Black v. DRS (Sept. 24, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Kenisha Black v. Mississippi DRS & Howard
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Sept. 24, 2025
Disposition
Motion Denied
KENISHA BLACK PLAINTIFF v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2723429Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D.Mississippi, Northern Division.KENISHA BLACK PLAINTIFFv.MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OFREHABILITATION SERVICES and CHRISM. HOWARD, Individually DEFENDANTSCIVIL NO. 3:23-CV-426-DPJ-ASH|Filed 09/24/2025ORDERDaniel P. Jordan III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE*1 Kenisha Black asks the Court to reconsider its Order [45]granting summary judgment. See Pl.'s Mot. [47]. The Courtdenies her motion.I. BackgroundBlack works for the Mississippi Department of RehabilitationServices (MDRS). After its Executive Director, ChrisHoward, chose to hire an African American male fora position Black wanted, she sued MDRS and Howardfor sex discrimination and retaliation under Title VII.She primarily says Mississippi law required Howard toconsider recommendations from one of his subordinates,the Director of the Office of Vocational Rehabilitation(OVR), before filling the disputed position (Director ofClient Services). See Miss. Code Ann. § 37-33-15(c) (statingOVR Director “[s]hall, with the approval of the executivedirector, recommend for appointment such personnel as maybe necessary for the efficient performance of the functions ofthe office”).In granting summary judgment to Defendants, the Courtrejected Black's statutory argument. First, the Court observedthat section 37-33-15(c) “creates a duty for the OVR Director(not the Executive Director).” Order [45] at 12. Next, theCourt cited Howard's testimony that he was unaware ofsubsection (c) and that Black offered no evidence to contradicthis testimony. Id. at 12–13 & n.2. Then the Court noted thatHoward had appointed three persons in a row—includingone woman—to the client-services position without everreceiving a recommendation from the OVR Director, who,despite subsection (c), repeatedly refused to give Howardrecommendations. Id. at 13. So even if Howard had failedto follow correct policy, that didn't imply any intent todiscriminate by sex. Id. at 13–14 (citing Turner v. BaylorRichardson Med. Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 2007)).Moving for reconsideration under Federal Rule of CivilProcedure 59(e), Black focuses on whether Howard lied whentestifying that he discovered subsection (c) during litigation.Pl.'s Mem. [48] at 1. She says the Court improperly creditedthat testimony and thus weighed the evidence. Defendantsdisagree and further contend that the statute doesn't meanwhat Black says it does. Defs.' Mem. [51] at 3. Afterfiling her motion for reconsideration, Black sought leave tofile amended supporting memoranda to correct AI-generatederrors in her briefs. See Pl.'s Mot. [54].II. Motion for Leave [54]Plaintiff's counsel admits that her opening memorandum andreply brief both contained false AI-generated content. Pl.'sMot. [54] at 1. She therefore offered corrected memorandaas substitutes, attaching them as exhibits to her motion [54-1,54-2]. Those memoranda mostly deleted references to theapparent hallucinations and substituted them with authorityshe had previously cited.Although Defendants had not yet responded to this motion,the Court docketed a text-only order suspending the briefingon it. Plaintiff's initial briefs supporting reconsiderationviolated Rule 11, so Black's counsel did the right thing by self-reporting.1 Because Plaintiff's corrected briefs added no newbasis for relief, the Court felt it was unnecessary to requireadditional briefing from Defendants. Plus, the Court did notwant Defendants to incur any additional expenses. The Courtdenies the motion [54] as moot but notes that the correctedbriefs remain in the record.II. Motion for Reconsideration [47]A. Standard*2 Rule 59(e) allows a party to move to alter or amenda judgment within 28 days, which Black did. A Rule 59(e)motion “is not the proper vehicle for rehashing evidence, legaltheories, or arguments that could have been offered or raisedbefore the entry of judgment.” Templet v. HydroChem Inc.,367 F.3d 473, 479 (5th Cir. 2004). The motion must “clearly
KENISHA BLACK PLAINTIFF v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2establish either a manifest error of law or fact” or else presentnewly discovered evidence. Ross v. Marshall, 426 F.3d 745,763 (5th Cir. 2005) (quoting Simon v. United States, 891 F.2d632, 638 (5th Cir. 1990)).Black isn't offering new evidence; instead, she argues theCourt erred as a matter of law. Pl.'s Mem. [48] at 2. “Manifesterror” means one that “is plain and indisputable, and thatamounts to a complete disregard of the controlling law.” Guyv. Crown Equip. Corp., 394 F.3d 320, 325 (5th Cir. 2004)(quoting Venegas–Hernandez v. Sonolux Records, 370 F.3d183, 195 (1st Cir. 2004)) (reviewing evidentiary ruling).B. DiscussionBlack largely revisits her summary-judgment argumentsabout Howard's credibility or augments those arguments inways she could have asserted before judgment. As Defendantscorrectly note, that is not enough to obtain relief. Defs.' Mem.[51] at 2–3 (citing Templet, 367 F.3d at 478–79). On this basisalone, the motion is denied.In any event, Black's primary point is that the Courterred in finding that she failed to create a fact questionwhether Howard lied when he testified that he did notknow section 37-33-15(c) required the OVR Director tomake a recommendation on hiring decisions. In its summary-judgment order, the Court found that Black's arguments werespeculative. Order [45] at 13. They thus fall short of cases likeRobinson v. Jackson State University,714 F. App'x 354, 360–61 (5th Cir. 2017).Also, Black has not demonstrated that the Court's constructionof the competing statutes is incorrect. Each credibilityargument Black asserts turns on whether section 37-33-15(c)limited Howard's ability to make this appointment. Yet Blackdid not address the Court's conclusion that Howard was notrestricted until she filed her reply brief. See Pl.'s Reply [52]at 2. District courts routinely “refuse to consider argumentsraised for the first time in reply briefs.” Gillaspy v. Dall.Indep. Sch. Dist., 278 F. App'x 307, 315 (5th Cir.2008)(citation omitted). Moreover, Black offers no arguments thatthe Court could properly consider under Rule 59(e). Thearguments in her reply were either asserted before judgmentor could have been. Templet, 367 F.3d at 478–79.And they do not demonstrate manifest error. Section37-33-15(c) outlines the OVR Director's authority andrequires that person to make a recommendation “with theapproval of the executive director.” Section 37-33-159 allowsthe Executive Director to fill this position without any statedlimitations. Thus, the Court still reads section 37-33-159 togive the Executive Director the authority to fill this position,even if the OVR Director refuses to make a recommendation.Section 37-33-15(c) limits the OVR Director's discretion, notthe Executive Director's. There is no authority to the contrary.Finally, Howard's uncontradicted testimony and Black'sspeculations about it were not the only reasons the Courtrejected Black's argument. The Court also concluded thateven assuming the department failed to follow the properprocedure, “[a] defendant's failure to follow its own policyis not probative of discriminatory animus in absence ofproof that the plaintiff was treated differently than othernon-minority employees.” Turner v. Baylor Richardson Med.Ctr., 476 F.3d 337, 346 (5th Cir. 2007) (quoting Upshaw v.Dall. Heart Grp., 961 F. Supp. 997, 1002 (N.D. Tex. 1997)).Here, the two previous appointments for this position weremade without an OVR recommendation. Once it benefited awoman, once a man. Black has neither addressed this holdingnor shown how the practice demonstrates discriminatoryanimus if it benefited a woman when used before.*3 To prevail at the pretext stage, Black must “producesubstantial evidence indicating that the proffered legitimatenondiscriminatory reason is a pretext for discrimination.”Outley v. Luke & Assocs., Inc., 840 F.3d 212, 216 (5th Cir.2016) (quoting Burton v. Freescale Semiconductor, Inc., 798F.3d 222, 233 (5th Cir. 2015)). “Evidence is ‘substantial’ ifit is ‘of such quality and weight that reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment might reachdifferent conclusions.’ ” Laxton v. Gap Inc., 333 F.3d 572, 579(5th Cir. 2003) (quoting Long v. Eastfield Coll., 88 F.3d 300,308 (5th Cir. 1996)). Black offers no arguments that may beconsidered under Rule 59(e) that would satisfy this burden.IV. ConclusionThe Court has considered all arguments presented. Any notspecifically addressed here would not alter the outcome.Black's motion [47] for reconsideration is denied.SO ORDERED AND ADJUDGED this the 24th day ofSeptember, 2025.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2723429
KENISHA BLACK PLAINTIFF v. MISSISSIPPI DEPARTMENT OF..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Footnotes1That said, the Court notes that Defendants signaled in their response to Plaintiff's original memorandum thatshe had cited incorrect authority. See Defs.' Mem. [51] at 4 n.1 (filed Feb. 2, 2025). Yet, Plaintiff did the samething in reply and then waited seven months to file a motion to correct the briefing. See Sept. 3, 2025 Show-Cause Order [22], Lewis v. Entergy Miss., LLC, No. 3:25-CV-323-HTW-ASH (raising use of AI-generatedcase citations by Plaintiff's counsel).End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access