Chumpitaz-Morales v. Bondi, No. 25-9527 (2026)

Case details
Full caption
Flora Chumpitaz-Morales v. Pamela J. Bondi
Country
United States
Jurisdiction
Federal
Decided
2026
Disposition
Petition Denied
Panel
Carson (Circuit Judge); Baldock (Circuit Judge); Kelly (Circuit Judge)
FLORA CHUMPITAZ-MORALES; D.S.T.C., Petitioners, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.12026 WL 382144Only the Westlaw citation is currently available.United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.FLORA CHUMPITAZ-MORALES; D.S.T.C., Petitioners,v.PAMELA J. BONDI, United StatesAttorney General, Respondent.No. 25-9527|February 11, 2026(Petition for Review)Before CARSON, BALDOCK, and KELLY, Circuit Judges.ORDER AND JUDGMENT*Bobby R. Baldock Circuit Judge*1 Flora Natali Chumpitaz-Morales, proceeding pro se onbehalf of herself and her minor daughter, petitions for reviewof the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)’s final order ofremoval. We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a) anddeny the petition.I. BackgroundMs. Chumpitaz-Morales and her daughter, both natives andcitizens of Peru, entered the United States without inspectionin August 2022. After an Immigration Judge (IJ) foundthem inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), theyapplied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protectionunder the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Another IJ helda hearing on January 29, 2024, at which Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales represented herself and testified. The IJ summarizedher testimony as follows:Since 2017 [Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales] ... engaged in a veryeconomically successful salon business with her father asa partner in Comas, Lima, Peru. Her father was very activein their community. Additionally, he was the driver forthe mayor. He died from COVID-19 on March 8, 2021.In 2018, while her father was still living, their businesswas threatened for money in exchange for the business tofunction free of harassment. Her father paid the money.She and her father had thought that the threats were dueto his job as a driver for the mayor. However, the threatscontinued even after his death. Since his death she hasreceived two threatening notes. Sometime in February2022, two armed men, whom she had not seen before,entered her business and demanded more money. She didnot pay them. She instead went to the police and reportedthe incident.... The police said they would look into it, butshe never checked back with them. She did not know whothese men were or their greater affiliation if they had any,such as gang, organized crime or police. She believes thesepeople are criminals.She believes her business was targeted because it is in adense commercial zone and it is successful, although otherbusinesses were also harassed for money. She believes themen just want money. [Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales] has notattempted to relocate in Peru because she does not have theability to do that, and she believes she would be harassedanywhere she goes in Peru. Neither she nor her child havebeen physically harmed.She fears the mayor and intimated that he is corrupt. [She]did not name any government officials by name who hadthreatened or harmed her or were specifically involved inthe threats she received.R. at 57.The IJ found petitioners ineligible for asylum, and thereforealso found they had not met the higher burden of proof forwithholding of removal. The IJ also denied their applicationfor CAT protection. Petitioners appealed to the BIA, whichupheld the IJ's rulings and rejected petitioners’ claim theywere denied due process. They now petition for our review ofthe BIA's decision.1II. Standard of Review*2 Because a single BIA member provided a reasoneddecision in a brief order under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(e)(5), wereview the BIA's decision but may consult the IJ's morecomplete explanation of the BIA's grounds. Jimenez v. Bondi,156 F.4th 1037, 1044 (10th Cir. 2025). We review legaldeterminations de novo and findings of fact for substantialevidence. O.C.V. v. Bondi, 153 F.4th 974, 982 (10th Cir. 2025).Under the substantial evidence standard, “findings of fact
FLORA CHUMPITAZ-MORALES; D.S.T.C., Petitioners, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.2are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would becompelled to conclude to the contrary.” Id.III. DiscussionA. Due ProcessInitially, we are not persuaded by petitioners’ claim theywere denied due process. Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales states shesuffered a panic attack during her hearing before the IJand argues that her mental distress and language barriersprevented her from effectively representing herself. However,she does not contest the BIA's observation that in earlierproceedings the IJ had “properly informed [her] of her rightto obtain counsel at her own expense and provided her with alist of free and low-cost legal providers,” and also “providedcontinuances for [her] to secure counsel and to prepare herasylum application.” R. at 4. We therefore affirm the BIA'sruling that Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales “was provided sufficienttime and opportunity to find legal representation.” Id. Shestates she could not afford to pay an attorney. But althoughrespondents in removal proceedings have the right to berepresented by an attorney, “there's no mechanism for thegovernment to pay the attorney. So noncitizens must hiretheir own attorneys.” Chavez-Govea v. Bondi, 147 F.4th 1231,1235 (10th Cir. 2025) (citation omitted).Moreover, to prevail on their due process claim, petitionerswould need to “identify evidence that the IJ should haveelicited that would have altered the BIA's finding[s].”Matumona v. Barr, 945 F.3d 1294, 1304 (10th Cir. 2019).Petitioners have not identified any testimony or evidencethey would present, beyond what the IJ already elicited andconsidered. We therefore reject their due process claim.B. AsylumTo be eligible for asylum, applicants must demonstrate “‘that they are unable or unwilling to return’ to the applicant'scountry of nationality ... ‘because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, religion,nationality, membership in a particular social group, orpolitical opinion.” Miguel-Peña v. Garland, 94 F.4th 1145,1159 (10th Cir.) (emphasis added) (quoting 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 545 (2024)). “Thesefive categories are called protected grounds.” Id. (internalquotation marks omitted). To be eligible for asylum, an“applicant must establish [a protected ground] was at leastone central reason for the persecution.” Jimenez, 156 F.4th at1046 (internal quotation marks omitted).The BIA, upholding the IJ's findings, concluded petitionerswere ineligible for asylum because they were “targeted forextortion simply for financial gain and not on account of ...family membership or any other protected ground.” R. at 4–5. This is a factual finding reviewed for substantial evidence.Miguel-Peña, 94 F.4th at 1159.2*3 Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales maintains she and her daughterwere targeted because of her father's opposition to politicalcorruption. However, when the IJ asked why she thoughtthey were targeted, she testified it was because her businesswas in “a very commercial district,” and “yielded a lot,”and the individuals who threatened her “saw that we weredoing well.” R. at 161. She also testified that while otherbusinesses were also extorted, hers was targeted more because“there was more income coming into mine.” Id. at 165l.Similarly, she testified that she believed the extortion wouldcontinue if she relocated within Peru because “this is goingon everywhere,” and “[her] business was very fruitful.” Id. at166. This testimony provides substantial evidence supportingthe IJ's and BIA's finding that petitioners were targeted forfinancial reasons, not on account of any protected ground.Petitioners dispute this conclusion but do not cite anyevidence to support their claim that they were targetedbecause of the anti-corruption activity of Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales's father. We “make some allowances” for pro separties, but “cannot take on the responsibility of serving as thelitigant's attorney in ... searching the record.” Garrett v. SelbyConnor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).We therefore will not search for evidence Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales has not herself identified. And even assuming thereis evidence that could support a different finding, “[i]t is notour prerogative to reweigh the evidence, but only to decide ifsubstantial evidence supports the IJ's or the BIA's decision.”Jimenez, 156 F.4th 1046 (brackets and internal quotationmarks omitted).Because the finding that petitioners were targeted forfinancial reasons was “supported by reasonable, substantialand probative evidence considering the record as a whole,”O.C.V., 153 F.4th at 984 (internal quotation marks omitted),we treat it as conclusive, id. at 982. We therefore upholdthe BIA's determination that petitioners are ineligible
FLORA CHUMPITAZ-MORALES; D.S.T.C., Petitioners, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.3for asylum. See Miguel-Peña, 94 F.4th at 1159 (statingpersecution is not on account of a protected ground “[w]herethere is no evidence that the persecutor would be hostiletoward the targeted individuals absent their financial ...motives” (internal quotation marks and brackets omitted)).C. Withholding of Removal“The burden of proof for withholding of removal is higherthan for asylum and requires the applicant to prove a clearprobability of persecution on account of a protected ground.”Escobar-Hernandez v. Barr, 940 F.3d 1358, 1362 (10thCir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omitted). Thereforepetitioners’ “failure to meet the standard of proof for [their]asylum application forecloses [their] withholding-of-removalclaim premised on the same facts.” Id.D. CAT ProtectionWe also uphold the BIA's denial of CAT protection. “Article3 of the Convention Against Torture prohibits the return ofan alien to a country where it is more likely than not that[s]he will be subject to torture by a public official, or at theinstigation or with the acquiescence of such an official.” Cruz-Funez v. Gonzales, 406 F.3d 1187, 1192 (10th Cir. 2005). TheBIA concluded Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales had not established“any connection between the allegedly corrupt mayor andthe extortion and threats she received,” and therefore had notshown it is more likely than not she or her daughter wouldbe “tortured by or at the instigation of or with the consent oracquiescence ... of a public official.” R. at 5.Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales has not meaningfully challenged thatruling in this appeal. She asserts the BIA did not thoroughlyaddress her CAT application, and she maintains she wastargeted because of her father's opposition to the mayor'salleged corruption. But she does not cite any evidence to showshe or her daughter are more likely than not to be tortured ifreturned to Peru.IV.*4 For the reasons above, we deny the petition.3Entered for the CourtAll CitationsNot Reported in Fed. Rptr., 2026 WL 382144Footnotes*After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has determined unanimously that oral argumentwould not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. SeeFed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R.34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is notbinding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It maybe cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1.1Although she was represented in her appeal to the BIA, Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales proceeds without a lawyerin this appeal, as she did before the IJ. We construe her filings liberally, but we do not act as her advocate.See Garrett v. Selby Connor Maddux & Janer, 425 F.3d 836, 840 (10th Cir. 2005).2The IJ found petitioners “did not establish past persecution.” R. at 60. The BIA concluded they “had notmeaningfully challenged” that conclusion and “therefore waived that issue.” R. at 4. Because we agree withthe government that this issue was not exhausted before the BIA, and because petitioners’ brief does notchallenge the BIA's conclusion that it was waived, we do not consider whether petitioners suffered pastpersecution. See Miguel-Peña, 94 F.4th at 1155 (“We enforce the exhaustion requirement [of 8 U.S.C. §1252(d)(1)] by declining to consider the unexhausted issue.”); see also Bronson v. Swensen, 500 F.3d 1099,1104 (10th Cir. 2007) (“[T]he omission of an issue in an opening brief generally forfeits appellate consideration
FLORA CHUMPITAZ-MORALES; D.S.T.C., Petitioners, v...., Not Reported in Fed.... © 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.4of that issue.”). Our discussion is therefore addressed only to whether they have a well-founded fear of futurepersecution.3Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales's brief misrepresents the holdings of several cases it cites. We suspect this may bedue to use of an “artificial intelligence” (AI) product (e.g., ChatGPT, Microsoft CoPilot) which “hallucinated”the cases’ purported holdings. See Jones v. Kankakee Cnty. Sheriff's Dep't, --- F.4th ---, 2026 WL 157661,at *2 (7th Cir. Jan. 21, 2026) (defining “a so-called AI ‘hallucination,’ ” as “a circumstance where an AI largelanguage model generates an output that is fictional, inaccurate, or nonsensical”).We may sanction parties who make such misrepresentations. See, e.g., Grant v. City of Long Beach, 96F.4th 1255, 1257 (9th Cir. 2024) (dismissing counseled appeal because of fabricated citations); 10th Cir.R. 46.5(B), (C). The government does not request sanctions here; it points out just one of the problematiccitations and understates the issue as only a “misplaced” reliance on authority. Response. Br. at 30 n.2. Wewill not sanction Ms. Chumpitaz-Morales. But parties who use AI products should know they can and do“hallucinate” legal citations, including (as we suspect happened here) by adding citations to cases that bearno relationship to the propositions for which they are cited. “[A]ll litigants—represented and unrepresented—must read their filings and take reasonable care to avoid misrepresentations, factual and legal.” Jones, ---F.4th at ---, 2026 WL 157661, at *3.End of Document© 2026 Thomson Reuters. No claim to original U.S. Government Works.
ProvenanceKnow exactly where this document came from.Members see the sourcing behind every authority on DocPost — so you can check the record yourself and cite with confidence.Request access