Cabanas v. Bondi (Nov. 13, 2025)

Case details
Full caption
Virginia Montoya Cabanas v. Pamela Bondi, et al.
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
Nov. 13, 2025
Disposition
Motion Granted
Majority
Hon Charles Eskridge (J.) (unanimous Court)
VIRGINIA MONTOYA CABANAS, Petitioner, v. PAMELA BONDI,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12025 WL 3171331Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States District Court, S.D. Texas, Houston Division.VIRGINIA MONTOYA CABANAS, Petitioner,v.PAMELA BONDI, et al, Respondents.CIVIL ACTION NO 4:25-cv-04830|Filed 11/13/2025Attorneys and Law FirmsFelix Alberto Montanez, Preferential Option Law Offices,LLC, Savannah, GA, for Petitioner.Jimmy Anthony Rodriguez, Shawn David Ren, DOJ-UnitedStates Attorney's Office, Houston, TX, for Respondents.OPINION AND ORDERHon Charles Eskridge United States District Judge*1 Petitioner Virginia Montoya Cabanas is a citizen ofMexico who has lived in the United States without lawfulpermission for over twenty years. She was taken into custodyby Immigration and Customs Enforcement in June 2025,where she currently remains. Respondents are sued in theirofficial capacity as officers or employees of the United Statesand are collectively referred to as the Government.Pending is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus, by whichPetitioner challenges her detention without a bond hearing.Dkt 1. She asserts that she's entitled to such a hearing under8 USC § 1226(a), which provides for discretionary detentionduring removal proceedings.Pending also is a motion by the Government for summaryjudgment. Dkt 8. It contends that no detention hearing isrequired, because Petitioner is an “applicant for admission”under 8 USC § 1225(b)(2)(A), which provides for mandatorydetention during removal proceedings.The text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) supports the Government'sposition. As such, its motion for summary judgment isgranted, and the petition for a writ of habeas corpus is denied.1. BackgroundPetitioner Virginia Montoya Cabanas is a citizen of Mexicowho has resided in the United States since April 2001. Dkt1 at ¶¶42–43. Both she and her husband were detained byICE after a traffic stop on June 6, 2025. Id at ¶48. Petitioneradmitted to ICE Enforcement and Removal Operations that“she unlawfully entered the United States, that she did notpossess or present any valid entry documents, and that shewas not admitted or paroled into the United States.” Dkt 8-1 at¶4 (declaration of Deportation Officer Matthew Alexander).Petitioner has no criminal history and no prior encounterswith immigration officials or law enforcement. Dkt 1 at ¶¶43,47. She and her husband were living in Claxton, Georgia,at the time of her arrest. Id at ¶42. She is now detained inHouston, Texas, and her husband is detained in Bakersfield,California. Id at ¶49. And she has three children who are UScitizens, with the youngest being ten years old. Id at ¶44.The petition states that her continuing detention is “inflictingsignificant harm on her family.” Id at ¶56. Her childrenare experiencing “deep emotional distress” and “depression.”Ibid.ICE charged Petitioner with removability pursuant to 8 USC§ 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) as an alien “present in the United Stateswithout being admitted or paroled, or who arrived in theUnited States at any time or place other than as designatedby the Attorney General.” Dkt 8-1 at ¶5. The Departmentof Homeland Security also instituted removal proceedingsagainst Petitioner pursuant to 8 USC § 1229(a). Dkt 1 at ¶57.While in detention, Petitioner requested a bond hearing beforethe immigration court. Id at ¶51. The Government thereargued that Petitioner wasn't eligible for a bond hearingbecause she was subject to mandatory detention under8 USC § 1225(b)(2)(A). Ibid. Although the immigrationjudge explicitly found that Petitioner was “not a danger orflight risk,” she then further determined that jurisdictionwas lacking to redetermine custody, given reliance by theGovernment on § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Dkt 8-2 (order of IJ).This itself followed from a recent unpublished ruling by theBoard of Immigration Appeals, holding that an alien whoentered without admission or parole, despite residing in theUnited States for a decade, was an “applicant for admission”subject to mandatory detention under 8 USC § 1225(b)(2)(A).See Dkt 1 at ¶31 n 2. The BIA later issued a precedential
VIRGINIA MONTOYA CABANAS, Petitioner, v. PAMELA BONDI,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2decision to the same effect on September 5, 2025. See Matterof Hurtado, 29 I&N Decision 216 (BIA 2025).*2 Petitioner reserved her right to appeal the decision of theIJ to the BIA but then didn't do so. See Dkt 8-2 at 3 (ordernoting reservation of appeal). The deadline for appeal has nowpassed. Ibid.Petitioner is currently detained at the Houston ProcessingCenter. Dkt 1 at ¶49. She filed the subject petition for a writof habeas corpus on October 9, 2025. See Dkt 1. She statescauses of action for (i) violation of the INA, and (ii) violationof the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. Id at¶¶59–65.The Government was ordered to show cause. Dkt 3. Itcomplied and also moved for summary judgment. Dkt 8.2. Legal standard“[A]bsent suspension, the writ of habeas corpus remainsavailable to every individual detained within the UnitedStates.” Hamdi v Rumsfeld, 542 US 507, 525 (2004). “Adistrict court may grant a writ of habeas corpus if a petitioneris in federal custody in violation of the Constitution or federallaw.” Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 2025 WL 2886346, *1 (SDTex), citing 8 USC § 2241 (internal citations omitted). “If adistrict court entertains a habeas petition, then it must eitheraward the writ or order the respondent to show cause as to whythe writ should not be granted, unless it is apparent from theapplication that the petitioner is not entitled to the requestedrelief.” Ibid, citing 28 USC § 2243 (emphasis added).3. Analysisa. Exhaustion of remediesAs noted above, Petitioner preserved her right to appeal theIJ order but then didn't do so. The Government didn't initiallyraise the issue of exhaustion of administrative remedies. SeeDkt 8. But given its jurisdictional import, the Governmentwas directed to brief exhaustion at hearing in a similar casebefore the undersigned that presented the same statutoryissue. See Maceda Jimenez v Thompson et al, 4:25-cv-05026,Dkt 6 (minute entry). The Government then briefed the issuein their supplemental filing in this case. See Dkt 14 at 7–9.Petitioner responded accordingly. See Dkt 18 at 15–19.The Government contends that failure by the Petitioner toappeal the decision of the IJ to the BIA bars consideration ofher petition here. Dkt 14 at 7–9. It cites in support Fuller vRich, where the petitioner argued that administrative appealwas futile because the deadline for filing the appeal hadpassed. 11 F3d 61, 62 (5th Cir 1994). The Fifth Circuitdisagreed, finding waiver of exhaustion not justified “until[the petitioner] actually appeals” because “we do not knowwhat the appeals board will do with [petitioner's] claim, anduntil the appeals board has been given an opportunity to act,[petitioner] has not exhausted his administrative remedies.”Ibid. With reference to Matter of Hurtado, 29 I&N Decision216 (BIA 2025), the Government further argues that merelikelihood of the BIA to deny relief in reliance on that decisionis insufficient to demonstrate futility. Dkt 14 at 8–9.Petitioner maintains to the contrary that any exhaustionrequirement should be waived because (i) the BIA doesn'thave jurisdiction to adjudicate constitutional issues, (ii)appeal would be futile, and (iii) Petitioner is sufferingirreparable harm while detained that would be compoundedby delay. See Dkt 18 at 15–19.*3 It is well settled that a “person seeking habeas relief mustfirst exhaust available administrative remedies.” Hinojosa vHorn, 896 F3d 305, 314 (5th Cir 2018). But any exhaustionrequirement is prudential, as no statutory proscription iscited in this context. See Covarrubias v Vergara, 2025 WL2950096, *6 (SD Tex). And the Fifth Circuit holds thatexceptions to exhaustion are appropriate where the availableadministrative remedies are (i) unavailable, (ii) whollyinadequate, (iii) patently futile, or (iv) when a constitutionalchallenge is advanced that is unsuitable for determinationin an administrative proceeding. See Fuller, 11 F3d at 62;Garner v US Department of Labor, 221 F3d 822, 825 (5th Cir2000).The IJ here issued a decision denying custody redeterminationto Petitioner on jurisdictional grounds upon finding thatPetitioner's detention was governed by 8 USC § 1225(b)(2)(A). See Dkt 8-2 (order of IJ). Petitioner plainly had a rightto appeal that determination to the BIA. See 8 CFR 1236.1(d)(3). Her failure to pursue an available appeal does suggest afailure to exhaust an available administrative remedy.
VIRGINIA MONTOYA CABANAS, Petitioner, v. PAMELA BONDI,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3Complicating that course of action, however, is the July2025 joint policy decision by the Departments of Justiceand Homeland Security to apply § 1225(b)(2)(A) toall “applicants for admission,” including individuals likeMontoya. See Dkt 18 at 18 n 2. Petitioner argues that appeal toBIA would have been futile because the BIA operates underDOJ authority. See id at 18, citing 8 CFR § 1003.1. She furtherargues that the BIA issued a nonprecedential decision in May2025 applying the Government's interpretation of § 1225(b)(2)(A), further suggesting futility. See Dkt 18 at 18 n 3. Andthis was confirmed shortly thereafter in the BIA's precedentialdecision in Matter of Hurtado, 29 I&N Decision 216 (BIA2025), which addressed the statutory construction dispute atissue here. In sum, it held that, regardless of length of time inthe United States, immigration judges lack authority to grantbond to aliens present in the United States without admissionunder § 1225(b)(2)(A).The Hurtado decision issued on September 5, 2025. Nothingin the record suggests that the BIA would reconsider thatreasoned decision, given its recency. And even if Petitionerhad pressed an appeal to the BIA, it doesn't appear that suchdecision would be available for appeal directly to the FifthCircuit. See 8 USC § 1252(a)(1) (limiting jurisdiction ofcourts of appeals to review of final orders of removal). Aswell, it must be recognized that Petitioner here challenges herdetention on constitutional grounds. See Dkt 1 at ¶¶62–65(asserting violation of right to due process). Such challengefalls outside the jurisdiction of the BIA. Falek v Gonzales,475 F3d 285, 291 n 4 (5th Cir 2007) (explaining “there is nodispute that the BIA has no power to adjudicate constitutionalclaims”).As such, failure to appeal in these circumstances shouldn't becounted as an impermissible failure to exhaust administrativeremedies. Consideration of the merits is thus proper.b. Applicability of § 1225(b)(2)(A) or § 1226(a)The parties primarily dispute the appropriate statute by whichto measure the permissibility of Petitioner's detention pendingotherwise valid removal proceedings. The Government seeksto enforce 8 USC § 1225(b)(2)(A). Petitioner favors 8 USC§ 1226(a). As always, “our inquiry begins with the statutorytext, and ends there as well if the text is unambiguous.”BedRoc Ltd., LLC v United States, 541 US 176, 183 (2004).*4 Section 1225 governs the inspection, detention, andremoval of aliens seeking admission into the United States.Section 1225(a)(1) quite broadly defines which aliens are“applicants for admission,” stating with emphasis:An alien present in the United Stateswho has not been admitted or whoarrives in the United States (whetheror not at a designated port of arrivaland including an alien who is broughtto the United States after having beeninterdicted in international or UnitedStates waters) shall be deemed forpurposes of this chapter an applicantfor admission.Section 1225(b)(2)(A) then prescribes specific detentionrequirements, stating with emphasis added:[A]n alien who is an applicantfor admission, if the examiningimmigration officer determines that analien seeking admission is not clearlyand beyond a doubt entitled to beadmitted, the alien shall be detainedfor a proceeding under section 1229aof this title.The parties agree that this statute, if applicable, requiresmandatory detention. See Dkts 1 at ¶60 & 8 at 1.On the other hand, § 1226(a) states:On a warrant issued by the Attorney General, an alien maybe arrested and detained pending a decision on whether thealien is to be removed from the United States. Except asprovided in subsection (c) and pending such decision, theAttorney General—(1) may continue to detain the arrested alien; and(2) may release the alien on—
VIRGINIA MONTOYA CABANAS, Petitioner, v. PAMELA BONDI,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4(A) bond of at least $1,500 with security approved by,and containing conditions prescribed by, the AttorneyGeneral; or(B) conditional parole; but(3) may not provide the alien with work authorization ....The parties agree that this statute, if applicable, permitsdiscretionary detention. See Dkts 8 at 5 & 18 at 1. TheSupreme Court observes, “Federal regulations provide thataliens detained under § 1226(a) receive bond hearings at theoutset of detention.” Jennings v Rodriguez, 583 US 281, 306(2018), citing 8 CFR §§ 236.1(d)(1), 1236.1(d)(1).The Government maintains that Petitioner is subject tomandatory detention under § 1225(b)(2)(A). In its view, sheis an “applicant for admission” for the very reason that sheis an alien “present in the United States who has not beenadmitted.” Dkt 8 at 6. And under the plain text of the § 1225(b)(2)(A), such individuals “shall be detained” without bond. Idat 7–9.Petitioner argues instead that she is entitled to the bondhearing attendant to discretionary detention under § 1226(a).In doing so, she concedes that she is an “applicant foradmission” under the statute. Dkt 18 at 12. But she disputesthat she was seeking admission, given her decades-longresidence in the United States. Dkt 1 at ¶41. She furtherargues that her petition requesting construction in favorof § 1226(a) finds support in legislative history, statutorystructure, longstanding ICE practice, and what she describesas “judicial consensus” of district courts. See Dkts 1 at ¶¶ 21–41 (petition) & 18 at 2–15.Simply put, the statutory text of § 1225(b)(2)(A) governsin this case. Adopted in such conclusion is the reasoningof Judge James Wesley Hendrix in Rene Garibay-Robledov Kristi Noem, et al, 1:25-cv-00177-H (ND Tex 2025). Thestatutory definition of applicant for admission is broad and,indeed, so broad that Petitioner doesn't dispute that she issuch a person. See Dkt 18 at 12. That factual determinationitself resolves the question as to whether § 1225(b)(2)(A)applies. For example, see Digital Realty Trust, Inc v Somers,583 US 149, 160 (2018), quoting Burgess v United States,553 US 124, 130 (2008): “When a statute includes an explicitdefinition, [courts] must follow that definition, even if itvaries from a term's ordinary meaning.”*5 Attempts by Petitioner to distinguish an applicant foradmission from an alien seeking admission are unavailing.First, as Judge Hendrix observed, there is “no materialdisjunction—by the terms of the statute or the Englishlanguage—between the concept of ‘applying’ for somethingand ‘seeking’ something.” Garibay-Robledo, 1:25-cv-00177-H at 8–9. That Petitioner has resided in the United Stateswithout valid permission for years thus doesn't render §1225(b)(2)(A) inapplicable.Second, there isn't a separate concept applicable to an“arriving alien” as distinct from an “applicant for admission.”Petitioner points to regulatory language that an “arrivingalien” is defined as “an applicant for admission coming orattempting to come into the United States.” Dkt 18 at 13,quoting 8 CFR 1.2. Put differently, she says, an arrivingalien is an applicant who is doing something, such asseeking admission under § 1225(b)(2)(A). Dkt 18 at 13;for example, see Martinez v Hyde, 2025 WL 2084238,*6 (D Mass) (holding § 1225(b) inapplicable upon findingapplicant seeking admission roughly interchangeable witharriving alien). The problem with the argument, however, isthat Congress could have said that § 1225(b) applied onlyto arriving aliens if that's what was meant. But it didn't,even as three other closely related subsections did. See §1225(a)(2) (“arriving alien who is a stowaway” isn't eligibleto apply for admission); § 1225(c)(1) (referring to situationwhere immigration officer or immigration judge “suspectsthat an arriving alien may be admissible”); § 1225(d)(2) (titledwith respect to authority “to order detention and delivery ofarriving aliens”). Congress chose not to use “arriving alien”in § 1225(b)(2)(A). As such, it simply cannot be said to belimited to aliens arriving at the border.Third, legislative history certainly cannot provide reason todepart from clear statutory text. Petitioner seeks by this toargue that the structure and legislative history of § 1225(b)limits its applicability to ports of entry. Dkt 18 at 3. Shecites a conference report that putatively states, “§ 302 ‘revisessection 235 of the INA to consolidate the inspection andremoval process at ports of entry.” Ibid. Upon close check, forwhatever reason, no such quote appears to exist in the citedconference report. Regardless, upon finding that the text of astatute is unambiguous, consideration of legislative history isinappropriate. See United States v Kaluza, 780 F3d 647, 658(5th Cir 2015), citing Carrieri v Jobs.com Inc, 393 F3d 508,518–19 (5th Cir 2004).
VIRGINIA MONTOYA CABANAS, Petitioner, v. PAMELA BONDI,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.5Fourth, it must be recognized that a great many decisionsin the district courts agree with the position of Petitioner.In one of her filings, she collects thirty citations. See Dkt10 at 2–3. In another, she focuses on five for emphasis. SeeDkt 18 at 2, citing Martinez v Hyde, 2025 WL 2084238(D Mass); Lopez-Arevelo v Ripa, 2025 WL 2691828 (WDTex); Buenrostro-Mendez v Bondi, 2025 WL 2886346 (SDTex); Covarrubia v Vergara, 2025 WL 2950097 (SD Tex);Alvarez Puga v Assistant Field Office Director, Krome NorthService Processing Center, et al, 2025 WL 2938369 (SD Fla).But others have decided to the contrary, in addition to JudgeHendrix in Garibay-Robledo and the BIA in Hurtado. Forexample, see Dkts 16, 20 & 21, collectively citing VargasLopez v Trump, 2025 WL 2780351 (D Neb), Chavez v Noem,2025 WL 2730228 (SD Cal), Sandoval v Acuna, 2025 WL3048926 (WD La), and Olalde v Noem, 2025 WL 3131942(ED Mo). Until such time as the Fifth Circuit takes upthis issue and gives an authoritative construction, it remainsincumbent upon district courts to each make their own,independent assessment.*6 And last, amendment to § 1226 by the recent LakenRiley Act doesn't imply that § 1225(b)(2)(A) should be readcontrary to its clear terms. This amendment was enacted inJanuary 2025 and requires mandatory detention for alienswho are inadmissible and have been arrested for, chargedwith, or convicted of certain crimes. See 8 USC § 1226(c)(1)(E)(i)–(ii). Petitioner herself doesn't appear to raise contentionin this regard. But many of the authorities cited abovein part conclude that, if Congress intended for § 1225(b)(2)(A) to govern all inadmissible aliens, then this recentamendment is superfluous to the extent that it prescribesmandatory detention within § 1226 as to only certain criminalinadmissible aliens. For example, see Alvarez Puga, 2025 WL2938369 at *5.Such conclusion isn't warranted. It's undisputed that priorAdministrations for decades applied § 1226(a) to individualslike Petitioner, thus declining to exercise the full extentof executive authority available under the INA. See Dkt1 at ¶28. As noted, Congress enacted the Laken RileyAct in January 2025, well prior to DHS under the presentAdministration issuing guidance clarifying that “section235 of the [INA], rather than section 236”—that is, §1225, rather than § 1226—“is the applicable immigrationdetention authority for all applicants for admission.” ICEMemo: Interim Guidance Regarding Detention Authority forApplications for Admission, AILA Document No 25071607,American Immigration Lawyers Association (July 8, 2025).“When Congress acts to amend a statute, we presume itintends its amendment to have real and substantial effect.”Peavy v WFAA-TV, Inc, 221 F3d 158, 169 (5th Cir 2000),quoting Stone v INS, 513 US 386, 397 (1995). Here, atthe time of enactment, the Laken Riley Act did havesuch effect, given that it required mandatory detention forcriminal, inadmissible aliens who had not been subject to it—under either § 1225 or § 1226—by longstanding practiceof prior Administrations. But this means only that Congressdetermined to narrow aspects of the discretion available toany Administration prioritizing removal proceedings toward§ 1226. It doesn't follow that the Laken Riley Act undercutsthe more fulsome, executive authority that Congress providedto exist independently under the text of § 1225(b)(2)(A).Simply put, amendment by the recent Laken Riley Act to§ 1226 isn't superfluous. Beyond that, and regardless, theSupreme Court holds, “Redundancy in one portion of a statuteis not a license to rewrite or eviscerate another portion ofthe statute contrary to its text.” Barton v Burr, 590 US 222,239 (2020). As noted by Judge Hendrix in Garibay-Robledo,“the canons of statutory construction should only be used toresolve remaining ambiguity, not to inject it where it does notexist.” 1:25-cv-00177-H at 9 (internal quotations omitted).The text being clear, it is appropriately applied as written.As summarized at the outset, the personal and familycircumstances of Petitioner are no doubt sympathetic. But§ 1225(b)(2)(A) by its terms applies to her and supportsthe position of the Government as to mandatory detention.Inquiry beyond that, as to whether such position is the best orwisest use of executive enforcement priorities, or whether itis in line with the priorities of prior Administrations, simplyisn't the remit of an Article III court. It is instead the subjectof legislation and the result of elections, both of which haveconsequences.c. Putative violation of due processThe claim by Petitioner for violation of her right to dueprocess briefly alleges, “The government's detention of [her]without a bond redetermination hearing to determine whether[s]he is a flight risk or danger to others violates her right to dueprocess.” Dkt 1 at ¶65. No other briefing of a constitutionaldimension appears in her other filings. See Dkts 5, 10, 11, 18& 19.
VIRGINIA MONTOYA CABANAS, Petitioner, v. PAMELA BONDI,..., Slip Copy (2025) © 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.6*7 This assertion appears to present nothing beyond thelarger contention as to the relevant and applicable statute toapply. That has been resolved above. And no assertion ismade that the application of 8 USC § 1225(b)(2)(A) is itselfunconstitutional, if determined to be the correct statute.It should be noted that the undersigned inquired at hearingas to the requirement within § 1225(b)(2)(A) that an“examining immigration officer” determine that “an alienseeking admission is not clearly and beyond a doubt entitledto be admitted.” The Government was directed to identifywho that particular officer was in this case, while alsoexplaining more generally the duties of that officer. See Dkt13 (minute entry). This was intended to ensure that Petitionerhad received the process to which she was entitled even under§ 1225(b)(2)(A).The Government subsequently explained that the INA defines“immigration officer” as “any employee or class of employeesof the [INS] or of the United States designated by the AttorneyGeneral ... to perform the functions of an immigrationofficer.” Dkt 14 at 2–3, citing 8 USC § 1101(a)(18).Implementing regulations further define an “immigrationofficer” to include “deportation officers.” See 8 CFR §1.2. The Government thus contends that the supervisorydeportation officer who gathered information about Petitionerafter her arrest and determined that she wasn't admissiblequalifies as the “examining immigration officer.” Dkt 14 at3. It also provides proof as to the identity of such officerand performance of such duty. See Dkt 15 at 1 (sealedsupplemental brief).Petitioner argues to the contrary that the “examiningimmigration officer” referenced in § 1225(b)(2)(A) is limitedto Customs and Border Protection officers conducting“face-to-face assessment of an applicant for admission ata port of entry.” Dkt 18 at 7. But the statutory text,regulations, and relevant authority don't impose such anarrow meaning on the word “examine.” And nothing bydefinition pertains to ports of entry alone. Petitioner observesthat the ordinary dictionary meaning of the examine is to“inspect or investigate closely.” Id at 15; see New OxfordAmerican Dictionary (3rd edition 2010) (defining examineas to “investigate thoroughly”). But such definition doesn'tsuggest that an “examining immigration officer” excludesfrom its ambit a supervisory deportation officer charged withgathering information and making determinations regardingadmissibility of an individual. The natural reading of thestatute instead dictates the contrary.In short, the Government provided the process to whichPetitioner was due under § 1225(b)(2)(A). As such, and aspleaded, the claim with respect to violation of due processfails.4. ConclusionIt's noted that several abnormalities appear in the responseby Petitioner to the supplemental brief of the Government.Dkt 18. For example, the brief states that the Governmentcited three cases that aren't actually cited. See id at 4–5.Substantive inaccuracies also exist in both quotations andcharacterizations of cited case law. See id at 3–4. Thismay be related to the use of artificial intelligence products.Whatever the cause, counsel is simply cautioned to ensurethat all citations are checked and all arguments are properlysupported prior to filing.*8 The petition for writ of habeas corpus by PetitionerVirginia Montoya Cabanas is DENIED. Dkt 1.The motion for summary judgment by the Government isGRANTED. Dkt 8.A final judgment will enter separately.SO ORDERED.Signed on November 13, 2025, at Houston, Texas.All CitationsSlip Copy, 2025 WL 3171331End of Document© 2025 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
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