Bradley v. Eichhorn (2025)

Case details
Full caption
Calvin Bradley v. Matthew Eichhorn, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2025
Disposition
Dismissed
Majority
Vascura (Justice)
CALVIN BRADLEY, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW EICHHORN, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 2625293Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D. Ohio, Eastern Division.CALVIN BRADLEY, Plaintiff,v.MATTHEW EICHHORN, et al., Defendants.Civil Action 2:25-cv-959|09/11/2025CHELSEY M. VASCURA, UNITED STATESMAGISTRATE JUDGEORDER and REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION*1 Plaintiff, Calvin Bradley, an Ohio resident proceedingwithout the assistance of counsel, sues the WashingtonCounty Sheriff's Department,1 two of its officers, and theCity of Belpre, Ohio, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violationof his Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights. Plaintiffhas submitted a request to proceed in forma pauperis. (ECFNo. 1.) The Court GRANTS Plaintiff's request to proceed informa pauperis. All judicial officers who render services inthis action shall do so as if the costs had been prepaid. 28U.S.C. § 1915(a).This matter is also before the Court for the initial screenof Plaintiff's Complaint (ECF No. 1-2) as required by 28U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) to identify cognizable claims and torecommend dismissal of Plaintiff's Complaint, or any portionof it, which is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claimupon which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relieffrom a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). Having performed the initial screen,Plaintiff MAY PROCEED on Counts I, II, III, and V ofhis Complaint against Defendants Eichhorn and Peters fordamages in their individual capacities, but for the reasonsbelow, the undersigned RECOMMENDS that the CourtDISMISS Plaintiff's remaining claims under § 1915(e)(2)(B)for failure to state a claim on which relief can be granted.I. BACKGROUNDPlaintiff alleges that on August 5, 2024, he was a passengerin a ride share vehicle that was pulled over by officers ofthe Washington County Sheriff's Department, DefendantsMatthew Eichhorn and Justin Peters, for speeding. DespitePlaintiff's assertion that he did not, as a mere passenger,wish to participate in the traffic stop, Eichhorn and Petersconducted a K-9 search of the vehicle, and the dog wasallegedly manipulated to hit on the window nearest Plaintiff.Plaintiff asserts that the dog was a marijuana-trained K-9whose use is no longer permitted after the passage of OhioIssue 2 in November 2023, which legalized possession ofrecreational marijuana.The officers then ordered the driver and Plaintiff to exitthe vehicle. Plaintiff was subjected to a soft pat down,after which one of the officers attempted a second, moreinvasive pat down, to which Plaintiff objected. Plaintiff thenattempted to exit the scene. The officers gave chase andapprehended Plaintiff, punching him multiple times in theprocess. Upon a subsequent search of Plaintiff's person, theofficers found “an illegal substance” in Plaintiff's possession.According to the docket for State of Ohio v. Bradley, 24CR 000567, currently pending in the Court of CommonPleas for Washington County, Ohio, charges of traffickingand possession of cocaine and fentanyl, as well as failure tocomply with an order or signal of police, remain pendingagainst Plaintiff.2*2 Plaintiff's Complaint advances seven counts under 42U.S.C. § 1983: (I) unlawful seizure and detention, (II)unlawful search without consent, (III) false imprisonment,(IV) racial discrimination and profiling, (V) unlawful arrestwithout probable cause, (VI) municipal liability against theCity of Belpre, Ohio, and the Washington County Sheriff'sDepartment, and (VII) unlawful search and seizure via theimproper use of a marijuana-trained K-9. Plaintiff seekscompensatory and punitive damages, attorney's fees andcosts, and declaratory and injunctive relief. (Compl., ECF No.1-2.)II. STANDARD OF REVIEWCongress enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1915, the federal in formapauperis statute, seeking to “lower judicial access barriers tothe indigent.” Denton v. Hernandez, 504 U.S. 25, 31 (1992).In doing so, however, “Congress recognized that ‘a litigantwhose filing fees and court costs are assumed by the public,unlike a paying litigant, lacks an economic incentive to refrainfrom filing frivolous, malicious, or repetitive lawsuits.’ ” Id.at 31 (quoting Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 324 (1989)).To address this concern, Congress included subsection (e) aspart of the statute, which provides:
CALVIN BRADLEY, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW EICHHORN, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2(2) Notwithstanding any filing fee, or any portion thereof,that may have been paid, the court shall dismiss the case atany time if the court determines that—* * *(B) the action or appeal—(i) is frivolous or malicious; [or](ii) fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted....28U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) & (ii); Denton, 504 U.S. at 31.Thus, § 1915(e) requires sua sponte dismissal of an actionupon the Court's determination that the action is frivolous ormalicious, or upon determination that the action fails to statea claim upon which relief may be granted.To properly state a claim upon which relief may be granted, aplaintiff must satisfy the basic federal pleading requirementsset forth in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). See also Hillv. Lappin, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010) (applyingFederal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) standards to reviewunder 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A and 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). Under Rule8(a)(2), a complaint must contain a “short and plain statementof the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed.R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). Thus, Rule 8(a) “imposes legal and factualdemands on the authors of complaints.” 16630 SouthfieldLtd., P'Ship v. Flagstar Bank, F.S.B., 727 F.3d 502, 503 (6thCir. 2013).Although this pleading standard does not require “detailedfactual allegations, a pleading that offers labels andconclusions or a formulaic recitation of the elements ofa cause of action” is insufficient. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (cleaned up). A complaint will not“suffice if it tenders naked assertion devoid of further factualenhancement.” Id. (cleaned up). Instead, to state a claimupon which relief may be granted, “a complaint must containsufficient factual matter to state a claim to relief that isplausible on its face.” Id. (cleaned up). Facial plausibilityis established “when the plaintiff pleads factual contentthat allows the court to draw the reasonable inference thatthe defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.“The plausibility of an inference depends on a host ofconsiderations, including common sense and the strengthof competing explanations for the defendant's conduct.”Flagstar Bank, 727 F.3d at 504 (citations omitted). Further,the Court holds pro se complaints “to less stringent standardsthan formal pleadings drafted by lawyers.” Garrett v. BelmontCty. Sheriff's Dep't, 374 F. App'x 612, 614 (6th Cir. 2010)(quoting Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972)). Thislenient treatment, however, has limits; “courts should nothave to guess at the nature of the claim asserted.” Frenglerv. Gen. Motors, 482 F. App'x 975, 976–77 (6th Cir. 2012)(quoting Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 594 (6th Cir. 1989)).III. ANALYSIS*3 Having conducted the initial screen of Plaintiff'sComplaint, Plaintiff may proceed on Counts I, II, III, andV of his Complaint against Defendants Eichhorn and Petersfor damages in their individual capacities. The undersignedrecommends that the remaining claims be dismissed.First, Plaintiff's claims for declaratory and injunctive relief(against all Defendants) must be dismissed. “When seekingdeclaratory and injunctive relief, a plaintiff must show actualpresent harm or a significant possibility of future harm inorder to demonstrate the need for preenforcement review.”Nat'l Rifle Ass'n of Am. v. Magaw, 132 F.3d 272, 279 (6th Cir.1997). In other words, “[p]ast harm allows a plaintiff to seekdamages, but it does not entitle a plaintiff to seek injunctive ordeclaratory relief.” Kanuszewski v. Michigan Dep't of Health& Hum. Servs., 927 F.3d 396, 406 (6th Cir. 2019). Plaintiffdoes not allege any ongoing or likely future violations of hisconstitutional rights. His claims for declaratory judgment andinjunctive relief must therefore be dismissed.Further, as Plaintiff is proceeding without the assistance ofcounsel, his claims for attorney's fees are not viable. SeeWright v. Crowell, 674 F.2d 521, 522 (6th Cir. 1982) (“a prose litigant is not entitled to an award of attorney fees under42 U.S.C. § 1988.”).Moreover, Plaintiff has not stated a claim against theCity of Belpre, Ohio. Although Plaintiff alleges that theincident underlying his claims occurred in Belpre, Ohio, theofficers involved were officers of the Washington CountySheriff's Department. Plaintiff's Complaint does not makeany allegations against the City of Belpre, its agents, or itsemployees. Any claims against the City of Belpre, Ohio, musttherefore be dismissed.Plaintiff also has not stated a claim for municipal liabilityagainst the Washington County Sheriff's Department. Tobegin, the Washington County Sheriff's Office is not anappropriate Defendant because, as a county department, it isnot sui juris—that is, it lacks the capacity to be sued. See,e.g., Carmichael v. City of Cleveland, 571 F. App'x 426, 435
CALVIN BRADLEY, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW EICHHORN, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3(6th Cir. 2014) (affirming district court's holding that sheriff'sdepartment, as arm of the county, is not sui juris). Plaintiff'sclaims against the Washington County Sheriff's Office musttherefore be dismissed.But even if the Court were to liberally construe Plaintiff'sComplaint to advance claims against Washington Countythrough its Board of Commissioners, see Ohio RevisedCode § 305.12, those claims could not survive. “[A] localgovernment may not be sued under § 1983 for an injuryinflicted solely by its employees or agents. Instead, it iswhen execution of a government's policy or custom...inflictsthe injury that the government as an entity is responsibleunder § 1983.” Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658,694 (1978); Nichols v. Wayne Cty. Mich., 822 F. App'x 445,448 (6th Cir. 2020) (“To state a municipal-liability claimunder § 1983, the plaintiff must allege the deprivation (1)of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the UnitedStates, (2) that was directly caused by a municipal policy orcustom.”) (citing Hardrick v. City of Detroit, 876 F.3d 238,243 (6th Cir. 2017)). A plaintiff may prove an unconstitutional“policy” or “custom” by demonstrating “(1) the existenceof an illegal official policy or legislative enactment; (2)that an official with final decision making authority ratifiedillegal actions; (3) the existence of a policy of inadequatetraining or supervision; or (4) the existence of a customof tolerance or acquiescence of federal rights violations.”Burgess v. Fischer, 735 F.3d 462, 478 (6th Cir. 2013) (citingThomas v. City of Chattanooga, 398 F.3d 426, 429 (6th Cir.2005)). Here, Plaintiff alleges that the Washington CountySheriff's Department is liable for its officers’ conduct, butstates only that the Washington County Sheriff's Departmentis responsible for a pattern or custom of racial profiling andillegal searches, a failure to train officers on passengers’Fourth Amendment rights, and allowing misconduct to gounchecked. (Compl., ECF No. 1-2, PAGEID #9–10.) Butthese allegations do not contain any facts on which thisCourt could rely to plausibly infer that Eichhorn's and Peters'sallegedly unlawful conduct was the result of a county customor policy. That is, “[h]e offers only...bare legal conclusionswhich the Court properly disregards.” Freeman v. Spoljaric,667 F. Supp. 3d 636, 651 (S.D. Ohio 2023) (dismissing aclaim for Monell liability due to conclusory allegations); seealso Assi v. Hanshaw, 625 F. Supp. 3d 722, 750 (S.D. Ohio2022) (dismissing a claim for Monell liability because it was“simply too conclusory to survive”). Accordingly, any claimsagainst Washington County must be dismissed.*4 Further, to the extent that Plaintiff sues Eichhorn orPeters in their official capacities, those claims also fail. A suitagainst a government official in his or her official capacityis “not a suit against the official but rather is a suit againstthe official's office.” Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491U.S. 58, 71 (1989). Thus, “an official-capacity suit is, inall respects other than name, to be treated as a suit againstthe entity.” Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 166 (1985).But, as just discussed, Plaintiff has not stated a claim againstthe relevant entities (Washington County or the WashingtonCounty Sheriff's Office). Plaintiff's official-capacity claimsagainst Eichhorn and Peters must therefore be dismissed.All that remain are Plaintiff's individual-capacity claims fordamages against Officers Eichhorn and Peters. As notedabove, Plaintiff may proceed on these claims under Counts I,II, III, and V. However, the allegations underlying Plaintiff'sCount IV, for racial discrimination and profiling, are tooconclusory to state a claim. Plaintiff alleges only thatDefendants’ conduct “constituted unlawful racial profiling”and that Plaintiff, “[a]s a Black man,” was “singled out andtargeted by Detectives Eichhorn and Peter for invasive, non-consensual searches that would not have occurred but forhis race.” (Compl., ECF No. 1-2, PAGEID #8.) Plaintiffdoes not identify the race of his ride share driver or theofficers involved. Indeed, the Complaint contains no factsrelated to possible racial profiling other than that Plaintiff isBlack. These are precisely the kind of “naked assertion[s]devoid of further factual enhancement” that do not sufficeunder Iqbal. See 556 U.S. at 678. Plaintiff's Count V forracial discrimination and racial profiling must therefore bedismissed.Finally, Plaintiff's Count VII, for unlawful search and seizureby means of improper use of a marijuana-trained K-9, mustalso be dismissed. The Court could locate no support for theinability of law enforcement officers to rely on marijuana-trained canines, even after marijuana legalization. Cf. State v.Bowen, 2023 WL 4266350, *7 (Ohio Ct. App. June 29, 2023)(rejecting a criminal defendant's argument that “because someforms and amounts of marijuana are now legal in Ohio, thesniff by Andor, a canine trained to alert to the presenceof marijuana, among other substances, did not give officersprobable cause to search the vehicle”).Plaintiff's assertions to the contrary lack merit. Plaintiffcontends that “recently, Ohio appellate courts have clarifiedthat after legalization [of recreational marijuana in Ohio viastate ballot initiative in November 2023], a K-9 alert alone
CALVIN BRADLEY, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW EICHHORN, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4cannot provide probable cause where the dog was trainedto detect marijuana.” (Compl., ECF No. 1-2, PAGEID #7.)Plaintiff cites two purported Ohio appellate court decisionsfor this proposition: “State v. Parker, 2018-Ohio-4210, 2dDist.; State v. Gonzales, 2016-Ohio-8319, 6th Dist.” Butneither of these citations lead to apposite cases, or indeed,the cases indicated by Plaintiff. 2018-Ohio-4210 is a citationto State v. Coleman, an Eighth District criminal appeal thathas nothing to do with drug-sniffing dogs or marijuana. 2016-Ohio-8319 does lead to a case titled State v. Gonzalez, but it isan Ohio Supreme Court decision, not a Sixth District decision,and again, has nothing to do with dogs or the legalizationof marijuana.3 And, perhaps more importantly, these 2016and 2018 cases can have nothing to say about the effectof a change in the law in 2023. As the use of marijuana-trained canines does not appear to be a legitimate basis forinvalidating a Fourth Amendment search, Plaintiff's CountVII must be dismissed.IV. DISPOSITION*5 Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed in formapauperis (ECF No. 1) is GRANTED. Plaintiff MAYPROCEED on Counts I, II, III, and V of his Complaintagainst Defendants Eichhorn and Peters for damages intheir individual capacities, but for the reasons above, theundersigned RECOMMENDS that the Court DISMISSPlaintiff's remaining claims under § 1915(e)(2)(B) for failureto state a claim on which relief can be granted.Plaintiff has submitted completed summons forms (FormAO-440) and a service of process by U.S. Marshal form(Form USM-285) for each of Defendants Eichhorn andPeters. (ECF Nos. 1-3, 1-4.) If Plaintiff wishes to have theUnited States Marshal effect service of the summons andComplaint on Defendants, Plaintiff is DIRECTED to submita service copy of the Complaint for each of DefendantEichhorn and Peters to the Clerk of Court. If Plaintiff does so,the Clerk is DIRECTED to issue the summons and the UnitedStates Marshal is DIRECTED to serve by certified mail uponDefendants Eichhorn and Peters the issued summons, a copyof the Complaint, and a copy of this Order and Report andRecommendation.PROCEDURE ON OBJECTIONSIf any party objects to this Report and Recommendation,that party may, within fourteen (14) days of the date ofthis Report, file and serve on all parties written objectionsto those specific proposed findings or recommendations towhich objection is made, together with supporting authorityfor the objection(s). A District Judge of this Court shall makea de novo determination of those portions of the Report orspecified proposed findings or recommendations to whichobjection is made. Upon proper objections, a District Judgeof this Court may accept, reject, or modify, in whole orin part, the findings or recommendations made herein, mayreceive further evidence or may recommit this matter to theMagistrate Judge with instructions. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1).The parties are specifically advised that failure to object tothe Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver ofthe right to have the District Judge review the Report andRecommendation de novo, and also operates as a waiver of theright to appeal the decision of the District Court adopting theReport and Recommendation. See Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S.140 (1985); United States v. Walters, 638 F.2d 947 (6th Cir.1981).IT IS SO ORDERED./s/ Chelsey M. VascuraCHELSEY M. VASCURAUNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGEAll CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 2625293Footnotes
CALVIN BRADLEY, Plaintiff, v. MATTHEW EICHHORN, et al.,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.51Plaintiff's Complaint alleges that Defendants were “Washington County Police” officers, but WashingtonCounty has a Sheriff's Department, not a police department. See https://www.washingtoncountysheriff.org/,last visited September 9, 2025.2This Court properly takes judicial notice of the state-court dockets relating to Plaintiff's state- court criminalproceedings pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201(b). Cf. Buck v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., 597F.3d 812, 816 (6th Cir. 2010) (“Although typically courts are limited to the pleadings when faced with a motion[to dismiss], a court may take judicial notice of other court proceedings without converting the motion intoone for summary judgment.”).3The Court has recently seen an influx of pro se filings relying on generative artificial intelligence (“AI”)technology. “Generative AI, at least in its current iterations, will sometimes simply make stuff up or hallucinatequotations and/or case law.” Muhammad v. Gap Inc., No. 2:24-CV-3676, 2025 WL 1836657, at *14 (S.D.Ohio July 3, 2025) (cleaned up). The Court suspects that Plaintiff's inaccurate case citations may be theresult of generative AI and CAUTIONS Plaintiff that future submissions relying on inaccurate or non-existentauthorities may be grounds for sanctions.End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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