilizing
AI.
Following
the
realization
of
this
incident,
Norris
and
Mr.
Watson
discussed
and
instituted
an
AI
usage
policy
for
the
Firm.
For
context,
the
Firm
has
used
a
case
management
software
named
Smokeball
for
several
years.
Within
the
last
year,
Smokeball
added
a
bu
ilt-in
AI
tool
called
“Archie”
that,
according
to
Norri
s,
keeps
all
files
internal.
3
“Archie”
can
assist
in
discovery
3
Norris
explained
“Archie”
can
only
be
used
to
sear
ch
documents
already
upl
oaded
into
the
Smokeball
software
and
“it
does
not
go
outside.”
[77]
at
p.
18.
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research,
document
review,
and
drafting.
4
Norris
explained
that
the
Firm’s
entire
staff
was
allowed
to
use
“Archie.”
The
Firm’s
newly
adopted
AI
policy
limited
Ms.
Watson’s
AI
usage
to
“Archie”
and
banned
the
use
of
any
external
AI
tool.
The
Firm
explained
that
Ms.
Watson
was
strongly
encouraged
to
use
traditional
legal
research
met
hods.
Ms.
Watson
apparently
told
the
Firm
that
she
would
comply
with
the
policy—a
promise
she
clearly
did
not
keep.
After
receiving
the
two
show
cause
orders
within
a
matter
of
days,
the
Firm
realized
that
Ms.
Watson
had
consistently
violated
the
AI
po
licy
since
its
inception.
The
Firm
then
began
reviewing
filings
that
Ms.
Watson
had
drafted
and
located
ten
cases
wherein
briefs
that
contained
unverified
and/or
inaccurate
citati
ons
had
been
filed
in
this
Court
and
the
Di
strict
Court
for
the
Southern
District
of
Mississippi.
The
Firm
represented
that
four
of
these
cases
were
in
the
Northern
District.
That
representation
was
inaccurate.
In
fact
,
the
undersigned
is
aware
of
at
least
five
other
cases
in
this
District
wherein
the
Firm
has
admitted
to
improper
AI
usage
in
submitted
filings.
See
Duffy
v.
The
Camp
House
LLC
,
1:25-CV-60-SA-DAS;
Davis
v.
City
of
I
ndianola,
Mississippi
,
4:25-CV-34-SA-RP;
Strickland
v.
Mabus,
LLC
,
1:25-CV-26-SA-DAS;
Moore
v.
Ashley
Furniture
Indus.,
LLC,
1:23-CV-158-GHD;
Harris
v.
Nidec
Motor
Corp.
,
4:25-CV-16-DMB-JMV.
The
Firm
represented
to
the
Court
that
it
has
taken
corrective
action
in
cases
where
unverified
AI
output
was
used.
The
Firm
explained
that
it
first
work
ed
to
identify
the
problematic
briefs
and
sought
leave
to
file
corrected
memora
ndums
in
those
cases.
The
Firm
also
informed
opposing
counsel
in
those
cases
a
nd
represented
that
no
opposing
c
ounsel
has
raised
an
objection
to
their
requests
to
file
correct
ed
briefs.
The
Firm
also
informed
Billups
of
the
unverified
AI
use
4
Norris
did
not
mention
the
drafting
capabilities
of
“Archie”
during
the
show
cause
hearing.
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that
caused
the
delay
in
his
case
.
Lastly,
Mr.
Watson
detailed
his
efforts
of
educat
ing
himself
on
AI
including
attending
a
recent
seminar
and
downloading
ABA
seminars
on
the
topic.
Following
the
hearing,
Norris
informed
the
Court
via
letter
that
the
Firm
dissolved
effective
on
November
30,
2025,
and
that
Billups
has
elected
for
Norris
to
continue
to
represent
him
in
this
case.
Rule
11
5
“‘[T]he
central
purpose
of
Rule
11
is
to
deter
baseless
filings
in
dist
rict
court
and
thus
…
streamline
the
administration
and
pr
ocedure
of
the
federal
courts.’”
Sec.
&
Exch.
Comm’n
v.
Faulkner
,
2018
WL
3708426,
at
*2
(N.D.
Tex.
Aug.
3,
2018)
(quoting
Cooter
&
Gell
v.
Hartmarx
Corp.
,
496
U.S.
384,
393,
110
S.
Ct.
2447,
110
L.
Ed.
2d
359
(1990)).
In
pertinent
part,
Rule
11
provides:
By
presenting
to
the
court
a
pleading,
written
motion,
or
other
paper—whether
by
signing,
filing,
submitting,
or
later
advocating
it—an
attorney
or
unrepresented
party
certifies
that
to
the
best
of
the
person’s
knowledge,
information,
and
belief,
formed
after
an
inquiry
reasonable
under
the
circum
stances:…
the
claims,
defenses,
and
other
legal
contentions
are
wa
rranted
by
existing
law
or
by
a
nonfrivolous
argument
for
exte
nding,
modifying,
or
reversing
existing
law
or
for
es
tablishing
new
law[.]
FED.
R.
CIV.
P.
11(b)(2).
Accordingly,
“[a]n
attorney
has
a
duty
to
c
onduct
a
‘reasonable
inquiry
into
the
facts
and
law
of
a
case
at
the
time
[at]
which
she
affi
xes
her
signature
on
any
papers
to
the
court.’”
Faulkner,
2018
WL
3708426
at
*2
(quoting
Mercury
Air
Grp.,
Inc.
v.
Mansour
,
237
F.3d
542,
548
(5th
Cir.
2001)).
The
Rule
requir
es
the
signing
attorney
“to
satisfy
himself
that
the
filed
paper
is
factually
and
legally
res
ponsible,”
and
by
signing,
he
indicates
“that
he
personally
applied
his
own
5
Although
the
Court
is
of
the
opinion
that
the
subject
conduct
is
sanctionable
under
its
inherent
authority,
the
Court
need
only
rely
on
Rule
11
to
im
pose
the
necessary
sanctions
in
this
case.
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judgment.”
Pavelic
v.
LeFlore
v.
Marvel
Ent.
Grp.
,
493
U.S.
120,
125,
110
S.
Ct.
456,
107
L.
Ed.
2d
438
(1989).
This
is
a
“nondelegable
duty.”
Id.
at
126,
110
S.
Ct.
456.
“An
attorney’s
conduct
is
j
udged
…
with
an
objective,
not
a
subjective,
standard
of
reasonableness.”
Snow
Ingredients,
Inc.
v.
SnoWizard,
Inc.
,
833
F.3d
512,
528
(5th
Cir.
2016)
(citing
Whitehead
v.
Food
Max
of
Mississippi,
Inc.
,
332
F.3d
796,
802
(5th
Cir.
2003)).
“‘Reasonableness
is
reviewed
according
to
the
‘snapshot’
rule,
focusing
upon
the
instant
the
attorney[s]
affix[]
[their]
signature[s]
to
the
document.’”
Id.
(quoting
Smith
v.
Our
Lady
of
the
Lake
Hosp.,
Inc.
,
960
F.2d
439,
444
(5th
Cir.
1992)).
“In
light
of
th
e
objective
standard
of
reasonableness
applied
under
Ru
le
11,
an
attorney’s
subjec
tive
good
faith
is
not
enough
to
immunize
[them]
from
sanctions
ba
sed
on
a
Rule
11
violation.”
Dodson
v.
Nichols
,
2024
WL
4299023,
at
*4
(M.D.
La.
Sept
.
26,
2024)
(citing
Thomas
v.
Cap.
Sec.
Servs.,
Inc.
,
836
F.2d
866,
873
(5th
Cir.
1988)).
“The
district
court
is
vested
with
considerable
discretion
in
determining
the
‘appropriate’
sanction
to
impose
upon
the
violating
party.”
Thomas
,
836
F.2d
at
877.
“When
Rule
11
has
been
violated,
the
court
must
‘carefully
choose
sanctions
that
foster
the
appropriate
purpose
of
the
rule,
depending
upon
the
parties,
the
viol
ation,
and
nature
of
the
case.’”
Faulkner,
2018
WL
3708426
at
*2
(quoting
Thomas
,
836
F.2d
at
877).
“The
Fifth
Circuit
has
held
that
the
sanction
imposed
‘should
be
the
least
severe
sanction
adequate
to
[accomplish]
the
purpose
of
Rule
11.’”
Ferris
v.
Amazon.com
Servs.
,
778
F.
Supp.
3d
879,
881
(N.D.
Miss.
Apr.
16,
2025)
(quoting
Thomas
,
836
F.2d
at
878-79).
A
sanction
imposed
under
Rule
11
“m
ust
be
limited
to
what
suffices
to
deter
repetition
of
the
conduct
or
comparable
c
onduct
by
others
similar
ly
situated.”
FED.
R.
CIV.
P.
11(c)(4).
A
court
may
consider
a
variety
of
fact
ors
including
“whether
[the
sanctionable
conduct]
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was
part
of
a
pattern
of
activit
y,
or
an
isolated
event[.]”
FED.
R.
CIV.
P.
11,
advisory
committee’s
note
to
1993
amendment.
Analysis
and
Discussion
There’s
a
difference
between
a
seasoned,
good
lawyer
and
somebody
who
uses
AI
to
look
like
one.
The
Court
reiterates
that:
AI
is
a
powerful
tool,
that
when
used
prudently
,
provides
immense
benefits.
When
used
carelessly,
it
produces
frustratingly
realistic
legal
fiction
that
takes
inordinately
longer
to
respond
to
than
create.
While
one
party
can
create
a
fake
legal
brief
at
the
click
of
a
button,
the
opposing
party
and
court
must
parse
through
the
case
names,
citations,
and
points
of
law
to
determ
ine
which
parts,
if
any,
are
true.
Ferris
,
778
F.
Supp.
3d
at
881
(emphasis
added).
This
case
presents
a
startling
example
of
th
e
harm
unverified
AI
usage
can
cause.
This
Court
has
wasted
significant
time
and
efforts
sorting
thr
ough
this
Memorandum
[65]
which
contains
blatant
misrepresentations.
The
Court
is
especially
troubled
that
a
firm
and
its
attorneys,
who
appear
in
dozens
of
pending
cas
es
across
this
state,
have
util
ized
and
relied
on
unverified
AI
usage
to
accomplish
a
portion
of
their
litigatio
n
obligations.
In
determining
whether
a
Rule
11
violation
occurred,
the
Court
will
a
ssess
each
attorney’s
conduct.
1.
Jane
Watson
Ms.
Watson
drafted,
signed,
and
personally
fi
led
the
Memorandum
[65]
at
issue.
She
admitted
that
she
used
“Grok”,
an
external
AI
tool,
to
assist
in
drafting
and
research
without
verifying
the
accuracy
of
the
output.
[77]
at
p.
12-13.
At
the
hearing,
Ms.
Watson
provided
the
Court
with
the
following
explanation
for
her
actions:
…
I
made
a
big
mistake.
I
was
la
zy.
I
did
not
check
my
work.
And
I
assumed
what
I
used
as
a
tool
to
help
supplement
my
research
to
be
accurate;
and,
upon
further
review,
it’
s
very
clear
that
a
lot
of
the
cases
are
either
hallucinated
or
they
were
misrepresented.
.
.
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And
I
have
nothing
more
to
say
ot
her
than
I
--
I
will
never
do
it
again.
I’ve
learned
my
lesson…
[I]t’s
very
pertinent
for
attorn
eys
to…double-check
these
citations
and
to
make
sure
they’re
correct…
I’m
new
at
this;
I’m
still
learning.
And
I
turned
to
AI
to
help
me
figure
out
how
to
do
the
ropes
without
trying
to
take
too
much
time
off
my
hands…
It’s
not
how
lawyers
should
litigate…
I
will
not
make
the
mistake
in
not
checking
my
citations
again.
[77]
at
p.
6-7.
To
state
“the
obvious,
an
attorney
w
ho
submits
fake
cases
clearly
has
not
read
those
nonexistent
cases,
which
is
a
viol
ation
of
Rule
11
of
the
Fede
ral
Rules
of
Civil
Procedure.”
Willis
v.
U.S.
Bank,
N.A.
,
738
F.
Supp.
3d
959,
960
(N.D.
Tex.
May
15,
2025)
(citing
Benjamin
v.
Costco
Wholesale
Corp.
,
779
F.
Supp.
3d
341,
343-44
(E.D.
N.Y.
Apr.
24,
2025))
(emphasis
in
original).
The
Court
finds
that,
through
Ms.
Watson’s
own
admis
sion,
she
failed
to
verify
the
legal
authorities
generated
by
AI
prior
to
filing
the
Memorandum
[65]
at
issue.
In
failing
to
do
so,
she
failed
to
“discharge
[her]
most
basic
responsib
ility
as
an
attorn
ey
[]
to
make
sure
that
the
statements
in
the
motion[]
were
true.”
Johnson
v.
Dunn
,
792
F.
Supp.
3d
1241,
1263
(N.D.
Ala.
July
23,
2025).
This
warrants
Rule
11
sanctions.
See
Willis
,
738
F.
Supp.
3d
at
960.
While
Ms.
Watson’s
misconduc
t
in
this
case
clearly
violates
Rule
11,
the
Court’s
analysis
does
not
end
here
as
it
is
compelled
to
point
out
Ms.
Watson’s
troubles
ome
pattern
of
conduct.
See
FED.
R.
CIV.
P.
11,
advisory
committee’s
note
to
1993
am
endment
(indicating
th
at
courts
should
consider
whether
the
subject
conduct
wa
s
part
of
a
“pattern
of
activity”).
As
of
March
2025,
Ms.
Watson
was
on
notice
of
her
mistakes
when
an
opposing
attorney
informed
her
directly
that
she
ha
d
submitted
a
brief
that
contained
misrepresen
tations
of
law.
She
was
apparently
then
given
an
opportu
nity
to
fix
the
issue
without
consequence.
Instead
of
learning
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from
her
mistake,
she
failed
to
change
her
ways
and
continued
the
same
practice
of
not
verifying
AI
output—only
then,
her
conduct
additionally
violated
the
Firm’s
policy
prohibiting
use
of
external
AI
tools.
The
Response
Memorandum
[65]
was
f
iled
on
June
12,
2025,
r
oughly
three
months
after
the
initial
notification
from
an
oppos
ing
attorney
in
another
case.
Th
at
is
particularly
concerning.
When
asked
about
this
continued
unveri
fied
AI
practice,
Ms.
Watson
stated:
I
was
told
that
I
can’t
rely
on
[AI]
to
be
forthright
and
have
accurate
case
representations
and
citations,
but
there
was
nothing
said
about
whether
or
not
I
could
use
it
[to]
enhance
my
writing,
to
make
it
be
more
succinct
and
more
clerical…A
nd,
so
far
as
not
conferring
with
the
policy,
it
wasn’t
totally
outright
not
to
use
it.
It
was
more
of
just,
you
know,
you
need
to
be
careful
in
how
you
use
it;
and
I
failed
to
continue
to
conform
to
that.
[77]
at
p.
36-37.
Ms.
Watson’s
response
highlights
her
blatan
t
disregard
for
the
Firm’s
policy
and
the
governing
ethical
standards
of
the
legal
profession.
Whether
she
was
allowed
to
use
external
AI
to
“enhance”
her
writing
is
irrelevant.
She
understood
the
policy
banned
reliance
on
AI
legal
research
and
blindly
relied
on
it
anyway.
These
viola
tions
encompass
more
than
what
Ms.
Watson
characterized
as
“nothing
more
th
an
just
[a]
careless
error
on
[he
r]
end[.]”
[77]
at
p.
7.
Ms.
Watson
wholly
integrated
unverified
AI
usage
into
her
pr
actice
of
law
in
blatant
disregard
of
the
Firm’s
policy
and
her
ethical
obligations
as
an
officer
of
the
Court.
In
light
of
repeated
warnings
from
federal
cour
ts
about
the
risk
of
hallucinated
cases,
as
well
as
CLE
trainings
she
attende
d,
direct
notice
and
knowledge
of
the
same
prior
mistakes,
her
violation
of
the
Firm’s
AI
po
licy,
and
the
sheer
number
of
fi
lings,
Ms.
Watson’s
misconduct
is
particularly
egregious
and
prolif
ic.
The
Court
will
consider
all
th
ese
variables
in
determining
an
appropriate
sanction.
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2.
Nick
Norris
For
his
part,
Norris
explained
at
the
show
cause
hearing
that
he
reviewed
the
Memorandum
[65]
for
legal
arguments
but
did
not
independently
check
the
cita
tions.
Norris
represented
to
the
Court
that
he
believes
this
practice
is
commonplace
and
that
he
was
not
aw
are
he
had
a
duty
to
go
back
and
read
every
single
case
cited
in
the
Memorandum
[65]:
I
just
assumed
that
when
an
attorney
gave
me
a
brief
and
[]
the
arguments
are
right
in
there
-
-
it
was
just
the
wrong
cases
cited.
I
assumed
they
were
correct.
I
did
not
understand,
as
a
supervisory
duty,
that
I
have
to
go
back
and
read
every
single
case
in
the
briefs
.
.
.
If
the
Court
determin
es
that
it
is
[]
part
of
my
duty,
I
understand.
I
apologize.
I
just
did
not
understand
that
was
my
duty.
[77]
at
p.
33.
In
essence,
Norris
simply
assumed
the
accuracy
of
the
citations
in
th
e
draft.
Other
courts
have
addressed
(and
rejected)
this
excuse
ad
nauseum
.
See,
e.g.,
Johnson
,
792
F.
Supp.
3d
at
1264
(holding
attorney’s
obligation
to
check
citations
is
not
excused
because
he
did
not
know
co-counsel
used
generative
AI);
Elizondo
v.
City
of
Laredo
,
2025
WL
2071072,
at
*3
(S
.D.
Tex.
July
23,
2025)
(finding
law
clerk’s
unsupervised
AI
use
does
not
excuse
attorney’s
failure
to
verify
the
cited
authorities);
Park
v.
Kim
,
91
F.
4th
610,
615
(2d
Cir.
2024)
(“at
the
very
least,
the
duties
imposed
by
Rule
11
require
that
attorneys
read,
a
nd
thereby
confirm
the
existence
and
validity
of,
the
legal
authorities
on
which
they
rely”);
see
also
Mid
Central
Operating
Engineers
Health
&
Welfare
Fund
v.
Hoosiervac
LLC
,
2025
WL
574234,
at
*2-3
(S.D
.
Ind.
Feb.
21,
2025)
(finding
AI-generated
cases
appearing
vali
d
did
not
relieve
attorney
of
his
duty
to
conduct
a
reasonable
inquiry).
Norris
is
a
signatory
to
the
Memorandum
[65]
and
admitted
that
he
failed
to
check
the
citations.
As
stated
above,
an
a
ttorney’s
responsibility
to
review
a
legal
filing
for
factual
and
legal
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accuracy
is
“nondelegable.”
Pavelic
,
493
U.S.
at
126,
110
S.
Ct.
456.
Th
e
Court
finds
that
Norris
violated
Rule
11.
Unlike
in
the
cases
cited
above,
Norris
was
on
actual
notice
that
Ms.
Watson
had
previously
used
unverified
genera
tive
AI.
He
even
told
Mr.
Watson
that
“[i]f
this
ever
happens
again
[Ms.
Watson’s
AI
usage],
we
’re
going
to
be
where
I’m
standing
today.”
[77]
at
p.
17.
Despite
having
notice
and
appreciating
the
gravity
of
the
situ
ation,
Norris
continued
to
assume
the
accuracy
of
Ms.
Watson’s
citations.
Further
troubling
is
the
ample
opportunity
Norris
had
to
identify
the
errors.
Norris
explained:
I
did
review
the
memorandum
.
.
.
I
did
not
check
the
cites
on
it.
There
were
several
iterations
of
the
Billups
memorandum
that
I
had
Ms.
Watson
go
back
and
change.
There
were
what
we
contended
were
contradictions
in
it
.
.
.
[our]
communications
[were]
mostly
30-minute
to
an
hour-long
phone
calls
,
kind
of
going
through
all
the
contradictions
I
was
trying
to
make
sure
were
in
and
the
arguments
were
properly
made.
[77]
at
p.
31-32.
The
Court
is
concerned
at
this
oversight.
As
outlined
in
the
attached
case
chart,
a
large
portion
of
Billups’
argument
relies
on
a
case
styled
Jackson
v.
Gautreaux
,
3
F.
4th
182,
190
(5th
Cir.
2021).
See
Appendix
at
p.
1-3.
In
fact,
this
case
is
c
ited
eight
times,
even
arguing
that
a
jury
should
be
instructed
under
its
holding.
See
[65]
at
p.
20
-21.
In
reality,
Jackson
is
an
excessive
force
and
failure
to
train
case
and
is
w
holly
irrelevant
to
the
case
at
bar.
6
A
seasoned
attorney
examining
the
brief
should
have
read
a
case
so
heavily
relied
upon.
Had
he
done
so,
he
would
have
easily
discovered
the
problems.
See
Johnson
,
792
F.
Supp.
3d
at
1262-63
(“An
y
reasonable
investigation
(indeed,
even
the
most
cursory
of
investigations,
or
a
spot
check)
would
ha
ve
quickly
revealed
the
6
Further,
the
pincite
in
the
citation
does
not
exist.
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problem.”).
In
light
of
how
little
effort
would
ha
ve
been
required
to
uncover
this
falsehood
that
permeated
throughout
the
Memorandum
[65],
the
Court
is
troubled
by
Norris’
indifference
to
his
professional
responsibility.
Although
Norris
has
appeared
before
this
Court
for
years
without
issue,
the
Court
simply
cannot
overlook
this
failure.
The
Cour
t
will
sanction
him
accordingly.
3.
Louis
Watson
Mr.
Watson
did
not
draft,
revi
ew,
or
sign
the
Memo
randum
[65]
at
issu
e.
The
Court
finds
that
Mr.
Watson
did
not
individua
lly
violate
Rule
11
as
a
signato
ry.
Notwithstanding,
as
the
Court
will
discuss
infra
,
Mr.
Watson
is
not
abso
lved
of
responsibility.
See
F
ED
.
R.
C
IV
.
P.
11(c)(1).
As
noted,
while
Mr.
Watson
is
not
usually
invol
ved
with
the
bulk
of
the
Firm’s
litigation,
he
is
involved
in
every
case.
In
fact,
he
appear
s
as
a
signatory
on
the
Co
mplaint
[1].
Despite
not
directly
supervising
Ms.
Watson’s
day-to-day
wo
rk,
Mr.
Watson
acted
as
a
supervisory
attorney
in
many
respects.
In
March
2025,
he
personally
addr
essed
the
unverified
AI
use
incident
with
Ms.
Watson.
After
receiving
a
call
from
the
opposing
attorney,
Norris
explained:
From
there,
I
called
Mr.
Watson
an
d
told
him
about
the
issue
and
was
very
upset
and
told
him
[]
this
has
got
to
be
corrected
immediately
…
Mr.
Watson
told
me
he
would
handle
the
issue
and
talk
to
her
about
it.
And
we
discu
ssed
policies
for
using
AI.
Because,
prior
to
that,
we
did
not
have
a
policy.
[77]
at
p.
17.
Mr.
Watson
acknowledged
the
role
he
played
to
this
Court:
The
Court:
Mr.
Watson,
do
you
co
nsider
yourself
a
supervisory
attorney?
Mr.
Watson:
Yes,
Your
Honor.
[77]
at
p.
34.
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Mr.
Watson,
in
recognition
of
hi
s
role,
reported
that
he
and
Ms.
Watson
were
in
the
process
of
self-reporting
to
th
e
Mississippi
Bar.
Like
Norris,
the
Court
acknowledges
that
Mr.
Watson
has
appeared
before
it
for
many
year
s
in
good
standing,
but
the
Court
cannot
ignore
what
has
occurred.
4.
Watson
&
Norris,
PLLC
Rule
11(c)(1)
provides
that
“[a]bsent
exceptiona
l
circumstances,
a
law
firm
must
be
held
jointly
responsible
for
a
viol
ation
committed
by
its
partner,
associate,
or
employee.”
F
ED
.
R.
C
IV
.
P.
11(c)(1).
Again,
Louis
Watson,
Jane
Watson,
and
Nick
Norris
were
the
only
attorneys
practicing
at
Watson
&
Norris,
PLLC
dur
ing
the
relevant
time
period.
7
The
Court
does
not
find
any
exceptional
circumstances
that
wa
rrant
the
Firm’s
exemption
from
being
held
jointly
responsible
for
the
Rule
11
violations.
See
Gonzalez
Bank
of
Am.,
N.A.
Hayman
Bank
of
Am.,
N.A.
Calidonio
Deutsche
Bank
Nat’l
Tr.
Co.
Jack
Deutsche
B
ank
Nat’l
Tr.
Co.
Torok
v.
Wells
Fargo
Bank
,
2014
WL
12616132,
at
*6
(S.D.
Tex.
Aug.
5,
2014)
(holding
ni
ne-attorney
firm
responsible
for
Rule
11
violations
by
three
attorneys);
see
also
Wadsworth
v.
Walmart
Inc.
,
348
F.R.D.
489,
499
(D.
Wyoming
Feb.
24,
2025)
(acknowledging
a
firm
can
be
he
ld
liable
for
Rule
11
violations
by
its
members
but
ultimately
declining
to
do
so).
Instead,
the
Court
finds
it
appropr
iate
to
hold
the
Firm
responsible.
In
addition
to
the
Firm’s
liabili
ty,
the
Court
is
concerned
with
how
the
Firm
is
handling
the
situation.
The
Show
Cause
Order
[69]
was
issu
ed
September
11,
2025
and
the
hearing
did
not
occur
until
October
24,
2025—giving
the
Firm
almost
six
weeks
to
prepare.
Despite
ample
time,
Mr.
Watson
was
learning
of
new
cases
involving
unverified
AI
us
age
by
the
Firm
on
the
morning
of
the
hearing.
The
Court
questioned
Mr.
Watson:
7
As
noted
earlier,
Watson
&
Norris,
PLLC
was
dissolved
on
November
30,
2025.
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The
Court:
Mr.
Watson,
what
steps,
if
any,
has
the
firm
taken
to
sanction
or
punish
or
ad
dress
the
wrongdoing
of
Ms.
Watson?
Mr.
Watson:
Well,
Your
Honor,
first
of
all,
we
try
to
get
our
hands
around
this
situation,
you
know,
to
figure
out
how
to
correct
it,
what
steps
we
needed
to
take.
And
that’s
when
Mr.
Norris
and
-
-
pr
imarily
Mr.
Norris
and
myself
and
Ms.
Watson
have
worked
to
identify
the
cases,
first,
where
this
issue
existed.
And,
of
those
cases
-
-
Mr
.
Norris
mentioned
there’s
ten
of
them.
I
wasn’t
aware,
until
this
morning,
of
the
issue
with
the
Megan
Long
ca
se;
so
we
haven’t
fully
dealt
with
that
yet
.
But,
the
other
cases
-
-
I
believe
there
are
eight
that
we
have
filed
motions
to
correct
the
briefs.
[77]
at
p.
24
(emphasis
added).
In
addition,
Mr.
Watson
and
Norris
offered
conflicting
accounts
regarding
the
number
of
cases
in
which
they
had
sought
l
eave
to
amend
a
tainte
d
filing.
For
instance,
the
Court
engaged
in
the
following
dialogue
with
Norris:
The
Court:
And
I
know
you
filed
so
me
motions
for
leave
to
file
corrected
memos.
Have
you
filed
--
has
your
firm
filed
leave
for
correctin
g
in
those
ten
cases?
Mr.
Norris:
In
nine
of
the
ten,
there
has
been.
I
have
a
meeting
set
with
a
client
on
Tuesday
at
two
o’clock.
We
have
one
issue
in
this
case;
it’s
Merit
--
Megan
Long
v.
Carrisus.
And
we
have
to
put
forward
a
correction
to
the
defendant.
And
the
defendant
responded
back
that
it
needed
us
to
correc
t
a
fact
on
top
of
it.
And
I
needed
to
talk
to
my
client
before
we
change
that
fact,
because
I
want
to
make
sure
it’s
right.
[77]
at
p.
21-22.
After
Norris
provided
his
explanation,
Mr.
Wats
on
stated,
“I
believe
there
are
eight
cases
that
we
have
filed
to
correct
the
brief.”
Id.
at
24.
The
Court
finds
th
is
discrepancy
troublesome,
especially
when
considering
other
misstatements
regarding
the
number
of
cas
es
involving
the
same
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issue.
Specifically,
as
noted
above,
Norris
repres
ented
there
were
“four
cases
in
the
Northern
District
we’ve
had
this
issue
with.
The
rest
are
in
the
Southern
District.”
[
77]
at
p.
20.
In
reality,
the
Court
has
identified
six
cases
in
the
Northern
District
where
the
Firm
has
admitted
that
it
submitted
filings
containing
misrepresentations
of
law
due
to
unverified
AI
usage.
Considering
the
ample
time
available
to
couns
el
to
prepare
for
the
hearing,
the
Court
is
especially
troubled
and
finds
that,
at
least
at
the
time
of
the
hearing,
the
Firm
failed
to
even
identify
the
reach
of
its
harm.
The
Court
will
consider
the
Firm’s
attempted
corrective
action
in
determining
appropriate
sanctions.
8
5.
LMSD
The
Court
also
observes
that
the
Defendant,
LM
SD,
could
have
flagged
the
fictious
citation
and
misrepresentation
of
case
law
in
a
reply
brief
or
supplemental
filing.
See
Ferris
,
778
F.
Supp.
3d
at
880-81
(opposing
party
aler
ted
the
court
to
hallucinated
cases).
The
Court
takes
this
opportunity
to
issue
a
charge.
Going
forward,
the
Cour
t
expects
all
parties
to
assist
in
maintaining
the
integrity
of
the
judicial
process
and
to
be
dili
gent
in
flagging
AI
misuse.
“[O]therwise,
the
risk
is
too
great
that
such
errors
will
persist
undet
ected,
potentially
leading
to
an
outcome
unsupported
by
law.”
Elizondo
,
2025
WL
2071072
at
*3.
Sanctions
This
Court
takes
no
pleasure
in
sanctioning
attorneys
who
app
ear
before
it.
However,
the
seriousness
of
the
violations
and
th
e
resulting
waste
of
judicial
re
sources
demand
sanctions
to
deter
future
violations.
The
Court
appreciates
the
acce
ptance
of
responsibility
and
corrective
measures
but
finds
these
efforts
inadequate.
8
The
Court
reiterates
it
may
consider
a
“pattern
of
conduct”
in
determining
appropriate
sanctions.
FED.
R.
CIV.
P.
11,
advisory
committee’s
note
to
1993.
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Rule
11
assigns
particular
value
to
the
deterrent
func
tion
of
a
sanction.
See
F
ED
.
R.
C
IV
.
P.
11(c)(4)
(providing
that
sanctions
“must
be
limite
d
to
what
suffices
to
deter
repetition
of
the
conduct
or
comparable
conduct
by
ot
hers
similarly
situated”).
In
addition,
the
Court
is
cognizant
of
the
Fifth
Circuit’s
directive
to
impose
the
least
severe
sanction(s)
necessary
to
accomplish
deterrence.
See
Thomas
,
836
F.2d
at
878-79.
The
Court
has
surveyed
the
array
of
sanctions
issued
against
attorneys
who
filed
briefs
containing
misrepresentations
du
e
to
unverified
AI
usage.
Co
mmonly,
courts
have
imposed
monetary
sanctions
ranging
from
$1,000
to
$15,000.
See
Benjamin
,
779
F.
Supp.
3d
at
347-48;
Wadsworth
v.
Walmart
Inc.
,
348
F.R.D.
at
498
($3,000
fine
against
drafter
of
the
brief
with
fake
cases
and
$1,000
for
other
attorneys
w
ho
signed,
but
did
not
draft
brief);
Elizondo
,
2025
WL
2071072
at
*3
($2,500
fine);
Gauthier
v.
Goodyea
r
Tire
&
Rubber
Co.
,
2024
WL
4882651,
at
*3
(E.D.
Tex.
Nov.
25,
2024)
($2,000
fine);
Mid
Central
,
2025
WL
574234
at
*3
($5,000
fine
per
filing
with
fake
cases
totaling
$15,000).
In
addition
to
monetary
fines,
courts
have
re
ferred
attorneys
to
the
applicable
disciplinary
body
for
disciplinary
proceedings.
See
Benjamin
,
779
F.
Supp.
3d
at
348
(citing
Park
,
91
F.
4th
at
615-16).
Courts
have
required
attorneys
to
provide
a
copy
of
a
sanction
or
der
to
their
clients,
opposing
counsel,
and
the
presiding
judge
in
every
pending
state
or
federal
case
in
which
they
are
counsel
of
record.
See
Johnson
,
792
F.
Supp.
3d
at
1267-68.
Courts
have
also
disqualified
attorneys
from
further
participation
in
the
case
and
required
attorneys
to
complete
CLE
courses
on
generative
AI
in
the
legal
context.
See
id.
;
see
also
Gauthier
,
2024
WL
4882651
at
*3.
Having
considered
the
potential
sanctions,
th
e
Court
finds
the
unique
facts
of
this
case
render
many
of
the
lesser
sanctions
inadequate
.
Ms.
Watson,
Mr.
Watson,
and
Norris
have
all
already
attended
CLE
trainings
on
the
dangers
of
AI,
self-reporte
d
to
the
Mississippi
Bar,
and
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informed
Billups
of
the
AI
misuse.
9
The
Court
also
finds
that
a
m
onetary
fine
would
not
have
a
meaningful
deterrent
effect.
See
Johnson
,
792
F.
Supp.
3d
at
1266
(“If
fines
and
public
embarrassment
were
effective
deterrents,
there
woul
d
not
be
so
many
[AI
misuse]
cases
to
cite.”).
Though
addressed
ad
nauseum
,
the
Court
again
emphasizes
that
the
Firm
was
on
notice
of
Ms.
Watson’s
unverified
AI
us
age
in
March
of
2025,
and
it
s
failure
to
adequately
address
the
issue
has
resulted
in
a
flood
of
tainted
filings
throughout
this
State.
This
has
caused
an
unnecessary
delay
in
litigation.
For
instance,
af
ter
becoming
aware
of
this
issue
in
this
partic
ular
case,
the
Court
could
not
resolve
the
pending
Motion
for
Summary
Judgmen
t
[60]
and
continued
all
pretrial
deadlines
as
well
as
the
trial
date
until
further
Order.
The
case
is
at
a
standstill
because
of
the
egregious
conduct
at
issue.
Considering
all
of
these
matters
and
bearing
in
mind
its
obligation
to
impose
the
least
severe
sanction
necessary
to
deter
future
conduct,
the
Court
first
finds
it
a
ppropriate
to
disqualify
all
three
attorneys
and
their
resp
ective
firms
from
further
representa
tion
of
Billups
in
this
case.
10
The
Court
is
aware
that
disqualification
can
cause
hardship
on
the
client
and
acknowledges
that
Billups’
case
has
been
unnecessarily
delayed
th
rough
no
fault
of
his
own.
However,
the
Court
finds
disqualification
would
not
cause
any
additiona
l
hardship,
and
“even
if
there
is
some
minor
hardship,
it
must
yield
to
the
se
riousness
of
the
misconduct
here.”
Id.
at
1267.
Billups
will
be
allowed
60
days
within
which
to
find
new
counsel
to
represent
him
in
this
case
moving
forward
or
advise
the
Court
of
hi
s
intent
to
proceed
pro
se
.
9
At
the
time
of
the
hearing,
Norris
had
not
yet
self-re
ported
to
the
Mississippi
Bar
but
Mr.
Watson
indicated
Norris’
intent
to
do
so.
10
This
includes
Norris,
despite
the
f
act
that
he
has
now
opened
a
new
la
w
firm.
That
fact
does
not
negate
the
Rule
11
violations
he
committed
in
this
case.
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Secondly,
all
members
of
the
Firm
are
required
to
provide
a
copy
of
this
Sanctions
Order
to
all
presiding
judges
in
every
pe
nding
state
or
federal
case
in
which
they
are
counsel
of
record.
11
Thirdly,
as
ordered
from
the
be
nch
during
the
hearing,
Ms.
Wat
son
must
seek
withdrawal
in
any
case
where
she
appears
as
attorney
of
reco
rd
that
is
assigned
to
th
e
undersigned.
[77]
at
p.
37.
She
shall
not
enter
an
appearance
in
any
other
case
assigned
to
the
unde
rsigned
for
a
period
of
two
(2)
years
from
today’s
date.
Lastly,
the
Firm
shall
conduct
an
internal
a
udit
of
all
substantive
filings
on
which
Jane
Watson
is
a
signatory
since
she
became
an
associat
e
attorney
with
the
Firm.
The
Firm
must
provide
a
report
of
the
audit
to
this
Court
identifying:
(1
)
every
case
in
which
Ja
ne
Watson
is
a
signatory
on
any
filing,
(2)
any
fictious
cas
e
citations
and/or
misrepresenta
tions
of
case
ho
ldings
in
any
filing,
and
(3)
the
corrective
action
that
has
been
ta
ken
in
each
case.
All
three
attorneys
shall
certify
under
oath
that
they
revi
ewed
all
filings
and
identified
al
l
fictitious
case
citations
and/or
misrepresentations
to
the
best
of
their
ability.
This
audit
report
should
be
em
ailed
to
this
Court
at
Judge_Aycock@msnd.uscourts.gov.
Should
this
aud
it
not
be
completed
a
nd/or
be
completed
improperly,
the
Court
will
consider
the
sa
me
to
be
further
sanctionable
conduct.
12
In
light
of
the
serious
and
pro
lific
nature
of
the
offense,
the
Court
finds
these
sanctions
to
be
the
least
severe
to
accomplish
deterrence.
C
ourts
across
the
country
are
faced
with
the
arduous
task
of
upholding
judicial
integrity
in
the
age
of
AI.
Attorneys
and
pro
se
litigants
alike
are
11
For
federal
district
court
cases,
this
ma
ndate
encompasses
both
the
assigned
district
judge
and
magistrate
judge
on
each
case.
It
also
includes
all
appellate
j
udges
assigned
to
any
case
that
is
currently
pending
in
state
or
federal
court.
This
is
a
continuing
duty
as
to
all
cases
that
are
currently
pending.
12
This
audit
is
limited
to
cases
where
Jane
Watson
is
a
signatory
on
any
filing.
The
Court
recognizes,
though,
that
Norris
was
also
a
signatory
in
this
case.
However,
as
the
Court
understood
his
explanation
at
the
show
cause
hearing,
Norris
has
not
utilized
AI
in
draf
ting
legal
briefs
for
filing.
If
such
is
the
case,
the
Court
directs
Norris
to
submit
to
the
Court
an
affidavit
verifying
the
same.
If
the
Court
is
incorrect
in
that
assumption,
the
audit
requirement
is
hereby
extended
to
all
cases
in
which
Norris
has
been
a
signatory
on
any
filing
within
the
last
two
years.
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bombarding
courts
with
fictious
fi
lings
that
drain
the
Court’s
limit
ed
resources.
At
the
end
of
the
day,
it
is
not
the
Court
who
is
the
victim
but
the
peopl
e
whose
day
in
court
is
endlessly
delayed.
This
cannot
continue.
Conclusion
For
the
reasons
set
forth
above,
the
Court
issues
SANCTIONS
as
follows:
1.
Ms.
Watson,
Mr.
Watson,
and
Norris
are
ORDERED
to
provide
a
copy
of
this
Sanctions
Order
to
the
presiding
judge
in
every
pending
state
or
federa
l
case
in
which
any
of
them
are
counsel
of
record.
They
must
comply
with
this
requirement
within
30
days
of
today’s
date
and
certify
to
the
Court
that
they
have
done
so
by
filing
a
Notic
e
indicating
that
they
have
done
so
on
the
docket
within
7
days
of
completing
the
requirement;
2.
Nick
Norris
is
DISQUALIFIED
from
further
participation
in
this
case;
3.
Jane
Watson
is
DISQUALIFIED
from
further
participation
in
this
case;
4.
Jane
Watson
is
ORDERED
to
seek
withdrawal
from
any
case
where
she
appears
as
attorney
of
record
that
is
assigned
to
the
undersigned
and
shall
not
enter
an
appearance
in
any
other
case
assigned
to
the
undersigned
for
a
period
of
two
(2)
years
from
today’s
date;
5.
Louis
Watson
is
DISQUALIFIED
from
further
participation
in
this
case;
6.
The
Court
DIRECTS
the
Clerk
of
Court
to
send
a
copy
of
this
Sanctions
Order
to
the
Mississippi
Bar;
and
7.
The
Firm
is
ORDERED
to
conduct
an
internal
audit
as
described
herein
and
submit
the
ordered
information
to
this
Court
within
60
days
of
today’s
date.
This
case
is
hereby
STAYED
for
a
period
of
60
days
to
provide
Billups
an
opportunity
to
obtain
new
counsel.
The
Court
trusts
that
No
rris
will
immediately
a
dvise
Billups
of
the
disqualification.
The
Court
also
di
rects
Norris
to
provide
the
Cour
t
(via
email)
wi
th
the
contact
Case:
1:24-cv-00074-SA-DAS
Doc
#:
79
Filed:
12/19/25
20
of
21
PageID
#:
511
21
information
of
Billups
so
that,
in
the
event
he
does
not
take
action
within
60
days,
the
Court
can
communicate
with
him
directly
and
take
appropriate
action.
13
SO
ORDERED,
this
the
19th
day
of
December,
2025.
/s/
Sharion
Aycock
SENIOR
UNITED
STATES
DISTRICT
JUDGE
13
Ms.
Watson
and
Mr.
Watson’s
respective
Motions
to
Withdraw
as
Counsel
[76,
78]
are
DENIED
AS
MOOT.
Case:
1:24-cv-00074-SA-DAS
Doc
#:
79
Filed:
12/19/25
21
of
21
PageID
#:
512
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